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REPORTING GOEBBELS IN TRANSLATION: A STUDY OF TEXT AND CONTEXT

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PhD

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis has been composed by me, that the work herein is mine and has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification except as specified.

Edinburgh, 28th April 2014

Elisabeth Anita Möckli

ABSTRACT

In its function as a mediating body between the political decision-makers and the population, the media have the potential to influence the public opinion and subsequently, policy making. Representations of political discourses are opinion-shaping instruments and often not mere reflections of a given reality; they incorporate implicit and explicit, conscious and unconscious evaluations. In cross-cultural contexts where information travels across languages the media are highly dependent on translation. Despite its central role, media translation as part of the political process has only recently gained visibility in Translation Studies (TS) and remains widely neglected outside the discipline. Current research in TS often prioritises either the textual analysis or, more recently, the identification of the shaping factors in the news production process, and often fails to address diachronic aspects.

This thesis investigates the translations of Goebbels' speeches as published in the French and British press during the interwar period. It combines a synchronic and diachronic textual analysis, inspired by CDA with an in-depth study of context which draws on socio-historical research and the analysis of archival material. Thereby, the thesis is able to link the textual makeup to a wide variety of socio-political and historical variables via the concepts of 'framing' and 'agenda-setting'. In doing so the thesis demonstrates on the one hand, how translation can function as a means of discourse mediation and, on the other hand, it provides evidence that ideology and political expediency alone cannot explain all textual changes introduced by the translator-journalists. Moreover, describing the development of the media images not only allows to add a translational perspective to the reception of the Third Reich but also contributes to a better understanding of the varying influence of contextual factors.

The results of the diachronic analysis show that throughout the interwar period the British media published very little about Goebbels and, up until late in 1938, reports focused on the peaceful intentions he expressed. In contrast, Goebbels was frequently reported on in France and the regime was early on represented as an aggressor. Whilst trends in the quantity mirror the differing economic conditions of the newspaper markets, the quality, i.e. the actual realisation, of the media images seems to be a reflection of the differing socio-political positions of France and the United Kingdom after WW1. The development of the images clearly illustrates that the political ideology of appeasement was finally overridden in the UK in 1938 when political expediency forced the government to take a different course of action. However, the study of the editorial correspondence of the *Manchester Guardian* brings to light that the mosaic of factors influencing the news production process is more complex. The intervention of the involved governments, personal convictions of the foreign correspondents and the editors, spatial and temporal restrictions, issues of credibility, etc. all impacted on the particular make-up of the media texts. The synchronic textual analysis, on the other hand, reveals that the range of framing devices through which the media images were established was largely determined by text type conventions. The strategies applied range from selective-appropriation of text, repositioning of actors and labelling, to audience representation. The analysis clearly demonstrates that intersemiotic translation, i.e. the representation of the speech context, is equally important as inter- and intra-lingual instances of translation.

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This winter I received a letter from my 92 year old grandmother that ended with the words: “I hope I will still be around to congratulate you on your degree”. Mind, my grandmother is in the best of health and still drives her own car (sometimes over her own dog) and to the present day I am still half convinced it was a ‘hint’ that I should speed up my work. Eight months later it is time to thank all those people who have helped me on this long, sometimes rocky but mostly amusing, eye-opening and enriching journey.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Critical Discourse Analysis	CDA
Descriptive Explanatory Translation Studies	DETS
Discourse Historical Approach	DHA
Descriptive Translation Studies	DTS
Great War	WW1
National Socialist People's Party	NSDAP
National Socialist Regime	NS-Regime
Second World War	WW2
Source Culture	SC
Source Text	ST
Target Culture	TC
Target Text	TT
Visible Translation-Import-Flow	VTIF

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INTRODUCTION

1 RESEARCH TERRITORY AND GAP

Since their birth nearly a century ago the mass media have captured the interest of politicians and scholars alike. They are praised by some as the ‘Fourth Estate’, a quasi-political but independent institution and hence a guarantor of democracy and freedom, and demonised by others as an instrument of propaganda in the hands of dictators and capitalist markets. This continued preoccupation is rooted in the shared belief that the mass media have the power to mould public opinion and subsequently politics.

Politics is indeed of paramount importance for society as a whole but also for each individual. It constitutes a space where different social groups discuss norms, values and beliefs in order to ‘define’ how society might best be organised. Within democracies, what is agreed on, ideally by a majority, will later on be implemented by the state and its institutions. Politics, however, cannot be carried out without language and many political actions are performed through discourse. The products of these political discourses are generally binding and entitle the members of a given society to particular rights and simultaneously subject them to particular obligations.

Discourses foster certain ways of speaking and thinking and exclude others. Thereby they determine how certain issues are perceived and influence subsequent reactions (Landwehr 2006:109). It is here that the power of discourse, of political discourse in particular, lies: the more successful a social group is in ‘convincing’ others of its views, the more influence it can exert. It is within this context that the mass media assume their powerful position in the political realm. They provide society with information about politics but also select *which* aspects to present and *how* to present them. This has a considerable impact on their reception.

At the height of the Cold War in November 1956, one of Nikita Khrushchev’s many remarks, namely “We will bury you”, was quoted numerous times in the mass media (Kelly and Zetzsche 2012: 36). This caused a public uproar in the Western world as it was represented and perceived as a threat directed against the capitalist nations and thus refuelled atomic anxieties. Several decades later, however, criticism questioning the ‘appropriateness’ of the translation has surfaced. Had Khrushchev really meant to threaten the West with this statement? Was it a mis-translation? Or a contextually inappropriate literal rendering, as some scholars claim (Krauss and Morsella 2000:4)? We all consume different types of media

on a daily basis and thereby learn about political events which took place in other, distant regions of the world. What few people think of when they see the statements of foreign politicians is that they are not reading what was originally said but translations of these utterances. Yet, as the above example aptly demonstrates, which political statements are rendered, and how, entail far reaching consequences.

Translation as a cultural practice only ever hits the media headlines when something has ‘gone wrong’ but is in reality an omnipresent part of, even a pre-condition for intercultural political media discourse to take place. However, the role translation plays in the media production, distribution and reception processes has gained systematic scholarly attention within Translation Studies only in the past fifteen years and remains widely neglected outside the field. Bassnett and Bielsa argue that one reason for this might lie with the fact that the international journalist simultaneously acts as the translator (2009: 63). The journalistic and the translational tasks are so closely linked that they can hardly be kept apart (*ibid.*) and examined separately.

So, what is ‘translation’ in the context of intercultural political media discourse? Within a given society a large number of political events take place at any given time. The international journalists (or journalist-translators as I prefer to call them) single out certain events in their host countries and report on them for their audience at home. These political events consist of oral and/or written texts but also of event contexts and instances of non-verbal communication such as audience reactions and are of course embedded in the broad cultural and linguistic environment of the host country.

When the journalist-translators draw up their reports for the newspaper company which employs them, at least two translational processes take place. On the one hand, instances of non-verbal communication are translated into a linguistic form as part of a newspaper article. This is akin to a reversed intersemiotic act of translation which Jakobson defined as “an interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of non-verbal sign systems” (2000:114). Simultaneously, the oral and/or written text(s) are, through a process of interlingual translation (*ibid.*), sometimes referred to as ‘translation proper’, transferred into the same article. Both the intersemiotic and the interlingual translation remain partial in the sense that they are unable to render each verbal or non-verbal aspect of the SC event for the TT reader.

These partial translations are then re-configured or re-contextualised in the newspaper article (TT), and of course also within the discourse(s) of the receiving culture. In this regard the representation of what I have called ‘event context’ plays an important role since it is often

assumed that these representations are to a certain extent factual and objective. The aforementioned scholarly debate, which argues that the rendering of Khrushchev's statement had been contextually inappropriate, in fact claims that it is this re-contextualisation which was faulty because the translator-journalist mediated the process linguistically but not socio-culturally – or at least not correctly. The TT audience, so they argue, was unaware of the implied cultural reference, i.e. Marx's theory which propagates the inevitable prevailing of communism over capitalism (Krauss and Morsella 2000:4). The translation was therefore misleading and it would have been more appropriate to render the statement as "we will be present at your burial" which is less 'threatening' since it does not imply that the communist Soviet Union will take action against the West but would just wait for 'nature' to take its course (*ibid.*).

Without engaging in a debate on whether the translation proposed by the scholars was more 'appropriate', this example highlights several important aspects with regards to translation in the context of the mass media. Media translation involves several selection processes (i.e. the selection of events and the selection of linguistic and semiotic aspects of these events) which determine what will and will not be translated for the target audience. Moreover, the (de-)selection and the re-contextualisation within the media text and within the wider discourse are socio-culturally mediated and determine the linguistic output, i.e. the makeup of the media text. What media research has shown then is that the makeup of the media texts and larger translational mediation patterns on the discourse level shape the reception of political SC event(s) and subsequently affect political actions. Research on media translation has examined both the comparative analysis of contemporary media texts and, more recently, the translation production process including contextual variables and agents that impact on it. Most studies have focused on texts that are full-text inter-lingual translations (which actually constitute a minority) and little is known about how translation has mediated intercultural political media discourse in historical contexts.

One political event that has not only changed the lives of the generations who experienced and witnessed it, but which still continues to shape the world we live in, is the Second World War (WW2). Its study is an important part of most European and North American educational syllabi, and literary, historical, popular-scientific, as well as cinematic works related to the topic attract large public and scholarly audiences. Within current political debates about the treatment of minorities in democratic states references to this global conflict and its consequences are central.

Research within Translation Studies on WW2 has either focused on how literary works were reshaped in translation so as to fit in with the National Socialist ideology (e.g. Kohlmayer 1994, Sturge 2004, van Linthout 2012) or on how Holocaust testimonials were shaped through translation and interpretation (e.g. Hirsch 1997, Boase-Beier 2011, Davies 2008, 2011). However, little research has been conducted into the translation of the political discourse of the NS-Regime into other languages. Although the political discourse of the Third Reich presumably influenced the course of the events leading up to the outbreak of the war, to my knowledge, only Baumgarten (2009) has investigated the phenomenon. In light of their important socio-political role in the European context, the political media discourse of France and the United Kingdom in the years up to the WW2 appears to be a worthwhile object of study.

2 RESEARCH AIMS AND QUESTIONS

Paul Joseph Goebbels, the German Minister of Propaganda and Enlightenment, was a political key figure in the National Socialist Regime and contributed largely to its ‘success’. His speeches are showcases of the political discourse of this totalitarian government and were extensively quoted in the French and British print media. The present thesis studies the representations of Goebbels’ speeches in French and British newspapers of the inter-war period and the role translation played in their construction. To this end, it combines a synchronic and diachronic textual analysis with an in-depth study of context which draws on socio-historical research and the analysis of archival material. Thereby, this thesis is able to link the textual makeup, via the concepts of framing and agenda setting (defined in section 2.4), to a wide variety of socio-political and historical variables.

This PhD thesis aims to (A1) add a translational perspective to the reception of the National Socialist Regime in France and the United Kingdom during the inter-war period, (A2) contribute to a better understanding of how translation mediates intercultural political media discourse in texts where interlingual and intersemiotic translation as well as journalistic writing are interwoven and (A3) to draw attention to socio-political factors impacting on this mediation in a historical context. These three foci are reflected in the following tripartite research question:

(R1) How was the National Socialist Regime represented in the French and British media between 1935 and 1939, (R2) how did translation contribute to the construction of these media representations and (R3) what are the contextual factors that impacted on the translation process and thus on the media images?

The following subordinate research questions are designed to divide the overarching research question into more manageable units:

(Q1) How often were (parts of) Goebbels' speeches translated for the French and British media and which speech topics did they cover?

(Q2) Which speech passages were translated (inter-lingual translation) by the different newspapers and how were they re-contextualised?

(Q3) Which aspects of the event contexts were represented in the target texts and how was the non-verbal communication of the event audience translated (intersemiotic translation)? How did these aspects impact on the re-contextualisation of the selected speech passages?

(Q4) How was the socio-economic situation during the inter-war years and what political ideologies dominated the European context? How did this influence the translation process?

(Q5) What were the institutional, professional, and also individual-dependent factors that characterised the situations of the newspaper companies and how did this affect the translation process?

(Q6) How did the identified media images affect the reception of the NS-Regime in the UK and France?

In addressing these questions, I will be using an adapted version of the descriptive-explanatory methodology for translation studies suggested by Calzada Pérez (2001). For Q1-Q3, the first and descriptive step of the methodology will be applied. Questions Q4-Q5 are investigated when relating the identified translation patterns to contextual variables at the second and explanatory step of the methodology. Question Q6 is examined at the explorative step of the analysis which, based on agenda-setting research, allows the building of hypotheses regarding the relation between media images and their reception.

Q1 assesses the translation-import-flows with reference to Goebbels' speeches. To this end, methods from agenda-setting research to measure the media agenda will be employed. The results will be synchronically and diachronically compared between different newspapers and between the two nations. Q2 on the one hand explores which arguments of Goebbels were translated, and whether they were simply re-stated, or else challenged or accepted. It is assumed that this provides cues as to the underpinning ideologies. On the other hand, the (de-)selection of text passages will also be studied in relation to particular media text types.

It is expected that the text type not only influences the quantity of translated speech passages but also the variety of available framing strategies. Q3 is mainly concerned with patterns of representations of the non-verbal communication by the speech audiences but also accounts for depictions of the speech location and the atmosphere of the event. It is argued that instances of intersemiotic translations of non-verbal communication in combination with speech event representations impact on the framing of the translated speech sections. Q4 relates the patterns of (de-)selection at the discursive level to the broad historical and ideological context. This analysis presumes that ideologies are best observed in argumentative structures and by investigating how different argumentative structures interact on the discursive level. Q5 addresses the relationship between institutional and journalistic constraints and the media production process. It also accounts for beliefs and preferences of the agents in this relationship. To this end, the editorial correspondence of one newspaper is by way of example studied. Finally, Q6 builds, based on agenda-setting research, and the results from the diachronic analyses on the discursive level, hypotheses regarding the level of awareness of the French and British public with regards to the increasing threat posed by the National Socialist Regime.

3 SCOPE

Temporal and spatial restrictions have imposed certain limitations on the present thesis. Firstly, in order to create a manageable corpus, only six newspapers have been searched for relevant data and the time period has been restricted to the five years prior to the outbreak of the war. The newspaper selection represents a cross-section of the French and British newspaper markets, and the time period appears to have been formative in terms of the perceptions of the Third Reich. Secondly, the corpus was further delimited for the in-depth framing analysis presented in Chapter 6 to increase the comparability of the data. Only those events which led to at least four media texts are examined. Thirdly, the case study which investigates factors impacting on the news production process accounts only for the *Manchester Guardian*. Since the analysis reflects on the working conditions of the foreign correspondents in Germany, it can be assumed that many observations apply for all the journalists who worked in the same environment and much will be learnt about the personal motivations of the *Manchester Guardian* staff. Finally, the agenda-setting analysis focuses on the measuring of the media agenda, which implies that statements regarding the effects of the media images and translation on the TCs remain hypothetical.

The following list of the 24 speech events which led to at least four reporting media texts is provided as a first point of orientation. The ‘STs’ have mainly been recruited from the newspaper *Völkischer Beobachter*. On one occasion a propaganda pamphlet has been included in the analysis (March 1936) and on another occasion (June 1937) a speech transcript has been used. The focus of the comparison lies on the media texts, the ‘STs’ are only used secondarily. A full list of all the media texts collected within the present thesis is provided in the appendix.

Date	Speech Title in German (Völkischer Beobachter)	Speech Title in English (my translations)
08/01/1935	Reichsminister Dr. Goebbels eröffnet die Saarausstellung in Berlin	Reich Minister Dr Goebbels opens the Saar exhibition in Berlin
16/01/1935	Reichsminister Dr. Goebbels zum deutschen Siege an der Saar	Reich Minister Dr Goebbels on the German victory in the Saar
03&4/02/1935	Die Partei gestaltet das Leben der Nation	The party shapes the life of the nation
02/05/1935	Die Kundgebung der deutschen Jugend	The rally of the German youth
01/07/1935	<i>No ‘ST’ available. Goebbels mainly talks about the ban on Jewish/Arian marriages.</i>	
18/01/1936	<i>No ‘ST’ available. Goebbels talks about the need for colonies, the right of rearmament and the League of Nations.</i>	
12/03/1936	Gefolgschaft Deutschland (additional ‘ST’: Sonderlieferung des Aufklärungs- und Rednermaterials der Reichspropaganda der NSDAP, Reichswahlkampf 29. März 1936)	Fellowship Germany (Special delivery of educational and speech material of the Reich propaganda of the NSDAP, Reich election campaign 29 March 1936)
11/09/1936	Der Bolschewismus muss vernichtet werden, wenn Europa gesunden soll	If Europe is to recover, Bolshevism must be destroyed
28/11/1936	Kunstbericht statt Kunstkritik	Art report instead of art criticism
14/02/1937	Großmacht Deutschland als Friedensgarant	The great power Germany as a guarantor of peace
29/05/1937	<i>No ‘ST’ available. Goebbels talks about the Church conflict.</i>	
11/09/1937	<i>No ‘ST’ available. Goebbels talks about Bolshevism in Spain.</i>	
6/11/1937	Dr. Goebbels über die politische Lage:	Dr Goebbels on the political situation:

	Die Ziele des Nationalsozialismus werden verwirklicht – Zug um Zug	the aims of National Socialism are being accomplished – step by step
24/02/1938	<i>No 'ST' available. Goebbels talks about the Anschluss of Austria.</i>	
07/04/1938	Reichsminister Dr. Goebbels sprach in Hannover	Reich Minister Dr Goebbels spoke in Hannover
29/09/1938	<i>No 'ST' available. Apparently a confidential speech in a private environment. Mainly the French press reports about an ultimatum imposed on Czechoslovakia.</i>	
11/11/1938	Empörung über die Bluttat: Aufruf des Reichsministers Dr. Goebbels an die Bevölkerung - Neue gesetzliche Regelung der Judenfrage angekündigt	Outrage over the bloody deed: Appeal of Reich Minister Dr Goebbels to the population – New legal regulation regarding the 'Jewish question' announced
14/11/1938	Alle jüdischen Geschäfte in kürzester Zeit deutsch	All Jewish businesses within the shortest time [to be] German
20/11/1938	Dr. Goebbels im Sudetenland	Dr Goebbels in the Sudetenland
06/03/1939	Die erste Reichsmesse Großdeutschlands	The first Reich fair of Greater Germany
20/04/1939	Der Name Adolf Hitler ist für die Welt ein politisches Programm	The name Adolf Hitler is a political programme for the world
18/06/1939	Danzig ist deutsch! (Two speeches, only one report which mixes the two in the <i>Völkischer Beobachter</i> .) (additional 'ST': Speech transcript published in Helmut Heiber's collection of Goebbels speeches)	
19/06/1939		
23/10/1939	Jetzt hat der Angeklagte Winston Churchill das Wort!	The accused Winston Churchill now has the floor!

TABLE 1: SPEECH EVENTS

4 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

The first chapter provides information about the historical backdrop against which the production, transmission and reception of the media translations of Goebbels' speeches will be analysed. It describes the socio-economic and political situation of Europe during the inter-war period and chronologically outlines the political events that preceded the outbreak of WW2. A definition of the concept of 'political discourse' is offered and political speeches are introduced as a specific genre of this discourse type. Based on this, the political discourse of the National Socialist Regime is described with a strong focus on political speech events.

Goebbels' speeches in particular are then investigated, outlining their characteristics in terms of style and content.

Chapter Two presents the theoretical framework that underpins the present research project. It outlines the main features of translation within the mass media, presents existing research in the field, and aligns itself with previous media translation research which draws on CDA. Based on the assumption that ideologies play an important role in the political realm, and thus in political media discourse, the chapter investigates the notion of political ideology, its structures and functions. Additionally, the broad ideological families which populated Europe in the 1930s are briefly outlined. The chapter then critically discusses research in CDA and explains how previous criticism directed at this research approach will be addressed. Finally, agenda-setting and framing are introduced as two media-studies approaches which can enhance the three-level methodology for DETS (Calzada Pérez 2001) applied within this thesis.

Chapter Three deals with methodological and data-related issues. The research design applied to the textual and contextual analysis will be explained, and justified with reference to the research questions and the theoretical framework: namely, the impossibility of a coupled-pair alignment, the inadequacy of the term 'translation shifts,' and the notion of causality. Moreover, the chapter provides a detailed description of the data selection and collection protocols, and their implications with regards to the results of the corpus analysis. Finally, the research design is presented in detail. The three-level methodology for DETS is enhanced with agenda-setting and framing, and applies the context triangulation suggested by the DHA. In this regard the importance of the case study is established, and finally, a practical tool is introduced for the conduct of the proposed research.

Chapters Four to Six present the results of the analysis. In the first analytical chapter a contrastive overview of the media images in the French and British press is provided. Based on the results of the media-agenda analysis hypotheses as to differences in levels of awareness between the French and the British public, and also within the targeted audiences, can be offered. The results of the media-agenda analysis, which investigates the visible translation-import-flows diachronically, are also set in relation to the selected speech topics; thereby topic preferences among the newspapers and between the two nations can be tracked. Moreover, the chapter also investigates what types of arguments – originally present in Goebbels speeches – were selected by the different newspapers and how they were re-

contextualised. The emerging patterns are then related to the political ideologies presented in Chapter Three.

Chapter Five outlines the findings of the case-study analysis which explores the editorial correspondence between the *Manchester Guardian* editor and his foreign correspondents based in central Europe. The chapter examines the history of the newspaper and introduces the relevant key figures and their personal convictions and beliefs. Furthermore, the influence of the NS-Regime on the press output of France and the United Kingdom is discussed. Finally, based on the examination of primary sources, the complex mosaic of factors that impacted in various ways on the news production and translation processes is reconstructed.

By drawing on Baker's framing categories (2006: 112 ff.), Chapter Six explores how translation contributed to the construction of the media images of the Third Reich in various media text types. One focus lies on selection and de-selection patterns of quotes and their re-contextualisation in media texts. The chapter also investigates patterns of intersemiotic translation and how they re-contextualise in combination with event context representations the products of the interlingual translation processes in the media texts. By relating the textual observations back to previous results regarding the contextual factors it is possible to argue why certain changes in the TTs might have occurred.

The conclusion then draws together the results of the different chapters and evaluates their main contributions to the general understanding of how translation mediates intercultural political media discourse and the impact of socio-cultural factors on this process. This section will also assess the effectiveness of the proposed methodology and implications thereof for the validity of the results. Finally, the section will suggest avenues for future research.

1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

*“But whoever closes his eyes to the past becomes blind to the present.”
Richard von Weizsäcker (my translation)ⁱ*

This chapter provides the historical background necessary to fully appreciate the production, transmission and reception of the French and British translations of Goebbels’ speeches. Section 1.1 outlines the socio-economic and political situation of inter-war Europe with particular attention to Germany, France and the United Kingdom. Section 1.2 provides a definition of the concept of ‘discourse’, explores the notion of ‘political discourse’ and introduces political speeches as a part of political discourse. Section 1.3 then investigates the political discourse and the political speeches under the NS-Regime. The focus of section 1.4 lies on Goebbels’ speeches. His oratory style and the characteristics of the content and style of his speeches are outlined. Finally, section 1.5 draws together the different leads of the previous sections and sums up the most important points.

1.1 EUROPE BETWEEN THE WARS

This section aims to paint a general picture of the European situation after WW1 thereby shedding light on the differences between the foreign policy and the public opinion in France and the United Kingdom with respect to the rise of the NS-Regime. This section only provides a brief overview and is limited because it focuses on Germany, France and the United Kingdom. Therefore it cannot do justice to the situation of other nations. Firstly, section 1.1.1 outlines the main mechanisms introduced in the *Treaty of Versailles* to ensure lasting peace; secondly, section 1.1.2 describes the implications of the increasingly strong communist and fascist movements as well as the shortcomings of the *Treaty of Versailles*; and finally, section 1.2.3 presents the main political events preceding the outbreak of WW2 which influenced the foreign policy of France and the United Kingdom towards the NS-Regime.

1.1.1 THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

After four years of fighting, WW1 ended in November 1918, when it became clear to the German government that the war was lost. It sought the assistance of the United States, assuming that the 14-Points-Speech of Wilson would be applied, in order to come to a sustainable armistice settlement (Henig 1995: 11). On the home front, this defeat came as a great shock. The German population had continually been informed about the successes of the troops, the army had not been defeated and no allied soldier had set foot on German territory (Joll 1973: 237). The German defeat also gave way to the *German revolution* which

eventually resulted in the transformation of the monarchist state into a democratic republic in 1919. The members of the Social Democratic Party, who participated instead of the monarch in the armistice negotiations, later became known within Germany as the ‘November Criminals’, accused of having prevented the German “army from winning the glorious victory so nearly within its grasp” (Henig 1992: 4). This - for the German people - incomprehensible surrender and the subsequent unfavourable armistice agreement gave rise to the infamous ‘stab in the back legend’ which was frequently referred to in the NS speeches. Few amongst the German population ever accepted the defeat and this was to become a considerable liability (Henig 1992: 4). Twenty-seven nations participated at the *Paris Peace Conference* from January to June 1919 which eventually led to the signing of the *Treaty of Versailles* (Cohrs 2006: 53). However, it was mainly dominated by the five powers of the United Kingdom, France, the United States, Italy and Japan of which the last three were to withdraw early from the conference (Henig 1995: 13). Its main aim was to guarantee lasting peace and stability within Europe. However, opinions on how to reach this goal were widely divided; especially between France and the United Kingdom as will be outlined in section 1.1.2 (Thomson 1966: 616).

The terms of the treaty meant substantial losses of territory for Germany and the incorporation of large numbers of German native speakers into the newly-constituted states of Poland and Czechoslovakia was hard to accept and would not be left unchallenged (Cohrs 2006: 60). However, many of these German minorities had never belonged to the German Empire - as people were often led to believe by the Nazi leaders - but had been minorities within other states. Furthermore, the industrially highly important Rhineland was demilitarised and occupied by allied troops so as to function as insurance against future German aggression (Cohrs 2006: 55). War reparations were to be paid to the victorious powers and substantial limitations of military forces were proposed (Thomson 1966: 628). What probably weighed hardest upon Germany was the ‘war guilt clause’ which attributed the responsibility for WW1 to Germany alone (Joll 1973: 277). The terms of the treaty were, and are, not considered by all historians to be unusually harsh. However, Germany was very successful in advertising precisely this, and especially in Britain and the United States a feeling of guilt towards Germany started to grow (Joll 1973: 279). Amongst other factors, this perception of the treaty would cause reluctance in Britain to impose sanctions upon Germany as a reaction to the numerous breaches of the treaty terms that were to come (Joll 1973: 279).

Mainly on the initiative of the US president Woodrow Wilson a *League of Nations* was created which “would operate as a loose flexible organisation of member states, pledging themselves to follow a number of set procedures in dealing with international crises” (Henig 1995: 15). Thereby, the *League of Nations* was meant to guarantee peace within and outside Europe as sanctions could be taken by its member states in case of unprovoked aggression. To minimise the potential effects of an armed conflict the disarmament of all member states was envisaged and promoted (Joll 1973: 276). High hopes were held for this organisation. However, the United States - which started pursuing an isolationist policy only five months after the *Paris Peace Conference* - ironically never ratified the treaty and did not join the *League of Nations* (Joll 1973: 280). Therefore, France, which had insisted on separate agreements of military assistance with the United States and the United Kingdom in the case of German aggression, failed to obtain these guarantees (Thomson 1966: 673). France wanted absolute security to precede disarmament and she consequently refused to undertake any further steps in this respect (*ibid.*). The French fear of differing interests paralysing the decision-making within the *League of Nations* materialised largely in the 1930s. Although the *League of Nations* failed to prevent acts of aggression among its member states, it “established itself as an international organization capable of resolving disputes between minor powers and promoting a wide range of humanitarian and economic activities” (Henig 1995: 46).

1.1.2 NEW ORDER IN DANGER: 1920 – 1930

Although the *Treaty of Versailles* had set up mechanisms to provide stability and peace in Europe, it suffered a number of shortcomings. A major problem left unsolved was the situation in Eastern Europe where several new states had been established. These young nations encountered numerous economic and political problems which “kept them weak and sapped the foundations of territorial settlement, leaving it open to challenge in the 1930s” (Henig 1995: 34). Furthermore, the *Locarno Treaty* (1925) failed to guarantee the same security for the borders of these Eastern nations as it did for the borders between Germany, France and Belgium because it assigned a lower status to them (Thomson 1966: 676). The National Socialist expansionary policy would focus on territory in Eastern Europe to increase *Lebensraum* (living space) (*ibid.*). Furthermore, the fragmentation of the formerly powerful Habsburg Empire left central Europe exposed to any Soviet expansionist ambitions (Thomson 1966: 634). This fear had been a cause for concern in central Europe for centuries and apprehension only increased after the breakdown of the tsarist state caused by the communist revolution (*ibid.*). The NS-Regime, which would later promote itself as a bulwark against ‘Bolshevism’, profited greatly from this persistent fear.

A considerable drawback to the *Treaty of Versailles* was, on the one hand, the disappointment of Italy as regards the territorial compensation it had expected for its participation in WW1 and the growing lack of interest in the European situation on the part of Japan and the United States. On the other hand, the two major powers left to implement the terms of the treaty, France and the United Kingdom, seemed to increasingly disagree on how this task should best be fulfilled (Henig 1992: 7). After WW1 the British government appeared to be mainly interested in stabilising its economic situation to maintain its leading position in the world (*ibid.*). Its vast colonial Empire, the source of British prosperity, became increasingly fragile and demanded military commitment (Thomas 1996: 15). Furthermore, as financial resources were already stressed and public opinion in the UK favoured spending on necessary social changes (such as the introduction of pensions), it was impossible to increase the budget allocated to the army (*ibid.*). Hence, the United Kingdom could not simultaneously maintain its colonial Empire and risk having to engage in potential conflicts on European mainland. In addition, many British politicians regarded the *Treaty of Versailles* as unfair towards Germany and they did not share to the same extent the French view that Germany might become a substantial threat to European security again (Thomas 1996: 8-9). Therefore, it was widely agreed that war should be avoided by appeasing Germany rather than keeping it in check by strictly implementing the terms of the treaty (Henig 1992: 7).

In France, the 'German problem' was considered from a completely different perspective. Many of the battles of WW1 had been fought on French (and Belgian) territories which had entailed massive destruction and loss of civilian population (Joll 1973: 282). In contrast, Germany had not been invaded and most of its industry was still intact. This subsequently led to ill feelings amongst the French population towards the former enemy and it was agreed that Germany should pay for all the damage it had inflicted upon France (Joll 1973: 275). In this matter, the British opinion tended more towards stabilising the German economy by keeping war reparation payments reasonably low, since Germany had been one of Britain's main trading partners and it was hoped she would become that again (Henig 1992: 7). Furthermore, with its industry still intact and a population that, even after the territorial revisions of 1919, significantly exceeded the French, France expected Germany to recover at a high speed. It was feared that Germany, should its aspirations not been tamed by the allied forces, would embark on a war of revenge mainly directed at France (Joll 1973: 275). Therefore, France desperately tried to ensure her own security by seeking stronger, more reliable agreements than the one it had with Britain with other European states, based on mutual military assistance (Thomas 1996: 120 ff.). The allies France acquired would not

prove strong enough to withstand the Nazi regime and it is often argued that “the failure of the architects of the 1919 peace settlement to complete their work on an agreed basis in the decade after 1919 was one of the major factors contributing to the outbreak of war just twenty years later” (Henig 1995: 49).

The newly established peace in Europe was also threatened by the unstable economic situation in which most European countries found themselves after WW1. To finance warfare France and Britain had taken up substantial loans from home investors and the United States, and these consumed up to one third of their budgets (Henig 1995: 7). The world market had developed without European involvement so that many of the European countries were overtaken by other non-European nations (Thomson: 1985: 601). Additionally, the United States insisted that the pre-war gold standard must be reached before any further credit could be granted and, partly in consequence of this, “violent short term currency fluctuations” (Henig 1995: 8) occurred which aggravated the precarious situation. Subsequently, most governments had to cut back on spending and this often engendered serious social effects (Henig 1995: 8). These cuts in social provision provoked numerous clashes between the working class and the aristocracy and “traditional elites in Britain, France and throughout Europe felt their power and position threatened by the revolutionary forces unleashed by the war” (Henig 1995: 8). Although loans from the United States to central European countries helped these economies to partially recover, they were by no means back to the pre-war standard and were profoundly affected when the New York stock market collapsed in 1929 (Thomson 1966: 680). Europe plunged again into a deep depression which aggravated the already existing social problems. The crisis, caused by overproduction, challenged the concept of the ‘self-regulating markets’ in capitalist countries (Thomson 1966: 682). It was no longer possible to believe that maximum production and the abolition of scarcity were the ultimate foundations of prosperity since Europe for the first time experienced “poverty admits plenty” (Thomson 1966: 697). Mass unemployment and growing economic inequality haunted Europe. An atmosphere of psychological insecurity, and the mere struggle for survival, led in many countries to even more radical upheaval amongst the population. Many people in powerful positions feared that the working class could take the communist revolution in Tsarist Russia (1917) as an example and turn against the establishment, and indeed a number of communist uprisings took place within Europe. Furthermore, the leaders of the Third International did not hide their intention to carry the revolution across national borders (Henig 1992: 8). Consequently, the fear of a Bolshevik revolution grew amongst capitalist governments. However, the increase in communist supporters was not the only effect of the *Great Depression*. The most detrimental

consequence, as might be argued today, was the intensification of nationalist feelings, which in some countries gave way to the establishment of fascist regimes as in Italy or Germany (Thomson 1966: 672). Democratic/capitalist countries would soon be caught up in this ideological polarisation in which some would feel right up to the outbreak of WW2 that fascism represented the lesser evil (Henig 1992: 8).

The most important milestone set in the 1920s to guarantee European security was the *Treaty of Locarno*, signed in October 1925 (Joll 1973: 289). France, Germany and Belgium agreed to mutually respect their national borders, and Italy and Great Britain acted as guarantors, committed to providing military assistance in case of a violation of the treaty (Thomson 1966: 674). Furthermore, France signed a separate agreement with the two strongest Eastern European states, Poland and Czechoslovakia, assuring mutual assistance in case of German aggression (Thomson 1966: 674). A result of the ‘spirit of Locarno’ was Germany’s admission to the *League of Nations* (Joll 1973: 290).

1.1.3 LANDMARK EVENTS ON THE ROAD TO WAR: 1930 – 1939

All attempts to fight the effects of the *Great Depression* on an international level had failed, liberal democracies and capitalism offered no solutions, and each state found itself facing the crisis alone (Thomson 1966: 707). To react effectively to the emerging economic and social problems, governments soon realised that a certain degree of “authoritarianism” and the abolition of “normal parliamentary procedures” were necessary (Thomson 1966: 703). Given these economic and political challenges it is not surprising that most European countries experienced a rise in extremist left and right-wing movements (*ibid.*). In France for instance the *Popular Front* was formed, uniting left-wing and moderate forces in response to increasingly violent fascist riots, whereas in Spain the discontent of the right-wing parties with the moderate government eventually led to the outbreak of the Civil War (Thomson 1966: 710).

The crisis did not spare Germany and was aggravated by the withdrawal of US financial help, so that the situation quickly deteriorated. The agricultural sector was badly hit by falling prices, unemployment rose dramatically and an atmosphere of fear and desperation spread through all classes (Joll 1973: 331). It was precisely in these years that the National Socialist German Worker’s Party (NSDAP) came to power and some historians argue that Hitler’s tremendous success was largely engendered by the effects of the *Great Depression* (Henig 1995: 10). In the two years that followed Hitler’s nomination as Chancellor in January 1933, the NSDAP consolidated the regime by maintaining and increasing the “mass support, while at the same time demonstrating the weakness” of the government of the

Weimar Republic “by sending Storm Troopers on to the streets to beat up their opponents” (Joll 1973: 335). When the Reichstag was set on fire during the election campaign in 1933 (allegedly a communist conspiracy), Hitler issued “an emergency decree suspending basic rights for the duration of the emergency”, and this decree was never revoked during the Nazi regime (Henig 1995: 13). Hitler held the power firmly in his grasp and managed to stabilise his regime. Similar to what happened in Italy and the Soviet Union, potential opponents were eliminated in Germany. For instance, Röhm, a moderate Nazi, died in the *Night of the Long Knives* in June 1934. Many thousands who would also be declared state enemies would suffer a similar fate (Thomson 1966: 719).

In October 1933 Germany withdrew from the *Disarmament Conference* and soon after from the *League of Nations*, claiming that the other member states had failed to keep the mutual promises of disarmament (Henig 1992: 20). This increased once again the French fear of a German war of revenge. Whilst the UK still refused to provide any substantial guarantees for French security, France, from 1929 onwards, invested much of its military budget in the building of the Maginot defence line and concentrated on reaffirming her treaties with her Eastern allies, which provoked strong disapproval from the UK since it was not thought to be wise to make Germany feel ‘encircled’ (Thomas 1996: 13). At the beginning of 1935 it became evident that Germany had started an extensive rearmament programme and Hitler openly boasted about the strength of the German air force (Henig 1995: 20). Despite the fact that this constituted a gross violation of the *Treaty of Versailles* and without consulting France, Great Britain concluded a naval treaty with Germany ‘limiting’ the size of both countries’ fleets (Thomson 1966: 733). Alienated, France started to seek stronger allies in Italy (Stresa Conference April 1935: GB/I/F) and the Soviet Union through the Franco-Soviet Pact (Thomas 1996: 19). The reintroduction of general military conscription and increased rearmament in Germany went unsanctioned by the *League of Nations* (Henig 1995: 20).

When Italy started the *Italo-Ethiopian War* in October 1935, which violated the terms set by the *League of Nations*, Britain ostensibly pressed for action to appease public opinion at home, all whilst knowing that it would not insist on intervention. This was opposed by France which did not want to lose its ally Italy (Henig 1992: 23). The sanctions eventually implemented proved to be too weak to force Italy to back down. As in 1933, when no action was taken against the Japanese invasion of China, the *Italo-Ethiopian War* revealed the weakness of this institution, with member states reluctant to take any military action (Thomson 1966: 731). The Franco-Soviet pact was ratified in February 1936 and Germany

used it as an excuse for the *remilitarisation of the Rhineland* (Henig 1992: 24). Since this presented such an imminent threat to the French security, it could have been expected that the United Kingdom and France would intervene with a strong hand. However, the British government had signalled previously its readiness to discuss the rearmament of the Rhineland and although it was not pleased by Hitler's 'unilateral military action' it did not see the need to intervene. France on the contrary "was unprepared to take military action and unwilling to act alone" (Henig 1995: 25), claiming that the French military was solely aimed at defence. In both countries, public opinion strongly favoured keeping peace at all costs, although the underlying reasons for this wish were different (Henig 1992: 25). Some historians argue that the failure to take action at this point helped open up the way for Hitler's expansion plans and consequently for the outbreak of WW2 (Henig 1995: 25 and Giro 2005: 75 ff.). Apparently, "the [German] officers in operation, it is now known, carried sealed orders to withdraw at once if they met with French resistance" (Thomson 1966: 734).

In July 1936 the *Spanish Civil War* broke out after a revolt of conservative generals against the elected Republican government. However, there was unexpected and widespread resistance and by the end of 1937 the situation was effectively a deadlock. It was for this reason that "the extent of foreign help became decisive" in gaining the upper hand (Thomson 1966: 716). Whilst Britain and France, and hence the *League of Nations*, declared themselves neutral regarding this conflict, Germany supported the right-wing revolt by providing the Falangists with equipment, and Italy eventually sent troops (Thomson 1966: 718). Similarly, the republicans received help from communist quarters. General Franco declared victory in March 1939 and established his dictatorship. This would eventually seal "the alliance of fascism", the so called '*Rome-Berlin-Axis*' in October 1936 (*ibid.*). In addition, Italy joined the *Anti-Comintern Pact* at the end of 1937 – an existent pact between Germany and Japan (*ibid.*). With Italy firmly on its side, Hitler proceeded to conduct the long-desired '*Anschluss*' of *Austria*. This was met with little resistance from Austria's weak government which could not expect any help from outside (Henig 1995: 33). Political resistance was soon silenced, and for Germany the latest territorial acquisition meant material gain, improvement of her strategic position and strengthening of national self-confidence (Thomson 1966: 743). Again, no sanctions were imposed.

Only in 1937 the French and much more so the British governments started to take the threat presented by the aggressive fascist dictatorships seriously and initiated extensive rearmament programmes (Thomson 1966: 736). France continued to concentrate on its Maginot line, and this would prove to be "a disastrously mistaken defensive doctrine" which eventually

“contributed to the demolition of peace in Europe” (Thomson 1966: 737). The UK feverishly worked on building up its military forces. Simultaneously, both countries pursued a policy that has become known as ‘*appeasement*’ (*ibid.*). It is not entirely clear whether the aim was to gain time to build up military strength or whether the governments were convinced that by granting the Nazi regime “timely and reasonable concessions” the Reich would be satisfied and no longer seek to embark on a war (Thomson 1966: 738). Fuelled by NS propaganda, demands to become part of the German Reich, or at least gain independence, became more intense in the Sudetenland in 1938, but such demands were refused by the Czech government (Henig 1992: 32). Although this first crisis passed without provoking a German invasion, Hitler made his intentions very clear (Henig 1992: 32). The UK tried to mediate between Czechoslovakia and Germany. In September Chamberlain convinced the Czech government that “any districts in Czechoslovakia with a German majority which opted for self-determination should be peacefully transferred to the German Reich” (Henig 1995: 33). But once this agreement was obtained, Hitler wanted more which led to the immediate occupation of these territories by German troops (Henig 1992: 34). This resulted in the meeting of the four powers Germany, Italy, France and Great Britain (Thomson 1966: 747). The *Munich Agreement* was reached on the 30 September, adhering to almost all of Hitler’s demands, robbing Czechoslovakia of substantial territory including her own ‘Maginot line’ and leaving the country thus exposed to any further attack (*ibid.*). France and the UK not only talked Czechoslovakia into surrendering to German demands but also actively helped to destroy one of their strongest allies which further strengthened the German forces (Thomson 1966: 378). Although there was a general relief at having avoided another war, public opinion changed as people realised how much Hitler had gained and how much they had conceded (Thomson 1966: 748). After German troops invaded the remaining part of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, the United Kingdom and France started renewing their guarantees of assistance to the states most likely to be attacked next, but it was by now too late to prevent war. In August 1939, the *German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact* was made public to everyone’s surprise. The German Chancellor now felt secure enough to take his next step. On September 1 his troops invaded Poland and two days later Britain and France in turn declared war on Hitler’s regime. WW2 had begun.

1.2 POLITICAL DISCOURSE

Section 1.1 has outlined the different socio-political positions of France and the United Kingdom after WW1 and also delineated the major political events leading up to WW2. The objective of section 1.2 is to provide a first theoretical backdrop against which the political

speeches of Goebbels and the French and British media discourses reporting them can be examined. Because section 1.3 will outline the characteristics of Goebbels' speeches this section needs to be positioned in front of Chapter Two which is dedicated to the presentation of the theoretical framework. Firstly the concept of discourse is investigated. Moreover a working definition of the concept is provided in relation to the material analysed within the present thesis; secondly, a cursory outline of what constitutes 'politics' is presented; thirdly, the notion of 'political discourse' is explored. In addition, this section explains when a discourse can be classified as 'political' and why the material analysed within the present thesis is part of political discourse(s). Finally, the political speech as a genre is introduced.

1.2.1 DISCOURSE

As will be outlined and justified in section 2.3 and 3.1, this thesis draws theoretically and methodically on CDA. Fairclough and other scholars representing this approach see discourse as socially determined language use, i.e. language use as governed by underlying social conventions (Fairclough 1989: 22). In turn, discourse is then assumed to have social effects (Fairclough 1989: 23). In this respect discourses do structure our reality (Killian 2004: 61) and constantly form and reform the objects of which they speak (Foucault 1972: 49 in Mills 1997: 15). Before investigating this further, a working definition of the discourse concept within this thesis is needed.

According to Kilian, Foucault sometimes refers to discourse as all written and oral language (2004: 62). In other instances he perceives discourse as all statements surrounding a specific topic. This then allows for the classification into different discourse types like 'academic discourse' or 'political discourse' and can even be narrowed down into increasingly smaller subdivisions – up to the point where a single text or speech is designated as discourse. Obviously different discourse types can then overlap with each other. Within the discourse of climate change it will be possible to discern statements that treat the political or ecological dimensions of the problem and therefore simultaneously belong to all those respective discourses. Hence, different discourse types form a complicated multi-dimensional, ever changing cluster where each discourse interferes with, overlaps, integrates and sometimes distinctively excludes other discourses and takes up different positions within the system of discourses. The objects of study of this thesis are the French and British media texts reporting about Goebbels' speeches and Goebbels' speeches as part of the NS propaganda. Within this study discourse is defined as an entity above oral and written text-level (see section 3.1.4). Regarding the French and the British media texts I will refer to discourse as all media texts collected for the agenda setting and framing corpus (see section 3.2.4)

surrounding a particular speech event. I will make specific references to this discourse level by describing it, for instance, as “*the French and British media discourse regarding the Rhineland remilitarisation*”, etc. It is clear that there are French and British media texts from newspapers other than the ones selected for this study which also report about the same speech event but they are not included in this definition. I will refer to the *French and British media discourse about the NS-Regime* when speaking about all the French and British media texts that I have collected for the agenda setting and the framing corpus. As regards Goebbels’ speeches I will refer to all the speeches collected and those not collected within the present thesis as “*Goebbels’ discourse*” but also see them as part of the wider *National Socialist discourse* and therefore refer to them as such.

I will now return to the issue of discourse being determined by social conditions and, in turn, having social effects. When applying this discourse concept to politics it should be noted that “the situational, institutional and social contexts shape and affect discourse, and, in turn, discourses influence social and political reality. In other words, discourse constitutes social practice and is at the same time constituted by it” (Wodak *et al.* 1999: 9). Regarding the impact of discourse upon society, Foucault describes discourse as a productive force in the sense that language does not only describe reality but also creates it (Kilian 2004: 64). Landwehr explains that discourse can be defined through its negative characteristic, which is that particular discourses exclude certain possibilities of speaking, thinking and acting (2006: 109). However, these same discourses allow and establish a particular view of the world thereby creating ‘realities’. What is and is not promoted as a reality is subject to rules. Thus, the underlying questions of how the ‘legitimate definitions’ of concepts and their linguistic definitions within a society are established, and by whom, need to be investigated (Landwehr 2006: 112). Most scholars taking a discourse-analytical approach agree that the answer to these questions can only be found when analysing power relations within and between societies and the struggle over what perception of reality becomes or is dominant is essentially a political one.

1.2.2 POLITICS

This section sketches a cursory outline of politics to provide a basis on which to define ‘political discourse’. The term ‘politics’, and consequently the adjective ‘political’, has a rather broad sense, and a large number of normative and descriptive definitions of ‘politics’ exist. They range from seeing politics as a “market-place in which people pursue their interests” by “maximising their benefits and minimising their costs” (Leftwich 2004: 7) to

seeing it as an expression of class struggle. However, there is some common ground: there appears to be an “overriding concern of those, who study politics, and that is the concern with power, political power and its effects” (Leftwich 2004: 19). Political systems are “part of, or subsystems of, a social system” (Berg-Schlosser and Stammen 2003: 32). These systems are closely linked to the question of power and of “legitimate physical coercive power” (Berg-Schlosser and Stammen 2004: 32) in particular. Easton describes politics as decision-making systems whose decisions are pivotal since they are concerned with the distribution of goods. The distribution is ‘authoritative’ since it usually has to be accepted. Deviant behaviour is often met with sanctions and these apply to all members of a given society (Berg-Schlosser and Stammen 2004: 33). Taking this away from an economics-coloured point of view it may be argued that “politics is that form of human action, which aims to establish and implement regulations and decisions (that is a general binding force) within and between groups of people” (Patzelt 2007: 23). According to this definition a broad spectrum of human activities could be seen as political – the discussion or handling of certain topics within families, sports clubs, etc. Indeed any person can become a political actor and every topic within a society can become politicised (Schäffner 2004: 119). Therefore politics penetrates the public and private spheres of society (Leftwich 2004: 10). Furthermore, this definition implies that since these actions are concerned with the establishment and implementation of generally binding regulations and decisions, they involve “all activities of conflict (peaceful or not), negotiation and co-operation” (Leftwich 2004: 15). It should be noted that “all actors act within a particular context of constraint and opportunity” (Leftwich 2004: 7), and are subsequently affected by their social contexts and, in turn, have effects upon this context. However, “the whole discipline of political science is the answer to such a question” (van Dijk 1998: 15) as to what politics actually is.

1.2.3 DEFINITION OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE

“Politics cannot be conducted without language” (Schäffner 2004: 117) and in fact “much political action and participation is accomplished by discourse and communication” (van Dijk 2002: 203). This section aims at providing a description and a broad definition of political discourse. Moreover, the classification of the material analysed within the framework of this study as political discourse is justified.

If politics is seen, as suggested in section 1.2.2., as a decision-making system in which almost any person can become a political actor, and if we further assume that almost any topic can become politicised, we can agree with the following statement:

Political discourse is not primarily defined by topic or style, but rather by who speaks to whom, as what, on what occasion and with what goals. In other words, political discourse is especially ‘political’ **because of its functions in the political process** (van Dijk 2002: 225, my emphasis).

When judging whether an oral or written text falls into the category of political discourse, its function needs to be accounted for. If the communicator aims to “establish and implement regulations and decisions (that is a general binding force) within and between groups of people” through a given text, this text and its communication are part of what is called political discourse, and their communicators are political actors (Patzelt 2007: 23). Political discourse is also socially determined and socially determining. This double constraint, the fact that political discourse more or less openly discusses norms, values and beliefs and at the same time is governed by the social realities it creates, exposes political discourses more often than any other discourse to ideological struggles .

Political discourse is located in “political and communicative events” (van Dijk 1998: 14) and is concerned with all forms of oral or written communication within “formal/ informal political contexts” and with “political actors”; “with, that is, inter alia, politicians, political institutions, governments, political media, and political supporters operating in political environments to achieve political goals” (Wilson 2001: 398). Some written and oral language use seems to fall into the political category more than others. “These are texts that either discuss political ideas, beliefs, and practices of a society or some part of it (e.g. textbooks, academic papers, essays), or texts that are crucial in constituting a political community or group (e.g. treaties, a manifesto of a political party, a speech by a politician)” (Schäffner 2004: 119). Regarding this Schäffner suggests using Burckhardt’s classification system (1996) which divides political discourse into three broad sub-categories based on who the communicating actors are and with whom they interact (Schäffner and Bassnett 2010: 2). This can be schematically represented as illustrated by Figure 1.




FIGURE 1: Political Discourse

Within this thesis, two sub-constituents of political discourse will be looked at. There are the alleged source texts (STs) (the term ‘alleged ST’ is discussed in section 3.1.2) in the shape of political speeches which formed part of a large-scale propaganda. They fall into the category of *External Political Communication* as they were delivered by the Nazi Propaganda Minister and addressed the German people and sometimes an extended foreign audience. Through his speeches Goebbels pursued various political aims ranging from eliciting support for actions against the Jewish population (e.g. November 1938) to persuading people to legitimise the regime’s actions in a plebiscite vote (e.g. January 1935). Then there are the TTs in form of partial translations of these speeches integrated in articles in newspapers which themselves were the prime medium of the mass media. These newspaper articles were aimed at informing the French and British audiences about the political situation in Nazi Germany. Moreover, they partook in the shaping of the public opinion in that they sometimes influenced their readership to adopt a particular view in respect to the topic that was reported on. Such viewpoints could then translate into political action. Thus, these media texts fulfilled a political function and fall into the category of *Political Discourse in the Mass Media*.

1.2.4 POLITICAL SPEECHES

This paragraph investigates political speeches as a specific genre within external political communication. The political speech is a “classical oral genre” (Kalivoda 2006: 1) and is “uttered on a special occasion for a special purpose by a single person, and addressed more or less to a specific audience” (Reisig 2008: 243 quoted in Byod 2010: 5). Speeches are

classified as political when they fulfil a particular function in the political process (see section 1.2.3). Political speeches occur as different text types (Kalivoda 2006: 1) such as acceptance speeches, inaugurals, epideictic addresses, etc. Such text types can be established by taking into consideration ‘heuristic criteria’ such as who is speaking, on what occasion, where, when, which (classical) rhetorical genres are employed, etc. and by considering ‘the constitutive conditions’ of the production and the reception” (Reisigl 2008: 249 – 258 quoted in Byod 2010: 5). Political speeches can be assigned to a specific epoch in history, “to a specific societal formation and to a specific culture” and should therefore be analysed not only regarding their text structures and rhetorical figures but also regarding their social meaning content (Kalivoda 2006: 1). The question of what function political speeches have within a given society needs to be addressed. Clearly, its function within a democratic society is often different to its function within a dictatorship. Whereas in the former case it might serve as communicative connection between the people and the state, “within authoritarian systems political speeches are enacted attempts of guiding the masses and instruments for the legitimisation of the repression and persecution of people with differing opinions” (Kalivoda 2006: 3). However, there is a continuum between these two extremes on which speeches can be situated. Their particular function(s) are not uniquely dependent on the political system from which they originate. Furthermore, some speeches are famous for a variety of reasons and therefore become a significant part of “representation and shaping of power and influence” (Chilton and Schäffner 2002: 21). This was the case for instance with Goebbels’ ‘Total War Speech’ in 1943 but it also applied to individual sentences that are singled out and repeatedly reported by the media (see section 6.1.3).

1.2.5 SECTION REVIEW

The CDA approach does not provide a single definition for the concept of discourse. Within the present thesis discourse is defined as an entity above text level. It is theoretically understood in the sense of a larger structure, as a system that organises all written and spoken propositions about the world according to particular subjects such as for instance politics. This definition retains the dynamic nature of the concept and stresses the interdependence and inter-textuality of the lower-level discourses. On a more practical level, the use of the term ‘discourse’ has been clarified with regards to Goebbels’ speeches and the reporting media texts. Whilst the *French and British Media Discourse about the NS-Regime* encompasses all the media texts collected for the thesis corpus, it is referred to the media texts reporting about a single speech event by replacing ‘about the NS-Regime’ with the name of the speech event. The notion *Goebbels’ discourse* refers to the entity of his speeches - whether analysed in the present thesis or not - and is seen as a sub-constituent of the *NS-*

Discourse in general. Moreover the discussion of the discourse notion revealed that all language use is socially determined and socially determining. This is highly important because this thesis aims to demonstrate what factors influenced the translation processes, i.e. the determining factors but also explores the potential effects of the media discourses. It has also been argued that it would be useful to see politics as a decision-making system concerned with the 'legitimate' establishment and implementation of generally binding regulations and decisions. The reflection of this broad function of politics in texts classifies them as sub-constituents of political discourse. It was argued that both the political speeches of Goebbels and the media texts reporting about the speeches fulfil political functions and are therefore to be classified as political discourse. More specifically, the speeches belong to the category of *External Political Communication* while the media texts fall into the *Political Discourse in the Mass Media* category. Political discourse can be realised in different text forms, one of which is the 'political speech'. Depending on the representational force of a speech, this speech can exert more or less influence on a national and international scale.

1.3 POLITICAL DISCOURSE UNDER THE NAZI REGIME

This section is concerned with the Nazi propaganda in general and with political speeches under the NS-Regime in particular. Firstly, the functions and forms of the Nazi propaganda will be described. Secondly, mass events as an important part of the propaganda, often incorporating political speeches, will be introduced. Thirdly, the political speeches under the NS-Regime will be examined and their form and functions be described. Furthermore their difference from political speeches in the classical sense will also be investigated.

1.3.1 NATIONAL SOCIALIST PROPAGANDA

Political speeches were one of the several modes through which the NS-regime disseminated its propaganda and they therefore should be analysed in this wider context. Propaganda or propaganda campaigns are "systematic processes of information management geared to promoting a particular goal and to guaranteeing a popular response" (Kallis 2005: 1). In other words, propaganda attempts to influence, mediate or shift discourses to create a particular picture of reality and to influence people's thinking and behaviour accordingly. However, it would be questionable to assume that propaganda is a one-sided communication process. Propaganda can only be successful if, at least partially, it corresponds to certain needs already existing among the addressees (Nill 1991: 49).

Propaganda played an important role in catapulting the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) to power, a party that had been mostly unknown until its surprising success

in the elections in 1930. Later it served as a useful tool for consolidating and stabilising the regime by integrating people “both as individuals and as members of a social group into a shared context of symbols, meanings and shared objectives” (Kallis 2005: 2) and then for mobilising people for a common effort to start and pursue war, and eventually to become complicit in unprecedented crimes. Hitler and Goebbels were acutely aware of the importance of propaganda for the success of the National Socialist movement and furthered its sophistication accordingly. Joachim Fest even claims that “the genius of the National Socialism was propaganda. It not only achieved its most important successes through it, it [propaganda] was also its only original contribution to the conditions of its rise to power and more than a pure instrument of power: propaganda was a part of its nature” (Fest 1997: 119 quoted in Breil 2006: 102). Hitler writes in his book *Mein Kampf* that “the propaganda has to hurry ahead the organisation and has to first win the human material to be worked on” (Hitler 1936: 694). He then explains that those who are not convinced can later on be forced to adhere to the new rules (*ibid.*). Goebbels and Hitler believed that propaganda could only be successful if it was omnipresent. Therefore, propaganda should not be confined to the “political sphere but extend to a whole range of cultural activities” (Bramsted 1965: 53). Thereby, people would be exposed to the ideas conveyed through propaganda at any moment they came into contact with one of the various mass media channels. Loudspeakers were later installed in important public places so that an escape from the Nazi propaganda became even more difficult. Goebbels was aware of the fact “that the different mass media did not possess the same effect or the same degree of intensity in reaching the public” (Bramsted 1965: 54). To make propaganda more effective, it was essential to constantly watch the ‘public mood’ (which is not to be confused with public opinion which cannot exist within an authoritarian state) and to adjust the propaganda accordingly (Bramsted 1965: 56).

1.3.2 PROPAGANDA & MASS EVENTS

The Nazis sought more ‘direct’ contact with the people through public speeches, propaganda actions and, later on, through mass-events. At the beginning, propaganda actions concentrated mainly on areas where the NSDAP had not yet established itself. They stretched over several hours, were very stereotypical in their organisation, aimed to use time most efficiently by exploiting modern technologies and took place not only shortly before elections but quite frequently (Breil 2006: 104). This omnipresent demonstration of power and *Volksnähe* (closeness to the common people) proved to be extremely effective. Furthermore, the management of mass-events where audience, location, time and so forth were carefully selected fully exploited mass-psychological processes. It was in this highly semiotic context, in the context of propaganda actions and/or mass-events that the political

leaders of the NS-Regime delivered most of, and most successfully, their speeches, drawing on a variety of extra-textual factors. As participants in mass events, people seemed to “have a say in the making of politics” to take part in a quasi-democratic process (Bramsted 1965: 56). However the hand-picked audience was only part of this décor when assuming the role it had been assigned to by the NS propagandists. “No one behaved differently, everyone obeyed, and alone by this confirmed the fascistic construction of reality” (Breil 2006: 122). In fact, “such events convey the auditor an experience of participation whilst at the same time suppressing any real participation” (Nill 1991: 135). The uniform behaviour of members of a given group has been described extensively in mass psychology. Historical, political and economic factors can lead to the so-called ‘pull-effect’ of the masses (Nill 1991: 70). Mass events allow individuals to escape from the unpleasant reality by offering them the experience of solidarity through identification with other group members and they can provide solutions, for instance in form of a leader who then becomes idealised (Nill 1991: 71 ff.). Within a mass or mass event, it seems, the intellectual capacity of the individual is lowered whereas his/her affectivity is intensified (Freud 1967: 16 in Nill 1991: 69). By appealing to emotions more than to their intellect, the mass can then be ‘guided’. Hitler notes in this respect: “Within the pack he [the individual] always feels slightly more secure, even if there are thousands of reasons against it” (1936: 536). Although the embedding of the speeches in these mass events certainly contributed to the success of the orators, it should not be overlooked that not everyone was carried away by the pull-effect of the masses and though the phenomenon explains certain actions it does not necessarily justify them.

1.3.3 POLITICAL SPEECHES UNDER THE NAZI REGIME

Despite the impact of recent technical advances, the most central element of the NS-propaganda remained the political speech. This was because the direct contact with the population was highly effective in terms of gaining support. Speeches under the NS-Regime did not address the elected representatives but the people themselves. Thus, there was a shift from *internal* to *external political communication* (see Figure 1 section 1.2.3) which suggested a stronger involvement of the public in the political sphere and thereby lent legitimacy and credibility to the orator, his speeches and subsequently the NS-Regime. The fact that a much broader and much ‘simpler’ audience was addressed by the NS orators impacted largely on the style and content of the speeches (see section 1.4.3). We will see in Chapter Six that the change of the speech audience targeted by the media texts also entailed changes in the content and style of the speech representations. As argued in section 1.4.2., extra-linguistic, contextual factors amplified the effects of the speeches on their audience and

the audience itself also constituted one of the contributing factors to their success. Thus, a “political speech under National Socialism has to be understood in a larger sense as a longer (...) oral (...) debate with political content **in front of an audience**” (Klein 1992: 1466 quoted in Taubert 2006: 8, my emphasis). Due to technical advances the audience was not always directly present. However, such speeches were the exception, not the rule. Apart from addressing the directly present audience it was possible to further disseminate the content of these speeches to a wider audience through different media channels such as broadcasting and newspapers. The participation of the direct audience (see section 6.2) and its confirmation of the NS-Regime was still perceptible through vociferous acclamation (welcomed and fostered by the Nazi leaders) in radio broadcasts and pictures and written descriptions in media texts. Through the involvement of the media the number of recipients was multiplied. This was paralleled by an increasing importance of the speeches and speech events (Klemperer 1947: 58). Regarding the function of the speeches and the media texts it is important to consider the concept of ‘audience design’ as described by Bell (1991) and adapted to the translational situation by Mason (2000). Mason describes the audience of any written or spoken text as quadripartite: firstly, there are the addressees whose presence is known and ratified and who are directly addressed by e.g. the speaker (2000: 4). Secondly, the listening/ reading of the auditors is known and ratified, however, they are not directly addressed (*ibid.*). Thirdly, there are the over-hearers who are known but neither ratified nor addressed (*ibid.*). Finally, the eaves-droppers are listeners/readers whose ‘participation’ in the communicative process is not known (*ibid.*). The orator and the media text producer need to be aware of these different groups to tailor their products to the different audiences. The simultaneous existence of the different audience types also suggests that the NS-speeches fulfilled multiple functions.

According to Taubert, speeches within the NS-Regime featured four main functions: Firstly, the audience should be emotionally overpowered so as to diminish its ability of reasoning. I have previously argued in section 1.3.2 that this presupposed a certain receptiveness of the audience; secondly, the regime’s power and existence should be legitimised; the immediate audience, especially, played an important role in this by seemingly approving of what was said. Thirdly, social and ethical discrepancies had to be harmonised; and finally, the speeches had to unify the masses, i.e. a shared will to follow the leader and his ideology was to be created (Taubert 2006: 7 ff.). Moreover, the presence of foreign guests at the speech events and the transmission and further dissemination of the speeches through modern technologies allowed targeting a much broader, international audience. Therefore, the speeches also served goals related to the German foreign policy. Goebbels explicitly and

implicitly addressed other nations and their governments in his speeches, by courting and threatening them. Political speeches under the NS-Regime were therefore not argumentative in Aristotle's sense but aimed at reaffirming an already existing point of view. This continuous reaffirmation is mirrored in the repetition of the same contents thereby creating a sense of security (Nill 1991: 134).

1.3.4 NAZI IDEOLOGY – A SHORT OVERVIEW

Prior to outlining the main components of the NS-ideology it seems important to mention that ideologies cannot incorporate the exact same beliefs for all members since personal experiences lead to variations within these systems of ideas (see section 2.3.2) The versatile functionality of ideology is based on the vagueness of many concepts and allows adapting them to a multitude of situations (Ehlich 1995: 16). However, a number of core components remained relatively stable and will be described in this section. Despite the individual differences, I will refer to them as the 'NS-ideology'.

The National Socialist ideology was unified a number of beliefs already existing within and before the Weimar Republic. Many of them had emerged during the previous century and "combined the deep stream of German romanticism with the mysteries of the occult as well as the idealism of the deeds" (Mosse 1961: 96). That many of the ideas and beliefs were already known or even accepted within Germany facilitated the introduction of the 'new', National Socialist ideology. National Socialism propagated the racial superiority of the Aryan (and Nordic) race which subsequently was meant to dominate other races by law of nature. To maintain this superiority, the race needed to be 'pure'. This belief was supported by a number of pseudo-scientific theories and led to the implementation of the Nuremberg Racial Laws in September 1935. Given this natural superiority and the subsequent right of expanding the *Lebensraum* (living space), it was only legitimate that other races should be wiped out or at least be driven away from their countries. The fact that the German people found itself in a rather bad position after WW1 was explained by a Jewish conspiracy and by fate. The belief in mystical fate, it seems, was often used to justify events since the assumption of responsibility could thereby be avoided. Such explanations fell on fertile ground as the German defeat had never been fully accepted (see section 1.1.2).

Furthermore, the Nazis stressed the concept of the *Volksgemeinschaft* (national community). All 'true' Germans were bound together by blood and soil and it was each individual's duty to do everything possible to serve this *Volksgemeinschaft* even if it meant to sacrifice one's own life. Moreover, being bound through "blood" also partly justified German expansionism which targeted territories (partly) occupied by German ethnics (see section 4.3.2). The use of

terms such as *Volk* (the people), *Vaterland* (fatherland) and *Rasse* (race) played an important role in strengthening the national unity of the *Volksgemeinschaft*. The *Volk* should be lead to its destiny by a strong leader, the *Führer*. Its true destiny was the establishment of the Greater German Reich reuniting all ‘true’ Germans within one nation state. The establishment of such an empire would be the expression of the Aryan supremacy. However, many obstacles needed to be overcome. The main antagonists of the German people were the Jews (later merged with the communists to the Jewish-Bolshevik-Bloc) who tried to subvert the German community from within and who were also suspected to initiate a world revolution for material gain. Anti-Semitism, an old phenomenon, became a driving force of German National Socialism. The NS-ideology is often seen as a “doctrine of salvation” (e.g. Kegel 2006: 33; Kriechbaumer 2001: 723) in which the *Führer*, Adolf Hitler, was presented as a redeemer who would save Germany and even the entire world (Kegel 2006: 33). The myth of the infallibility of the *Führer* was an essential part of National Socialism.

1.3.5 SECTION REVIEW

Political speeches under the NS-Regime, which addressed the people directly instead of their elected representatives, were part of a large-scale, omnipresent propaganda concept which was aimed at winning people over to the NS-ideology and the political aims of the regime. However, the propagandists not only sought to achieve this goal by convincing people with their argumentation but also by emotionally overpowering them. Furthermore, the NS leaders considered political speeches pivotal for propaganda. Nonetheless, neither ideology nor propaganda could have been successful had there not been a psychological environment that made people more susceptible to respond positively to such influences. There is a variety of contextual factors which were decisive for the success of the Nazi speeches. The highly semiotic settings in which these speeches were delivered and which enabled mass-psychological processes to take place, necessitate special attention. The audience, as an appraising body, also played a crucial role in the legitimisation of the regime. These contextual variables were similar to the speeches themselves subject to changes in the media production process. This was because the producers of the speeches and the media texts had different target audience perceptions and their texts fulfilled differing functions within the respective political systems.

1.4 GOEBBELS’ SPEECHES

The information provided in this section will facilitate the understanding of the production and reception of Goebbels’ speeches but will also help to broadly contextualise the speech events referred to in the analytical chapters. Section 1.2 discussed the concept of discourse

while section 1.3 portrayed the political discourse under the NS-Regime and highlighted the importance of the fact that the NS speeches were embedded in mass events. This section is dedicated to Goebbels and his speeches and introduces the ST material. Firstly, a short biography of Goebbels will be provided, outlining the major stages of his life, describing some of his characteristics and presenting his role within the NS-Regime. Secondly, an attempt will be made to shed light on Goebbels' success as an orator. Thirdly, the content and style of Goebbels' speeches is investigated. It will be shown that the addressee-orientation of the speeches causes repetitiveness in terms of content and style. It will be argued that the accumulation of certain stylistic features in combination with their meaning content led to a distinctive language style that was and is associated with the language use of the NS-Regime.

1.4.1 SHORT BIOGRAPHY OF GOEBBELS

Paul Joseph Goebbels was born in 1897 as one of six children in the German city of Rheydt located in the occupied Rhineland zone. His parents were devoted Catholics and belonged to the rising (bourgeois) middle class. His early life was unspectacular besides his physical deformity, a clubfoot, which left him isolated but also spared him doing active duty during WW1. Whether his handicap was a birth defect or the result of an illness remains unclear but it became a sensitive question under the NS-Regime as the Nazis took a very negative stance towards all forms of disability. Given Goebbels' vulnerability, it is not surprising that his mother was prone to overprotect her son. His classmates and teachers described him as "arrogant, quarrelsome and difficult" with a "marked *Geltungsdrang*" (need for admiration) (Bramsted 1961: 5) and these characteristics only became more pronounced in later years.

After gaining his *Abitur* (A-Levels), Goebbels went on to study Literature and Philosophy at various German universities. He struggled financially and was forced to give private lessons. Therefore Goebbels deeply envied his fellow students from wealthier backgrounds (Börsch 2004: 20). Despite these sorrows Goebbels had several amorous relationships during his university years including one with a woman of Jewish descent (Gathmann and Paul 2009: 42 ff.; Börsch 2004: 20). Even after marrying Magda Quandt in 1931, he continued more or less openly having numerous affairs and he became known as "Der Bock von Babelsberg" (The Buck of Babelsberg). This behaviour seems to be an expression of his narcissism, which entails the constant need for self-affirmation. This would eventually impact negatively on his career. In 1921 he obtained his doctoral degree in Heidelberg and he set out to realise his dream of becoming an author or journalist (Börsch 2004: 20; Gathmann and Paul 2009: 60 ff.). However, he failed to achieve any notable success and this triggered another phase of

great depression from which he suffered regularly throughout his life (Longerich 2010: 21). He perceived living as imminently painful and indeed longed for 'spiritual meaning'. He saw his own misfortune mirrored in the political and economic situation of Germany (Nill 1991: 194) and National Socialism eventually became what gave meaning to his life (Nill 1991: 214). Goebbels joined the NSDAP in 1924 and despite ideological differences with Hitler in the early years he soon became his most faithful supporter, which he remained until the end of his life on May 1, 1945. Hitler was Goebbels' redeemer, his stronghold, and their relationship was characterised by Goebbels' almost lover-like, but not always reciprocated devotion (Gathmann and Paul 2009: 83).

Until the party came into power Goebbels was in favour with Hitler and he even assured himself the influential post as Reich Minister of Propaganda and Enlightenment in 1933. However, his luck turned in the middle years of the regime because of his love affair with Lidia Baarova, a Czech actress. The Goebbels family had often been promoted as the German ideal and according to Hitler, Goebbels' public betrayal was an embarrassment for the Reich (Gathmann and Paul 2009: 168). This falling out was welcomed by his opponents and competitors because few people within and outside the party ever liked the egocentric Goebbels and he was mocked for his physical appearance which corresponded so little to the Aryan ideal (Bramsted 1961: 4). Despite all this, Goebbels had a very influential role as Minister of Propaganda. He worked frantically to maintain this position and did not hesitate to use whatever means to defend it against his competitors. Nonetheless, Goebbels was forced to constantly quarrel with other ministries over competences (Kallis 2005: 205). His main opponent in this respect was Joachim von Ribbentrop who was the head of the Foreign Ministry (Bramsted 1961: 51). With the outbreak of the war propaganda and hence Goebbels gained even more importance and his biggest moment as Propaganda Minister came in 1941 after the success on the battlefields faltered (Heiber 1971/1972, Kallis 2005). Though "the propaganda output until 1943 was a cumulative result", Goebbels undeniably played a decisive role in its design and dissemination (Kallis 2005: 8).

1.4.2 GOEBBELS THE ORATOR

Goebbels' influence is also reflected in the multitude of speeches he delivered. Besides Hitler, he was the most successful orator of the NS-Regime (Nill 1991: 147). "During the 1930s, Goebbels gave up to seven speeches in one evening at different places. That was not unusual at all. His productive output increased in 1941 to over thirty important speeches a year and to over fifty in 1942" (Gathmann and Paul 2009: 194). The fact that Goebbels, especially before the seizure of power, often made them without producing a written version

and that not all of them were recorded or filmed, means that it is not possible to give an exact number of the speeches he gave in total. Although Goebbels worked on his speeches for days and weeks, he still often changed passages whilst delivering them (Gathmann and Paul 2009: 195). Unsurprisingly, there are “large discrepancies between the oral and printed” versions (Heiber 1971/72: XXII) which necessitates special consideration in terms of establishing STs. The ST material and difficulties relating to the alignment of the ST and TTs will be discussed in sections 3.1.2 and 3.2.2.

Goebbels though often convinced of his own words, cared little about the truth of what he was proclaiming. “No sense of shame restrained his constant readiness to lie: lying despite the obvious contradiction to reality in which he is not interested because the only thing that counts is achieving the propagandistic goal” (Gathmann and Paul 2009: 196). The contents of his speeches had to serve the NS cause and it was only important what effect they had upon the audience.

It is due to this unscrupulousness and amorality that being compared to Goebbels is still synonymous with being accused of “extreme moral deprivation, to a lack of conscience, to cynically designed, and with great slyness conducted political and propagandistic tricks” (Nill 1991: 13). When watching the audio-visual recordings of Goebbels’ or Hitler’s performances, one is alienated by the fact that they often seem to speak or even scream at the top of their voices. According to the contemporary witness Klemperer, this was an integral part of the NS usage of language where “everything was speech, had to be appeal, call for action, rabble-rousing” (Klemperer 1947: 28). He describes this as the style of the “market crier like agitator” (*ibid.*). Goebbels however developed his oratory skills and became able to master the art of conveying whatever feeling appropriate through the tone of his voice; he developed a surprising number of different styles of speaking adjusted to the type of speech he was delivering (Longerich 2010: 242).

Today, Goebbels’ gesturing often seems to be excessive, even comical. This was perceived differently - its vividness and its dramatic apparently conveyed an almost Mediterranean flair to the contemporary audience (Longerich in Bönisch 2010: 81). Gestures and facial expression were carefully rehearsed, underlined the content of the speech and were often already enacted whilst writing the text (Gathmann and Paul 2009: 199). His voice was solemn and he had a peculiar way of stretching certain vowels, especially at the end of sentences (Bönisch 2010: 81).

1.4.3 CONTENT & STYLE OF GOEBBELS' SPEECHES

The following section outlines the characteristics of the content and style of Goebbels speeches. However, these characteristics do not only apply to his speeches or his use of language but to a certain extent to the NS language use in general. This is because Goebbels, as one of the leading politicians of the NS-Regime, stands representative for the Nazi ideology, politics and language. In his function as Propaganda Minister Goebbels had far-reaching competencies particularly in terms of defining appropriate language use and it was **his** voice, through various media channels, which was mostly heard. "There were only a few people who provided the universal language models. Yes, after all it was probably only Goebbels who determined what language could be used" (Klemperer 1947: 28).

Based on CDA I argued in section 1.2.4 that politics cannot be conducted without language and subsequently language reflects but also impacts on politics. Goebbels and Hitler were aware of the imminent importance of language to the success of the NS ideology and with language they won "their strongest, most public and most secret advertising medium" (Klemperer 1947: 22). Ideological beliefs are in various ways, e.g. semantically, syntactically but also through argumentative structures, expressed through and in language and can create a sort of shared language use amongst a given group of people. Though there are of course individual differences, a particular language use can then be associated with a specific group of people. Within the NS-Regime the language use appears to have been enormously influenced by leading politicians such as Goebbels. The constant repetition of their preferred language use through various channels led to its adoption by large proportions of the population. A particular language use necessarily incorporates certain value systems or evaluations and in that sense these values were subconsciously internalised by many people (Nill 1991: 92). Klemperer describes this phenomenon as "language which composes and thinks for us" (1947: 33). The relative uniformity of the Nazi language use acted as a strongly unifying element within the NS-Regime. In turn language as expression of national identity was also used to exclude enemies. Jewish people, for example, were forced to add to any text they wrote in German that it was actually a translation from Hebrew (Klemperer 1947: 35).

Recently it has been questioned whether one should be talking of a 'Nazi language' or rather a 'fascist language' since many seemingly typical elements of the NS language use can be found elsewhere. In accordance with Nill's argumentation the term 'NS language use' will be applied because it does not exclude that many of the described elements occur in different fascist or other 'language uses' too. The elements that will be described in section 1.4.3.2 are

introduced due to their frequent occurrence under the NS-Regime. However, Nill stresses that they are mainly characteristic for the Nazis when looked at in relation with their content. What is said and how it is said forms a unity and changing one of the two elements often makes a significant difference.

1.4.3.1 CONTENT

Whatever the externally imposed topic or whatever the occasion for the speech was, the Nazi orators filled it with the same argumentations, the same beliefs and viewpoints using slightly different formulations or organising them differently and stressing different aspects according to the topic and speech occasion. Indeed Hitler wrote in *Mein Kampf*: “Variation should never change the content of what the propaganda conveys, at the end, it always has to convey the same message” (Hitler 1936: 203). Goebbels agrees with him when he explains that it is utterly wrong if the revolution seeks to introduce new thoughts (1935: 241). The subsequent repetitiveness is not only reflected in the content but also in the style of the NS speeches as will be shown in section 1.4.3.2.

Hitler and Goebbels knew that to achieve their goals, they needed to convince a majority of the population of their ideas. Hitler states in this regard: “Who should the propaganda address? The academia or the less educated masses? It has to always address the masses!”, (1936: 196). However, neither Hitler nor Goebbels seemed to respect the people on whose support they depended. “The absorbing capacity of the mass is limited, its understanding small but in contrary its forgetfulness is high” (Hitler 1936: 198). Therefore Hitler insisted that speeches should limit themselves to a few topics but repeat them constantly in variation, present a clear picture of the enemy (in case there were several enemies, they should be made into one) and they should very much appeal to, or better still overpower the emotions of the audience (1936: 197 ff.).

1.4.3.2 STYLE

This section only presents some of the most striking features of the NS language use. Thus, the list is by no means an overview or exhaustive. Its only aim is to give the reader an impression of the language use under the NS-Regime. The characteristics described originate from the lexical-semantic, the syntactical-grammatical and from the textual level. As mentioned in the introduction to section 1.4.3 they are only characteristic for the NS language use in accumulation and only when linked to their meaning content.

One of the most striking features of the NS language use was certainly its vocabulary. A number of words were ‘invented’ to describe new groups of people and institutions that

emerged within the Reich such as the *Bund Deutscher Mädel* (League of German Girls) or the *Hitlerjugend* (Hitler Youth) (Schwertfeger 2004: 4). In everyday life, it was not the full names of such groups that were used but mostly abbreviations. The *Bund Deutscher Mädel* for instance was known as the *BDM* and the *Hitlerjugend* as *HJ*. Klemperer sees their function as “code word and protection against outside and as unity towards the inside” (*ibid.*). Other words such as *Endlösung* (final solution designating the genocide) or *Sonderbehandlung* (special treatment instead of execution) were used as euphemistic descriptions for realities that needed to be concealed.

The National Socialists ‘borrowed’ a large number of words from other fields and re-evaluated their meaning (Nill 1991: 306, Schwertfeger 2004: 4). Sometimes these words originally carried a positive connotation that was transported to the new meaning content. The ‘new’ words then triggered positive associations (Nill 1991: 324). Other words formerly displaying a positive connotation were re-evaluated negatively as for instance ‘democracy’ and ‘liberalism’ (Schwertfeger 2004: 5). It also happened that words with a negative connotation were positively reinterpreted such as *fanatisch* (fanatic). Problematic in this respect was the shared use of terminology with other political groups, which led to competing meanings of terms (Nill 1991: 307). One such term was ‘socialism’ which was also used by political opponents of the NSDAP. In order to differentiate themselves from these groups they named them *Allerweltssozialisten* (all-purpose socialists) or *Christussozialisten* (Christ socialists) (Nill 1991: 339).

The three main fields from which the National Socialists borrowed terms were religion, biology and *völkische* (racial) groups (Frind 1966: 86 in Dube 2005). In this respect, especially the use of Christian/Catholic metaphors has attracted much attention among linguists. The Church with all its rituals and its specific language use was deeply rooted within the German society and Goebbels “understood clearly its structures and effects and realised how immensely effective they were in order to control people” (Beißwenger 2000: 3). Therefore, he employed highly religious and mythically-loaded language and borrowed the established rites and ceremonies of the church, “tying in this new religion with Germanic-mystic beliefs” (Kegel 2006: 33). The Christian influence became most visible in the Führer myth. It presented Hitler as a chosen, infallible and salutary leader who was meant to fulfil the mission as ordained by fate - the establishment of the Greater German Reich (Nill 1991: 291). Therefore, terms such as *Glaube* (belief), *ewig* (eternal) and *Vorhersehung* (divine providence) occur frequently in NS texts. Goebbels refers to the Führer by saying: “He has filled the nation with HIS spirit. It is aligned to HIS will” (*ibid.*).

Also interesting was the use of word combinations like *unbeugsamer Entschluss* (sturdy decision), *unabänderlicher Wille* (irrevocable will) and *gläubiges Vertrauen* (faithful trust) (Ehlich 1995: 143). Within the NS language use they gained a similar status as collocations and Klemperer writes about “new combinations, which quickly froze to stereotypes” (1947: 35). The overuse of superlatives and elatives is another characteristic of the NS language use. Expressions like *größte Bedeutung* (greatest importance), *einmalige Schuld* (unique guilt) and *lebenswichtigst* (most vital) occurred frequently. Ehlich explains that the frequent use of certain adjectives led to a “desensitisation regarding their semantic value” which was compensated for by the employment superlatives (1995: 144). Thereby, they amplified the importance or scope of certain facts. The graduation of non-gradable adjectives such as *ausnahmslos* (most invariably), *ausserordentlichst* (most extraordinarily) and the application of elatives such as *lebenswichtigst* (most vital), *unmenschlichst* (most inhuman) are also observable (Beißwenger 2000: 34).

The argumentation strategies applied by the National Socialists are another interesting aspect. By describing certain groups of people with terms from particular semantic fields a ‘good vs. bad’, ‘us vs. them’ a dichotomy was established intra- and inter-textually. This acted as a simplification of more complex situations thereby facilitating the orientation for the audience or readership (Nill 1991: 231). Jewish people for instance were often mentioned in context with corruption, greed for money, the plague, sickness, tenacious weeds, etc. In contrast, the German, Aryan people were described as pure, noble, superior, just, etc. Therefore, the term Jewish people was likely to trigger negative connotations while the term Germans would trigger thoroughly positive associations within people unaware of the manipulative language use.

Goebbels also often resorted to comparing complex circumstances with more understandable every-day situations (Nill 1991: 262). He explains that the ‘enlightenment’ or the education of people should only take place at intervals by comparing it with the military drumming which, if continuously done, will eventually be overheard (1935: 238). In a different speech he compares the task of the politician with the task of the artists. Like a painter who turns colours into something living, the politician turns the amorphous masses into a living people (1935: 220). In doing so Goebbels tried to render the content of his speeches more understandable to the population. According to him propaganda needed to be “very primitive, very simple, very clear” (1935: 239) because this corresponded to the intellectual capacity of the average man or woman.

The oversimplification of situations was a strategy used by Goebbels to reformulate decisions that were thereby turned into simple ‘yes or no’, ‘us or them’ questions (Nill 1991: 244). In his famous *Total War Speech* he explains: “The world does not have the choice between a Europe that falls back into his former fractions and a Europe that will orientate itself newly under the leadership of the axis; but between a Europe that is protected by the military power of the axis or a Bolshevik Europe” (1943: 181). Obviously the alternative to the axis rule as presented by Goebbels is much more threatening because a Bolshevik Europe equalled being dominated by the archenemy.

Mystical metaphors in connection with nature, fate, life, history, etc., were used by Goebbels as ultimate justifications (Nill 1991: 287). The expansion politics of the Third Reich was rightful because the establishment of the Greater German Reich was a holy mission (and German ethics bound to Germany by ‘blood’), Jewish people were to be eliminated because of their racial inferiority and because they had historically always been the enemies of the German people.

1.4.4 SECTION REVIEW

The short biography of Goebbels has shown that psychologists argue that his narcissistic personality led to isolation and the need of constant self-affirmation. He tried to obtain this affirmation through his relentless work to become and remain a successful NS politician and through surrounding himself with beautiful women. Unluckily for Goebbels, the latter clashed with the former and he ‘lost’ his privileged position during the middle years of the regime. We will see in Chapter Four that this impacted on his work output and subsequently the extent to which he featured in the French and British press. Goebbels’ desire to make a career for himself is reflected in his unusually high output of work. His working style, driven by perfectionism, changed over the years and he no longer gave his speeches offhand but prepared them over weeks. He also improved his oratory performances by working on the modulation of his voice and his gestures. His obsession for work and his oratory talent partly explain why he was one of the most successful orators and politicians under the NS-Regime. Goebbels’ propaganda and subsequently his speeches were highly addressee-oriented and therefore showed little variation in terms of their content (see section 1.4.3). From a stylistic point of view, the vocabulary and the general NS language use appears to be especially interesting. New or re-evaluated terms, abbreviations, mystically-loaded or even Catholic metaphors are some of the typical features. Furthermore, the unusually frequent employment of superlatives and elatives as well as the simplification strategies visible in his argumentation style seem to be typical for the NS language use. However, all these stylistic

features only became ‘typical’ for the NS-Regime because they occurred in accumulation and they also need to be considered with regards to their semantic value. We will see in the analytical chapters that the media texts informing the French and British public about Goebbels’ speeches were similarly addressee-orientated as Goebbels’ propaganda output and featured a language use that reflected their socio-political environment. The differences between the addressed audiences and between the text functions according to Mason (see section 1.3.3) would necessarily entail changes in the translations. Chapters Four and Six will demonstrate that these changes were introduced on the content and the style level.

CHAPTER REVIEW

The objective of this chapter was to provide the historical background information necessary to contextualise the material analysed within this thesis. Section 1.1 described the socio-economic and political situation of central Europe after WW1 and outlined the political events leading up to WW2. Section 1.2 provided a first theoretical backdrop against which the object of the present study could be examined. It discussed the notion of discourse and defined how the concept is understood within this thesis. Moreover, political discourse as a genre was investigated and political speeches were presented as a particular text type within this genre. Based on this information, section 1.3 was able to investigate the political discourse of the NS-Regime. A strong focus was placed on the NS speeches which were embedded in propaganda events. Taking an even closer look, section 1.4 discussed Goebbels’ speeches in terms of their stylistic and content-related characteristics.

Section 1.1 revealed that the inter-war years in Europe were indeed eventful. The economic and political problems which haunted Europe in the aftermath of WW1 were closely interlinked. Despite attempts to solve them collectively, the individual needs and goals of the nations were too different to find common ground. In some countries, like Germany, the socio-political tensions eventually led to the establishment of fascist regimes; other countries like France and Britain with older democratic traditions survived the crisis more or less unscathed. With the victory of the NSDAP in 1933 and the subsequent establishment of the Nazi regime, Germany became a dominating factor in European politics. France and Britain closely watched the development of her foreign policy. This section will be referred to in numerous instances in the analytical chapters (chapters 4-6) when talking about specific speeches and the political events that gave occasion for their delivery. Section 1.2 pointed out that discourses on the one hand reflect the social situations in which they developed and, on the other hand, influence the social environments in which they exist. This is the most central underlying assumptions guiding this project. One of its aims is to investigate

precisely this phenomenon: the factors shaping the political discourse about the NS-Regime and the impact of these discourses on the respective nations. The section also demonstrated that both the STs and the TTs are sub-constituents of political discourses. However, their position within the respective societies is different in that they fulfil different functions in the political process. The differences in terms of function and addressees, as Mason (2000) aptly demonstrates, necessarily lead to translation shifts or changes. This guides the analyses in that observed differences and particularities will be linked to the text function of the STs and TTs as well as to the target audiences. Section 1.3 was then concerned with the role political speeches played within the NS-Regime. It was shown that they were part of a large-scale propaganda concept and differed from political speeches within a democratic context in that they were not primarily aimed at convincing people of political views by logical argumentation in Aristotle's sense. The framing of the speeches by mass-events enabled a number of psychological processes to take place which amplified this emotional appeal. This section also indicated that particular attention should be paid to the translation of the contextual elements. Alongside providing information about Goebbels' career and his oratory skills, section 1.4 investigated Goebbels speeches outlining their main characteristics in terms of style and content. In doing so, this section not only described the ST material analysed in this thesis but also indicated potential areas for changes in the translations. Though this chapter was only able to touch upon the aspects discussed, it nonetheless provided a solid foundation for the reader to contextualise the material analysed in Chapters Four to Six.

2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Chapter One has provided the historical backdrop to contextualise the material analysed within the framework of this study. It outlined the differing socio-political situations of Germany, France and the UK after WW1 and also defined the notion of ‘discourse’ and ‘political discourse’. Based on this the political discourse of the NS-Regime could be described. Chapter Two now outlines the theoretical framework that underpins the present project. Its primary objectives are to explain what main theoretical approach has been taken and how it has been complemented with other research. The identified problematic issues will need to be addressed in the discussion of the research design in Chapter Three. In section 2.1 I firstly elaborate on the relationship between politics, the mass media and translation. Additionally, I present a concise review of existing research in media translation and explain where the present research is situated. I then outline the main characteristics of media translation. Secondly, I explain in section 2.2 why the concept of ideology is highly relevant in the production of political media discourse and a definition of ‘ideology’ is presented. Moreover, the ideologies relevant to this study are very tentatively described. Thirdly, I introduce CDA as a useful approach to investigate how discourse reflects and affects socio-political realities (see section 1.2.1). In this respect I discuss the underlying principles governing CDA work and explain how CDA scholars aim to uncover ideological influences through textual analysis. Moreover I explore criticism that has been directed at research in CDA and explain briefly how I will address these issues in my research design. Fourthly, I argue in section 2.4 that framing and agenda setting can usefully be integrated into CDA-inspired research in Translation Studies (TS). Finally, I present a review which elaborates on the main theoretical aspects presented in this chapter.

2.1 TRANSLATION & THE MEDIA

This section addresses the interrelatedness of politics, the mass media and translation in sub-section 2.1.1 and identifies relevant research approaches aimed at studying the tripartite relationship. In section 2.1.2, the main approaches to media translation within Translation Studies are presented and under-researched areas are identified. Furthermore, it discusses the characteristics of media translation in sub-section 2.1.3 and points out established concepts within TS and other fields, which need to be re-considered in the field of media translation.

2.1.1 MASS MEDIA, POLITICS & TRANSLATION

The mass media constitute a space where politics are ‘discussed’ by different social groups and between the state and the public. This exchange is crucial for both sides. Political parties and governments rely on the support of the public, whilst the public wants and needs

information about political events to form an opinion about the course of action taken. The mass media hold a powerful position in every media-dependent society and they “play an important role in disseminating politics and mediating between politicians and the public” (Schäffner 2004: 118). What continuously attracts our interest then is the influence of politicians (and other actors and factors) on the mass media and the mass media’s potential to influence the public. Apart from research conducted in media translation within TS (see section 2.1.2), three fields of study - which are mainly or partly concerned with researching the relationship between politicians, the mass media and the public - seem to be particularly relevant for the present study: media linguistics, text analytical approaches and the agenda setting/framing approach.

Media Linguistics (ML) investigates the phenomenon of ‘media language’ and outlines its changing functions and characteristics across different media types and time (e.g. Lüger 1995, Breuer 2001, Burger 2005). Though ML scholars demonstrate and mention the influence of media language in the political realm, this is not their main focus. Insights gained from this field of study are highly relevant to this study because many linguistic phenomena in political media language are related to norms and conventions in this genre. We will see in the analytical chapters that namely the different expectations of the readers of the quality and the tabloid press (see Chapter Four) as well as (media) text type conventions (see Chapter Six) played an important role in the shaping of the media texts. The findings of ML will be discussed when relevant in Chapters Four and Six. A further approach that seems to be useful is CDA. Scholars in this field (e.g. Richardson 2007, Fairclough and Wodak 1997) are concerned with how linguistic properties observed in texts relate to social, i.e. political realities. Analysing discourses from a CDA perspective then may help to counteract such inequalities (see section 2.3.2). Finally, within media studies both agenda-setting and framing have produced a multitude of studies and applications. Agenda-setting argues that (a) whether a topic is reported on or not, (b) how frequently this happens, (c) how prominently the reports are placed within the newspaper and (d) how the reports represent the topic extensively influences the importance the public assigns to it (e.g. Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007, McCombs and Shaw 1972). Framing, also seen as second level agenda-setting, then proposes that through different modes of presentation an issue can be foregrounded thereby suggesting or making more likely the adoption of a particular viewpoint (e.g. de Vreese 2005, McCombs 2004, Entman 2004). The framing concept and especially its application within TS make part of the methodological design and it is therefore discussed in detail in section 2.4. Agenda-setting will be used in section 4.1 and to some extent in section 4.2. It is therefore discussed in sub-section 2.4.4.

Rarely does the involvement of translation in the construction of political media discourse catch the public's eye. However, as the Khrushchev example in the introduction illustrates, what political statements are translated and how, has an impact. Political statements are often transferred in mono-lingual and multi-lingual contexts through quotes. In media texts these inter-textual and inter-discursive references are often invisible. If they are highlighted, they have a special rhetoric function within the discourse (Burger 2005: 75). Direct quotes claim to be demonstrations of their originals, to mirror both content and form whereas indirect quotes suggest describing their content (Clark and Gerrig 1990: 764). Direct and indirect quotes in journalistic writing refer to original speech events which have taken place in the real world and they therefore carry a certain degree of authority and truthfulness (Parmentier 1993: 263 quoted in Obiedat 2006: 292). The degree of authority assigned is closely linked to the social position of the original enunciator. If high-ranking politicians are quoted directly, and especially when they were speaking in their function as state officials, these quotes are believed to be truthful. Furthermore, such quotes also feature a high representational power in that what has been said by these politicians is believed to be the expression of the opinion of the whole political apparatus they represent. Despite the common assumption that one is confronted with verbatim and 'truthful' renderings of political statements, they in fact undergo substantial changes.

“Direct speech is lifted out of one textual context and inserted into a very different one, which represents it, frames it, manipulates it and subordinates it to another voice and to different communicative goals; by definition, this de-contextualization and re-contextualization deform the meaning, whether in large or small ways” (Waugh 1995: 155).

The transformative power of news quoting is highlighted in the translational context. This is because the cultural and linguistic context often changes considerably and the TT reader depends on the 'cultural' and 'linguistic' mediation of the news producer to make sense of the statement. Moreover accessibility to the original statement is scarce. Political, social and cultural factors exert considerable influence on the translation process and subsequently affect the translation products. Thus, political discourse analysis and media studies could gain new insights into the processes that take place in intercultural political news production by considering the research of the media translation scholars.

2.1.2 MEDIA TRANSLATION IN TRANSLATION STUDIES

The objective of this section is to outline the development of research in media translation within TS and to explain where the present thesis fits in. This is not a comprehensive review of media translation research but a concise presentation of the main approaches.

The interest of TS in media translation is, as Roberto Valdeón rightly points out, not a completely new phenomenon (2010: 149 ff.). Regarding possible text type classification systems and the ST and TT functions the scholars of the ‘Functionalist Approach’ already studied informative texts, including media texts, in the late 1970s and the 1980s. Central to this discussion were differing text type norms, differences of ST and TT addressees and translation shifts introduced in relation to the afore-mentioned divergences. The development of the Skopos theory can be seen as liberation of the translator from the previously dominant ST-orientation and the notion of ‘equivalence’ (e.g. Reiß and Vermeer 1991, Hatim and Mason 1990, Nord 1997). At this point it seems to be important to take an excursion away from news translation into the realm of ‘political translation’. After the ‘cultural turn’ in TS in the 1990s scholars increasingly started to draw attention to intersections of politics, ideology and translation (e.g. Álvarez and Vidal 1996, Gentzler and Tymoczko 2002, Tymoczko 2003, Baker 2006). Greater attention was paid to “extra-textual factors related to the cultural context, history and convention” which influenced the translation process (Brook 2012: 24). Translation as a means to re-enforce or subvert established power relations and ideologies as well as the role of the translator as a mediator but also as a manipulator became focus points (Álvarez and Vidal 1996, Gentzler and Tymoczko 2002 and maybe more positively discussed by Hatim and Mason 1997). Similarly important in this context is the notion of ‘patronage’ since it refers to “the powers (persons, institutions) that can further or hinder the reading, writing and re-writing of literature” (Lefevre 1992: 15 quoted in Brook 2012: 27). Though concerned with politics and political implications of translation few of these works actually analysed or referred to what is commonly classified as ‘political’ communication, i.e. communication that officially serves political aims, not to mention media translation. But of course, as stated in section 1.3, any text can become political depending on its function within the political process. Nonetheless it seems interesting that little attention was paid to media translation – an area that would certainly have yielded pertinent results. Conversely, at approximately the same time as the ‘cultural turn’ scholars such as Hatim and Mason (1997), Calzada Pérez (2001) and Schäffner (2004, 2005) started, inspired by Critical Linguistics (CL) and CDA, to take an increasing interest in the role of translation in political discourse and in political media discourse. This engendered subsequent CDA-inspired research (e.g. Kuo and Nakamura 2005, Brook 2012). Moreover, the promotion of the narrative approach to (news) translation by Baker proved to be valid and valuable complementation of research in (news) translation that already existed. Yet another group of scholars had started branching out their research interest into the role of translation in audio-visual ‘texts’ in the 1990s. Though audio-visual translation (AVT) did

and does account for the political dimension of translation, e.g. by investigating censorship mechanisms, there is little research so far from AVT scholars into audio-visual news. When the focus point of TS started to shift towards the influence of socio-cultural factors in translation, the news production process and the role of the different actors involved started to gain visibility within the scholarly debate. We might add here that Descriptive Translation Studies (DTS) had already highlighted in the 1990s the importance of accounting for all three aspects, the translation product, function and process (Brook 2012: 31). The Warwick Conference in 2006 and the subsequent publication of the monograph *Translation in Global News* (Bassnett and Bielsa 2009) but also the volume *Political Discourse, Media and Translation* (2010) by Schäffner and Bassnett testify to the extension of the research focus and its new insights. Despite the increasing interest media translation has enjoyed over the past decade there are still many areas in this field where little or no research has been undertaken so far. As previously mentioned an extension into audio-visual media translation might be fruitful as would be the investigation of the history of media translation, etc. Apart from these extensions, there is also some room for expansion within the existing body of research. One aspect that seems under-researched is the multi-ST situation of most translational activity within media translation (see section 2.1.3). Apart from Schäffner (e.g. 2005), Brownlie (2010) and most recently Brook (2012) there is little text-based research that accounts for media texts that merge intersemiotic and interlingual translation and journalistic writing. Subsequently, there are not many established methodological approaches which help dealing with this material. Whilst Schäffner and Brook combine CDA and ethnographic research, Brownlie, based on Bourdieu (1994), uses the notion of positioning to account for the context level (Brownlie 2010: 33). Both approaches seem indeed convincing but bear difficulties regarding the present study. Schäffner and Brook possibly employ ethnographic research partly to forestall the criticism that has been directed at CDA (see section 2.3.5). However, it is impossible to undertake ethnographic research in the context of the present study because here historical material is analysed. A similar problem arises with Brownlie's model where I would be unable to account for the 'personal positioning of the journalist' because for a majority of cases the relevant information is unavailable. Brownlie acknowledges the interrelatedness of the 'positionings' (newspaper, genre, personal positioning of the journalist, addressees, socio-historical positioning of the TC, intercultural positioning, transcultural positioning) (Brownlie 2010: 34) but does not seem to explain how she establishes what positioning influences to what degree at a given moment of time the translation process. A further lacuna is situated in the area of the often mentioned (de-) selection processes which are believed to be central to the news production

process. Yet little research seems to account systematically and on a larger scale for what has been de-selected (exception: van Doorslaer 2010). The present study aligns itself theoretically and in part methodologically with research conducted at the cross-road of CDA and TS in the field of media translations. It also integrates, for reasons that will be justified at a later stage (2.4.2), the media studies approaches of ‘framing’ (Baker 2006) and ‘agenda setting’ into its methodological design.

2.1.3 THE CHARACTERISTICS OF MEDIA TRANSLATION

The aim of this section is to present the characteristics of media translation, namely with regards to the notion of ‘ST’ and the concept of ‘authorship’, and to relate this information to the case study conducted within the framework of this thesis. This section has in part been published (Möckli 2012: 5ff.). Media translation research has shown that translation in the journalistic field has little in common with ‘translation proper’ as defined by Roman Jakobson in 1959/2000 (van Doorslaer 2010: 181). The reason for this lies in the nature of journalism where news items such as articles come into being through the common effort of various people who neither necessarily belong to the same institution nor always know of the involvement of the other. The journalists of a particular newspaper might base their article on a news item provided by a news agency, a news channel, an online source, etc. Furthermore, it might be decided that a multitude of sources would be used and there may be several people working on a text. News agencies and newspaper companies hardly ever employ translators as such; the journalists act as the translators and “translation is not felt to be something essentially dissimilar from the tasks involved in the production of news” (Bassnett and Bielsa 2009: 65) and “direct translation of a text written in one language into another is probably the least common form of media translation” (*ibid.*: 12) To highlight that translation is an integral part of the journalist’s work – and I believe it to be necessary - I will henceforward call the members of this profession journalist-translators. The absence of a ST “challenges established definitions of translation” (*ibid.*) whereas the way in which translated news texts are constructed questions the concept of authorship (*ibid.*: 65) and, to a certain degree, subsequent claims of the translator’s responsibility.

Both the notion of the ST and the concept of authorship are relevant to the case study at hand. The analysis of the collected material revealed that in many instances it is not apparent on what ‘STs’ (i.e. written or oral versions of Goebbels’ speeches) the newspaper articles are based since no indication was given. In other cases it was specified that agency texts or other newspaper articles served as STs. Additionally some media texts seem to be based on oral accounts of the foreign correspondents present at the original speech event – these accounts

were then transmitted through a phone call or by telegram. However, the indications of the sources seem unreliable – when comparing the media texts collected for this study it became obvious that sometimes the same news agency texts were used but different or no indications as to the source were given. Additionally, the indicated STs are often inaccessible so that a comparison between the alleged ST and the TT is impossible. Regarding the concept of authorship, the name(s) of the journalist(s) who wrote a particular media text hardly ever feature with the articles. Indicating authorship seems to have been a less common practise in the inter-war years than nowadays; only editorials explicitated the name of the author. Indeed, it seems to be difficult to do justice to both the intertextual and the multi-source nature of media texts (see section 3.1.2). Translation as an integral part of the news production process is subdued to journalistic norms and requirements. This means that speed, newsworthiness, spatial limitations, stylistic guidelines, genre requirements, etc. have priority over other considerations and affect the translation process (*ibid.*). This indicates that textual changes might not be related to political considerations but are introduced due to necessity. Chapter Five, which discusses factors impacting on the particular makeup of media texts, may help to better understand to what degree political and ideological but also economic and journalistic influences restrain and guide the work of the journalist-translators. One important journalistic practice that needs mentioning at this point is the use of agency texts. Newspapers, as will become evident in the analytical chapters, were (and continue to be) for economic reasons highly dependent on news agencies. These agencies provided them with news in form of agency texts and their use by the papers clearly entails “a considerable amount of transformation of the ST which results in a significantly different content of the target text” (Bassnett and Bielsa 2009: 63).

2.1.4 SECTION REVIEW

The objective of this section was to discuss the interrelatedness of politics, the mass media and translation and to outline approaches that can usefully be applied to the study of this phenomenon. Moreover, it aimed at providing an overview of the characteristics of media translation and at identifying established concepts within TS and other fields which need to be re-considered in media translation. It was explained that the mass media play an important role in the political realm since they inform large sections of the population about political issues but also in part reflect the public opinion on said issues. In that sense, the mass media mediate between politicians and the public. TS already considered media translation within the functionalist approach. However, it was only in the late 1990s and the early 2000s when scholars working with CDA and slightly later Mona Baker (and her narrative approach) started to more explicitly account for the phenomenon of media translation and its

implications for politics. In the wake of the Warwick project and influenced by the sociological turn media translation sparked a more widespread interest. The type of media text analysed within the present study, however, remains under-researched. Only two methodologies have been applied to the kind of text in which inter-lingual translation and journalistic writing (which can also be seen as intersemiotic translation) are interwoven: CDA combined with ethnographic fieldwork or Brownlie's sociologically-inspired 'positioning'. As discussed, both are valuable but pose problems since the material analysed is historical. The production of news (as outlined in section 1.2.3) is anything but straight forward, and involves a considerable amount of reshaping, combining, repacking and manipulating of (textual) material (Bassnett and Bielsa 2009: 117). The complexity is even multiplied in the production of intercultural political media discourse where translation is of paramount importance. Here, a large number of socio-political, economic and profession-related factors come into play and need to be considered. Namely, the barely re-constructible multi ST situations and the existence of collective authorship (which is equally difficult to back trace) deserve careful attention. Other characteristics of media translation, such as the fusion of translational and journalistic tasks as well as cultural, geographical and medium-related restrictions need to be accounted for. In order to highlight the relevance of translation in the media production process I suggested calling the journalists involved 'translator-journalists'. The multi-source situation, the absence of indications of the sources and the transformative use of agency texts, all pose methodological problems. How can STs and TTs be aligned if we do not know what sources were used and if these might be multiple? Moreover, when reconstructing the influence of contextual factors and agents – how do we pinpoint who is responsible for alterations if there is a collective authorship and we have no access to ethnographic data? Such and other questions necessitate careful consideration in the methodological design.

2.2 IDEOLOGY

Section 2.1 described the function of the mass media in the communication between politicians and the public and thereby highlighted the power inherent in this mediating position. This suggests that gaining (part-) control over the mass media can serve political interests. If the media production process is exposed to political (power) struggles, we need to account for ideological issues. This is because "Ideology is an intrinsic feature of the political sphere, since politics exists by virtue of competition between differing values, beliefs, opinions and attitudes concerning the principles, institutions, practices, and policies of government" (Flood 2009: 13). Furthermore, "political actors, including media personnel,

can be assumed to be bearers and communicators of ideological beliefs” (*ibid.*: 9). It seems to be likely then that media products feature traces of ideologies. The following part consists of four sections. Firstly, I will describe the origins of the differing perceptions of the concept of ideology and clarify what definition has been adopted for this thesis. Secondly, I will explain the structures, characteristics and functions of political ideologies within society. Thirdly, I will take a cursory look at the ideologies relevant to this study and finally, I will review the main points discussed in this section.

2.2.1 DEFINITION OF THE CONCEPT

The notion of ideology has various definitions, which leads to uncertainty regarding its ‘correct’ use and understanding. Therefore it is necessary to clarify and define the concept prior to applying it. The objective of this section is to outline the two lines of thoughts which have determined the debate on the notion of ideology and their differing understandings of the concept. Moreover, a working definition of the concept is provided.

The concept was introduced into European culture during the French Enlightenment and carried first a “purely scientific and philosophical meaning” (Barth 1945: 15) designating “a philosophical discipline that was to provide the foundations for all science” (Barth 1945: 1). The concept became used by a broader spectrum of the population, its meaning was transformed and multiplied, its borders blurred. Barth states that “the concept of ideology has developed a variety of possible meanings upon which the users as a rule do not reflect” (1945: 15). Although the definitions and perceptions of ‘ideology’ diverge widely, a common denotation can be singled out. Behind a specific ideology lies “a system of ideas and ideals” (Oxford Dictionary 2010), these ideas and ideals “belong together in a non-random fashion” (Gerring 1997 quoted in Oliver and Johnston 2000: 5) and they are shared by a significant group of people (Freedon 2003: 10).

According to Eagleton there are two main lines of thoughts dividing the concept. The one of which Marx and Engels are the major representatives, “has been much preoccupied with ideas of true and false cognition, with ideology as illusion, distortion and mystification” (Eagleton 1991: 3). According to them, the ruling class, the bourgeoisie, deliberately deceives the working class to maintain and obtain privileges. The pejorative use of the term was continued by representatives of other movements, who accused Marxism itself of being a distorting ideology (Oliver and Johnston 2000: 5). It is a common practise to accuse political opponents of being ideologically driven. Thus, a majority of people does not use the term ideology for ideas and ideals with which they agree (*ibid.*). The other line investigated the concept of ideology from a sociological angle, “concerned more with the functions of

ideas within social life than with their reality or unreality” (Eagleton 1991: 3). Here the notion of ‘ideology’ is employed in a non-pejorative sense – many political scientists and sociologists use it “to refer to the belief system of any social movement” (Oliver and Johnston 2000: 5). The definition adopted here, follows this second tradition of thought. Within the framework of this thesis the notion of ideology is understood a system of ideas “assumed to specifically organize and monitor one form of socially shared mental representations, in other words, the organized evaluative beliefs – traditionally called ‘attitudes’ – shared by a social group” (van Dijk: 1996a: 7). Therefore, it is assumed that ideology is a social phenomenon acting out of and upon society and clearly has the potential to sustain and create power relationships. Secondly, it is presumed that ideology has a cognitive dimension as shared mental representations are involved (van Dijk 2001: 137). The existence of a cognitive dimension indicates that ideology does not exist as a tangible unit and requires an intermediary level to be studied.

2.2.2 THE STRUCTURES & FUNCTIONS OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

This section is concerned with political ideologies and will outline their characteristics and functions. Similar to political discourse political ideologies are ‘political’ because of their function within the political system. Thus, a political ideology can be defined as “a set of ideas which is normative, setting out an ideal, aiming at arousing support on a mass basis for these ideas seeking to agitate in [these ideas’] favour” (Schwarzmantel 2008: 26). Political ideologies offer a broad view on what kind of society should be seen as desirable (*ibid.*) and actively seek support for political actions in order to realise the previously set out ideals (*ibid.*). Pursuing these ideals can consist of “justifying, contesting or changing the social and political arrangements and processes of a political community” (Freedden 2003: 32). According to this wide definition, not only dominant groups, but all political groups promulgate ideologies. To offer a broad view on the socio-political sphere and to argue for or against the maintenance of a given status quo, ideologies need to consist of some core elements. They should “couple understandings of how the world works with ethical, moral, and normative principles that guide personal and collective action” (Oliver and Johnston 2000: 7). The values and norms incorporated by a given ideology are not new products but are selected from a cultural reservoir. The members of a particular group “select [consciously or unconsciously] from the general repertoire of social norms and values those that optimally realize its goals and interests and will use these values as building block for its group ideology” (van Dijk 2001: 138).

Given that several ideologies might feed on the same reservoir of norms and values it is necessarily the particular configuration of norms, values and political concepts that distinguishes ideologies. Norms and values that are deeply rooted within a society are less likely to be (openly) violated by a political group. In this regard, Kallis explains that it is impossible to promote an ideology which is completely in opposition to a society's fundamental values and beliefs if it fails to "create an illusory (or real) congruence" between the two (*ibid.*). We have seen in section 1.3.4, that the NS propagandists used already existing values and beliefs such as for instance 'social solidarity' to make people believe that the government would improve the living conditions of its people. In the name of 'social solidarity', for instance, the *Winterhilfswerk* (winter aid campaign) was launched and institutionalised. While other political currents accord (or pretend to accord) everyone the right for 'social solidarity', National Socialism excluded certain groups, namely the Jews, homosexuals, etc. from accessing this institution. It could be argued that it is the particular selection of social and ethnical groups excluded from social solidarity that contributed to defining National Socialism. This example demonstrates that it is not the existence of a particular idea within society that reveals the underlying ideology but the connections between them.

In the light of the enormous body of literature on the concept of ideology, the above description is necessarily a stark simplification. Some potentially problematic aspects of ideologies will now be discussed as they need to be clarified to appreciate the identification of ideological influences in Chapter Four. Firstly, ideologies are more or less tight or loose systems of ideas. This means, that some systems incorporate a large number of concepts, values and norms waving a tight ideological net that covers many aspects of the political landscape. Conversely, there are rather loose ideologies, consisting of few core values and concepts. Drawing the line between loose ideologies and random accumulations of ideas is potentially difficult. Ideologies, I might add, are also not mutually exclusive. Secondly, since people usually are part of several social groups, they might belong to more than one belief system, have made individual experiences or possess knowledge about a given issue that makes them think outside a given ideological frame and leads to an inconsistent application of the ideology in question (van Dijk 2001: 136). Assuming there is a relation between the ideological background of a text producer and the particular realisation of a textual product, such inconsistencies need to be expected and accounted for when analysing political media texts. Ideologies have an individual component – whilst some might have a very narrow understanding of an ideology-determined issue, others might have a broader view, or have a different understanding of one particular issue. Applied to the material at hand it means that

while the journalists of a newspaper might share a general outlook, they have diverging opinions on certain aspects (e.g. Crozier's and Voigt's views on how to report about the NS-Regime as discussed at the end of section 5.1.3). Finally, certain ideologies possibly emerge as a reaction to or out of a given political reality as has been argued for instance in the case of communism where the suppression of the working class had given rise to Marx's theories. Alternatively, ideologies might change over time because of social and political realities. Regarding this Freeden makes us aware of the "significance of social and historical circumstances in moulding political ideas" (2003: 10). Of course, this is a reciprocal process.

Political ideologies fulfil a number of functions within society. Firstly, if there is more than one, they provide competing interpretations of what facts mean (Freeden 2003: 3). Since it is impossible to account for every aspect of a given reality, there is necessarily a certain degree of simplification involved in this. We have for instance seen in section 1.4.3.2 that simplification was one key strategy in Goebbels' argumentation. Secondly, political ideologies exercise power in that how an issue is perceived by a social group entails political consequences. (*ibid.*: 10). In this respect van Dijk argues that the "main social function of ideologies is the co-ordination of the social practices of group members for the effective realization of the goals of a social group, and the protection of its interests" (1998: 24). This implies that what interpretation of facts is upheld is not random but in accordance with political interests. Obviously, a goal-oriented co-ordination of social practices presupposes a certain degree of consensus on what these goals are. Orhan states in this regard that ideology can "act as a form of social cement, providing social groups, and indeed whole societies, with a set of unifying beliefs and values" (2007: n.p.). Fairclough seems to agree with this in saying "ideology is the prime means of manufacturing consensus" (1989: 4). As we will see when discussing socialism in section 2.2.3, the inability to convince a clear majority of people of socialist thinking led to a cabinet crisis in France at the end of 1937 which paralysed political decision making.

Political ideologies set out an ideal as to how a 'good' and 'desirable' society should be structured and organised and seek to rally mass support in order to legitimise political actions engendering the establishing or maintaining of this 'ideal' society. However, there are individual differences in how people 'perceive' and 'live' ideology. Moreover, ideologies as at least partly social entities are not stable but subject to change. Sub-currents develop into differing directions, assume dominant positions, remain peripheral or disappear. Nonetheless, they provide people for a certain period of time with interpretative frames which help them understand and interpret the world in which they live. As social entities they also create

consensus within a group and might also cause discontent between social groups who have opposing political views.

2.2.3 POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES OF THE INTER-WAR PERIOD

The objective of this section is to provide a brief overview over the different ideologies which populated the political realm of the inter-war period. The descriptions refer to broad ideological families which contain various sub-forms. Therefore they remain very superficial but make reference to and serve as reference points in the discussion of the political outlooks of the newspapers and in terms of the policies adapted by the French and British government in Chapter Four. This section will account for liberalism, conservatism and socialism and look at the totalitarian ideology of communism. National Socialism, also totalitarian, was already described in section 1.3.4 and it is therefore not included in this section. Moreover, we shall take a brief look at what some define as the ideology of appeasement.

2.2.3.1 LIBERALISM

One of the most determining ideologies for central Europe at the time was liberalism. It had developed in response to the destruction of feudalism and its societal structures as well as to the period of ‘Enlightenment’ that followed (Bellamy 1993: 24 ff.). Its core values consist in the assumption that human beings are rational and that the individual, if provided with equal opportunities and liberty of thought, would automatically contribute to the progress of society (Freeden 2003: 81). Society is seen as a voluntary collaboration between individuals and the task of the government is to facilitate communication between individuals (Bellamy 1993: 27). Moreover, those who work hard are assumed to be successful and though the state, of course, has to provide some social security, there should still be a basic motivation to work. Unsurprisingly, many liberals belong(ed) to the middle class – happy to be freed from the aristocracy’s rule and wealthy enough to attain economic success. Many of these principles and values are pillar stones of our modern democratic societies and “the liberal language of rights, democracy and market” is used across most of the major political groupings in the Western world today (*ibid.*: 23). The market, so it was and by some still is assumed, would regulate itself. However, liberalism and many of its underlying beliefs were tested in the crisis years after the stock market collapse (see section 1.1.3). This shifted liberalism in some countries into the direction of social liberalism (*ibid.*: 32 ff.). The realisation that people could run into social difficulties without being responsible for it led to the promotion of social reform and eventually the establishment of the welfare state in the United Kingdom (Freeden 2003: 82). However, a punitive approach, i.e. the ‘punishing’ of those unable to support themselves by lowering their living standards in comparison to those

who are working, was still maintained. In the politically polarised France, such beliefs were to some extent shared but taken further and mostly promoted by political groupings far more on the left (Bellamy 1993: 35).

2.2.3.2 CONSERVATISM

The scholarly debate about the definition of conservatism seems to feature more discontent than in the case of liberalism. Freeden for instance argues that conservatism changes its attitudes to key concepts that remain stable in most other ideologies such as “human nature, distributive justice and the relationship between the human and the individual” (2003: 87). This contributes to the difficulty in finding a definition that applies over the course of time. However, he maintains that two threats differentiate conservatism from other ideologies: an anxiety about change and the need to distinguish between natural and unnatural changes as well as the belief that social order is based on laws that are beyond the control of humans (*ibid.*: 88.). In contrast, O’Sullivan states the following: “Conservatism is not opposed to change, as it is sometimes thought, or even to radical change, in some situations: what it *is* opposed to is change which is advocated on preconceived ideological grounds” (1993: 50). Problematic in O’Sullivan’s definition, at least in light of the ideology definition adapted in this thesis, is the claim that conservatism is in opposition to ‘ideology-based argumentation’ for surely conservatism as an ideology itself does not oppose its own reasoning. Though there is some truth in O’Sullivan’s statement that conservatism sometimes allows for radical change (e.g. Thatcherism – but that can also be seen as a re-establishing of ‘natural’ change (Freeden 2003: 90)), we shall assume that conservatism, in a majority of instances, opposes radical and fast change. In doing so, conservatism helps maintaining the status quo (Freeden 2003: 88-89). This status is seen as providing a stable social order which is not man-made but imposed or given by “god, nature, history, biology and economics (...)” (*ibid.*: 88). These ‘authorities’ are often invoked in conservative argumentation. In France and Britain many conservatives estimated during the inter-war years that communism constituted the greater or at least more immediate danger than National Socialism. And Hitler, so they argued, had at any rate established some kind of order in an unstable nation. However, they certainly disagreed with some of the regime’s actions such as the persecution of clerics for instance. Moreover, the increasingly evident threat to the respective national security was reason for concern.

2.2.3.3 SOCIALISM

Unlike liberalism in which the individual is the basic social unit, socialism argues that humans are defined by their social interaction and the ‘group’ is therefore the central element

of society (Freedon 2003: 83). One core value of socialism is the equality of the group members and subsequently the abolition of hierarchical structures and the fair distribution of wealth (*ibid.*). Society should then be structured around work, and welfare was to be provided for those in need (*ibid.*: 84). Having experienced increasing popularity in the course of the 19th century in the UK, socialism ran into unexpected difficulties during the inter-war period. Its social reforms struggled to tackle the economic and social problems brought about by the Great Depression (see section 1.1.3) (Wright 1993: 87). In Britain the Labour Party (representing Socialist ideology) lost its majority in parliament in 1931 and was replaced by a conservative government. France, characterised by an increasing political polarisation, experienced a succession of governments throughout the inter-war years. From 1936 to 1937 socialists formed a coalition with the radicals (conservatives), the so-called *Front populaire*, under the leadership of Léon Blum. However, opinions were deeply divided regarding whether or not France should take sides for the Spanish republicans or not intervene in the conflict at all (see section 1.1.3 for more information about the Spanish Civil war). Blum was forced to step down in June 1937. The new coalition government under Chautemps was literally unable to take any political decision until March 1938. The shift of the coalition to the centre-right was finalised when Edouard Daladier succeeded Chautemps as Prime Minister. The French cabinet crises probably contributed to the non-intervention of France when faced with the Anschluss of Austria (see section 1.1.3).

2.2.3.4 COMMUNISM

Closely connected to socialism – at least theoretically - is communism. Whilst the communist revolution was first carried by the working class, the socialist ideals were soon distorted. Under the leadership of Lenin and more so Stalin, communism in the Soviet Union started to acquire totalitarian and elitist features when large numbers of opponents were murdered to the ‘benefit’ of the revolution (Freedon 2003: 91). The communism propagated by Marx was different from how it was practiced by Lenin and Stalin. However, during the last five years of the inter-war period it was this new communism which started to cast its shadow over Europe. Like National Socialism ‘authority’ was associated with the state and a leader figure supposedly looked after the well-being of the population (*ibid.*: 93). The public and the private sphere collapsed and the government assumed control over every aspect of peoples’ lives (*ibid.*: 91). Liberty in fact meant to be free of other, false ideologies (*ibid.*: 93). The individual did not matter when the well-being of the mass was endangered and thousands of people died in the name of the communist revolution. There clearly are similarities between National Socialism and communism, both totalitarian ideologies, which shared many beliefs and mostly so their brutal methods. However, it was the alleged

difference and opposition of these two ideologies which seemed to polarise the political debate in Europe during the 1930s.

2.2.3.5 APPEASEMENT

The original meaning of appeasement meant “the attainment of peace, the settlement of strife, the alleviation of discord, the tranquilisation of relations between states (Riff 1990: 25). However, in the aftermaths of WW2, this meaning changed profoundly. Already in the 1940s the politicians representing appeasement politics, foremost Chamberlain and Daladier, were held responsible for what was seen as misguided and naive attempts to prevent war with Germany through territorial and other concessions (Hucker 2011: 2). This view was reversed by some historians in the 1960s and 1970s when appeasement politics were re-interpreted as a rational strategy by ‘good’ man who tried to make the best decisions for their nation(s) in a difficult situation (Bruce 2008: 482 f.). Perhaps less ‘judgmental’ is Hucker’s definition of appeasement as “Avoiding war by altering the Versailles system to accommodate peacefully the grievances of the revisionist powers” and the imperative avoidance of war (2011: 2). It is subject to historical debate *if* and *how much* pro-fascists ideologies, anti-communist ideologies but also the belief in collective security, pacifism, war anxiety but also economic and military necessity constituted part of the appeasement ideology or influenced appeasement politics (e.g. Hucker 2011: 1 ff., Riff 1990: 25 ff., Bruce 2008: 481 ff.).

3.2.4 SECTION REVIEW

The objective of this section was threefold. Firstly, I intended to outline the origins and the two main traditions of understanding the concept of ideology in section 3.2.1. In addition, I explained how ideology was defined in the framework of this thesis. Secondly, section 3.2.2 aimed at describing the structures and functions of political ideologies. Finally, I briefly outlined the political ideologies relevant to this study and explicitly linked them to the politics in central Europe during the inter-war period in section 3.2.3. We have seen that two lines of thought divide the scholarly debate about ideology. On the one hand, works inspired by Marxism see ideology as a means to suppress the masses by smothering over social inequalities and by making them “appear as normal, necessary and congruous” (Freeden 2003: 5). Here, ideology has a pejorative sense. On the other hand, there are scholars who are more interested in the functions of ideology within society and they define the concept in more neutral, non-pejorative terms. The definition adopted in the framework of this thesis is in line with this second tradition. In the second part, political ideologies have been investigated in more detail. Likewise other ideologies, they set out an ideal of what societal

order is seen as desirable. Moreover, they seek to arouse mass support for particular policies that should be adopted. These policies serve to achieve the shared political ‘ideal’ which accords them a function within the political system and distinguishes them as ‘political ideologies’. In that sense political ideologies then justify, contest or seek to change existing socio-political realities. Furthermore, political ideologies relate political concepts, norms and values in very particular ways and it is this configuration, more than the elements that distinguishes (political) ideologies from each other. One of the main functions of (political) ideologies is their ability to provide interpretative frames. It is here that the potential and the danger of political ideologies lie: interpretative frames shape how we perceive reality and how we act upon political questions – the discursive construction of reality, a process through which ideologies are communicated, has political effects. The second main function of political ideology then is precondition to its aim to arouse mass support: ideologies generate consensus. Several ideologies populated the political stage of Europe during the 1930s and shaped political debates and actions. In Britain certain social advancements had been brought about by liberalism (e.g. Parliament Acts of 1911 limiting the power of the House of Lords and the welfare state) but the politicians in power after 1931 harboured conservative beliefs. We have seen that the conservatives were mainly interested in maintaining the status quo but in the course of the 1930s grew increasingly concerned about the threat posed by the NS-Regime. In France, the ideological polarisation of the political sphere engendered political instability because none of the parties was able to establish a clear majority. The popular front government, a coalition of socialists and (conservative) radicals, exemplified this phenomenon. The increasing threat of the NS-Regime finally tipped the balance in favour of the conservatives in 1938. Both the British and the French government adopted policies inspired by appeasement ideology. However, as outlined in section 1.1, these beliefs came to the fore and determined the French and British politics towards NS-Germany for differing reasons. Nonetheless, both nations seem to believe or at least hope that Hitler could be appeased by territorial concessions and thereby a new global war could be avoided. The ideological clash between communism and National Socialism dominated the political debate of Europe in the 1930s and was the reason for many anxieties and simultaneously justification for political actions that were adopted or dismissed. Ideologies clearly played a dominant role in the politics of the 1930s which is reflected in the political media discourse of this period. Evidently the present project which studies this media discourse is well advised to account for these ideological struggles.

2.3 IDEOLOGY & CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS (CDA)

Ideology, due to its cognitive dimension, cannot be observed but needs to be inferred from more visible manifestations of it. According to Teun van Dijk ideologies find “their clearest expression in language” (1996a: 3). An approach that studies ideology in language is CDA. Both the theoretical and the methodological framework of this project are greatly inspired by this approach which necessitates its detailed discussion. In the following part I first provide a brief overview of CDA and I then describe the underlying principles governing all CDA work. Thirdly, how CDA aims to reveal ideological influences through linguistically inspired analysis is investigated. Finally, I discuss some of the criticism directed at CDA and how it was addressed in order to establish where potential pitfalls for the methodological design lie.

2.3.1 CDA – AN OVERVIEW

The origins of CDA lie in Critical Linguistics (CL), an approach developed at the end of the 1970s mainly at the University of East Anglia. Scholars such as Roger Fowler and Gunther Kress aimed at unveiling ideological influences in discourse by applying Michael Halliday’s Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG) (Sheyholislami 2001: 1). Over the years what has become known as CDA drew on approaches from numerous disciplines, such as classical rhetoric, text linguistics, socio-linguistics, pragmatics and social theories such as politics, history and sociology, to enhance the field (Wodak and Meyer 2001: 3). Currently the most prominent representatives are (a) Teun van Dijk with his socio-cognitive model; (b) Ruth Wodak who draws on socio-linguistics and who has developed a discourse historical approach to CDA; and (c) Norman Fairclough, whose theory about the relationship of language and power has remained central to the field of CDA. Within TS, CDA went not unnoticed and as early as 1990 Hatim and Mason published their influential work *Discourse and the Translator*. Other scholars such as Christina Schäffner (2004, 2005), María Calzada Pérez (2001), Robert Valdeón (2005, 2010) and Jeremy Munday (2007) followed and explored new avenues as we have seen in section 2.2.

2.3.2 PRINCIPLES

In the following part I will outline the underlying assumptions of CDA, based on the presentation of the eight principles by Fairclough and Wodak (1997). (1) First of all, CDA sees itself as an interventionist approach in that it is concerned with social problems and aims at unveiling unequal power relationships. This means that CDA scholars aim at empowering those who are disadvantaged in society. What I personally aim at doing in this regard is to open up such discussions by contributing to the highlighting of the large variety of factors – among them translation - that shape discourse. (2) Secondly, power relations are

seen as being discursive, i.e. they take place in and through discourse. Subsequently, the analysis of discourse reveals the power relations it enacts. (3) Thirdly, the scholars of CDA argue that discourse properties are not arbitrary but determined by social conditions, i.e. discursal and social conventions determine how to behave in, react to and interpret communication (Fairclough 1989: 17). Therefore they speak of a social determination of language and a linguistic determination of society (Fairclough 1989: 17; Wodak *et al.* 1999: 8). In that sense discourse constitutes society and culture. (4) Fourthly, discourses are seen as ideological work in that they reproduce the underpinning ideological beliefs. Additionally, ideology is communicated and therefore partly acts through discourse. We have seen in section 2.1 and 2.2 that a substantial part of the political communication between the public and politicians took (and takes) place through the mass media in the 1930s and I also pointed out that the political debate in the inter-war years was dominated by ideological beliefs. Subsequently the object of the present study, i.e. the political media discourse of the 1930s, was underpinned and enacted by these ideological beliefs. (5) Discourse is seen as ‘historical’. This means that discourse is connected to previous, contemporary and subsequent discourses. This is very evidently the case – in his speeches Goebbels frequently alludes to previous discourses, for instance the debates that took place during the *Paris Peace conference*. In turn, Goebbels’ speeches are frequently referred to in various media discourses to which he also refers in subsequent speeches. As pointed out in section 1.2.1 this situating of discourse within other discourses allows the wider contextualisation of ‘text’ in their contexts. This phenomenon and its implications have also been widely discussed by Schäffner (2005). (6) The link between the text and the society is mediated. This alludes to the cognitive dimension of discourse and the processing of discourse and indicates the necessity of studying phenomena - such as ideology – which intervene in the production, transmission and reception of discourse. (7) CDA is necessarily interpretative and explanatory. This highlights that the relationship between discourse and society needs to be systematically studied and such studies need to take account of contextual factors. In other words, presupposing that language and language use is socially determined, the CDA approach assumes that on the basis of a linguistic description of discourse properties, the cognitive processes of the participants can be inferred or interpreted and explained with regard to the social context and the relations between the participants (Fairclough 1989: 26). (8) Finally, discourse then is a form of social action which allows the discourse participants and the analysts of discourse to actively shape the society to which they belong.

2.3.3 THE DISCURSIVE MANIFESTATIONS OF IDEOLOGY

CDA, based on its principles, argues that social structures and entities, such as ideologies, are produced and reproduced in discourse (and in turn affect society). The question then is how ideology can be detected in language use. In this regard, I find it useful to draw on van Dijk's works, which explain the relationship between discourse, ideologies and opinions. He defines ideology as a system of ideas "assumed to specifically organise and monitor one form of socially shared mental representations, in other words, the organized evaluative beliefs – traditionally called 'attitudes' – shared by a social group" (van Dijk: 1996a: 7). Evaluative beliefs relate to issues which cannot be "settled by objective and generally accepted criteria of truth" (*ibid.*: 9). They are the result of judgements based on values and norms and translate into direct and indirect expressions of opinions (*ibid.*: 12). To forestall or, more so, respond to criticism here, I should add that van Dijk obviously does not claim that there is 'objective truth' or 'knowledge' as such. He defines these concepts also as social entities (for a discussion, see van Dijk 1996b). If the members of a social group share the same ideological background, they express similar opinions and the larger the community that shares certain beliefs the more likely they become what we refer to as 'knowledge' or 'truth'. Such socially shared opinions are general and relatively stable. Personal opinions, on the contrary, are dynamic ad-hoc constructs based on socially shared opinions and are therefore controlled by these shared opinions (*ibid.*: 15). Whereas an opinion relates to a single evaluative belief, attitudes are larger and more complex structures of opinions (*ibid.*). In this sense, ideology can be inferred via cognitive structures that become more visible in discourse than ideology that is from direct and indirect expressions of opinions. When wanting to demonstrate what kind of ideology was involved in the production of a particular text or discourse (considering the positivistic definition of ideology its implication is presupposed), it is important to reconsider that (political) ideologies do not necessarily contain differing concepts, values and norms but are distinguishable through the particular configuration of these elements. In fact, "political ideologies are generally conceptualised as sets of arguments" (Flood 2009: 13). After identifying these sets of arguments (i.e. the specific configuration) they then need to be related to the "long-standing, typology of traditions (currents) of political thought which are transnational in nature" (*ibid.* 11&12). Political discourse as a vehicle of political action is particularly 'argumentative' in nature. This means that political discourse (including political media discourse) is concerned with opinions on political issues and tries to rally support for particular political actions. In this regard it is necessary to directly or indirectly challenge, maybe discredit differing arguments and use similar or congruent arguments to reinforce one's own point. In other words,

political discourse is also dialectical in nature. Applied to the textual material analysed within the framework of this study I would then argue that the (de-) selection of Goebbels' arguments and their subsequent re-contextualisation into the new discourse at once allows an insight into the effectiveness of Goebbels' discourse in the French and British media and simultaneously unravels the evaluations of these arguments by these newspapers thereby revealing their own viewpoints.

2.3.4 DRAWBACKS AND POTENTIALS OF CDA

Both the interventionist ambition of CDA and its theoretical and methodological approaches have provoked criticism from scholars of and outside CDA. In the following part, I will discuss the main points of criticism that have been raised and show to what extent CDA has addressed these issues. Moreover, I explain how I will address them in my research design. However, this discussion does not claim completeness but is nonetheless relevant since addressing the criticism will improve the methodology applied within the present project.

Henry Widdowson has pointed out several critical aspects of CDA in a number of articles (most importantly in *Discourse Analysis – a Critical View*) (1995; 1996; 1998 listed in Haig 2004: 142). Haig, a CDA scholar, summarises one of Widdowson's most detrimental arguments as follows: "The beliefs of analysts are ideologically biased, leading to analysts reading meaning into, rather than out of texts" (2004: 142). Widdowson substantiates his claim by saying that an analysis would necessitate the evaluation of several alternative readings of the text (1995: 169) and also alludes to the CDA scholar's open commitment to empower dominated social groups. (Widdowson paraphrased in Haig 2004: 142). These arguments were countered by Fairclough who stressed that no research could be free of ideological bias and that CDA at least openly stated its commitment. In addition he pointed out the "open-endedness of results required in the principles of CDA" (Wodak *et al.* 2001: 17). Nonetheless, these accusations weigh heavy as they attack CDA at its very heart. Meaning, as is commonly agreed, is not stable and resides therefore not exclusively in the text or in the author's mind but is constructed and re-constructed by each receiver of the text (Haig 2004: 144). This could lead to the assumption that there are an infinite number of interpretations for each text and hence, that CDA is entirely subjective and only "reads meaning into the text". Conversely, we observe in everyday life that to a certain extent we agree on what a particular statement, text or argument 'means'. This is because "cultural and historical constraints narrow down that indeterminacy" (Freeden 2003: 50). In that sense, the meaning of, say a political speech, is understood in a similar way within a given social group at one particular moment in time. This indicates the existence of spatio-temporal and socio-

ideological (a right-wing politician might interpret the speech of a left-wing politician differently than a politician sharing the same view point, i.e. ideology) restrictions acting upon meaning. Nonetheless there is a level of subjectivity involved in the construction of meaning. However, meaning cannot be entirely 'relative' since this would render impossible communication altogether. Having established that there certainly is common understanding of talk and text up to a certain degree (although within the aforementioned limitations), it can be concluded that an approximation of the meaning of a given stretch of discourse can be established for a particular social group at a particular moment in time by taking into consideration, what is commonly called 'context'. Context in the discourse-historical approach to CDA has four distinctive levels: firstly, "the immediate language or text-internal co-text"; secondly, "the intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between utterances, texts, genres and discourses"; thirdly, "the extralinguistic (social) level which is called the 'context of situation'"; and finally, "the broader socio-political and historical context" (Wodak *et al.* 2001: 31). By taking all four levels equally into consideration, the risk of bias should be minimized (*ibid.*). Furthermore, in an attempt to bridge the gap between the analysts' reading of a text and the reading of the producer and receiver, the Vienna School of CDA has started to integrate ethnographical field research into their studies (Wodak *et al.* 1999). Thereby, data regarding the understanding of discourses by the producing and receiving participants can be gathered and be mirrored against the results of the textual analysis. Furthermore, Haig admits that CDA (and other disciplines) could benefit from subjecting "their analyses of texts to at least a mild form of falsification by examining alternative possible readings and seeking evidence to support them" (2004: 142). One aspect that appears to be frequently overlooked in this discussion is, in my opinion, that critics of CDA often point out one single textual example (for instance the use of the pronoun 'we' instead of 'I' in a particular sentence) and then argue that one cannot relate this convincingly to a particular ideology. What they seem to not consider enough is that CDA scholars are looking for patterns. It might be useful then to stress the repeated occurrence of particular linguistic and textual features when discussing the ideological influences of texts. What I will moreover propose in terms of the research design as presented in section 3.3, is to follow Wodak's suggestion of a triangulation of the context. This thesis, as its title and research questions suggest, accounts extensively for different contextual components and thereby increases the viability of the results. Instead of integrating ethnographical data, which I cannot collect, I will by way of example analyse archival correspondence of the prime news (and translation) producers, i.e. the foreign correspondents and the editors.

Another of Widdowson's criticism is directed at the biased selection of texts. He accuses

CDA scholars of only choosing those texts for their analyses which confirm their beliefs (Haig 2004: 142; Blommaert 2005: 31). Indeed, no recommendations or established processes on how to collect data exist within CDA (Wodak *et al.* 2001: 28) The biased selection of texts could be overcome by establishing the representativeness of samples, by the employment of statistical survey methods, or by explaining the protocol of selection (Haig 2004: 147). However, I would argue that the interventionist stance taken by the approach, i.e. the aim of wanting to “investigate social inequality” as expressed in language, seems to indeed limit (and therefore bias) the variety of texts that is looked at. Texts already considered as ‘empowering’ are rarely analysed by CDA scholars and hence, linguistic expressions of non-dominant ideologies attract far less attention. The study of such texts however, could give useful (positive) indications on how for instance minorities could be ‘empowered’. This bias seems to be especially dominant within Translation Studies, where many CDA-inspired analyses focus on mis-representations of non-European-American nations only. In addition, this one-sidedness does not do justice to the dialectical nature of discourses, which constantly inspire each other. In this regard I would like to highlight that my study complements existing research on translation into and under NS-Germany and adds to what little we know about the translation of texts from NS-Germany into other languages. Moreover, I will provide a detailed description and justification of how the material was selected and collected and what implications this might have in terms of the results (see section 3.2).

Yet another point of criticism that has been expressed by Schegloff (1997 quoted in Blommaert 2005: 32) relates to the concept of context. In his view the selection of which contextual factors are to be considered for the interpretation of a given text or discourse is questionable in many cases since their relevance is taken for granted rather than explained. He argues that only those contextual elements to which the participants recurrently refer should be accounted for (*ibid.*). Wodak’s discourse-historical approach, which takes into account four different contextual levels, can be seen as a response to this. She also argues in a keynote speech given in 2000 that it is especially at the level of context where CDA scholars should recur to social theories such as provided by history, politics, sociology and psychology. This does, however, still only provide a very general guideline on how to select among the contextual factors. In this regard I will discuss the conceptually important difference between text and context in section 3.1.4 and I will provide detailed information about the context levels I examined in section 3.3.

2.3.5 SECTION REVIEW

CDA combines linguistically oriented theories with social theories in order to explain certain formal features of texts. An analysis based on the CDA approach is guided by a number of underlying principles. CDA assumes that social realities are reflected in discourse and that, in turn discourse affects social realities. The relationship between a given text and society is mediated and can therefore not be directly observed. Linking the two together necessitates inference through interpretation and explanation. This also means that factors residing outside the text have to be taken into consideration. In terms of their methodology, some approaches are more inspired by linguistic theories whilst others have an emphasis on social theories. A majority of them are at least partly informed by Fairclough's tripartite model. It consists of a descriptive, an interpretative and an explanatory level. Firstly, textual features are linguistically described; secondly, the meaning(s) of the text is established by taking into account contextual factors; and thirdly, the CDA scholars investigate how the textual features reflect social realities and how this potentially affects society. Based on van Dijk's socio-cognitive CDA approach, I have explained how expressions of opinion on the lexico-semantic and the syntactical-grammatical level as well as in macro-textual structures are believed to reveal the influence of ideology. In order to do so, the notion of evaluative and socially shared beliefs has been explored. In the present thesis ideological influences are analysed in terms of the argumentative structure of the media texts. More precisely, the selection and de-selection of arguments used by Goebbels to justify actions and claims will be scrutinised. Finally, I have discussed the main criticism directed at CDA and how CDA scholars have addressed this criticism. The reproach to CDA of merely reading (ideologically coloured) meaning into texts has been adequately dealt with in that a number of methodological amendments have been suggested and in part been implemented. In line with this the present thesis will outline a detailed context model and include results from archival research and from socio-historical studies. Moreover, the data selection and collection protocols will be explained in detail.

2.4 AGENDA-SETTING & FRAMING


This section introduces two media studies approaches, agenda setting and framing, which I believe can fruitfully complement existing research in media translation. Agenda setting research suggests that the relative salience placed on an issue by the media determines how much importance the public assigns to this issue which in turn influences policy making (Dearing and Rogers 1996: 8, McCombs and Shaw 1972: 177). The quantitative measuring of the reporting of a given issue in the media in cross-cultural studies compares to existing

research in TS which measures translation flows. If we contextualise media translation flows within agenda-setting research, we can demonstrate that the (de-) selection of media texts for translation has an impact on politics. Framing research argues that how an issue is characterised in the media can have an influence on how it is received by the audience because it suggests certain ways of assessing an issue and excludes others (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007: 11). Applied to the present study I would say that whether the media for instance framed Goebbels' Danzig speech (17 June 1939) in terms of the peaceful messages it conveyed or in terms of the threats it contained affected its reception. Framing research is interested in *how* interpretative frames are established. One way of doing so is the (de-) selection of Goebbels' arguments for translation but also their re-contextualisation within the TTs. Apart from providing an apt instrument to analyse how translation contributes to the framing of issues, frame analysis also constitutes an intermediary level to study ideological influences. Section 2.4.1 describes briefly the process of media agenda-setting. It focuses then on explaining on how the media agenda is set. The present thesis cannot study the interplay between how the media agenda is set and how particular issues are received by the public. This would necessitate a far larger research project. However, by demonstrating how translation is relevant to the setting of the media agenda a basis for the investigation of the reception of 'translated' media texts is provided. Section 2.4.2 explains the emergence of the framing concept and provides a definition. Section 2.4.3 discusses the relationship between ideology and framing and section 2.4.4 explains, based on Baker's (2006) application of the concept, how framing can be used to analyse the role of translation in mediating discourse.

2.4.1 AGENDA-SETTING

The objective of this section is to briefly present the relationship between the public, the mass media and politics from the perspective of agenda-setting research. Moreover, the section will explain how agenda-setting studies analyse 'media-agendas' and what factors need to be accounted for. Agenda-setting research dates back to 1922 when Lippmann first postulated the existence of a causal relationship between the agenda of the mass media and the agenda of the public (Dearing and Rogers 1996: 9). Researchers in this field argue that how much salience is given to an issue by the mass media affects the importance the public and political stakeholders assign to it (McCombs and Shaw 1972: 177). This presupposes that there is a hierarchy of issues in the news and that whatever issue is at the top of the hierarchy at a given moment in time is likely to be more politically effective than the others (Dearing and Rogers 1996: 3). Agenda-setting then is a political process through which the proponents of an issue seek to gain the attention of the media, the public and the politicians in order to obtain a 'political' response in form of a political action such as the

implementation of a new law or an increasing in funding, etc. (*ibid.*: 1). The importance of an issue changes over time depending on who is successful in setting the agenda, what other issues are promoted in this competition of interests and whether the proponents are able to generate new information on the issue (*ibid.*: 3-5).



(Source: Dearing and Rogers 1996: 5)

FIGURE 2: The Three Main Components of the Agenda-Setting Process

The present study will tentatively analyse how the media agenda was set in France and Britain during the inter-war period in terms of the issue ‘Goebbels’. Goebbels is seen as partially representing the problem of the Third Reich as a nation seeking to expand its territory through militaristic action. As highlighted in the introduction to section 2.4, translation is seen as the means by which the ‘issue Goebbels’ travelled from the German source event to the French and British political media discourse. What is measured here is then the setting of the media-agenda by (de-) selecting the issue for translation. The study does not analyse how this affected the public or the policy agenda but proposes a number of hypotheses in this regard. Apart from this mutual influence of the three spheres, there are other factors influencing the media production, transmission and reception. As illustrated by Figure 2, agents of any of the three spheres have prior personal experiences which affect the reception of a given issue as does the personal communication on the issues with others. ‘Personal experiences and the interpersonal communication’ are only accounted for in so far that the general attitudes of France and Britain towards the NS-Regime in the 1930s - presented in section 1.1 based on research of historians – will be considered. Media agenda studies measure the importance assigned to an issue by the different media, but are also interested in learning how and why a particular issue attracted more interest than the rest. Since the media report on real-life events it is assumed that the relative importance of these events in the real world has a certain effect on whether or not it is reported on (*ibid.*: 5 ff.). In order to account for this, real-life indicators, i.e. “a variable that measures more or less objectively the degree of severity or risk of a social problem” are usually identified and used

as a point of comparison (Dearing and Rogers 1996: 28). Though research so far has shown that such variables are neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause for an issue to attract media attention, the present study accounts for the real-life importance of the issue by investigating the number of reports on Goebbels' speeches in the German press. This is only an indirect indicator but it allows us at least to gauge how many speeches Goebbels might have given and how important these events were for the German press. There are many other factors and actors that influence the setting of the media agenda. Among them we find established institutions such as a generally recognised leading newspaper for instance, or important politicians such as the Prime Minister (*ibid.*: 31 ff.). It is important to account for them by analysing the media production environment. This corresponds with what CDA, DTS and sociological approaches to TS also call for. In the present study I will conduct a detailed contextual analysis. Chapter Five in particular will provide important cues for who sets when and why the media agenda. In terms of the actual measuring process different practices have been established. Some studies count the number of story column inches in a set newspaper, others count the number of front page stories (*ibid.*: 35 ff.). These numbers and the subsequently designed graphs are always 'gross' indicators of the media interest but have nonetheless revealed pertinent results that were also practically applied to influence electoral behaviour (*ibid.*). In the present study the topic frequency will be measured by comparing the number of days on which each of the newspapers published an article or articles on Goebbels' speeches. The focus lies not only on the comparison between the newspapers but also between the nations. The results are presented in Chapter Four.

2.4.2 DEFINING FRAMING

The origins of the framing concept are twofold. It evolved in cognitive psychology in the 1970s through Gregory Bateson's observation of the communicative behaviour of schizophrenic patients. So-called frames, in connection with previously gained knowledge, enable humans for instance to differentiate between imagination and reality or to understand metaphors (Lengauer 2007: 93). Framing also has its roots in sociology, where the concept was introduced by Goffman (Oliver and Johnston 2000: 3). Whereas psychology is interested in frames on the individual level, sociological research sees frames as socially shared entities, which are observable in communication at the societal level (Lengauer 2007: 93). Broadly speaking, when applied to the study of the mass media, the concept refers to a process by which e.g. an event is presented to the public in a way that influences the public's perception of it, thereby encouraging particular interpretations of the event and simultaneously dismissing a large number of alternative interpretations. Goffman emphasised the importance of linguistic analysis for framing research (Oliver and Johnston 2000: 3) and thereby made

visible the concept's ability to elucidate how social reality is constructed through discourse. Framing has a strong focus on the analysis of the textual organisation taking into account information and argumentation structures. It therefore provides an intermediate level through which ideological influences can be studied. Hence, its application within CDA approaches is germane and complementary. Within Translation Studies framing has most explicitly been applied by Baker in 2006 but it also features in other media translation studies such as for instance van Doorslaer's article on the effects of language and (non-) translation on the media newsroom published in 2009.

The application of the concept across disciplines such as media studies, sociology and psychology resulted in a multitude of definitions. Some scholars plead for a more unified research paradigm (Entman 2004), others see an advantage in the variety of approaches that frame analysis unifies (D'Angelo 2002). The most widespread definition adopted is probably Entman's. Framing is "to select some aspects of a perceived reality and to make them more salient in the communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described" (Entman 1993: 52). De Vreese describes framing as a dynamic process consisting of three distinct parts: "frame building, frame setting and the individual and societal consequences of framing" (2005: 51). Frame building refers to the construction of the frame by the communicating institution or person. Regarding media texts, various journalistic factors such as editorial policies, journalistic norms and values, as well as extra-journalistic factors influence this stage of the framing process (de Vreese 2005: 52). Again in reference to the present study, this necessitates a thorough contextual analysis. Frame setting designates "the interplay between media frames and individuals' prior knowledge and predispositions" (*ibid.*). The prior knowledge of an individual, which has been acquired through experience made when growing up in a given culture, organises the individuals' "knowledge about the world and [the individual] uses this knowledge to predict interpretations and relationships regarding new information, events and experiences" (Tannen 1993: 16). Such structures of expectations are also called 'schemata' (Baker 2006: 105) or in Goffman's terms 'frameworks' (Baker 2006: 106) and influence how information is processed and interpreted. They are to a high degree culture-specific, which explains why texts need to be adapted when transposed into a different cultural context to obtain a similar response. Frames play on these schemata by "activating knowledge" and "stimulating stocks of values" (Capella and Jameison 1997: 47 quoted in de Vreese 2006: 53) thereby fostering certain ways of interpreting a given text. Framing effects then occur on the individual and societal level and can translate themselves into changes in behaviour, attitude, etc. (de

Vreese 2005: 52). Frames, although only becoming effective when interpreted in the intended way, are to a certain degree embodied in texts. Only a particular set of textual and visual elements in a given text serve as framing devices whereas others are, at least in the journalistic field, “core news facts” (de Vreese 2005: 53). Both, frame setting and framing effects relate to the criticism Widdowson raised with regards to CDA that I discussed and responded to in section 2.3.6.

2.4.3 IDEOLOGY AND FRAMING

The objective of this section is to very briefly discuss the relationship between framing and ideology and to explain why it is useful to use frame analysis within the present study. A number of scholars (Oliver and Johnston 2000; Entman 2004, Flood 2009) have accused frame analysis of failing to address the conceptual differentiation between frames and ideology. As was established in section 2.1 the mass media and its representatives are political actors and necessarily communicate ideologies directly or indirectly. Therefore, approaches analysing media discourse cannot afford to neglect ideological factors. Both concepts are associated with ‘interpretative frames’, which they provide for a certain section of the public. Frames, as outlined in section 2.4.2, define particular situations. This, however, does not happen randomly but is influenced by ideologies, which “determine what situational elements need to be considered, how these elements are interpreted and evaluated and what consequences should follow” (Schnabel in Greve *et al.* 2008: 95). In that sense, ideologies determine what frame is applied to a certain situation or issue and constitute “cultural resources for framing activity” (Snow and Benford 2000: 9). Furthermore, frames are “comprised, at least in part, of strands of one or more ideologies” (*ibid.*). The difference between ideology and framing might be best explained by using an example. I have argued in section 2.4.1 that different groups might apply differing frames to an issue. However, it is also possible that they apply the same frame but draw different conclusions from it. Whilst both communists and conservatives in France highlighted the German potential for aggression, the communists concluded that an alliance with the Soviet - Union would solve the problem whilst the conservatives sought remedy in mutual assistance agreements with other ‘capitalist’ nations. These differing positions can be explained when relating the sets of arguments they invoke to ideologies. In the present case it seems rather obvious – the communists seek help from the communist nation whilst the conservatives look for allies with less radical ideas. In other words, the concept of framing conceptualizes *how* a problem is presented whereas the concept of ideology explains *why* it is presented as such. A further point to consider with regards to the two concepts is, that framing can “function as remedial work” (Snow and Benford 2000: 10). In section 2.3.2 I described how ideologies sometimes

need to create an illusionary congruency between existing values and beliefs, and beliefs that they aim to introduce into society. The same strategy is applied when reality contradicts what is postulated by ideologues. When for instance communist leaders claim to create a better society but people experience this differently there is a need to make the two compatible. Simplifying this process to a large extent, this might be realised by an extensive release of news items describing and showing the happiness of the population (agenda setting and framing) or by shifting the blame on external factors. Framing strategies are very helpful in this respect as they enable the text author to guiding the audience' interpretation of issues to a certain degree.

2.4.4 FRAMING STRATEGIES

Frame analysis can function as an intermediate level to study ideological influences in media texts. Referring back to Entman's definition of the concept as stated under 2.4.2, frame analysis has to be concerned with what aspects of reality have been (de-) selected for reporting and how they have been made more or less salient than others. In this respect Lengauer suggests that media texts should be analysed on a formal and on a content level.




FIGURE 3: Lengauer's Framing Model

(SOURCE: LENGAUER 2007: 97)

Formal features such as the prominence given to an article within the newspaper, the graphic highlighting etc. need to be accounted for (Lengauer 2007: 97). On the content level, he distinguishes between defining-cognitive and evaluating-affective characteristics. They can be analysed by deconstructing the causal interpretation and the evaluation patterns embedded in the text. Other factors such as the alleged chronology of events, the narrational roles, etc.

deserve careful attention too (Flood 2009: 17). Once a clearer view has been gained over what interpretations and evaluations can be found in the text, these findings should, as stated earlier, be related to traditions of thought in order to unveil where ideologies exert their influence. Some framing strategies that I will look at in particular in the analysis are selective appropriations of text, temporal and spatial framing, re-positioning and labelling. In the following sections I will present the different framing strategies and indicate where they are discussed in the analytical chapters.

Labelling: Baker defines labelling as “any discursive practice that involves using a lexical item, term or phrase to identify a person, a place, group or event or any other key element in a narrative” (2006: 122). These elements then “provide an interpretative frame that guides and constraints our response to the narrative in question” (*ibid.*). In this regard she gives examples of how euphemistic expressions are used by particular groups to refer to the same fact thereby highlighting differing aspects of these issues (*ibid.*: 123). Furthermore, rival systems of naming can be identified when analysing the writings of different political groups. “Using a name is at once to make a claim about political and social legitimacy and to deny a rival claim” (*ibid.*: 124). An example for this is for instance the labelling of the crimes committed against the Jewish population in November 1938 to which the Nazis referred as ‘Reichskristallnacht’ (The Night of Broken Glass). This term is no longer used because it conceals the illegitimacy and atrocity of the events. Contemporary research refers to the event as the ‘November pogroms’. Similarly, the French and British newspapers of the inter-war period reported about ‘riots’, ‘reprisals against the Jews’, ‘attacks on the Jews’, ‘scènes barbares’ (barbaric scenes), ‘vagues de terreur’ (waves of terror), etc. Other labels such as expressed in newspaper headlines or titles of persons can serve as effective framing strategies too. In addition I will account for graphical highlighting (which according to Lengauer belongs to the formal level) – a strategy through which paragraphs or sentences are marked as especially important in news texts. In my case study, I focus on headlines and sub-headlines (section 6.1.2.2) as well as attribution in context descriptions (section 6.1.4.2) and graphical highlighting (section 6.1.2.2).

Repositioning of participants: Baker convincingly argues that the positioning of actors within the translated text, but also the positioning of the ST reader to the ST author, and of the TT reader to the translator, can be altered in the process of translation. She explains this feature as follows: “One aspect of relationality (...) concerns the way in which participants in any interaction are positioned, or position themselves, in relation to each other and to those outside the immediate event. Any change in the configuration of these positions

inevitably alters the dynamics of the immediate as well as the wider narratives in which they are woven” (Baker 2006: 132). This aspect seems to be especially relevant in the present case study in terms of how the journalist-translator positions himself to the event. I will discuss the re-positioning of participants in section 6.1.4.3 in terms of authorial presence and perspective in reportages and in section 6.2 where different audience representations lead to repositioning of the involved actors.

Selective Appropriation of Text: Considering the constraints impacting on journalistic work, a selection of which of Goebbels’ speeches will be reported on and which quotes to publish needed to be made. However, not every selection or de-selection can be judged meaningful in terms of framing. Only the ones that add or take away an emphasis in salience and therefore contribute to the creation of an interpretative frame are relevant. Selective appropriation is defined as “patterns of omission and addition designed to suppress, accentuate or elaborate particular aspects of a narrative encoded in the ST or utterance, or aspects of a larger narrative in which it is embedded” (Baker 2006: 114). Within the present study selective appropriation of text plays a central role. On the one hand, the partial agenda-setting analysis conducted in sections 4.1 and 4.2 analyses on the discourse level what speeches were selected or de-selected. On the textual level, I investigate which main arguments of the speech contents have been (de-) selected by the newspapers and how they have been fitted into the argumentative structure of the media text in section 4.3. Moreover, selective appropriation of text is also a central strategy across all the text types analysed in sections 6.1 and with regards to the appropriation of contextual information as discussed in section 6.1.4.

Temporal and Spatial Framing: Baker defines these framing types as follows: “Temporal and spatial framing involves selecting a particular text and embedding it in a temporal and spatial context that accentuates the narrative and depicts and encourages us to establish links between the current narrative that touches our lives, even though the events of the source narrative may be set within a very different temporal and spatial framework” (2006: 112). Within the present study it would be very difficult to differentiate between this framing type and ‘selective appropriation of text’ because many instances of selective appropriation of text suppress particular information and simultaneously (or even: thereby) encourage the establishing of links with current narratives. Therefore, I will in terms of temporal and spatial framing pay attention to alterations in the temporal and spatial deixis (section 6.1.2.2). Moreover, I will also investigate alterations in the sequencing of paragraphs as this can

change the chronology of events and/or the relative importance assigned to the elements (section 6.1.2.2).

2.4.5 SECTION REVIEW

Section 2.4 introduced agenda-setting and framing as two approaches, which can complement existing research in media translation. Agenda-setting research has revealed that the importance assigned to a given issue by the mass media has effects on its reception by the public and the policy makers. Agenda-setting in cross-cultural contexts, I argued, can be aligned with the measuring of translation flows. Section 2.4.1 provided a summary of the most essential aspects of agenda-setting relevant to this study and explained how the media agenda will be measured in the present research project. The findings will then be used as a basis to build hypotheses regarding the relative ‘informedness’ of the French and British audiences about the increasing German threat. Section 2.4.2 explained that the concept of framing has its roots in psychology and sociology. Sociological approaches in frame analysis postulated the validity of text-based studies. Following that, frame analysis has increasingly drawn on textual analysis whereas text-based analyses (including CDA) have started to integrate the concept of framing into their research body. In relation to the mass media, framing consist of selecting/ de-selecting and highlighting/back-grounding certain aspects of reality so as to define a problem, to explain causal relationships, to provide a moral evaluation or even to make recommendations about further actions (Entman 1993: 52). Three distinctive stages of framing can be identified: frame building, frame setting and effects of framing upon the individual and the society (de Vreese 2005: 51). Section 2.4.3 argued that the construction of such media frames is not arbitrary but is influenced by a variety of factors one of which is ideology. Since the mass media constitute an important political actor, political ideologies play a particularly influential role here. Both concepts, ideology and framing, are associated with interpretative frames that shape our perception of the world. This illustrates their intimate relationship but also necessitates distinguishing them clearly. Whilst frame analysis is interested in how issues are presented in the media, ideology asks why they are presented in this particular way. Having said this, frame analysis can then serve as an intermediate level to study ideological influences in the production of intercultural media texts of which translation is an important part. The analysis of causal interpretation and evaluation pattern in particular can help to unveil ideological influences. By relating the findings of the textual analysis to long-standing traditions of thought, the influence of ideologies can be made visible. Finally, I have briefly introduced the framing strategies of labelling, repositioning of participants, selective appropriation of text and temporal and spatial framing and I have indicated in which parts of the analytical chapters they become

relevant. We need to account for certain ‘weaknesses’ of the agenda-setting and framing approaches as they will be applied in the present study. The agenda-setting analysis will only be partial in that its effects on the public and the political sphere cannot be measured but will be speculated on. Moreover, certain reservations as to the representativeness of ‘Goebbels’ as an illustration for the entire ‘German threat’ should be born in mind. In terms of the framing approach there might be conceptual difficulties due to overlaps. (e.g.: Is an issue framed through the selective appropriation of text or is the representation a question of re-positioning?). Nonetheless, the application of the two concepts seems to be promising and it is hoped that future research, especially applications of agenda-setting, can advance the field of media translation in TS.

CHAPTER REVIEW

The purpose of this chapter was to outline the theoretical framework underpinning the analysis conducted within the present thesis. Section 2.1 presented the existing research in media translation, outlined the general characteristics of translation in this field and took a closer look at those projects which engage with material in which journalistic writing and translation are interwoven. Moreover, the present thesis aligned itself with previous research drawing on CDA. Section 2.2 highlighted the importance of accounting for ideological influences in political media translation, presented a definition of the concept and discussed the main characteristics and functions of the ideology. It then introduced the ideologies relevant to the present study. Section 2.3 was dedicated to investigating CDA research, its underlying principles and assumptions. Most importantly, it discussed criticism directed at CDA, explained how it has been dealt with and how the present thesis will account for it. Finally, section 2.4 introduced agenda-setting and framing, two media studies approaches, and explained their usefulness for the present study.

Currently, there are not many studies in media translation which deal with material that contains ostensibly ‘translated’ and seemingly ‘un-translated’ text passages. Of the two approaches that have been proposed, the combination of CDA combined with ethnographic research has a longer tradition. Nonetheless, Brownlie’s ‘positioning’ also seems to be a viable approach. This thesis aligns itself with the CDA inspired research but – since the material analysed is historical – has to find alternative sources to the ethnographical data commonly used. What followed was a discussion of the concept of ideology because political media translation takes place in the political realm and is therefore exposed to ideological struggles. Ideology was positively defined and is thought to be an inherent part of any political system. The characteristics and functions of ideologies were analysed and it

was found that especially argumentative structures and the particular connectedness of the content elements would help inferring what ideological influences played a role in each of the cases. The description of the main ideologies populating the interwar era in relation to the political context of Europe provided a first glimpse at what the analytical chapters might reveal. The discussion of CDA and especially the criticism that has been directed at this approach showed that the methodological design will need to provide a detailed description of the data selection and collection processes and a convincing concept for the analysis of the context. Moreover, the use of archival material to replace the ethnographic research that cannot be provided seems to be necessary to increase the viability of the results. Moreover, it was found that framing constituted a useful tool to analyse the work of translation in discourse mediation but also to indirectly point out where ideological influences were possibly involved. The addition of the agenda-setting approach seems to be promising because it allows us to study translation flows, thereby indicating how translation mediates intercultural political discourse.

It has to be acknowledged that using Brownlie's approach or adapting Baker's narrative approach to the material at hand would probably have yielded pertinent results too. In any case it would be tremendously interesting to see how the results would differ from what the present study will find. Additionally, not all the criticism directed at CDA was presented and not every point could be addressed. It is nonetheless hoped that the research design that I will present in Chapter Three overcomes the most important problems that have been pointed out. Moreover, there is not enough room to carry out a full agenda-setting analysis. The partial analysis will therefore only provide results of limited explanatory power. Moreover, certain categories proposed by Baker seem to be conceptually fluid when applied to the present study and might need re-definition in relation to media translation. Nonetheless, the discussion of the theoretical framework suggests that the different research approaches that have been brought together – Translation Studies, CDA, Agenda-Setting and Framing – will indeed allow for a fruitful and well founded study of the proposed material. It is hoped that future research might use a similar approach or aspects of the approach to the advancement of media translation research in TS.

3 METHODOLOGY & DATA

Chapter One painted the picture of the socio-political and economic situation in Europe during the inter-war years, I described the political discourse of the NS-Regime and in particular the political speeches framed in mass-events. Chapter Two laid out the theoretical framework underpinning the present research project. The objective of the present chapter is threefold: firstly, it establishes a framework to situate the methodology applied in the comparative study; secondly, it provides a detailed introduction to the data and thirdly, it proposes a tool to conduct the analysis. Section 3.1 outlines the relationship between the underpinning research questions and the methodological approach taken. This is followed by a brief introduction to Calzada Pérez' methodology and a discussion of important conceptual and terminological issues, namely, the impossibility of a coupled-pair alignment (Toury 1995: 89) and the unsuitability of the notion of 'translation shifts' (Catford 1965: 73-83). Furthermore, the often neglected notion of causality and the disputed conceptual differentiation between text and context will be discussed. Finally, by drawing on the *DHA* and *DETS*, four levels of context are proposed. Section 3.2 is entirely devoted to the data. The data selection protocol will be explained and justified. In this regard, general issues such as the setting of the spatial and temporal frame but also more specific problems such as the selection of particular newspapers will be debated. Moreover, the data collection process and implications thereof are investigated, and finally a description of the corpus is provided. Section 3.3 presents the research design in detail. For each of the three steps of the methodology, concrete questions and aspects are proposed that need to be examined to answer the research questions presented in the introduction.

3.1 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

The objective of this section is to justify the methodology applied to this study and to discuss methodological and terminological issues related to the characteristics of media translation are. Moreover, certain concepts need to be clarified and the selection of the context levels will be justified. In view of the research aims outlined in the introduction it seems to be evident that (a) a comparative methodology will need to be applied since two different spatial areas and a multitude of different temporal elements will be contrasted against each other; (b) that the study is descriptive in nature in that it aims to answer the question of how the NS-Regime was represented and the question of how translation contributed to the image construction process; (c) that the study is also explanatory in nature due to its aim of relating the textual observations to contextual factors. Therefore, the analysis will be designed as a comparative study applying a methodology based on *Critical Discourse Analysis* (CDA) and

Descriptive-Explanatory Translation Studies (DETS). A methodology situated within *Descriptive-Explanatory Translation Studies* (DETS) seems to be especially suitable since this approach regards the historically changing socio-cultural and political context of the TT as an indispensable factor in the creation, description and explanation of translations (Isbuga-Erel 2008: 59). In contrast to CDA, it has a focus on the comparison of translational processes and products. Although socially-orientated models and theories exist within DETS these models are area-specific and seem difficult to apply to political media translation (*ibid.*). In this respect, CDA, which is applicable to media texts and equally eager to stress the importance of contextual factors, can complement DETS aptly. Furthermore, I would argue that the conduction of a comparative study across languages and cultures, i.e. a translation-based study is also of considerable benefit to CDA. This is because the comparison of ‘original texts’ and their translations offers the possibility of pinpointing instances of intervention in the TT. Thereby the visibility of mediation processes and the influence of contextual factors are more pronounced than in a monolingual or non-comparative textual analysis. It is owing to the possibility of such a combined approach of conducting a micro- and macro textual analysis that it has been favoured over Mona Baker’s narrative approach. This latter strand of text analysis focuses more on macro- and inter-textual features. Arguably, complementing the methodology with a corpus study approach could yield very interesting results. However, the relatively small number of comparable speech parts of the corpus would impede the results

3.1.1 METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW

In the present comparative study a number of ‘STs’ (transcriptions of Goebbels’ speeches or re-prints of them in NS newspapers) are compared to a number of ‘TTs’ (French and British media texts reporting on Goebbels’ speeches) in order to identify synchronic and diachronic differences in the representations of the NS-Regime in France and the United Kingdom between 1935 and 1939. These differences will then be explained by accounting for a number of contextual factors, whilst highlighting the role translation plays in the image construction process. To this end, the *three-level methodology for descriptive-explanatory Translation Studies* as introduced by Calzada Pérez (2001) will be used as broad overarching methodological frame. It has been designed to “link up linguistic and socio-cultural concerns” (2001: 205) and combines DETS and CDA.

As the name already suggests the three-level methodology for DETS consists of three steps. Firstly, the tangible text units are investigated. The translational shifts between the STs and the TTs are identified and described. The aspects described here can range from

grammatical-syntactical to lexical-semantic features. Two analytical models originating from Media Studies, i.e. agenda setting and framing, will come into play at this step of the analysis. Secondly, the linguistic analysis allows us to conduct the explanatory step. Calzada Pérez points out that the “[T]angible units may serve as ostensive indicators of what is happening at this pragma-semiotic level and are potential clues that allow scholars to penetrate the ideology that underlies texts” (2001: 208). Here, observations on the textual level are linked to contextual factors to explain why the translation shifts occurred. Calzada Pérez clearly indicates the interrelatedness of these two steps. The third and exploratory step consists of analysing the potential impact the translated texts have upon the TC. Within the present thesis this step will be based on the agenda-setting research (see section 2.4.1) and therefore only allows for the building of hypotheses. Given the dialectical nature of the relationship between discourse and society, the model needs to be circular in its approach.

3.1.2 METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS RELATED TO MEDIA TRANSLATION

The first methodological problem is the implicitly proposed coupled-pair alignment of STs and TTs. The particular nature of media translation through which “any clear distinction between source and target text ceases to be meaningful” (Bassnett and Bielsa 2009: 65) need to be taken into consideration (see section 2.1.3). The only parts of the TTs which can be identified as ‘translation proper’ are the quotations because they claim to be exact renderings of what Goebbels had said. What is unknown however, is how ‘directly’ the translations moved from the SC to the TC (Toury 2012: 82). Often it is impossible to know on what ST a particular quote is based. Nonetheless, the quotations have the status of translations. These articles might contain other passages which are the products of translations but they are rarely marked as such. As pointed out in section 2.1.3, the use of agency texts is a common practice in the media production process and these texts are often subjected to intra-lingual translation. Moreover, depending on the media text type the articles contain descriptions of elements of the speech event such as the location, the reaction of the audience, , etc. The descriptions of the non-verbal communication of the event participants are instances of intersemiotic translation – they are translating the non-verbal signs into a linguistic form. The focus of the comparative analysis conducted in the framework of this thesis then lies on the textual extracts that either claim to be translations or that could be identified as being the products of intra- or inter-lingual translation processes as well as passages which claim to be either products of intersemiotic translations or representing the event context.

In terms of the inter and intralingual translations transcriptions of Goebbels’ speeches will be used as a point of comparison whenever possible. This is because of the quotations’ claim of

being mimetic in relation to the original enunciations. However, the original speech has often either not been preserved or is not accessible for the researcher and other sources will need to be resorted to. Articles from the *Völkische Beobachter*, the most prolific NSDAP newspaper, will be consulted. As for the intersemiotic translations and the event context descriptions I will focus on a comparison between the TTs.

The present thesis does not offer a comparative study as traditionally conducted within TS and a number of adaptations regarding the methodology seem necessary. I will compare the ‘assumed STs’ with the political media texts reporting about a particular speech event. This implies that several articles pertaining to the same newspaper might be compared with one assumed ST. In view of the only ‘assumed ST status’ of the original speech the comparison of the TTs amongst each other is important. This also means that a given ST is compared with media texts that only partly consist of translations. When specific quotations are compared against the assumed ST passages, it seems to be inappropriate to be speaking or writing about ‘translation shifts’ as usually done in a coupled-pair alignment but rather about ‘differences’ or ‘changes’. This is because the ST status is not confirmed and therefore the differences could have occurred due to the use of a different ST, etc. Nonetheless, such differences are meaningful in terms of media representations.

3.1.3 CAUSALITY

The three-level methodology for DETS attempts to establish causal relationships between contextual factors, translations and the TC. Thus, it seems to be necessary to briefly discuss the concept of causality within TS and to point out its implications for the present research. This section is also an attempt to respond to Widdowson’s criticism that CDA reads meaning into texts (section 2.3.4).

The question of causality is often not or only implicitly addressed by many studies in the field. The existence of causal relationships seems to be presupposed, its particular nature and implications seem to be neglected. However, research conducted in this area [Chesterman (2001, 2008) Pym (1998) and Brownlie (2003)], has shown the benefit of discussing such issues to improve the rigour of results. Most scholars agree that there are indeed certain causal conditions in form of contextual factors which influence the translation process. These factors are traceable in the translation products and have in turn certain effects upon the TC. Since all discourse is dialectical in nature, the chain of causality can also be reversed (Chesterman 2001: 24). In the field of translation, we are not dealing with deterministic causes but rather with what Chesterman describes as more or less “vague influences” (2001: 20). Furthermore, Brownlie argues that “a single condition is almost never a sufficient

condition for the occurrence of an event; instead the conjunction of a set of conditions is normally needed to supply a sufficient condition” (2003: 112). This indicates that we have to be aware of a multitude of contextual variables that might influence each other symmetrically or asymmetrically and the notion of cause might be best understood as a set of causal conditions. Establishing causality then means to weigh up what contextual factors are likely to have influenced the translation process and to what degree. Subsequently, “the problematic nature of causality means that the status of proposed explanations remains hypothetical” (*ibid.*). What is rarely pointed out but should be borne in mind is that if causes are necessarily hypothetical and gain their ‘causal force’ most likely in combination, the same applies to translations when they become ‘causes’.

Based on a description of translational behaviour, products, etc. and of contextual factors, interpretative, explanatory, descriptive or predictive hypotheses might be formulated. The interest of this thesis lies in explanatory hypotheses in which relations between the described variables are established. Explanatory hypotheses can be more or less convincing. This is related to the explanatory power of the hypothesis which is increased (a) when our predictions become more accurate and (b) when they are more general in nature. This second condition can be achieved through (b1) increasing the number of relations incorporated; (b2) by increasing the types of factors; and by (b3) relating the explanandum to larger networks (Chesterman 2001: 376). The wish to increase the explanatory power of the hypothesis might be equated with the aim of CDA to produce more viable results in general. In this respect, the *DHA* (see section 2.3.1) proposes a triangulation of the concept of context as will be outlined in section 3.1.4. The present study aims to ensure a high explanatory power of the proposed hypotheses by (a) increasing the ‘textual’ variables which are compared. Therefore six newspapers of differing political orientation from two different nations are compared over a stretch of five years. The explanatory power is also increased (b) by applying the triangulation of the context as proposed by the *DHA*.

3.1.4 TEXT & CONTEXT

The use of the concept of context within the CDA approach has attracted important criticism. Unfortunately, research that is partly inspired by this approach appears to have inadequately dealt with such issues. One reason for this might be spatial restrictions. A discussion of these issues is of imminent importance since the concept is central to the methodology applied.

Firstly, Leitch and Palmer have drawn attention to the lack of distinction between text and context in some CDA work (2010: 1195). Secondly, Schlegoff rightly points out that the selection of the contextual levels is rarely explained but its viability is usually taken for

granted (1997; quoted in Blommaert 2005: 32). Arguably, a careful consideration of these objections is vital for the present thesis. In the following sections I will attempt to respond to these concerns. Firstly, I will briefly define the concepts of text and context as applied in this study and explain where they necessarily need to be collapsed. Secondly, I will revisit the three dimensions of analysis as proposed by Fairclough, i.e. text, discursive practice and social practice. Finally, I will relate these dimensions to the four levels of context as proposed by the DHA (see section 3.4.5).

The concept of text and the concept of context have various definitions within CDA research. Whilst van Dijk, for instance, distinguishes between text and talk other scholars such as Kress and Fairclough see texts as manifestations of discursive practices which encompass spoken and written language and even sounds, symbols, pictures, etc. (Lynch and Palmer 2010: 1197). Divergences regarding context definitions revolve around the question of whether the cognitive or the “outer world” dimension of the concept should be highlighted (*ibid.*). Scholars stressing the former dimension are concerned with how readers and hearers interpret ‘texts’ differently and why. Scholars emphasising the latter dimension are concerned with factors outside the ‘text’, such as social conditions, professional practices, etc. (*ibid.*). A definition that accounts for both the cognitive and the outer-world dimensions of context is the one proposed by Schiffrin:

I will use the term ‘text’ to differentiate linguistic material (e.g. what is said, assuming a verbal channel) from the environment in which ‘sayings’ (or other linguistic productions) occur (context). In terms of utterances, then, ‘text’ is the linguistic content: the stable semantic meanings of words, expressions, and sentences, but not the inferences available to hearers depending upon the contexts in which words, expressions, and sentences are used. [...] Context is thus a world filled with people producing utterances: people who have social, cultural, and personal identities, knowledge, beliefs, goals and wants, and who interact with one another in various socially and culturally defined situations (Schiffrin 1994: 363).

The distinction between the stable (denotative) and the instable (connotative) meanings embodied in texts offers a criterion to distinguish text from context. Anything outside the denotative meaning of words and sentences which has a bearing on the connotative meaning is regarded as context. It is often claimed that stable meaning does not exist. As discussed in section 2.3.4 I would argue it does for a particular group at a particular moment in time, to a certain extent. The distinction between denotative and connotative meaning is highly relevant on a theoretical level since it accounts for the interpretative act made by each person when reading a text. It also has a direct bearing on the definition of context and subsequently on what levels of context need to be analysed. When I refer to ‘media texts’, i.e. clearly

identifiable, self-contained, coherent and cohesive stretches of writings including text graphic features and images as published in newspapers, I do not refer to ‘texts’ as defined by Schiffrin but to media discourses, that is language in use. In section 1.2, discourse has been defined as socially determined and socially determining written and oral language use. Therefore the concept of discourse incorporates both text and context as defined by Schiffrin. In a sense then texts do not exist as clearly distinguishable physical entities and the analytical levels of text and context are necessarily collapsed to a certain degree in praxis.

Arguably, the definition of context provided above is still somewhat theoretical and needs some practical explanation. Therefore, I will briefly revisit Fairclough’s dimension of discourse to highlight the different areas where contextual factors might come into play. I will then refine these areas by accounting for the context levels as proposed by DHA and the sources of explanations suggested by DETS.

Fairclough proposes a tripartite model of analysis whose aim is to “map three different forms of analysis onto one another” (1989: 2). He proposes three dimensions of discourse, i.e. the textual dimension, the dimension of discursive practices and the dimension of social practices. Fairclough seems to hold quite a broad definition of text. In relation to the adopted definition of text/context, the textual dimension encompasses the text-internal context and the text. The linguistic features to be analysed correspond by and large to Calzada Pérez’s suggestions. The dimension of discursive practices is concerned with aspects of the text production and consumption. In contrast, the dimension of social practices investigates “discursive events as instances of sociocultural practice” (*ibid.*). This means that the wider socio-cultural and political context is taken into consideration, e.g. the influence of our capitalistic society on text production and consumption, etc. This model clearly advocates an interdisciplinary approach to discourse analysis since it combines the use of linguistic approaches (textual dimension) and the use of social theories (dimension of discursive and sociocultural practices). What I would see as a valuable refinement with regards to the textual dimension is the distinction between the “immediate language or text internal co-text” and the “intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres, and discourses” as proposed by the DHA (Wodak and Krzyzanowski 2009: 21). This is because due to the highly intertextual nature of media texts (section 2.1.2), the intertextual aspect is of high relevance for any analysis dealing with media texts. The media texts used in the framework of this study (section 3.1.2) contain various overt and covert intertextual references. A further refinement can be achieved by revisiting the sources of explanation as suggested by DETS since these sources are tailored to the translational

activity. By drawing on Aristotle, Pym identifies the following four types of causes: (1) the efficient causes, i.e. factors related to the translator's mind and body; (2) the material causes, i.e. factors inherent to the target language, the ST, equipment, etc.; (3) the final cause, i.e. the *skopos* of the translation; and (4) the formal causes, i.e. norms and expectations (1998: 149). Chesterman 'complements' these causes by adding the (5) proximate causes, i.e. the cognitive aspect of what happens in the translator's mind and the (6) broad socio-cultural causes (2008: 213-217). We can easily integrate the material cause into the first two dimensions of the DHA; and the final and the formal cause into the language external, social dimension. It is also clearly evident that Chesterman's socio-cultural causes correspond to socio-political and historical dimension of CDA. However, the proximate cause, which overlaps with Pym's efficient cause, seems to be especially important since Chesterman points out that "all causal influences are filtered through the translator's own mind, through subjective decisions taken at a given moment" (2001: 26). I propose in accordance with the DHA the following four levels of context: (1) the immediate language or text-internal context; (2) the intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourse; (3) the language external social/ sociological variables, institutional frames and **individual-dependent components** of a specific situational context; (4) the broader socio-political and historical context in which the discursive practices are embedded and to which they are related.

DETS and CDA address this issue of the individual dependent component by conducting 'ethnographic fieldwork', i.e. interviews with agents involved, experiments, etc. Given the historical nature of the present study such methods are not applicable. Furthermore, in light of the diverse aspects that will be compared, it seems impossible to take into considerations all individual instances of agency. Therefore, I will tackle the issue by delimiting the material analysed in this regard and by consulting archival sources providing information about individual agency. More concretely, I will conduct a comparative descriptive-explanatory analysis for all six newspapers drawing on all other context levels as sources of information. I will then substantiate the hypotheses made on the basis of this analysis by conducting a small-scale in-depth study accounting for individual agency regarding one particular newspaper – the *Manchester Guardian* (see Chapter Five). To this end, I will study the correspondence between the foreign correspondents of the *Manchester Guardian*, who were based in mainland Europe, and the editor, with regards to reasons for why certain speech events were (de-) selected, why certain articles were (de-) selected for publication and why alterations were introduced into the texts.

3.1.5 SECTION REVIEW

The purpose of this section was to introduce and justify the methodology applied in this study. Furthermore, methodological and terminological issues related to the characteristics of media translation were addressed and disputed concepts within the proposed approach needed clarification. This section was also dedicated to the selection of the contextual levels to be accounted for in the analysis.

In light of the research aim to pursue a combined CDA and DETS approach I proposed using Calzada Pérez's three-level methodology as an overarching frame. I argued that such an approach corresponds to the comparative, descriptive and explanatory nature of the intended analysis. Methodological issues in terms of the data render a conventional coupled-pair alignment of STs and TTs impossible. The present research compares not-always-identifiable partial translations embedded in media texts and assumed STs, which excludes such an alignment. The main focus lies on the comparison of different media texts reporting about one specific speech event and on the comparison of identifiable translations and assumed STs. It seems difficult to establish at what particular moment translations have been altered. Moreover, the ST status can only rarely be confirmed. Therefore the notion of 'translation shifts' is not applicable but such alterations are better referred to as 'differences' or 'changes'. I have then investigated the current discussion about the notion of causality within TS. There seems to be agreement that we are not dealing with clear-cut cause-effect situations when we examine translation profiles. Since causes are better considered as vague influences, the use of the term of 'causal conditions' was proposed. Thus, statements about causes and effects of translations remain hypothetical. Within this thesis, the explanatory power and the viability of the hypotheses is increased by using a wide variety of textual sources and by a triangulation of the context. With regards to this second aspect it seems to be vital to distinguish between the analytical level of text and context. However, their collapsing is inevitable in praxis. Nonetheless, four contextual levels have been proposed, ranging from text-internal, textual, discursive to text-external aspects. Particular attention is paid to individual agency of the actors involved in the news production process. To this end, the editorial correspondence regarding particular speech events will be studied in Chapter Five.

I have acknowledged that different methodological approaches, namely Baker's narrative approach, could also lead to viable results. Furthermore, although I have engaged in the discussion about shortcomings of the proposed approach, I have not responded to all

criticism that has been raised regarding CDA (section 2.3.4). Certain aspects such as the selection of contextual factors need to be further substantiated. Nonetheless, I have addressed the most pertinent points of criticism and I have, based on Wodak's DHA approach (1999), introduced possible ways to deal with them. I have proposed (1) a different alignment that allows us at once to compare the media texts in general and the inter-textual and inter-discursive references (the translations) in particular. Furthermore, (2) by accounting for the unconventional alignment but also for the problematic nature of causality within TS, I have suggested the afore-mentioned amendments to the terminology. Finally, (3) I have also suggested four levels of context by drawing on CDA and DETS. Summing up, by drawing on previous research a sound methodological framework has been established on the basis of which a series of analytical questions tailored to the material at hand can be drawn up (see section 3.3).

3.2 DATA

The data selection and the data collection are of paramount importance for each research project due to their potential to affect the viability of the results. The primary purpose of this section is to justify the data selection and to describe the data collection protocol and the corpus. Firstly, I will discuss wider aspects of the corpus selection; namely the focus on the politician Goebbels, the selection of the medium (newspaper) and the exact temporal frame. It is assumed that the geographical and wider temporal selection (i.e. the inter-war period) has been sufficiently justified in the first chapter. Secondly, I will discuss the selection protocol regarding the six newspapers under analysis. Thirdly, I will outline the data collection process and its implications on the results. Finally, I will briefly describe the corpus.

3.2.1 CORPUS SELECTION

Some of the wider issues regarding the corpus selection that need to be addressed are the questions of (1) why the study investigates the speeches of Goebbels in particular; (2) why the translations published in newspapers as opposed to other media have been selected; and (3) why the precise temporal limitation of 1935–1939 has been set.

3.2.1.1 WHY GOEBBELS?

As outlined in section 1.3 and 1.4, political speeches were of particular significance for NS propaganda in that they formed part of carefully organised large scale propaganda events. These speeches were intended to disseminate not only the political views of the government on particular issues but also NS ideology. Therefore they were, in terms of their content and form, repetitive. Although idiosyncrasies among the different speakers can certainly be

observed, it is nonetheless true that the political speeches under the NS-Regime display strong similarities. Given Goebbels' highly influential political position as the head of the NS propaganda system, and acknowledging that in this function he influenced NS language use considerably, it seems justifiable to argue that his speeches stand exemplarily for the political discourse of the NS-Regime. Furthermore, concentrating on the translations of the speeches of one particular politician seems to be fruitful in the field of media translation. This is because the credibility and authority of particular quotes is closely linked to the social position of the original enunciator. This in turn is significant in terms of the selection and de-selection of quotes for translation. Given that the social position of a particular politician, as Goebbels' case illustrates, might change in the course of a certain time period, the focus on one politician allows accounting for such changes.

3.2.1.2 WHY NEWSPAPERS?

The political media discourse as circulated by and in the newspapers was of paramount importance during the inter-war period. It is commonly agreed that the mass media, due to their size and due to the fact that the public is highly 'exposed' to them, "play an important role in disseminating politics and mediating between politicians and the public" (Schäffner 2004: 118). Not only does the public learn about political events through the media but it is also the case that politicians get a 'feel' of the public opinion regarding particular political decisions through them. At the turn of the 20th century, new technologies such as cinema and radio broadcasting emerged in Europe as a consequence of increasing industrialisation and technological developments, and the newspaper sector, whose golden age was in the 1920s, experienced substantial difficulties during WW2. However, the period in question was still characterised by the predominance of the print media because these more recent inventions were not yet available or affordable for the general public. Therefore, large sections of the public relied entirely on this medium for information. Furthermore, "both, the British and the French elites believed that the examination of a cross-section of the press provided an accurate picture of overall opinion" (Hucker 2011: 18) and since opinion polling had not yet been established, politicians relied heavily on the press too.

3.2.1.3 WHY 1935 – 1939?

The temporal restriction is closely linked to the focus on Germany, France and the United Kingdom as opposed to other nations. As stated in Chapter Two, the reluctance of France and the United Kingdom to intervene with regards to the German breaches of the *Treaty of Versailles* had allowed the NS-Regime to establish a strong political and economic position in 1939. Subsequently, it can be argued that this empowered Hitler to launch the attack

against Poland and was in fact a contributing factor to the outbreak of WW2. Therefore, the time span between the NSDAP's entry onto the political arena until the beginning of WW2 seems to be particularly interesting to investigate. The NSDAP had been largely unknown outside Germany until its surprising success in the 1930 elections and became only fully acknowledged once it rose to power in 1933. Since the foreign policy of the NS-Regime was of particular concern for the security of Europe, which France and the United Kingdom intended to safeguard, 1935 has been chosen as the starting point. At this moment in time the NS-Regime had fully consolidated its power and it was in this year that it became apparent to the world that Hitler had launched an extensive rearmament programme, signalling his bellicose intentions. Furthermore, the first (though legal) territorial annexation was undertaken with the incorporation of the Saarland into the German Reich in 1935. The temporal end point has been set at the end of December 1939, allows for the investigation of how the political discourse changed during the first three months of war. Interesting results could have been gained from extending the time scope until the end of the war or even beyond. However, the period chosen is certainly the most promising of insight in terms of learning more about the reasons for the relatively late military intervention of France and Britain in the escalating conflict.

3.2.2 SOURCE AND TARGET TEXTS

The data used for the comparative analysis consists of a number of Goebbels' speeches (assumed STs) and also their partial translations embedded in media texts (TTs) which were published in a selection of French and British newspapers. The TTs have been selected first, thereby defining the number of assumed STs that are relevant to this study. In accordance with this, the TTs selection shall be presented first. In this section, only the ST and TT data will be discussed, whereas further context related data sources will be presented in section 3.3.2.

Criteria All newspapers that have been selected are (1) daily newspapers. In order to get a broad overview of the entire spectrum of the media images in France and the United Kingdom I have chosen the newspapers in accordance with their (2) political orientation. They cover left of centre, centre and right of centre political views. Furthermore, two competing criteria, their relative importance in terms of their (3a) circulation figures and (3b) political influence, have been applied too. In both countries, newspapers with high circulation figures were cheaper and more often read by a less educated readership. The newspapers with lower circulation figures were quality newspapers, more expensive (about twice as much) and more often read by a more educated readership. Subsequently, these

quality newspapers were probably more influential on the political level (for a discussion see Hucker 2011). Interesting when comparing the British and the French newspaper market during the inter-war period is the former's staggering commercial success and the latter's stagnation (Chalaby 1996: 143). Inter-war Britain was politically relatively stable, the newspaper market seemingly free from governmental interference but driven by economic considerations, i.e. circulation figures were of great importance. Therefore, I have chosen two newspapers with high circulation figures and one newspaper that can be considered as especially influential in terms of politics. In contrast, the French newspaper market was characterised by a quasi-monopolistic situation in the advertisement and distribution sectors, and governmental coercion and corruption hindered market forces to unfold their full effect (*ibid*: 143-146). However, there was a strong polarisation of left and right of centre forces in the political sphere which subsequently affected the newspaper market. Therefore I have chosen two newspapers covering such 'extreme' positions, although the newspapers with the highest circulation figures were politically 'neutral'. However, I shall discuss the selection in more detail below. Another, less scientific criterion has played a role in the data selection and collection process too: (4) the accessibility of the data in terms of my personal financial resources. None of the libraries contacted was prepared to provide microfilms through interlibrary loans. This means that I had to travel to the relevant libraries and pay for travel and accommodation costs which, as a self-funded student, I was eager to keep low.

France In terms of the media, the inter-war years in France are often referred to as *L'ère des grands journaux* (The era of the big newspapers). Four newspapers dominated the market and were "ostensibly politically neutral" and "accounted for fourth-fifths of the daily press" (Balle 1987: 24 quoted in Thogmartin 1998: 92). However, inter-war France was determined by a strong polarisation between left- and right wing forces. This polarisation was reflected in the so called 'opinion papers', few of which reached high circulation numbers. Taking this into consideration, the following selection of French newspapers will be proposed. As representative of the big four *Le Petit Parisien* (PP) (1, 320,000/ neutral) has been selected. As representatives of the two extremes I selected *L'Humanité* (H) (320,000/ communist) and *Le Figaro* (F) (90,000/ centre-right) (Anon 2008: 1). Although *Le Petit Parisien* only comes second with respect to its circulation figures, it has been chosen over *Paris-Soir* because its entire archives are available online (the same is true for *L'Humanité* and *Le Figaro*) which has facilitated the TT identification and is justifiable since the circulation figures were still very significant. The numbers quoted in these sections date back to 1939 – the only information on circulation figures that is available to my knowledge. The *Petit Parisien* as a neutral paper indirectly claimed to be ideologically unaligned. However, its market-

orientation and the political system in which it was placed would suggest that it shared many of the liberal views as discussed in section 2.2.3.1. The F certainly shared some of the liberal values but leaned towards conservatism as outlined in section 2.2.3.2. The PP and the F essentially supported appeasement politics and its underpinning beliefs as outlined in section 2.2.3.5.

United Kingdom As regards the United Kingdom, Aigner provides us with an overview of the then available newspapers, listed according to their political orientation and indicating the circulation figures of 1936/1938 (1969: n.p.). The three most important political orientations as presented by Aigner are: *conservative*, *liberal* and *labour*. In accordance with their circulation figures I have chosen the *Daily Herald (DH)* (2,000,000/ labour) and the *Daily Mail (DM)* (1,717,000/ conservative). Although the *Daily Express* sold more copies than the *Daily Mail*, I have opted for the latter. This is because of the strong political engagement of the owner of the *Daily Mail*, Lord Rothermere, and his political influence. The third newspaper I selected is the *Manchester Guardian* (80,000/ liberal). Although the *News Chronicle* had significantly higher circulation figures I have opted for the *Manchester Guardian (MG)* because by 1935 it had established itself as a high-quality newspaper at home and abroad and was to be found amongst Chamberlain's daily reading (Hucker 2011: 18). This testifies to its political influence. The DH as a working class paper was clearly inspired by socialist beliefs and values as outlined in section 2.2.3.3. Though communists tried to get a foothold in the Labour Party and its official paper, the DH, they failed (Gannon 1971: 42) and communist ideals were never openly propagated within the paper. The DM had strongly conservative views (see section 2.2.3.2) but its owner, Rothermere, also admired National Socialism (see section 1.3.4). The MG, as illustrated in Chapter Five, harboured liberal beliefs (section 2.2.3.1). All of these newspapers were in favour of appeasement politics – however with differing degrees of enthusiasm.

3.2.3 DATA COLLECTION

The objective of this section is to explain the data collection process and potential implications with regards to the results. Three different types of searches have been used to identify the TTs: (1) keyword search; (2) manual search, consulting all issues published between 1935 and 1939; and (3) issue consultation according to a list of dates. The different types of data collection did not impede the results of the textual study in terms of the frame analysis (since frame analysis is not concerned with the completeness of data) but potentially influenced the hypothesis drawn from the agenda-setting approach.

Keyword search All French newspapers were available in electronic form in the digital library *Gallica* which has been made available by the *Bibliothèque nationale de France* (National Library of France, <http://gallica.bnf.fr/>). Therefore they could be searched using keywords. Given that only speeches of Goebbels needed to be collected the following types of keywords were employed: keywords containing his name, e.g. *Goebbels* and *Joseph Goebbels*, his title, e.g. *Ministre de la Propagande* (propaganda Minister) and *ministre* (minister), or keywords which can be associated with his professional environment, e.g. *propagande allemande* (German propaganda), *propagande nazie* (Nazi propaganda), *propagande* (propaganda). Although it cannot be excluded that certain speeches have been missed out, I would argue that the generic nature of the keywords (e.g. minister and propaganda) would have led to the inclusion of most, and certainly the inclusion of the most relevant speeches. This assumption gains credibility through the fact that the second search type (manual) led to the identification of few dates that had not yet been identified. On the contrary, it was possible to retrieve more material from the French newspapers.

Manual search all issues This search type consisted of manually consulting all available issues of a given newspaper between 1935 and 1939, and can be seen to be the most thorough search type. Due to financial considerations, this search type has only been used for the *Manchester Guardian* which could be accessed on microfilms free of charge in the *Zentralbibliothek Zürich* (Central Library of Zurich City) in Switzerland.

Search according to list Based on the dates that had been identified through the first two search types, I compiled a list with all dates on which media texts reporting about Goebbels' speeches have been published. I then consulted the issues of the *Daily Mail* and the *Daily Herald* regarding the dates indicated on the list +/- one day. These newspapers were accessible in the *British Newspaper Library* in London. It is possible that some relevant media texts have been missed out in these two newspapers. However, I believe that the number of such neglected speeches is relatively low since it seems unlikely that the other four newspapers did not report about the speech event. Finally, I updated the list and consulted, in the way described above, the relevant issues of the *Völkischer Beobachter* in the *Bibliothek der Eidgenössischen Technischen Hochschule* (Library of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zürich). In terms of this last newspaper we need to be aware of the fact that statements regarding the actual number of speeches given by Goebbels (in this thesis measured through the VB), in comparison to the number of reported speech events in France and the United Kingdom, remain uncertain. It is important to bear this in mind as this number is taken as a real life indicator in the agenda-setting analysis in sections 4.1 and 4.2

(see section 2.4.1). All the newspapers searched according to lists were available on microfilms.

3.2.4 THE CORPUS

The main objective of this section is to provide a brief quantitative and qualitative description of the corpus. The collected data has been divided into two sub-corpora. This is in accordance with the two different types of analyses that are conducted in the framework of the present thesis; namely the agenda-setting and the framing analysis. In the following part, I will briefly introduce these two types of analysis and explain which parts of the corpus have been selected for each analysis and why. Furthermore, I will describe the two sub-corpora of the framing corpus from a qualitative point of view.

Agenda-Setting Corpus The agenda-setting analysis is of quantitative nature and relates the emphasis placed on Goebbels' speeches in the different newspapers to the importance assigned to the speeches by the audiences. There are different ways of emphasising a particular topic. Investigated within this thesis is the monitoring of the topic frequency by the media. The topic frequency is measured in terms of the number of days on which each of the newspapers reported about Goebbels' speeches. Therefore, the corpus relating to this analysis comprises of all media texts published between 1935 and 1939 in one of the aforementioned newspapers, independent of their length, comparability, etc. This corpus consists of 524 media texts and 119 alleged STs (117 media texts VB, 1 transcript, 1 original propaganda pamphlet).

Framing Corpus The framing analysis is of qualitative nature and compares the different media images of the NS-Regime constructed by the newspapers through different modes of presentation. This analysis constitutes the main part of the research project. Only comparable media texts, (i.e. media texts that can be compared to one or more other media texts published in different newspapers reporting about the same speech event) form part of this corpus. To ensure the diversity of the compared factors, the minimum number of media texts per speech event has been set at four. This allows us to make sure a relatively high number of media texts can be compared; and, it increases the likelihood of being able to compare media texts from both countries. This sub-corpus consists of 26 assumed STs (against 24 speech events) and 127 media texts. All of them vary in length and extensiveness of quotations. The speech events which have been reported on can generally be divided into three subject-related groups. Firstly, there are eight speech events that were related to the *Heim ins Reich* campaign. In these speeches Goebbels talks about certain regions which should be or have been incorporated into the German Reich. Secondly, seven speech events

are related to how Goebbels views the current political situation on the European continent. Thirdly, six speech events are concerned with the Nazi ideology. The topics are the 'Jewish question', Bolshevism and the Church controversy. Finally, there are three speech events that cannot be subsumed under any of the categories. They treat diverse domestic issues such as Hitler's birthday, Goebbels' views on art and Labour Day.

3.2.5 SECTION REVIEW

The main purpose of this section was to explain and justify the data selection and data collection process. It was also intended to provide a detailed description of the corpus. In terms of the wider corpus selection criteria, three aspects needed to be explained, i.e. the focus on Goebbels' speeches, the medium newspaper and the period of 1935 to 1939. In this regard, the representativeness of Goebbels' speeches for the NS discourse was established and it was argued that the print media still held a predominant position during the inter-war period in Europe. Furthermore, the time frame was explained with reference to the historical events, i.e. the beginning of Hitler's territorial annexations and the outbreak of WW2. Regarding the selection of the particular newspapers, three criteria were considered to be important. Firstly, all the newspapers needed to be published on a daily basis. Secondly, the newspaper selection for each country needed to cover the political range from left of centre to right of centre positions. And thirdly, the relative importance of the newspapers in terms of their circulation figures but also in terms of their political influence was considered. In this respect, the different conditions governing the political and economic sphere in France and the United Kingdom had to be borne in mind. Clearly, important and tenable selection criteria assuring the viability of the results have been presented. However, the criterion of 'political influence', which is indeed difficult to measure, might not be as clear-cut as one would hope. Therefore, it needs to be acknowledged that other newspapers could have been selected too. Furthermore, the fact that my personal financial situation came into play certainly impacted on the research design and it would have been desirable to avoid this. In terms of the data collection process three different types of searches have been used: keyword search, full manual search, and manual search according to list of dates. Although the last data collection type is certainly less rigorous than the other two, it is still estimated that it had little effect on the outcome of the textual analysis in terms of the hypothesis put forward as regards agenda-setting. The corpus itself has been divided into two sub-corpora – differing in terms of the number of STs and TTs. This division has been conducted with regards to the different analyses conducted in the analytical chapters, that is, agenda setting and framing analysis. To sum up, the criteria governing the corpus selection and data collection have been sufficiently justified in order to assure that the results of the analysis

will be viable and significant. Although closely tied to the research questions at hand, the presented criteria might be used in an adapted way in future research projects.

3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN

The main objective of this section is to outline in detail how the descriptive-explanatory methodology is applied to the corpus in order to answer the research questions. To this end, the three steps of Calzada Pérez's methodology will be revisited. Firstly, the textual analysis will be looked at. For this step, I will propose employing agenda-setting and framing. Secondly, the explanatory step is investigated. Concrete questions will be formulated, covering the four levels of context proposed as sources of explanation in section 3.1.4. Finally, the explorative step will be looked at, explaining how viable hypotheses can be formulated based on the results of the first two steps. These hypotheses tentatively investigate potential effects of translation in the TC.

3.3.1 DESCRIPTION

In this section I will firstly discuss how agenda-setting and framing can enhance the descriptive step of the methodology. Secondly, I will propose a series of questions that are useful to be considered in view of the research question. Thirdly, I will present a table linking the questions to linguistic features and framing strategies.

As outlined in section 2.4.1, agenda-setting research has demonstrated that the emphasis the mass media place on certain issues, through regulating the frequency and amount of information provided and the position allocated, affects the importance attributed to this issue by the audience. By selecting and de-selecting certain topics, by according them more or less space in more or less prominent places, the media set their agenda, influence what topics the public considers to be relevant and to what degree. This indicates that studying how often the topic of Goebbels has been taken up by the different newspapers, and how the translational import changes over time, allows us to gauge how much importance the topic was assigned by the media. The researcher can then relate these fluctuations to other contextual factors. The results of this analysis will be beneficial when building hypotheses about the potential impacts of the media discourses upon the TCs on the explorative level. As outlined in section 2.4.2, framing theory argues that how issues are presented affects their reception. I have proposed in section 2.4.4 that the use of frame analysis could be beneficial in terms of investigating the media images of the Third Reich, since it furthers the understanding of how representations of the NS-Regime were constructed by analysing what aspects of a given issue have been selected/de-selected and how salient they were made.

Thereby the problem definitions, the causal interpretations, the moral evaluations and treatment recommendations provided through the media frame become visible. What makes frame analysis and agenda setting especially suitable is their focus on the selective aspect of news reporting. I would argue that it is here that translational mediation within the media context can best be observed and has its biggest impact. Comparing media texts to their assumed STs allows a unique insight into what general discourses were originally present in a given setting, which speech events were made accessible for foreign audience and what aspects have or have not been translated. Thus, agenda-setting and framing seem to be useful tools to analyse what role translation played in these processes.

We now need to turn our attention to the problem of what concrete aspects of the media texts should be investigated. In order to ‘frame’ political speech events to a particular end, news producers apply framing strategies which draw on linguistic and textual devices such as transitivity, modality, logical connectors, etc. Therefore, we could conduct the textual analysis by focussing on a predetermined set of such devices. However, investigating broader framing strategies not only helps to establish patterns of discourse mediation but also allows accounting for unusual single occurrences. Since a large variety of linguistic features can be subsumed under each framing strategy, a frame analysis does not unnecessarily limit the scope of the textual analysis. In order to investigate media frames it is helpful to assume in line with CDA that language is active. In this regard Richardson rightly points out that “in order to properly interpret [a text] we need to work out what the speaker and writer is doing through discourse” (2007: 24). Hence, I would suggest conducting the analysis along the lines of the following questions:

- (a) What actors feature/do not feature in the reporting articles?*
- (b) How are these actors referred to, how are they characterised?*
- (c) How are the actors positioned amongst each other?*
- (d) What actions/events are referred to/ not referred to?*
- (e) Who is active/passive? To who is the responsibility for certain actions/events attributed?*
- (f) How is the event represented in relation to time and space? Are there any changes in the event chronology?*
- (g) What are the consequences of these actions according to the journalists (for France/the United Kingdom)?*
- (h) How are the actors/actions/events evaluated?*
- (i) Which quotations have been selected/ de-selected for translation?*

(j) What is the function of these quotations in the overall organisation of the text?

In view of the diachronic dimension of this analysis, I propose to address the following questions:

(k) What types of speech events were reported on by the different newspapers?

(l) How often do reporting articles of speech events feature in the different newspapers? How does this develop over time?

(m) How was the NS-Regime depicted in the reporting media texts? How does this change over time?

Having analysed what happens on the perlocutionary level of the text, we need to investigate what purpose the text serves (*ibid.*) or what image is thereby created for the reader. This step however, cannot be conducted without taking into account contextual factors influencing the text production; the shifting between the descriptive and explanatory level is therefore necessary. It might rightly be argued that the effectiveness of a particular frame cannot be evaluated through a pure textual analysis since frames play on the prior knowledge of individuals to which we have no access. It is here that we need to stress the importance of accounting for the contextual levels and of a time- and place-restricted text interpretation. The above presented questions make the occurrence of the following framing strategies, previously outlined in the theoretical framework, likely: labelling, selective appropriation of text, re-positioning of participants and temporal and spatial framing (Baker 2006: 112-134). What follows now is a schematic outline of the relationship between questions, linguistic features (although this list is by no means exhaustive) and framing strategies. The diachronic dimension of the analysis is to a large extent informed by the synchronic dimension.

Questions	Linguistic/textual Features	Framing Strategy	
What actors are mentioned/ not mentioned?	Content analysis	Selective Appropriation of Text	Synchronic Dimension (Text)
How are these actors referred to, how are they characterised?	Naming/ reference/ predication	Labelling	
How do the actors stand in position to each other?	Us/them dichotomy	Re-Positioning (Information Structure)	
What actions/events are referred/not referred to?	Content analysis	Selective Appropriation of Text	

Who is active/passive? To whom is the responsibility for an action/event attributed to?	Transitivity	Re-Positioning (Information Structure)	
How is the event represented in relation to time and space? Are there any changes in the event chronology?	Temporal and Spatial Deixis, Paragraph Sequencing, Tenses	Temporal and Spatial Framing	
What are the consequences of the actions/ events? What is the alleged impact on the receiving culture?	Argumentative Structure	Re-Positioning	
Which quotes have been selected/de-selected for translation? What propositions are made in these quotes?	Content Analysis	Selective Appropriation of Text	
How are actors/actions/events evaluated?	Presuppositions, Modality	Re-Positioning	
What types of speeches were reported on/not reported on?	Content Analysis	Selective Appropriation of Text	Diachronic Dimension (Discourse)
How often were these speeches reported on?	Topic Frequency/ Agenda-Setting/ Translation Flows	Selective Appropriation of Text	
How did they depict the NS-Regime and how does this change diachronically?	All of the above	Any Type of Framing Strategy	

FIGURE 4: Synchronic and Diachronic Analysis

3.3.2 EXPLANATION

The main objective of this section is to explain and justify what practical aspects of the four context levels will be accounted for in view of the data at hand. Furthermore, the sources used with regards to these practical aspects will be introduced thereby illustrating the triangulation of the contextual level. Firstly, I will present the practical contextual aspects and the sources used in relation to the four contextual levels. In addition, I will highlight where issues discussed in section 3.3 might come into play. Secondly, a table providing an overview is presented.

Level 1 The immediate language or text-internal co-text is already analysed or drawn upon at the descriptive step of the analysis. As previously stated this contextual level cannot be separated from the text in praxis. Therefore all the questions relating to the synchronic dimension of the textual analysis are at the same time questions investigating the first level of context.

Level 2 The second level of context investigates the intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourse. The present thesis will draw upon information provided by journalism, translation and media studies with regards to genre conventions in journalism and professional standards relating to reported speech in journalistic discourse. Genre conventions account for structural differences between media texts originating from different lingua cultures but also have implications with regards to the translation strategies employed (Bassnett and Bielsa 2009: 68). The importance of intertextual references and quotation patterns in media texts has been amply discussed in section 2.1.1. In this regard, among others Richardson's work *Analysing Newspapers* (2005), Bassnett and Bielsa's *Translation in Global News* (2009) as well as Burger's *Mediensprache* (2005) will be consulted. Furthermore, the alleged STs as well as the other media texts reporting about the same speech event will be investigated regarding intertextual references and with regards to interdiscursive references. The use of agency texts needs to be carefully considered.

Level 3 The third contextual level accounts for the language external social/sociological variables, institutional frames and individual-dependent components of a specific situational context. The following factors seem to have had a strong bearing on the production of the journalistic discourse during the inter-war period: (a) the political position of owners and editors of newspapers as they had influence on content and form of the news texts (b) the targeted audiences since media texts have a strong target-text orientation, (c) the news values in general such as objectivity, time pressure, etc. as outlined in section 2.1, (d) the possible access to primary sources the journalist-translators had, (e) the actual use the journalist-translators made of the sources, (f) editorial and stylistic policies of the newspapers to which the journalists/translators had to adhere and (g), the dependence on and use of news agencies as a source of information. It is important to note that news agencies such as *Havas* and *Reuters* provided newspapers often with pre-translated agency texts. To account for these factors, research conducted by historians and sociologists will be consulted. The following sources in particular will be drawn upon, (i) historical sources dedicated to the individual newspapers; (ii) historical sources dedicated to the press in France and the United Kingdom

during the inter-war-period in general; (iii) historical sources dedicated to the history of the news agencies and (iv) sociological research concerned with the conditions governing the French and British newspaper markets during the inter-war period. As discussed in section 3.2.4, this thesis also aims at incorporating information regarding individual agency by (v) analysing the editorial correspondence of the *Manchester Guardian*.

Level 4 The fourth level is concerned with the broader socio-political and historical context in which the discursive practices are embedded. This context level seems to be especially important when conducting an analysis of historical data. This is because the researchers need to familiarise themselves with a context that is broad in its dimensions but temporally removed and therefore difficult to access. They also need to make sure that their audience has enough information to fully appreciate the results emanating from the analysis. For this reason, the entire first chapter has been dedicated to outlining the relevant aspects of the socio-political and historical context in which Goebbels' speeches and their media translations were embedded. For a discussion of the selection and relevance of the contextual aspects please refer to Chapter One.

In the following section a table of the four context levels and the relevant sub-aspects thereof are presented in order to provide an overview.

Level 1: the immediate language or text-internal co-text;	Synchronic dimension of descriptive analysis
Level 2: the intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourse	Genre conventions of media texts (inverted structure etc.)
	Intertextual references
	Interdiscursive references
	Quotation patterns
Level 3: the language external social/ sociological variables, institutional frames and individual-dependent components of a specific situational context	The dependence on and the use of news agencies
	The targeted audiences because of the strong target-text orientation of media texts
	The news values in general such as objectivity, time pressure, etc. as outlined in section 2.1
	The political position of the owners and editors of newspapers as they had influence on content and form of the media texts

	The actual use the journalist-translators made of the sources
	The editorial and stylistic policies of the newspapers
	The general conditions of the newspaper markets in France and the United Kingdom which might have had a bearing on the discursive production
	The access to sources the journalist-translators had
Level 4: the broader socio-political and historical context in which the discursive practices are embedded and to which they are related	The backdrop as outlined in Chapter One

FIGURE 5: Context Levels

3.3.3 EXPLORATION

This section briefly explains how this thesis aims to build hypotheses with regards to potential effects of the translationally mediated media texts upon the TCs. This thesis does not incorporate a reception study but does tentatively explore in Chapter Four the potential effects. This section is relatively short since the main focus of the present research lies on the description and explanation of the data production processes and the data.

We have seen in section 2.2 that large sections of the public relied on the newspapers for information about contemporary political events. Furthermore, the political elites were also dependent on the printed press since they considered the media texts published by the newspapers as reflections of the different sections of the public opinion. Given that the political elites were directly, the broad public only indirectly influential in terms of politics, we can assume that the former group held more power when it came to directing the course of politics. Since the political elites were constituted of the better educated and/or wealthier members of society, it is reasonable to believe that they were targeted by newspapers which were sold at a higher price. We can also observe that these more expensive newspapers (*Manchester Guardian*, *L'Humanité* and *Le Figaro*) seem to be quality newspapers i.e. more informative than the newspapers selling at a lower price and targeting a less educated or less wealthy audience (*Daily Herald*, *Daily Mail* and *Le Petit Parisien*). Taking this into consideration and combining it with the findings from the first two steps of the analysis, we can propose some interesting hypotheses. Questions such as what section of the population in each country obtained more or less information (agenda-setting) about the NS-Regime, what aspects were considered to be relevant by the newspapers targeting educated/less educated, rich/poor sections of the population (framing), how the created media images

relate to the course politics took, etc. serve as an interesting basis for building such hypotheses. What needs to be borne in mind, however, is the difficult relationship between causes and effects within this research project (see section 3.2.3). Since the hypotheses built in terms of the explorative component of the analysis will not be tested by, for instance their viability will be of a much lower degree than the hypothesis proposed in term of the explanatory level.

3.3.4 SECTION REVIEW

The main objective of this section was to outline in detail the concrete application of the *three-level methodology for DETS* to the corpus of data as outlined in section 3.3. I argued that in terms of the descriptive step of the model, agenda-setting and framing could be usefully employed. This is because of their focus on selection and de-selection processes which also play a major role in translational discourse mediation. The analyses conducted at this step help answering the research question (a) of how the NS-Regime was represented in the French and British media between 1935 and 1939 and how this changed over time. Moreover, by conducting an agenda-setting and a frame analysis, the research question (b) of what role translation played in the construction of the media representations can be answered. In terms of the contextual-levels, a large number of data-specific factors which seemed to have affected the media production processes have been identified and relevant sources of explanation have been named. It remains to be seen in the analytical chapters whether the selection of contextual factors is accurate and what the relative influence of the different factors were. This step of the analysis makes a major contribution to answering the research question (c) as to what contextual level influenced the image construction processes. I have also argued that certain hypotheses regarding the potential effects of the media texts upon the TC can be formulated; based on the findings from the two previous steps and accounting for the relationship between the newspapers and their targeted readership. However, I also explained that hypotheses built in terms of the explorative step of the model, which is concerned with potential effects of the media texts upon the TC, will remain speculative since they cannot be tested. Summing up, an instrument tailored to the selected data has been proposed which will allow the three research questions to be answered. The examination of research questions (a) and (c) could be attributed to two distinctive steps of the analysis. However, research question (b), which investigates what role translation played in the representation of the NS-Regime by the media, can only be addressed by taking all levels of the analysis into consideration.

CHAPTER REVIEW

The present chapter aimed at describing the corpus collection and at clarifying the methodological approach applied in this research. With regards to the corpus, the primary objective was to justify the data selection. The broad frame was set in terms of the particular historical context whilst the newspaper selection was based on the criterion of representativeness and political significance. Representativeness was relatively easily established in relation to the political orientation of the newspapers. Significance was defined with regards to the competing factors of circulation figures and political influence. These were dependent on the differing conditions of the newspaper market. Due to issues of accessibility, three different data collection procedures have been employed. It is estimated that this only insignificantly impeded the results.

In view of the research questions, an adapted version of the *three-level methodology for DETS* has been proposed for application (Calzada Pérez 2001). In doing so, causal relationships between the particular realisation of the media texts and the professional and socio-political environment in which the production took place were to be established. However, the notion of causality is problematic and a careful and thorough analysis of a multitude of contextual factors seems to be necessary. Furthermore, the particular nature of the media texts hindered a coupled-pair alignment in the traditional sense and necessitated terminological alterations. In view of the selective aspect of media translation, the methodology has been complemented by integrating an agenda-setting and frame analysis at the descriptive stage. In addition, by adding a small-scale case study to the explanatory component it is hoped to better understand why the individual agents made decisions about including or excluding events or media texts and why articles submitted by the translator-journalists were altered.

Summing up, the methodological framework outlined in the present chapter is sound and tailored to the data at hand. Not only the selection of the methodological approach but also the selection of the data has been justified in view of the research questions. Of particular benefit is the practical tool presented at the end of the chapter. This tool will guide the analysis and hopefully allow the research questions to be answered in the following analytical chapters. It is hoped that the adapted version of the methodology might be of use to other research investigating media translations.

4 THE MEDIA IMAGES OF THE THIRD REICH IN THE FRENCH AND BRITISH PRESS

A newspaper has two sides to it. It is a business, like any other, and has to pay in the material sense in order to live. But it is much more than a business; it is an institution; it reflects and it influences the life of a whole community; it may affect even wider destinies.

(C.P. Scott 5 May 1921)

Chapter One has outlined the historical information necessary to contextualise the data presented in the analytical chapters. The second chapter delineated the theoretical framework underpinning this study. It situated the thesis within the field of media translation, examined the structures and functions of ideology, critically discussed CDA as a research approach and finally argued that agenda-setting and framing are apt tools to study media translations. Chapter Three provided a detailed introduction to the data and presented a practical instrument to conduct the intended analysis.

The objective of the present chapter is twofold. On the one hand it presents and discusses the results of the contrastive media-agenda analysis which investigated the visible translation flows from the German SC to the French and British TCs. These findings will be mirrored against the audiences targeted by the different newspapers and against their circulation figures. Thus, hypotheses regarding how informed the British and the French public were can be offered. On the other hand, the chapter explores the selection and re-contextualisation patterns. It will be analysed which of Goebbels' arguments were selected for translation and whether the arguments were contested, simply reported or supported in the media texts. This allows us to gauge how successful Goebbels' argumentation was and to investigate how the translator-journalist depicted the SC speech events. As explained in sections 2.2.2 and 2.3.4, the thesis attempts to relate the argumentative patterns in the TTs to the broad ideological families as outlined in section 2.2.3. Each of the three main sections (4.1, 4.2 and 4.3) will include a concluding section called 'exploration'. These sections draw together the findings and explore the effects of the media discourses on the TCs.

4.1 THE (DE-) SELECTION OF SPEECHES: MEASURING THE VISIBLE TRANSLATION-IMPORT-FLOW


The aim of this section is to explain how the media-agenda was measured within this thesis and to discuss the results by comparing differences between France and Britain and between the targeted audiences. Agenda-setting research has established that the emphasis placed on a given issue by the media impacts on the importance assigned to the topic by the readership. This impact can be measured when the media, the public and the policy agenda are set in

relation to each other. Because of the inaccessibility of the data but also for temporal and spatial restrictions it is not possible to conduct a full-fledged agenda-setting analysis within this thesis. Instead the media-agenda will be analysed by measuring how often the ‘issue Goebbels’ was selected for translation and publication by the newspapers. This indicates the relative importance the media assigned to the political discourse of Goebbels. As mentioned in section 2.4.1, different measuring methods are established within agenda-setting research. The most commonly used is the measuring of the topic frequency. This means that each article which reports on a particular issue within a given newspaper (or several newspapers and/or other media) over a certain period of time is counted and the total number of reports compared to a real-life indicator. In sixteen cases (all of them in French newspapers) it was difficult to establish whether a particular text passage formed a media text in its own right or needed to be considered as part of a larger reportage. Therefore I resorted to measuring the topic frequency by counting the days on which the newspapers printed text passages from Goebbels’ speeches. Given the relatively low number of the afore-mentioned cases it is unlikely that this impeded the results. The number of days on which speeches about Goebbels were published in the *Völkischer Beobachter* will be used as the real-life indicator. Selecting only one newspaper from Germany means that the indicators cannot be used to compare the discourse quantities but it allows us to compare the curve progressions. Conversely, the visible translation import quantities can be compared between France and the UK. The section of the SC discourse which was not only selected for translation but also for publication is referred to as ‘visible translation-import-flow’ (VTIF).

Apart from the overall comparison between the French and British VTIF, this flow is also compared by contrasting the different target audiences, i.e. the British quality (*Manchester Guardian*) and French opinion (*Figaro* and *L’Humanité*) press as opposed to the British tabloids (*Daily Herald* and *Daily Mail*) and the French popular title(s) (*Petit Parisien*). The first group features relatively low circulation figures compared to the second group. As regards the targeted readerships, the newspapers do not exclusively fall along the lines of tabloid/popular vs. quality/opinion press. The French communist paper *L’Humanité* and the British labour paper *Daily Herald* catered for the working class. The conservative *Daily Mail* and the neutral *Petit Parisien* targeted the middle class, leaving the upper-middle and upper class to the liberal *Manchester Guardian* and the conservative *Figaro*. However, the differing socio-political situations of the United Kingdom (relatively stable/class society) and France (unstable, strong left/right polarisation/strong labour movement) engendered that *L’Humanité* was politically influential in inter-war France.

4.1.1 COMPARISON BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM


The followings section will graphically present the results of the media-agenda analysis and provide interpretations of the results. Graph 1 represents the VTIF for the two variables France and the UK as well as for the real-life indicator the *Völkischer Beobachter* between 1935 and 1939. Graph 2 compares the number of days the opinion and quality press (low circulation figures, high selling price) reported about Goebbels. Graph 3 compares the number of days on which the tabloid/popular press (high circulation figures, low selling price) provided information about Goebbels' speeches. Graph 4 represents and contrasts the number of days on which each of the six newspapers reported about Goebbels' speeches in the five years between 1935 and 1939. Graphs 5 to 7 contrast how often the French and British newspapers targeting the same social class in their respective countries reported Goebbels' speeches.



GRAPH 1: Comparison VTIF FR & UK


Graph 1 exhibits that the French and British press imported, translated and published articles about Goebbels more or less in proportion to how often Goebbels approximately gave public speeches. The frequency of his speeches depended partly on the course of politics but also on his personal situation as a NS politician within the regime. The curve progression of the British and French newspapers reveals the importance the newspapers assigned to specific topics when put in relation to the list of articles in the appendix. As it is for spatial restrictions impossible to provide the entire corpus in the appendix a certain amount of trust will need to be placed in the researcher – alternatively, at least the French newspapers are accessible online. The relationship between the curve progressions and the speech topics will be looked at in more detail when investigating graphs 8 to 17 in section 4.2.

The progression of the curves in graph 1 seems to be disproportional towards the end of the observed time period, starting late in 1938 and continuing in 1939. Given the important political events that took place at the time, i.e. the Munich conference in September 1938, the November pogroms in 1938, the invasion of rest-Czechoslovakia in March 1939 and finally the outbreak of WW2 in September 1939, it seems highly likely that this development was caused by the escalating aggressiveness of the Reich and the increasing threat of war. The curve progression also indicates that the VTIF in France was less strongly coupled to the real-life indicator than in Britain. The marked drop in the VTIF across all newspapers and nations between 1936 and 1937 was probably the consequence of Goebbels quarrel with Hitler over one of his numerous affairs (see section 1.4.1). Being unpopular with Hitler meant that Goebbels gave fewer speeches and subsequently the foreign press had less to report on. The most remarkable trait the graph exhibits, however, is that throughout 1935 to 1939, the French press imported significantly more often information originating from Goebbels' discourse through translation than their British counterpart. This discrepancy partly reflects the selection of the analysed newspapers. Whilst the selection represents Britain with two tabloid newspapers which typically feature less political content than the quality press, France is represented with two opinion papers which are highly politicised. However, the staggering fact that the British market offered its readers less than half as often information about Goebbels' speeches is related to a more widespread and profound trend; that is the significant and strong de-politisation of the entire British newspaper market. This trend becomes even more evident when we take a look at graph 2 which compares the VTIF among the quality/opinion press and graph 3 which compares the VTIF among the popular/tabloid press.




GRAPH 2: VTIF in the Quality/ Opinion Press

The British *Manchester Guardian* stays consistently behind the French *L'Humanité* and the *Figaro* in terms of the VTIF.



GRAPH 3: VTIF in the Tabloid/Popular Press

The French *Petit Parisien* leads in all but one year the statistics on the number of days on which it imported information about Goebbels.



GRAPH 4: VTIF Across All Newspapers

Curiously, the *Petit Parisien* increased the import to such a degree that it managed to overtake the *Manchester Guardian* in 1939. This might be related to the fact that France, geographically more exposed to the German threat, was more wary about the events in 1938/1939.


Graphs 2 and 3 demonstrate that the French press, irrespective of the newspaper type, was reporting more frequently about Goebbels' speeches. The only exception can be found in

1935 when the *Daily Mail* was leading the popular press. As discussed in section 3.2.2 the driving force behind this phenomenon were the different market mechanisms in France and the UK. After the abolishment of the governmental taxes in the news sector in the 1850s, market forces unfolded unobstructed in Britain (Chalaby 1996: 143). Economic competition between the newspapers was enormous and most of the popular newspaper companies tried to assure a secure position by increasing their circulation figures decreasing the selling price per copy (*ibid.*). This also included pushing other, smaller companies off the market by employing strategies such as predatory pricing (Chalaby 1998: 32). To survive on the market, newspapers had to take measures aimed at attracting a broader readership. The number of pages was increased (the French newspapers only featured about half as many), headlines were highlighted, more images were provided and news became more sensational and emotional (Chalaby 1996: 148). One discursive strategy that was successfully exploited to gain an economic advantage was the de-politisation of news (*ibid.*). This means that political topics were increasingly de-selected for publication and if they were reported on, they focussed on human interest stories rather than on the political issues at stake (*ibid.*: 149). This was because the company managers assumed that a large number of people were more interested in sports and society news than in politics (*ibid.*). The *Daily Mail*, for instance, devoted only 6% of its content to politics in 1937 (*ibid.*: 150). Alongside the de-politisation of the news emerged a diversification and popularisation of the news content. The ideological views of the press owners and editors were still manifest in the British press output, but surfaced less frequently and often less explicitly (*ibid.*). We will see in section 5.3 that the *Manchester Guardian* resorted to different means to counteract the stiff competition. However, Chalaby's research (1996 and 1998) and the results presented in this section clearly indicate that the quality newspapers were also affected by the demands of the market. In France, the situation was different. With a much smaller readership to recruit among the proletariat and a lower degree of urbanisation, i.e. fewer copies could be sold and the distribution was more difficult, the French market had come to stagnation (Chalaby 1996: 143). Since the abuses of journalists went unpunished under the Third Republic, the French press became widely corrupt (*ibid.*: 145). Newspapers received not only bribes from the world of finance but also from the "government who used the press to protect its interests, political parties to publicise their opinions and political leaders to promote their careers" (*ibid.*). It is not surprising then that *Havas*, with its quasi-monopolistic position in the French news selling and advertising sector, was highly subsidised by the French government (Georgakakis 2004: 92). Moreover, foreign countries started to take an increasing interest in the French press output from the *Paris Peace Conference* onwards and numerous papers

were willing to manipulate their articles in exchange for money (Blandin 2007: 109). “Corrupt money alleviated the constraints of economic competition by allowing numerous newspapers to survive even though their sale and advertising revenues would not permit it” (Chalaby 1996: 145). Therefore and in contrast to their British counterparts, the Parisien dailies were still highly politicised in the 1930s and held “explicit and marked political positions” (*ibid.*: 151). Their discourse was partisan and became, in many cases, violent from 1934 onwards (Blandin 2007: 106).

4.1.2 COMMON VS. ELITIST READERS: A COMPARISON ACROSS NEWSPAPER TYPES AND SOCIAL CLASSES


Whilst section 4.1.1 compared the VTIF between France and Britain, this section will compare the same variable among and between the social classes. Graphs 5 to 7 portray the frequency with which the different social classes were exposed to information about Goebbels. However, it is important to bear in mind that the selected newspapers only addressed those members of the targeted class who actually bought and read the newspaper. The data that follows can therefore only in a limited way represent how aware the respective classes were about Goebbels discourses.



GRAPH 5: VTIF Working Class


The British working class members who read the *Daily Herald* were probably less aware of Goebbels’ speeches than the French readers of the communist paper. This is partly related to the fact that the *Daily Herald* was a tabloid and therefore less inclined to publish political content than the French opinion paper. It also confirms the British de-politisation trend. A further point to consider is the influence potential of the two newspapers on the respective political decision makers. Within the political system in France *L’Humanité* filled an

important position; the same cannot be asserted for the *Daily Herald*. “Daladier’s papers indicate a preoccupation with the hostile commentary of the left-wing press, particularly le Populaire (a socialist newspaper dominated by Léon Blum) and L’Humanité (the official journal of the French Communist Party). By contrast, Chamberlain was perturbed by criticism of the conservative press, suggesting that the opposition newspapers caused him few sleepless nights” (Hucker 2011: 21). However, the *Daily Herald* was among those newspapers with the highest circulation figures and its scarce reporting about Goebbels certainly affected to some degree the relevance a considerable number of people assigned to it. It should be mentioned that the illustration for 1939 is slightly biased in that *L’Humanité* was banned by the French government in August 1939.



GRAPH 6: VTIF Middle Class

The *Daily Mail* and the *Petit Parisien* catered for the middle class and displayed important circulation figures. Subsequently, both newspapers reached a wide audience. However, it is assumed that their relevance in terms of influencing the political elites was relatively low. Despite the fact that both of them had a similar position on their respective markets as a tabloid and a popular paper, the graph does only partially reflect the stronger de-politisation of the British market. This might be related to Lord Rothemere’s declared interest in politics and his wish to contribute to a rapprochement of Britain and Germany. Nonetheless, the discrepancy between the two newspapers is striking in 1939. In addition to the geographical closeness of France, the *Daily Mail*’s unwillingness to report negatively about the NS-Regime could have potentially contributed to this phenomenon.



GRAPH 7: VTIF Upper-Middle Class

The *Figaro* and the *Manchester Guardian* were in many ways similar. After a rather shameful excursion into pro-Nazi territory under the ownership of François Coty, the *Figaro* was back to being a quality “literary, society and gossip” paper catering for the “social and cultural elite” in 1935 (Thogmartin 1998: 100). Like the *Manchester Guardian* (see section 5.1) the *Figaro* also employed a number of excellent and renowned journalists such as Wladimir d’Ormesson and Lucien Romier who greatly contributed with their editorials to the profile of the paper. Their political outlook was however, different. Whilst the *Manchester Guardian* supported liberal views, the *Figaro* was rather conservative. Both newspapers were committed to uphold quality journalism and were therefore inclined to keep informative and evaluative media text types distinct from each other (see section 5.1). Out of the six newspapers selected for the present research, the *Figaro* is clearly leading the statistics of the number of days on which it published about Goebbels (see graph 4). Graph 7 exhibits most clearly the differing market conditions in France and the UK. It seems as if the readers of the *Figaro* were especially alert to the unfolding events in Germany which also becomes evident in the sudden increase of publication days in 1938/1939. The readers of the *Manchester Guardian* seem to have been more often informed than the working and middle-class readers in Britain but only about as often as the French reader of the popular *Petit Parisien* (see graph 4).

4.1.3 EXPLORATION 1


The objective of this section was to investigate how present the NS-Regime represented by Goebbels was in the mind of the public and of politicians in France and Britain. To this end a media-agenda analysis has been conducted investigating how frequently Goebbels’ discourse was imported through translation and published in the newspapers. This analysis contained

three contrastive elements in that it compared (1) divergences between France and Britain, (2) divergences between the newspaper formats (quality/opinion press vs. tabloid/popular press) and (3) divergences between the targeted audiences (working/middle and upper-middle/elite class). The analysis has revealed that the British newspaper consumers were in considerable disadvantage since the highly competitive conditions on the national media market engendered a progressive de-politisation of the media discourse. Therefore, considerably fewer articles than in France were published about Goebbels. This phenomenon is likely to have been reinforced by a general preoccupation of the British government with internal affairs such as the decline of the Empire and the abdication of the King as well as a general reluctance to commit to any engagement on the continent (see section 1.1.2 and 1.1.3). Based on these observations and in line with agenda-setting research I would then propose the hypothesis that (T1) the British readers were considerably less aware of the increasing threat posed by the NS-Regime than their French neighbours. Similarly, the findings also support the assumption that the tabloid/popular press were less political than the quality/opinion press and therefore published considerably less about Goebbels than the quality and opinion papers. Subsequently, I propose that (T2) the masses of readers who consumed tabloid or popular papers were significantly less aware of the increasing threat posed by the NS-Regime than the much smaller number of readers who consumed quality or opinion papers. Moreover, when mirroring the division between tabloid/popular vs. quality/opinion press against the social class of their target audiences, it becomes evident that the VTIF increases along the continuum of working class to upper class in Britain. However, this does not apply to France where the VTIF raises in relation to the division between tabloid/popular vs. quality/opinion press. Accordingly, I propose that (T3a) there was a tendency in inter-war Britain that the lower social classes bought primarily tabloids which left them less aware of the increasing threat posed by the NS-Regime than other readers. Additionally, I would also argue that the strong political polarisation in France which cut across classes encouraged all supporters of these movements to read the respective opinion press. Therefore, I propose that (T3b) the more actively interested in politics people in France were the more aware they became of the increasing threat posed by the NS-Regime. As previously mentioned only the media-agenda has only tentatively been set in relation to the policy and public agenda. Therefore there is admittedly potential to challenge the proposed hypotheses. However, the results seem to correspond with prior socio-historical research (Chalaby 1996, Chalaby 1998) which increases their viability. The hypotheses will be complemented and extended at the end of this chapter. Moreover, this section also provided first evidence that the agenda-setting approach can successfully be applied to the measuring of translation flows in the field


of media translation. Given that this approach establishes causal relationships between the media-agenda (which in the present case was analysed in terms of translation flows) and the public and the policy agenda, its successful application to media translation promises new insights for the discipline of Translation Studies.

4.2 THE (DE-) SELECTION OF SPEECHES: A COMBINED QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE APPROACH


Section 4.1 has investigated how present the NS-Regime, represented by Goebbels, was in the minds of people in France and Britain. We have seen that the British public appears to have been for socio-political but also for media-related reasons substantially less aware of the Nazi regime. Moreover the results revealed that readers of the quality/opinion press were probably more involved with the unfolding events in Germany than readers of tabloids and popular papers and that this was class-dependent in Britain but not in France. The aim of the present section is to compare with what (speech) topics people in France and the UK were confronted and how much importance the different newspapers assigned to these subject matters. To this end, charts comparing the VTIF between France and the UK for each of the five years between 1935 and 1939 are analysed in terms of peaks and curve progressions that diverge largely from the real-life indicator, the *Völkischer Beobachter*. Such striking features will be investigated more closely by analysing what (speech) topics had captured the interest of the media. Furthermore, graphics depicting the VTIF for each newspaper are studied and differences between the newspapers commented on. We have seen in section 3.2.4 that the reporting media texts in the French and British press fall thematically into three broad groups within the framing corpus. These categories do also apply to the graph irregularities observed in the agenda setting corpus: (a) speeches reporting about the Third Reich's *Heim ins Reich* campaign, i.e. speeches talking about future and past territorial conquests of the Nazi regime; (b) speeches regarding the current political situation in Europe focussing mainly on the question of whether there would be war or peace; and (c) speeches concerning topics relevant to the Nazi ideology, namely involving anti-bolshevism, anti-Semitism and the Church conflict. The discussion of the graphs (8-17) will be conducted along these three speech groups.




GRAPH 8: VTIF 1935 - Comparison FR & UK




GRAPH 9: VTIF 1935 - Across Newspapers




GRAPH 10: VTIF 1936 - Comparison FR & UK




GRAPH 11: VTIF 1936 - Across Newspapers




GRAPH 12: VTIF 1937 - Comparison FR & UK




GRAPH 13: VTIF 1937 - Across Newspapers




GRAPH 14: VTIF 1938 - Comparison FR & UK



GRAPH 15: VTIF 1938 - Across Newspapers



GRAPH 16: VTIF 1939 - Comparison FR & UK



GRAPH 17: VTIF 1939 - Comparison FR & UK

4.2.1 HEIM INS REICH & POLITICAL SITUATION

It seems to be useful to consider the *Heim ins Reich* campaign as part of NS expansionism. The NS government claimed that the Reich was lacking living space to provide for its large population. Additionally, German ethnics living for various reasons outside German territory were, due to their language and culture, considered to be German citizens. The *Heim ins Reich* campaign combined these two lines of argumentation by bringing the German ethnics “Heim ins Reich” (back to the fatherland) through annexing the respective territories. In this regard “NS propaganda became a very decisive instrument to raise interest for German *Volkszugehörigkeit* [ethnicity] among the people who lived in various parts of Europe and it also served to create acceptance for such methods among the “Reichsdeutsche” [ethnic Germans living on German territory] population” (Vogt 2011: 31). This campaign soon translated into political actions, i.e. territorial demands and annexations. Goebbels was

highly prolific in this regard. Between 1935 and 1939 the VTIF reached its peak at six different times because of increased reporting concerning the campaign.

Closely related to the *Heim ins Reich* campaign were the speeches talking about the current political situation in Europe. In fact most of the media texts reporting about the Reich's territorial annexations discussed the consequences of the territorial demands or conquests for European politics. Only two of the speeches which solely focussed on European politics managed to engender a significant increase of media attention and subsequently translational import across the selected newspapers.

4.2.1.1 HEIM INS REICH

The Saar January 1935: In January 1935 (see graph 8) both the French and the British press extensively reported about the Saar plebiscite. The plebiscite had been foreseen by the *Treaty of Versailles* which had placed the Saar territory under French leadership (see sections 2.1.3, 6.2.1, 6.2.6 and 6.2.2). The Saar population was to decide whether it wanted to return to Germany, maintain the status quo or become part of France. Graph 8 depicts that the British and the French media showed a similar level of interest. Graph 9 reveals that not only the opinion (*Figaro* and *L'Humanité*) and the quality (*Manchester Guardian*) press but also the *Daily Mail* frequently imported and published information about Saar.

Danzig Elections April 1935: Danzig, once part of Poland, had been integrated into the Prussian Empire in 1814. After WW1 the *Treaty of Versailles*, stripping Germany of many territorial possessions and recognising the Polish need for access to the sea, declared Danzig to be “a free city under the protection of the League of Nations with special rights for Poland” (Lemkin and Power 2005: 154 quoted in Möckli 2012: 8). However, a vast majority of the inhabitants were German and spoke German as their first language. Thus, the NS-Regime had a strong interest in ‘regaining’ Danzig and the NSDSAP established a Danzig branch during the inter-war years. Majority in Parliament was reached in 1933 and the success of these elections, it was hoped, would be repeated in 1935. The French opinion press reported extensively about Goebbels’ election speech. The *Manchester Guardian* and the *Petit Parisien* also accorded a number of articles to the event. However, neither the *Daily Herald* nor the *Daily Mail* seemed particularly interested in informing their readers about Goebbels’ latest declarations on the Danzig question.

Rhineland March 1936: The re-militarisation of the Rhineland in March 1936, clearly against the terms of the Versailles treaty, stirred considerable media interest (see sections 2.1.3, 5.1.2.1 and 6.1.2). As graph 11 demonstrates, especially the conservative papers, the *Figaro* and the *Daily Mail*, informed about this event.

Austria March 1938: The next step forward in Hitler's expansionist plan was the *Anschluss* of Austria in March 1938 (see section 2.1.3). Though media interest increased noticeably it stayed behind the figures the VTIF had reached in 1936 (see graph 14). It was the French opinion press which accounted most comprehensively for Goebbels' relevant speech (see graph 15). Also interesting is the almost complete absence of reports on Goebbels' speech in the *Daily Mail* and the generally scarce interest of the other British newspapers (see graph 15).

Sudetenland (Munich Agreement) November 1938: On the eve of the *Munich Agreement* Goebbels gave a speech outlining the German view on the Sudeten problem (see section 2.1.3). Europe stood on the brink of war and this speech was politically highly explosive. All French newspapers provided frequent descriptions and evaluations of the speech event. Under the circumstances the apparent lack of interest in the British press, and in particular in the *Manchester Guardian*, seems to be rather surprising (see graphs 14 and 15).

Czechoslovakia March 1939: Though Hitler had assured everyone that the Sudetenland was the final piece missing, his troops invaded what had remained of Czechoslovakia on March 16 1939. Goebbels did not directly comment on the event but he gave speeches prior to the invasion. At the opening of the Leipziger fair on March 6 he talked about Germany's precarious situation caused by the shortage of living space and also attacked the British government for its lack of understanding. Similar to the absence of media reports at the eve of the Munich agreement, the British press only reluctantly informed its readership about the speech (see graph 16). The French opinion press, in contrast, reported and referred to the event repeatedly (graph 17).

Danzig June 1939: The conflict between Poland and Germany over Danzig eventually reached boiling point in June 1939 when Goebbels made two speeches in the framework of the *Gaukulturwoche* (see Möckli 2012). The media interest was enormous, however it was considerably more pronounced in France than in Britain (see graph 16). Especially the quality and the opinion press provided comprehensive and numerous reports about the event (graph 17).

4.2.1.2 POLITICAL SITUATION

Germano-Nippon Agreement November 1936: One of the most discussed speeches with regards to its consequences for Europe was delivered by Goebbels in November 1936. It treated the agreement between Japan and NS Germany which was allegedly concluded to build a bulwark against bolshevism. Given that the German Reich had only sealed the *Rome-Berlin-Axis* a month before (see section 2.1.3), this agreement demonstrated yet another strong alliance and clearly strengthened the German position within Europe. It was mostly

discussed by the French opinion press and to a lesser degree by the *Manchester Guardian* and the *Petit Parisien*, whilst the *Daily Herald* and the *Daily Mail* appear to not have mentioned it at all (see graphs 10 and 11).

Eve of WW2 August 1939: The second considerable increase in the VTIF relating to a speech event solely discussing the European situation falls into August 1939, the eve of the outbreak of WW2 (see graph 16). The sudden surge of interest was not related to any current speeches Goebbels gave but to the heightened awareness of the French press of what was about to happen. A number of articles appeared in the *Petit Parisien* and *L'Humanité* discussing Goebbels' propaganda in the UK and France but also elaborating on the conflict between Germany and Poland over Danzig (see graph 17). In contrast, neither the British press nor the *Völkischer Beobachter* did acquaint their readers with these topics (see graph 17).

4.2.2 'IDEOLOGICAL' SPEECHES

The NS-Regime legitimatised its existence, its demands and subsequent actions to a large extent through ideological beliefs which appear to have been shared among considerable sections of the German society (see section 2.3.4). Thus, most of the NS speeches contain ideologically motivated argumentation or at least traces of the underlying ideology. As discussed in 3.3.2, ideological underpinnings are present in any political discourse but seem to be more readily identifiable within certain political systems. In that sense all NS speeches are to varying degrees 'ideological'. The speeches that have been classified as 'ideological' in the framework of this thesis are then discourses which were mostly considered under their ideological premises by the French and British newspapers. This was often the case when the speeches treated topics such as bolshevism, anti-Semitism and the Church conflict. The Church conflict was rarely discussed isolated from other topics. Surprisingly, within the present corpus it did not lead to a significant increase of media interest across the newspapers. Five peaks in the VTIF curve progression appear to be the result of an increased media interest in ideology-dominated speeches of Goebbels.

Gautag Essen August 1935: At the beginning of August 1935 Goebbels gave a speech at the district party day in Essen. In his speech he violently attacked the Jewish population and announced a ban on Arian/Jewish marriages. He also accused the Church of triggering unrest among the German population and explained that all non-governmental organisations such as the *Stahlhelm* (Literally: Steel Helmet. Paramilitary organisation established after WW1) needed to be dissolved. Moreover, Goebbels repeatedly declared that the foreign press should take care of its own business and not meddle with internal German affairs. This

speech caused uproar throughout the French and British press (see graph 7). The French opinion papers provided the most voluminous reporting about the event (see graph 8). Whilst the *Figaro* focussed on the attack against the Church, *L'Humanité* emphasised the involvement of the German communists and the German willingness to provoke a war. Both, the *Manchester Guardian* and the *Petit Parisien* provided comprehensive reports; however the *Petit Parisien* was more explicit with its anti-Nazi stance. The *Daily Mail* and the *Daily Herald* used agency texts. Most interesting is, however, that for the first time the VTIF in Britain was higher than in France.

Nuremberg Rally 1936: Probably inspired by the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War (July 1936) which the Nazis depicted as the exemplification of the quarrel between National Socialism and communism (see section 2.1.3), Goebbels made a violent speech attacking the Soviet Union. The French journalists reported considerably more about the speech than their British colleagues (see graph 10). By far the most extensive coverage was provided by the *L'Humanité*, followed on an equal level by the *Figaro* and *Petit Parisien*. Slightly less coverage was granted to the topic by the *Manchester Guardian* and the *Daily Mail*, whilst the *Daily Herald* did not report the speech at all (see graph 11).

February 1937: Still under the influence of the Spanish Civil War, Goebbels gave another speech in February 1937 in which he declared that the world had two choices, to opt for bolshevism and against National Socialism or for National Socialism and against bolshevism. Around the time of the speech Ribbentrop, the German ambassador in London, met with British officials to discuss the Anglo-German relations. This meeting instilled nervousness in the French public mind. Again the speech was mainly covered by the French opinion press, followed by the *Manchester Guardian* which actually overtook the *Petit Parisien* in terms of topic frequency. Only the *Daily Herald* failed to acquaint its readers with the topic (see graphs 12 and 13).

Nuremberg Rally 1937: At the Nuremberg Rally in 1937 Goebbels discussed the importance of Germany as a bulwark against Bolshevism – the Spanish Civil War served once more as the example for the struggle between National Socialism and communism. The interest in both countries was relatively low (see graph 12) and came mainly from the *L'Humanité*, followed by the *Manchester Guardian*. Though the *Figaro*, *Petit Parisien* and *Daily Mail* reported the event, the *Daily Herald* did not make any mention of it (see graph 13).

November Pogroms 1938: The assassination of a German diplomat in Paris by a Jewish teenager served as pretext for the biggest anti-Semitic ‘riots’ in Germany prior to the war. Jewish shops were destroyed, synagogues burnt down and Jews chased out of their homes. Goebbels gave a speech explaining the situation to the foreign press whose interest was overwhelming. Especially the *Manchester Guardian* reported repeatedly about the event but the *Daily Mail* also kept its audience informed. In France it was the *Figaro* which was most prolific with its reports followed by the *L’Humanité* (see graph 17). Interesting is the fact that the topic frequency in Britain was, only for the second time, higher than in France (see graph 16).

4.2.3 EXPLORATION 2

The objective of this section was to compare which speech events were (de-) selected by the different newspapers and to establish whether there were tendencies of nation-related differences to be observed. Summing up the media coverage of speeches relating to the political situation in Europe and/or the *Heim ins Reich* campaign, the re-incorporation of the Saarland, the re-militarisation of the Rhineland and the conflict over Danzig attracted considerable interest in France and the UK. The interest for similar events seems to have considerably decreased in Britain across the newspapers between mid-1936 to mid-1939. Reasons for this might be more urgent domestic problems. The abdication of King Edward VIII in 1936 and the coronation of his successor George VI certainly demanded substantial media coverage – especially in the popular press. Furthermore, we should not forget that Goebbels also gave considerably fewer speeches in 1936 and 1937 than in previous and following years. Moreover, for reasons discussed in section 4.1.1, the VTIF in Britain stayed consistently behind the French. Considering the differing market conditions, it seems to be useful to take a closer look at the media attention the French popular paper *Petit Parisien* and the British quality paper *Manchester Guardian* paid to the events between April 1936 and August 1939. In the case of the Germano-Nippon agreement, the Anschluss of Austria and the invasion of the remnants of Czechoslovakia the *Petit Parisien* and the *Manchester Guardian* seemed to have assigned a similar degree of importance to the events. Interesting, and perhaps somewhat worrying is the very low media coverage the *Manchester Guardian* granted Goebbels’ speech at the eve of the Munich agreement. The underreporting of a speech preceding such a major event (it constituted the height but also the beginning of the end of appeasement) appears to be too important to justify the pronounced reluctance of the British newspapers to report about Goebbels’ speech. Equally interesting is the absence of Goebbels’ speeches and/or his propaganda from the British press in August 1939.

Goebbels' 'ideological' speeches gave rise for translation import and publication on numerous occasions. Interesting in this regard is the fact that the VTIF in Britain was higher than in France on two occasions. Namely in August 1935 when Goebbels announced the ban on Jewish/Arian marriages and in November 1938, when the pogroms indicated the brutality with which the Jewish population was to be treated in coming years. Given that the *Manchester Guardian* reported more frequently about political events than the tabloids, it is probably due to this paper that this increase occurred. The *Manchester Guardian* editor Crozier, as we will see in section 5.1.2 and 5.3.5, felt that it was the paper's duty to alert the public to the ill-treatment of the Jewish population in Germany as he hoped this could improve their situation and, to a certain degree, reveal the true face of National Socialism. Equally striking is *L'Humanité's* preoccupation with Goebbels speeches on Bolshevism. It was in these cases that the topic frequency in *L'Humanité* overtook the *Figaro's*. It is almost certain that this increased interest relates to *L'Humanité's* own communist stance and its alliance to Soviet Russia. Surprising is the glaring underreporting of Goebbels' speeches in the *Daily Herald* between 1935 and 1938. A revived interest can be observed in 1939. Apart from socio-economic factors that led to a general de-politisation of the British press and even more so of the British tabloid press, there is evidence that another major factor contributing to the (de-)selection of speeches is the ideological orientation of the reporting newspapers.

4.3 THE (DE-) SELECTION OF ARGUMENTS: A QUALITATIVE APPROACH

The objective of the present section is to exemplarily illustrate the media images of the NS-Regime constructed by each of the analysed newspapers and to indicate major changes in these representations over the observed five-year period. The identified differences will be related to the ideological beliefs previously outlined in section 2.2.3. Since ideological underpinnings are most visible in argumentative structures, section 4.3.1 first discusses the argumentativeness of political discourse in general and of Goebbels' propaganda speeches in particular. This is followed by section 4.3.2 which presents recurring arguments in Goebbels' speeches. Finally, the media images constructed by the different newspapers will be described in terms of *if*, *which* and *how* they addressed Goebbels' arguments in section 4.3.3 and 4.3.4. The results presented in this section will – given the maybe over-ambitious dimensions of the task at hand – only scratch the surface and necessarily remain incomplete. However, it seems vital to at least attempt to provide an overall perspective for the reader.

4.3.1 ARGUMENTATIVE POLITICAL DISCOURSE

The aim of this section is to briefly investigate the 'argumentativeness' of political discourse and more particularly in cross-cultural contexts. Section 1.2.2 has discussed that political

actions are concerned with the establishment and implementation of generally binding regulations and decisions. Given that not only democratic but also autocratic states rely to a certain degree on the support of the general public (see section 1.2.3), it can then be argued that the primary function of political discourse is to persuade. Persuasion in this context can mean to genuinely convince people that certain social actions and facts are desirable (or at least more desirable than others) or to convince people that they have to accept these social actions and events. In this sense persuasion is a continuum stretching from seeking friendly agreement to coercion. There are different ways to persuade people of a particular viewpoint. Among them we find appealing to emotions, appealing to authority and logical reasoning or ‘arguing’, to name but a few (Richardson 2007: 159 ff.). As outlined in section 1.4.3 one striking feature of Goebbels’ speeches is their argumentative style and their repetitiveness. According to Nill, Goebbels’ argumentative strategies played an important role in the persuasion of the public (1991: 231).

A substantial part of the persuasion of the public is (and was) undertaken by or filtered through the print media. This necessarily entails changes and transformations of the original discourse which is re-contextualised (Schäffner 2010b: 264). This is because the media do not merely inform but inform from a certain perspective, in a particular context and with particular aims. If political media discourse crosses linguistic borders the re-contextualisation process becomes even more complicated since an additional transformative stage is added – the passage from one lingua-culture to another – and the participants of the new discourse are further removed from the original discourse in time and space. One question that can be asked when looking at the French and British media representations of the Third Reich through Goebbels’ speeches is what happened to the ‘argumentativeness’ of his discourse during the transfer process.

The declarations Goebbels made and the arguments he put forward contain, in Habermas’ terms, validity claims (truth, rightness and sincerity) (Habermas 1971: 143 ff. paraphrased in Chilton and Schäffner 2002: 15). Truth (*Wahrheit*) relates to the claim that what is spoken about, the facts that exist independent of the utterer’s beliefs, are actually true (*ibid.*). Sincerity (*Wahrhaftigkeit*) describes the claim that utterers’ verbal indications of their intentions correspond to their real intentions (*ibid.*). The final claim to rightness (*Richtigkeit*) states that the concluded speech act is – within the present normative context – appropriate (*ibid.*). The invoked norms need to be generally established and the speech act should be justifiable. Applied to the present study, each of Goebbels arguments/statements could then be accepted or challenged by the other discursive participants. The modes of challenging

reached from rising doubt to openly contradicting the relevant claims. Similarly, the modes of accepting included open declarations in this regards or just simple re-statings of the claim. Analysing how the different media addressed Goebbels' arguments then at once allows us to gauge their success in the TCs but it also provides indicators for what ideological beliefs guided their re-contextualisation. This is because these arguments were embedded into and became part of the argumentative structure of the TTs.

4.3.2 RE-OCCURRING ARGUMENTS IN GOEBBELS' SPEECHES

Section 4.3.1 explained that analysing how Goebbels' arguments were embedded into the argumentative structure of the TTs allows uncovering which ideological beliefs influenced this re-contextualisation process. This section will present the two main lines of Goebbels' argumentation and single out reoccurring arguments in his discourse.

Section 1.3.3 highlighted that Goebbels' speeches had – intentionally and unintentionally – domestic and foreign policy functions. The Propaganda Minister saw his speeches as opportunities to advertise the regime and to campaign at home and abroad for understanding for the regime's situation and its political convictions (Michels 1992: 415). In terms of their foreign policy functions, the speeches were characterised by two contrasting and often seemingly conflicting strategies (*ibid.*). On the one hand, Goebbels highlighted the power of the NS-Regime, threatened other nations and, based on alleged rights, kept insisting that the German demands needed to be satisfied. Indeed, Goebbels was fully convinced of the supremacy of the German military strength (*ibid.*). On the other hand, he was inclined to convey the allegedly peaceful intentions of the NS-Regime. He courted potential allies such as Britain and tried to avert action against Nazi Germany (*ibid.*). The two strategies were often simultaneously pursued which produced curious 'carrot and stick' (Zuckerbrot und Peitsche) discourses, containing contradictory messages. Two observations might be pointed out. Firstly, Goebbels' discourse seems to have 'escalated' in the course of the observed period as the aggressiveness towards other nations increased. This probably happened in proportion to the cumulating successes of the NS-Regime on the political stage of Europe. Secondly, while the NS-Regime was at least in the early years interested in gaining the UK as ally, its dislike for France appears to have been more perceptible. In the following paragraph the reoccurring arguments will be presented.

Goebbels used a number of arguments to justify the German intentions and actions to (re-) incorporate territories populated by ethnic German minorities into the Reich. **(a1)** The argument of **ethnicity** was frequently employed. The Nazis claimed back territories they had lost through the *Treaty of Versailles* (see section 1.1.1). According to them the people living

on these territories were inherently German through their blood, their culture and language and should therefore be united with the rest of Germany (see section 1.3.4). This claim was then extended to territories that had never belonged to Germany. Supporting this argument was the aim of the *Treaty of Versailles* to divide Europe in a way to give independence to ethnic minorities (Ahonen *et al.* 2008: 5). This goal had obviously not been reached for all the German (and many other) minorities which gave rise to new grievances. A further argument in favour of the territorial demands of the Nazis was the claim **(a2)** that these minorities explicitly **wanted to belong** to the German Reich. This was supported by the ill-defined principle of self-determination as propagated by Wilson during the *Paris Peace Conference* (*ibid.*). In addition, the support of the minorities for the return also had a legitimising component. The demands were further substantiated by allegations **(a3)** of **ill-treatment of the German minorities by their hosting nations**. These allegations appear to have been true in a number of cases (as for instances in) but also partly fuelled by the links the Nazis “established with ethnic Germans outside the Reich” which were “perceived as a threat” (Wolff 2013: 3). The defence of the ethnic Germans against their ‘perpetuators’ was, according to Goebbels, a question of honour. Finally, the Nazis argued **(a4)** that the German population **needed more “living space”** since the territory was too small to feed a population of this size. Originally, new living space was to be found through overseas colonies but Hitler’s interest soon turned to an expansion into the East. Interestingly, the fact that the German society prospered (which is in clear contrast to the lack of living space), was attributed to German supremacy (see **b6**).

The overarching and increasingly more pressing question was of course whether there would be peace or war in Europe. In this regard the German rearmament and the strength of her army as well as her statements regarding belligerent intentions were of great interest. In order to justify the violation of the treaty through rearmament Goebbels argued that **(b1)** the **army was needed to protect the German nation** from outside attacks, namely from bolshevism. To substantiate this line of argumentation Goebbels explained that the League of Nations - aimed at guaranteeing peace - had failed to protect other ‘defenceless’ states (see section 1.1.3). The highlighting of a common enemy, i.e. bolshevism, helped too. Furthermore, the League of Nations had previewed **(b2) equal rights** for all its member states which included the right of self-protection. As Germany had been denied these rights it had been forced to leave the League but was willing to return once fully equipped with the equal rights (see section 1.1.3). In relation to Germany’s treaty breaches it was often stated outside Germany that it would have been desirable if Germany had negotiated rather than just acted upon her wishes. Goebbels’ reply was that **(b3a)** there were times **when actions**

were needed not words and that (b3b) Germany had tried to negotiate but **had not been taken seriously**. In fact, the German actions were represented as a result of previous actions by other nations, which shifted responsibility away from the NS-Regime. Another important, and reoccurring claim made by the Nazis (b4) was that once **the territorial demand(s) had been satisfied, Germany would not ask for more; thus there would be peace**. Feeding into the evaluation of this overall question of peace versus war were statements of Goebbels with regards to the German strength. In relation to the rearmament of the German military forces Goebbels (b5) insisted that it had **earned Germany the other European nations' respect** in that they now **had to listen to what German politicians said and could not just ignore them**. Furthermore, he also highlighted time and again (b6) that it was due to the **superiority of the German nation and especially of its politicians** that the achievements, and in particular the territorial conquests, had been possible. Remarks that these conquests were prepared secretly stirred up fears as regards to what would come next. Finally, Goebbels also repeatedly stated (b7) that **Germany would get what it wanted, be it through peaceful or 'other' means**.

There was a series of arguments or claims that was more ideologically inspired. According to Goebbels, (c1) the Jewish-Bolshevik bloc (included here are the communists, the Russian bolshevists and all Jews) prepared a **world revolution to plunge Europe into chaos**. This, according to Goebbels, was evident when looking at what was happening in Spain. (c2) Given the **danger** posed by this revolution, the Jews and the communists had to be **exiled or even destroyed**. This was the justification for their taking part in the Spanish civil war but also (partly) for the pogroms against the Jews in Germany (e.g. November 1938). Furthermore, Goebbels argued that (c3) this enemy tried to undermine the Western civilisations **by stirring up upheaval amongst the populations where it would not normally exist (Saar, Spain, etc.)**. This, Goebbels claimed, culminated in attacks by the foreign press which is entirely motivated and sponsored by the 'international Jewry'. (c4) According to Goebbels, the other **nations were still blind** to this threat and needed to be alerted by the Nazis. Finally, Goebbels insisted (c5) that there was a **polarisation between bolshevism and National Socialism** and that it was no longer possible to remain neutral. Each nation had to decide which side it wanted to support.

4.3.3 RE-CONTEXTUALISATION OF GOEBBELS' ARGUMENTS IN THE FRENCH AND BRITISH PRESS

While section 4.2.1 explained how analysing which of Goebbels' arguments were (de-) selected for translation and how they were re-contextualised in the TTs could indicate what ideological beliefs underpinned this process, section 4.2.3 presented the two main line of

argumentation of Goebbels and a series of reoccurring arguments. The aim of this section is to provide the results of the analysis by describing for each of the analysed newspapers how they had represented the NS-Regime. Moreover, it will be indicated what ideological beliefs might have underpinned the process. This section is divided into six sub-sections. In order to facilitate the reading of this section sub-headings have been provided within the sub-sections. Not all of the sub-headings reappear in the description of the media images because the individual newspapers placed different emphases. My results have been completed with information from various socio-historical sources.

4.3.3.1 L'HUMANITÉ

L'Humanité was the official paper of the communist party and therefore, as discussed in section 2.2.3.4, ideologically opposed to National Socialism. From the outset of Hitler's ascent to power the newspaper consistently opposed the new regime in Germany.

Peace or War: Like the other French newspapers analysed in this study, the overwhelming concern of the paper seemed to be the question of whether there would be peace or war. Already in 1935, *L'Humanité* raised doubts about the regime's peaceful intentions (b4): “after having railed against the German emigrants who had been chased away by the Nazi terror, Goebbels smiled at France and declared that Germany wanted to ‘bury the past’ (08/01/1935: 3)ⁱⁱ. The contrasting of the aggressive acts with the promises of peace as well as the use of inverted commas indicate that the author did not believe that these declarations could be taken seriously. Similarly, *L'Humanité* printed the following headline in August of the same year “Hitlerism prepares war” (06/08/1935: 3)ⁱⁱⁱ and described Goebbels' anti-Bolshevist speech at the Nuremberg rally in 1936 as “war declaration” (11/09/1936: 3)^{iv}. Unsurprisingly this pattern continued in 1938 when the paper reported that Goebbels' speech in support of the plebiscite in Austria was “full of warmongering provocations, threats and terror” (27/03/1938: 3)^v. In a similar vein, the paper did in many cases not incorporate Goebbels' declarations of wanting peace.

Germany's Strength: Conversely, the paper highlighted statements of Goebbels regarding the German strategic superiority (b6) and confident affirmations that Germany would get what she wanted (b7). “Goebbels declared that Germany had a determined will although the **means it uses would be flexible**” (06/08/1935: 3 my emphasis)^{vi}. Similarly, it rendered Goebbels' statement in January 1936 as follows: “The Reich **is on the qui vive** and is **waiting for the best moment**” (19/01/1936: 3, my emphasis)^{vii}. These quotes indicated that Germany was ready to attack when the right moment would come and that it was prepared to employ any method. It is likely that such quotes raised serious doubts about the

trustworthiness of the NS-Regime. In the aftermath of the re-militarisation of the Rhineland the paper represented Hitler's propositions on how European peace could be achieved as an ultimatum (see *L'Humanité* 12/03/1936: 1 and section 6.1.2). Especially in Britain these propositions had been received quite differently. On the eve of the Munich agreement in 1938 the paper featured the following headline which once more displayed Germany's willingness to use force: "I declare it: we want the German Sudeten and we will have them..." (29/09/1938: 3)^{viii}.

Lacking Public Support: In contrast, *L'Humanité* questioned whether the regime was backed by the German population. As will be discussed in section 6.2, the German public played an important role in legitimising the regime's existence and its actions by showing support. When the Nazis celebrated the outcome of the Saar plebiscite in 1935 *L'Humanité* stated that any other government would have obtained better results (16/01/1935: 3) and it reported on important divisions (01/07/1935: 3) and growing protest within Nazi Germany (05/08/1935: 3). Especially with regards to the Saar plebiscite the *Figaro* and the *Petit Parisien* expressed much more moderate opinions and did not doubt the outcome of the plebiscite. According to *L'Humanité*, Goebbels did not manage to fully convince the audience with his speech about the Sudeten question in September 1938 (29/09/1938: 3) and the paper also questioned the seriousness of Goebbels' threats made in the Danzig speech with the sub-headline "Provocations and Bragging of Dr Goebbels" (19/06/1939: 4).

Throughout the period of 1935 to 1939 the paper used this double strategy of representing the regime as very aggressive but simultaneously questioning its seriousness and sometimes its military strength. This strategy allowed *L'Humanité* to at once draw attention to the threat the regime posed and at the same time providing hope and confidence that the challenge could be met.

Ideological Alliance: As reported by *L'Humanité*, Germany's aggressiveness and expansionism was directed at the Soviet Union and at France. By depicting the NS-Regime as the common aggressor, the two countries were simultaneously positioned as a unit. The anti-Bolshevist speech on September 11 1936 was, *L'Humanité* argued, a war declaration against France and the Soviet Union. Germany's involvement in Spain – where according to the Nazis National Socialism fought communism (b7) - was explained by its wish to attack France: "Every day, Hitler sends Nazi troops to make war against the Spanish people and to prepare, above the Pyrenees bases to attack France" (14/02/1937: 1)^{ix}. The pattern of representing France and the Soviet Union as a unit facing the NS threat appears to have been the counterpart to Goebbels strategy of portraying NS-Germany as a bulwark against the

Jewish-Bolshevik Bloc (c1). This certainly reflects an alliance with the Soviet Union and thereby indicates the ideological position the communist paper advocated. Interesting and also ideologically coloured is the paper's perception of the UK.

Britain's Role: The British government, according to *L'Humanité*, was mainly interested in its own imperialistic and capitalistic goals and ready to sacrifice the military clauses of the *Treaty of Versailles*. The "Anglo-Nazi intrigue", it argued, was about to harm Franco-British relations (03/02/1935: 3). Similarly, Péri claimed in an editorial published on March 12 1936, that the British politicians who opposed the collective security system and those sympathising with Hitler were dominating the British parliament thereby hindering actions to be taken against the NS-Regime after the Rhineland coup (12/03/1936: 1). The British government was depicted as selfish and morally corrupt, ready to become Germany's ally. Therefore the only possible solution to guarantee peace was a Franco-Soviet pact. The negative stance the paper took towards the UK was caused by the British reluctance to commit to any engagement on the continent. Moreover, it seems that the paper also justified its anti-British stance ideologically by referring to British capitalism and imperialism both of which the communist paper opposed.

Linguistic Style: What differentiated *L'Humanité* from the other quality/opinion newspapers was its linguistic style. Between 1935 and 1939 the discourse of the newspaper became increasingly polemic and provocative. Illustrative for this are the denominations of Goebbels. At the beginning it occasionally stripped him of his academic and professional title. Already in September 1936 he was called an "agent provocateur" (11/09/1936: 3), and in 1938 he was referred to as "the midget Goebbels"^x (20/11/1938:4). Similarly, the reporting clauses used to frame Goebbels' quotes were far from being neutral: they reached from "he intervenes insolently in the debate on domestic politics" (12/03/1936: 1)^{xi}, to 'dares to assert' (14/02/1937: 1)^{xii}, to 'he delivered himself to a dangerous and violent diatribe' (19/06/1939)^{xiii}. Moreover, the different media text types became increasingly blurred in that informative text types contained considerable amounts of overt and covert evaluation.

4.3.3.2 LE PETIT PARISIEN

The *Petit Parisien* was founded in 1876 in support of the weak Republic but evolved "into a bland mass-market paper dedicated to supporting the government in power trying to offend as few readers as possible" (Thogmartin 1998: 93). Its main objective was to make money, not to defend a particular political position. To this end the *Petit Parisien* increased the number of reportages and improved its sports section (Manevy 1955: 166). The diversification of its content and its politically 'neutral' position allowed the newspaper to

cater for a broad audience (Thogmartin 1998: 92). The strong market orientation which affected the discursive output of the newspaper might be an expression of capitalism underpinned by liberal beliefs.

Spanish Civil War: During the Spanish Civil War the *Petit Parisien* and the *Paris Soir* were the only French newspapers which tried to provide balanced accounts and to illustrate the opinion of the Falangists and the royalists (Thogmartin 1998: 124). However, the paper's position towards Goebbels and National Socialism is at times perceptible in the seemingly neutral reports. In a piece of short news published in January 1935 we read that Goebbels had violently attacked the press of the German emigrants and had “**again developed** the thesis that nothing would hinder a Franco-German agreement once the Saar question would be solved”^{xiv} (08/01/1935: 2, my emphasis) and in February we read that Goebbels “delivered his **habitual** eulogy regarding the political, economic and social measures the regime had taken” (02/02/1935: 3, my emphasis). In August of the same year the newspaper featured the headline “Germany will ‘make all the parties hostile towards the regime bite the dust’”^{xv} (05/08/1935: 1). These examples illustrate that Goebbels was portrayed as aggressive (he attacked, he was willing to make the opponents bite the dust) (b5). Furthermore, the peaceful intentions were doubted (b4; he developed again the **thesis**) and Goebbels was depicted as repetitive (developed again, habitual eulogy). Though these are only minor opinion indicators, they nonetheless seem to establish a negative frame when consistently applied. This pattern continued throughout 1935 and 1936. From 1937 onwards, the newspaper seemed to increasingly rely on *Havas* for the coverage of Goebbels' speeches and these agency texts feature relatively little evaluative content. The (de-) selection of the quotations during these years nonetheless paints the picture of a rather aggressive propaganda minister.

Ideological Alignment: Of great interest is the *Petit Parisien's* reporting of the Nuremberg Rally 1936. In the rather lengthy report the unnamed author discussed the similarities of National Socialism and communism. Its own position towards these two ideologies described the paper as follows: “Regarding the Western countries, namely France, the Nazi speakers should not bother to go to any trouble: they are as **free institutions secular in practice** and a defence against both bolshevism and Nazism”^{xvi} (11/09/1936: 3, my emphasis). This statement reveals at once the paper's disagreement with these two ideologies and the respective regimes but also indicates that the paper believes in the separation of state and Church and in fact in democracy as defined after the French revolution. This again seems to be an expression of underlying liberal thinking.

Appeasement: The material collected for the analysis conducted in the framework of this thesis is not conclusive enough to fully reconstruct the paper's ideological position. More editorials and other evaluative media text types would be needed. According to historians the *Petit Parisien* did support the appeasement politics of the government as became, for instance, evident in the aftermath of the Munich agreement in 1938. "The *Petit Parisien* offered him [Bonnet] the *Grand Livre de la Paix*, containing the signatures of more than 350,000 people, conveying the tribute of those 'who are eternally grateful for his tireless efforts in September 1938 to save Peace' (Bonnet quoted in Puyaubert 2007:170)" (Hucker 2011: 60).

Change of Editorial Line: The whole of Europe had been shocked by the violent excesses against the Jewish population during the November Pogroms in 1938. Like many other newspapers, the newspaper increased its output regarding Goebbels considerably in relation to this event. After the Danzig crisis in June 1939, when the quarrel over the Free City between Poland and Germany had reached boiling point and Europe subsequently stood at the brink of another war, the *Petit Parisien* seems to have picked up where it had left off in 1937. The paper started to extensively report about Goebbels' propaganda in France and in Britain, and provided profound analyses of the political situation.

4.3.3.3 LE FIGARO

Le Figaro, a traditionally conservative paper catering for the upper class, was taken over in 1929 by the wealthy businessman François Coty who was inclined to disseminate his anti-communist and anti-Semitic views (Manevy 1955: 168f.). However, Coty lost ownership over the paper in his divorce and the editorial line of the paper changed. By 1935, the paper had "found a moderate tone again; polemics were banished once more and the paper fell again back on the traditional positions of the right and managed to keep its distance from the extreme-right fascism" (Blandin 2007: 137).

From hopeful to doubtful: The paper observed the Saar plebiscite in 1935 with interest and d'Ormesson, a leading *Figaro* journalist, expressed hope that the politically more left sections of the NSDAP would determine the politics of NS-Germany again (16/01/1935: 1). However, the paper was quick to realise that this was by no means the case. Goebbels' speech at the end of June 1935 was considered to be very aggressive and d'Ormesson added that Goebbels was, in contrast to his fellow party members, careless enough to plainly state the regime's belligerent intentions (b4) (01/07/1935: 3). Goebbels and the regime, it was argued, had no interest in establishing a stable peace (15/02/1937: 1). Over the course of the five years the *Figaro* increasingly portrayed the regime as threatening and warned that action,

in form of strengthening collective security, should be taken. In 1936 the paper wrote “During more than two hours the Propaganda Minister has let freely run the torrent of his angry and brutal but skilful eloquence, sure of its effects: the enthusiastic standing ovations testified to it” (11/03/1936)^{xvii}. Goebbels’ statements, which highlighted the German strength (b5) and its tactical superiority (b6), were gladly incorporated in the accounts as they supported the general picture the paper painted of the Reich.

National Socialism’s Effect Potential: What made the *Figaro*’s reports particularly informative was that they described the effect of National Socialism and Goebbels’ speeches on the German population and the speech audience (see section 6.1.4). In contrast to *L’Humanité*’s reports, the German public was not opposed to National Socialism but was – willingly or under the influence of propaganda - part of it. A detailed description of the almost holy silence, that gripped the audience when Goebbels spoke in 1936 (see section 6.1.4.2), allowed the reader of the *Figaro* to visualise the magnitude of the event. Similarly, the German people were represented as possessed in the first reports about the November Pogroms in 1938. “Some kind of lunacy has overcome the German population and the hate of the Israeli race has reached its paroxysm today” (11/11/1938: 1)^{xviii}.

Ideological Alliance: Little hope was placed on resistance from within and even less from the communist party as *L’Humanité* continued to propagate. Though the paper did not express an explicit negative stance towards the Soviet Union and Bolshevism, it did not consider it as a potential ally either. Goebbels’ anti-Bolshevik statements (c1 and c4) were restated but not commented on. Conversely, we have seen in section 4.2 that the paper took a strong interest in the conflict between the Church and the German government. This increased interest seems to reflect the conservative beliefs which guided the editorial line of the paper. I discussed in section 2.2.3.2 that conservatives generally did not support fast and radical change and backed established authorities such as the Church.

Appeasement: Despite depicting the NS-Regime as aggressive and dangerous, the *Figaro* did not urge its readers to take military action. It advocated a closer alliance with the UK and Italy, even with fascist Spain (Blandin 2007: 137). This appears to have been the typical line of argumentation the French appeasers took as they were afraid and reluctant to face another war. Additionally, they were aware of the increasing inferiority of the military forces that paralleled the German rearmament. The ideology of appeasement became especially apparent in the reports that followed Goebbels’ pre-Munich Agreement speech. “We admit perfectly that **there is a problem with the German minority** in Czechoslovakia, that the situation of this problem had become unavoidable since the Anschluss and that **it was better**

to solve it without recurring to inadequate measures in the interest even of the Czech unity” (29/09/1938: 1, my emphasis)^{xix}. D’Ormesson seems to have fully embraced French and British appeasement politics as he stated with regards to Chamberlain: “one cannot pronounce his [Chamberlain’s] name with emotion, so great does he inspire respect and admiration”^{xx} (29/09/1938: 1). Though the paper argued that Hitler’s unauthorised actions were not acceptable, it suddenly admitted that there was a ‘German minority problem’ (a3) in Czechoslovakia. The territorial loss of the Sudetenland was represented as being in the interest of the Czech nation. The Figaro’s viewpoint - expressed in the way in which it (de-) selected arguments and re-contextualised them seems to mirror conservative and more so appeasement-related beliefs.

4.3.3.4 DAILY HERALD

The *Daily Herald* was first published in 1912 but encountered substantial financial problems in the 1920s (Gannon 1971: 42). Therefore it was bought by Odhams Press Ltd. in 1929 which took over 51% while the remaining 49% were “held by thirty-two Trade Union Officials as trustees of the Labour Party” (*ibid.*). The paper originally devoted considerable attention to politics and backed the Labour Party. However after Lord Southwood, the head of Odhams, took over, the newspaper format changed and the editorial staff could no longer consistently support the Labour Party (Gannon 1971: 43 and Richards 1997: 145). The continuous disputes over the political and commercial control between the editor Francis Williams and Lord Southwood eventually led to the editor’s resignation in 1940 (Gannon 1971: 42).

De-Politisation: Odhams was interested in profits and though “politics and industry each had their page” (...), “these were two pages out of twenty rather than ten or twelve of the old Herald” (Richards 1997: 145). This de-politisation and popularisation proved tremendously successful and the paper consequently reached the highest circulation figures of any British daily in three successive years (*ibid.*: 147). The articles that appeared on the one page the *Daily Herald* accorded to politics needed to bear a strong relation to Britain. “Like the public they serve, popular newspapers care little for what goes on out there in the world, unless it concerns Britain” (Derek Jameson 1991:54 quoted in Richards 1997: 152). Though what was happening in the resurging German Reich was undeniably of concern to Britain, we have seen in section 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 that the *Daily Herald*’s figures in terms of the VTIF were relatively low. Though this phenomenon can to a large extent be attributed to the substantial de-politisation of the British popular press, the choice of Odham to compete with a tabloid paper on the market seems to be underpinned by capitalistic and therefore liberal beliefs.

That a labour paper was bought by a liberal 'press baron' unsurprisingly caused quarrels between the owner and the editor and is an expression of differing ideological beliefs. As the German threat became increasingly pressing, the VTIF figures eventually started to pick up in 1938.

German Threat: The *Daily Herald* was clearly opposed to the NS-Regime. In January 1935 after the German success in the Saar plebiscite the paper featured the headline: "Saar Terror and Insult" (16/01/1935: 1). The article reported about NSDAP members lashing out at Catholics and Jews and also explained that many who had voted for the return to the Reich were already regretting it (*ibid.*). In doing so it contradicted Goebbels' statements about the peaceful German intentions (b4) and also questioned the Saar population's willingness to return which had been based on false assumptions (a2). Similarly the paper questioned Goebbels peaceful intentions (b4) uttered in two speeches in May 1935 by describing the messages as contradictory (Daily Herald 02/05/1935: 9). Two years later the paper again chose a headline illustrating Goebbels' aggressive behaviour "Wild Attack on Church" (29/05/1937: 1) and after the Anschluss of Austria it printed the headline "Amazing Threat by Goebbels" (08/04/1938: 1). Statements of Goebbels emphasising the (b3, b5, b6, b7) German superiority and strength were consistently selected for publication whilst expressions of peaceful intentions were de-selected or challenged. However, we should recall that the paper only featured such negative reports on few occasions and like the *Petit Parisien*, the *Daily Herald* seems to have increasingly relied on agency news from 1937 onwards (see section 4.3.3.2).

Appeasement: In contrast to its French counterpart *L'Humanité*, the *Daily Herald* was not in favour of an alliance with the Soviet Union and the Labour Party had more or less successfully fought communist infiltration (Ganon 1971: 43). Instead there is no doubt that Southwood was a strong supporter of the appeasement policy and tried to pressure the editorial staff of the *Daily Herald*, some of whom clearly opposed Hitler and his regime, into adapting his 'moderate' line. The result of this pressure and the "confusion and divisions within the Labour Party and an entirely reasonable desire to avoid another war", was an inconsistent and 'lurching' course of the paper's position towards Chamberlain's attempts to appease Hitler (Richards 1997: 95ff.).

Linguistic Style: What the two left of centre papers analysed in this thesis, the communist *L'Humanité* and the socialist (labour) *Daily Herald*, had in common, was not so much their political position but their populist and sensationalising journalistic styles. This became

especially visible in their headlines and also through the personal and often dramatic angle they added to their stories.

4.3.3.5 MANCHESTER GUARDIAN

The *Manchester Guardian* was a liberal and independent quality paper founded in 1821 and in family possession until 1936. To safeguard its editorial independence it was then transferred into the Scott Trust (online Archive Manchester Guardian 01/06/2013). In the 1930s the *Manchester Guardian* already enjoyed an international reputation as a quality newspaper and as such was devoted to providing balanced, truthful and comprehensive accounts of international events (Ayerst 1971: 507).

The unjust Versailles Treaty & Unreasonable France: Though ideologically opposed to the NS-Regime, the *Manchester Guardian* shared the NS-government's opinion that the *Treaty of Versailles* was too harsh on Germany (b2) (Gannon 1971: 80). Similarly, the paper judged the demands of France to be excessive and generally urged that one should try to avoid war (see section 5.1.1 and 6.1.2).

Peace or War: Goebbels' speech prior to the Saar election was judged to be "conciliatory" (b2) (07/01/1935: 12) and after the German success the paper featured the subtitle "Herr Hitler and Peace" clearly highlighting the non-belligerent intentions of the Reich (b4). Similarly, the paper emphasised the regime's peaceful intentions in 1937 when it featured the headline (b4) "Goebbels reassures Germany: 'There will be no war: we do not want to attack anyone'" (13/02/1937: 16). The paper printed the following headline after Goebbels' Danzig speech which marked an unprecedented height of the conflict between Poland and Germany over the city: "Tension not brought to crisis point" (b4) (19/06/1939: 14).

Ideological Alignment: However, the *Manchester Guardian* did not agree with the Reich's forceful annexations and was especially appalled by how the Jewish population was treated. The positive representation in January 1935 was quickly reversed when Goebbels' attacked the regime's opponents, i.e. the Jews, the Church and the Bolsheviks, in a speech at the end of June 1935. The speech was described as a "tirade" and Goebbels' derogative statements about the Jewish race were fully reported (01/07/1935: 6) (c1 and c2). In September 1937 when anti-Semitic and anti-Bolshevik speeches dominated the Nuremberg Rally the *Manchester Guardian* displayed again its ideological alliance. A column that exposed the line of argumentation taken by the Nazis concluded with: "Such pretentious nonsense hardly requires any comment, let alone refutation, but it does provide some insight into the Nazi mentality" (11/09/1937: 12). As we will see in Chapter Five, it was the declared aim of

Crozier, the *Manchester Guardian*'s editor, to expose the ill-treatment of the Jewish population to the world. This interest in supporting the German Jews, which is reflected in graphs 9 and 17 in section 4.2, suggests that Crozier apart from liberal values also harboured socialist beliefs (2.2.3.3).

Appeasement: The crisis over the Sudetenland in September 1938 was particularly difficult for the *Manchester Guardian* to deal with (Gannon 1971: 198). On the one hand, the paper's staff agreed that the Sudeten Germans had a right to independence (a1-a3); on the other hand, they foresaw that the German position would be strengthened through this additional territorial annexation. This conflict tipped the balance first in favour of a 'positive' representation of the problem. Hitler "was once again pictured in the *Manchester Guardian* as a moderate being swayed by the aggressiveness of the General and misinformed by the frustrated and evil van Ribbentrop" (Gannon 1971: 200). Goebbels' violent speech on the eve of the Munich agreement was simply not reported. It was hoped that a strong alliance between Soviet Russia, France and Britain would avert the fall of Czechoslovakia (Gannon 1971: 200). When the Munich agreement was finally concluded the *Manchester Guardian* expressed relief. The editorial correspondence that will be discussed in Chapter Five reveals that the staff members of the *Manchester Guardian* had a clear vision of where Hitler would lead his people. Although the paper was ideologically opposed to the NS-Regime, it could due to its own liberal views and the belief that the Versailles treaty indeed had been unfair, not deny that some of the German demands were just. Moreover, it seems as if the members of the *Manchester Guardian* staff, despite their insight, were willing to make concessions to Germany to safeguard peace. This seems to reflect beliefs associated with appeasement. The editorial line of the quality paper, which advocated balanced and objective accounts, also hindered the expression of a full-fledged anti-Nazi stance. Summing up, the differing ideologies united within the *Manchester Guardian* led to an inconsistent representation of the NS-Regime.

4.3.3.6 DAILY MAIL

The *Daily Mail* was owned by Lord Rothermere who defined the paper's editorial line until he was succeeded by his son Harmsworth in 1937 (Gannon 1971: 32). Rothermere had watched the NSDAP's rise to power with admiration and was impressed by its ideological and economic accomplishments (*ibid.*).

Ideological Alignment: He shared many of Hitler's views. His biggest concern was "a communist invasion of England" (Gannon 1971: 24). In line with its own fear of and dislike for communism, the paper's article on Goebbels' Nuremberg speech in 1936 agreed that the

Soviet Union was in the hands of the Jews (c1) and posed an imminent threat to central Europe (c2) (11/09/1936). It graphically highlighted the figures indicating the size and strength of the Soviet army, thereby emphasising the Bolshevik threat (11/09/1936: 12). In doing so the *Daily Mail* followed not only Goebbels' argumentation but also revealed its own, rather similar viewpoint caused by shared ideological beliefs. In a similar vein the paper had argued after the Saar plebiscite that it was the separatists, i.e. the communists and socialists, who endangered peace (c3) (16/01/1935: 12). Throughout 1935 to 1939, the *Daily Mail* promoted friendship with Germany against the Bolshevik threat and, to a certain degree, also against 'hysterical and weak' France.

German 'Threat': In January 1935 Ward Price, the paper's special correspondent, informed the readers of the *Daily Mail* that despite the tensions between the party members of the NSDAP and the alliance of communists and socialists there had been no outbursts of violent conflicts – mainly due to the Nazi's self-restraint (07/01/1935: 12). In the article that followed the Saar plebiscite the paper highlighted Hitler's and Goebbels' promises of peace (b4) and provided detailed figures to demonstrate the size of the support the NSDAP enjoyed in the Saar (a2) (16/01/1935: 12). The NS-Regime's peaceful intentions were continuously emphasised in the paper through the (de-)selection of quotes but also through headlines. "Goebbels on 'Will there be war?' 'Not now that we are armed'" (b1) was the headline the paper featured in February 1937 (13/02/1937:11-12).

Appeasement: Equally favourable was the report on Goebbels' speech on the eve of the Munich agreement. The paper claimed that "Dr. Goebbels has told his friends he expects an amicable settlement" (29/09/1938: 12). As to the reaction of the people when they heard that the conference was to be continued the paper wrote that "people smiled again" and "the men and women in the street felt as if they were basking in sunshine of hope breaking through black clouds of despair" (*ibid.*). This description is a clear indicator for the *Daily Mail's* wish to avoid war at all costs and its support for the government's appeasement politics.

Anti-Semitism: The November pogroms in 1938 caused mixed reactions in the newspaper. Bretherton wrote that the "Nazis threaten to ration Jews' foods" (12/11/1938: 11) and generally informed about the ill-treatment of the Jewish population. However, at the same time he played the role of the concentration camps down by describing them as follows: "Labour camps, where Jews **can support themselves by manual labour**" (*ibid.*, my emphasis). Similarly he claimed that the money that had been disseized of the Jews was to be "distributed among them [Jews] all" (*ibid.*). Previously to this excess, which the paper could not afford to ignore because every other newspaper was reporting the event, there was little

about the ill-treatment of the Jewish people or any other opponents of the regime to be found in the *Daily Mail*. Lord Rothermere apparently “had no patience with ‘the old women of both sexes’ who filled the British newspapers with hysterical reports about Nazi ‘excesses’ (*Daily Mail* 10/07/1933: 10 quoted in Gannon 1971: 32).

Linguistic Style: Surprisingly, the majority of the paper’s articles about Goebbels were apart from the headlines and the (de-) selection strategies relatively neutral and did not come anywhere near the *Daily Herald*’s or *L’Humanité*’s polemic and aggressive style. It seems, however, that this ‘neutral’ style was only applied to this particular topic. This might reflect the outsider position the paper had with its openly pro-Nazi stance within the British society.

Armament: Interestingly is the somewhat contradictory advertising of friendship with Germany in combination with the urging for rearmament. Gannon argued that the press baron was as early as 1933 concerned with the re-enforcement of the British army (1971: 33). “(...) he combined awareness of danger to Britain implicit in German rearmament with a belief that a rearmed Britain could be firm friends with a rearmed Germany (*Sunday Times* 26/03/1939: 7 quoted in Gannon 1971: 33). This might also be related to the long tradition of the conservative forces in Britain to promote a mighty army as an emblem and insurance for the imperialistic Empire.

4.3.4 DIFFERING MEDIA IMAGES: EXPLORATION 3

The aim of this section was to provide a brief description of the overall media images each of the six newspapers painted of the NS-Regime and to indicate major changes. Moreover, their particularities were related to broad ideological families. As stated in the introduction to this chapter each of the explorative sections draws on the previous ones. What this explorative section will not discuss is the contribution of this chapter to the discipline of Translation Studies. I will develop on achievements in this regard in the chapter review that follows.

Firstly, I will address common aspects of the media images across all the newspapers independent of their political orientation or national alliance. It was shown in section 4.2 but also in the descriptions of the media representations in each of the newspapers in section 4.3 that the overriding question was whether there would be peace or war. This was expressed in the frequent selection of the speeches related to the *Heim ins Reich* campaign but also the shared preoccupation with Goebbels’ statements either relating to the allegedly peaceful intentions (b1-b4) of the Reich or to his statements indicating strategic superiority and military strength (b5-b7). Conversely, the statements were of course treated differently in each newspaper. What this common preoccupation with peace versus war nonetheless seems

to show is that the fear of another world war was omnipresent and fear was what probably guided many political decisions in France and Britain at the time.

Secondly, I will investigate what differentiated British and French media representations. It was amply illustrated in section 4.1 that Britain imported far less information through translation than France (T1). This seems to have been especially pronounced in the case of Goebbels' pre-Munich Agreement speech in September 1938, the crisis over the Free City of Danzig in June 1939 and the following two months leading up to WW2. Given the severity of the events, this seems to have been a major disadvantage for the British public. In a similar vein a female reader wrote in a letter to the *Manchester Guardian* shortly before the Munich conference: "There are few people in Britain (and France) who understand German sufficiently well to appreciate the awful tone of such a speech that the public in general cannot realise how dangerous is the present situation in Europe" (*Manchester Guardian* 14/09/1938: 12). This appears to be a problem caused by the inaccessibility of discourse for which translation is the remedy. Moreover, the selection of the newspapers analysed in the British context seems to have also portrayed a more 'moderate' picture of the regime than the French newspapers. The *Daily Mail* was supporting Hitler, while the *Manchester Guardian* struggled due to its conflicting ideological beliefs and was therefore unable to oppose the regime in a consistent way. The *Daily Herald*, though drawing a negative picture, reported so few of Goebbels' speeches that it hardly mattered anyway. In contrast, *L'Humanité* and the *Figaro* and, apart from mid-1936 to the November pogroms in 1938, also the *Petit Parisien*, represented Germany as a dangerous aggressor that could not be trusted. Therefore it appears possible that at least the British public who lacked access to other sources of information was not as aware of the war to come as their French neighbours. As previously argued, this divergence was surely to a large extent engendered by the differing market situations. In this regard it can be argued that the strong market-orientation in Britain might have been an expression of liberal beliefs, while the popularity of the opinion press in France reflected the political and subsequently ideological polarisation of the Third Republic. Similarly, the limited access the working class obtained in the liberal-dominated Britain as opposed to the flood of information the working class obtained due to its strong involvement with the communist movement, might also be a reflection of an ideologically driven organisation of information (T3).

Closely related to the representation of the NS-Regime was then the question of how one should address the 'German problem'. *L'Humanité*, which simultaneously represented the Reich as a threat and questioned its seriousness and public support, argued that the challenge

would best be met with an alliance with the Soviet Union. The *Daily Herald* which represented Germany with a similar strategy came to a different conclusion, namely that stronger alliances with other European nations should be sought. The generally negative media representations in the *Figaro* curiously seem to contain some of Goebbels minority and ethnicity arguments (a1-a3) when a justification was needed to defend non-reaction. Similarly, the *Manchester Guardian* was susceptible to Goebbels' equal rights (b2) claim. Both papers argued in favour of appeasement politics (though inconsistently) and strengthening the mutual assistance agreements. The *Petit Parisien*, as we learned from historical research, also supported appeasement politics. The only 'true' Nazi sympathiser was the *Daily Mail*, which painted a rather favourable picture of the regime but nonetheless argued that rearmament would be needed. This, the paper argued, would avoid that Hitler even started to consider attacking Britain. And of course Rothermere and his son happily agreed to territorial concessions to their German 'friends'. It seems that all newspapers but *L'Humanité* believed that appeasement would hinder the war they dreaded. The justifications and argumentations as to why appeasement politics should or should not be pursued, however, diverged and allow an insight into the broader ideological motivations.

A further interesting observation is the unusual and very pronounced interest of the British press in the Jewish question. Though the overtaking of the VTIF by Britain was probably due to the *Manchester Guardian*, the interest in this topic of both the *Daily Herald* and the *Daily Mail* appears to have been heightened too. The *Manchester Guardian* appears to have been ideologically driven in this regard. Equally ideologically-based is the alliance *L'Humanité* promoted between France and the Soviet Union. I would argue that the *Daily Mail*'s suddenly 'tame' linguistic style, which was so unusual for the tabloid paper, might also have been an expression of the paper's ideological stance. It attempted to use the strategies of the quality press, i.e. the 'voice of reason', to gain support for its rather unpopular political views.

In terms of substantial changes the media representations in the different newspapers underwent, several aspects can be pointed out. *L'Humanité* seems to have responded to the growing threat the NS-Regime posed by radicalising its own discourse. This possibly discredited its views in the eyes of people harbouring more moderate views. The *Petit Parisien* was throughout the inter-war years less neutral than believed and certainly started to openly stating its views after the November pogroms. The *Figaro* started to present Germany as an aggressor as early as 1935 but portrayed it more moderately when action would have been called for otherwise. The *Manchester Guardian* as a quality paper tried to present the

regime ‘objectively’ but showed its disagreement with the regime’s prosecution of the Jewish population. Similar to the *Figaro*, it resorted again to ‘moderate’ representations when military action would have been needed otherwise. Both these papers represented the regime ‘inconsistently’. The *Daily Herald* continuously (but very rarely) depicted the regime as a threat (though not invincible) whilst the *Daily Mail* remained positive in its representations until the outbreak of the war.

As previously pointed out we need to be cautious about the general applicability of these results because they are only based on the analyses of six newspapers which is a very small section in comparison to the entire newspaper markets. Moreover only one specific issue, i.e. Goebbels, was investigated which further limits the general validity of the results. Nonetheless, the analysis has, as promised, provided a general overview of the differing media images in France and Britain between 1935 and 1939. Moreover, it convincingly linked the representations to ideological beliefs and thereby substantiated the claim that ideology is a major factor influencing the news production process.

CHAPTER REVIEW

The objective of this chapter was twofold: it aimed at presenting the results of the media-agenda analysis and at proposing hypotheses in terms of the different levels of awareness between and within the UK and France in section 4.1. Furthermore, it aimed at comparing in section 4.2 and 4.3 the media images painted of the Third Reich in the UK and France by analysing (de-) selection patterns in terms of speech topics but also arguments. Section 4.3 also investigated how the selected arguments were re-contextualised by restating, agreeing with or challenging them. These observations were then related to underpinning ideological beliefs.

Section 4.1 showed that the British public was probably considerably less aware of the German threat than the French and that awareness was decreasing along the division of quality/opinion versus tabloid/popular press. Moreover this division was mirrored in Britain in terms of the social classes – the lower the social class, the less informed the people were. In France, the phenomenon was related to people’s interest in politics. These patterns were caused by the different market conditions. Section 4.2 indicated that the topic selection was partly determined by ideological beliefs in that Britain in general and the *Manchester Guardian* in particular displayed a high interest in the Jewish question while *L’Humanité* was preoccupied with Goebbels views on the Soviet Union. Section 4.3 presented the selection and re-contextualisation of Goebbels’ arguments. It showed that arguments related

to the question of whether there would be peace or war were dominantly selected by all the newspapers but ‘treated’ differently. Overall, the French papers seem to have portrayed the regime more frequently in stronger terms than this was the case in Britain.

This chapter has added to existing historical knowledge and provided some interesting results for Translation Studies. Section 4.1 demonstrated that agenda-setting research methods can be successfully applied to the comparative measuring of the VTIFs. This allows us to not only provide evidence for how VTIFs vary between different nations but it also offers the possibility of proposing hypotheses which relate the level of translational import to effects on the socio-political level. After further refinements, applications of agenda-setting research within TS might be able to generate results indicating the level of influence translation exerts in terms of a particular political issue. What is and what is not selected for translation and how frequently, affects the reception in terms of awareness-levels and is likely to impact directly on political decision-making processes.

Section 4.2 and 4.3 have provided evidence that translation also intervenes on the discourse and text (event) level. The selection and de-selection of textual structures (such as ‘arguments’) for translation greatly impact on the media image that is constructed by the translator-journalist. In the context of political media discourse which is highly ‘argumentative’ it is certainly worth taking a closer look at the variety of arguments that exist within the SC discourse and to compare this variety with the range of arguments that penetrates the receiving culture. The selective transmission of textual structures seems to not only reduce the complexity of the presented situation or ‘problem’ but also to simultaneously suggest a certain problem definition. In other words, if Goebbels’ ‘equal rights’ argument was repeatedly presented in relation to the regime’s territorial annexations, then maybe these annexations were considered under this particular angle. Of course the re-contextualisation processes play an important role too and will be more extensively analysed in Chapter Six. Translation not only limits access to information but also the possible problem definitions that the reader might adopt. In this regard we should keep in mind, however, that translation is not only used as a tool to mediate discourse by the journalist-translator of the newspaper but also by other agents involved at any stage at the news production process.

Sections 4.2 and 4.3 have also demonstrated that ideological beliefs seem to underpin this large (de-) selection pattern. The (de-) selection of speech topics and arguments can already provide cues as to what ideological constructs might have guided this selection process. However, they can more convincingly be related to the textual evidence when their re-contextualisation is analysed. In this regard Brownlie points out that the journalist-translator

acts as cultural mediator and ‘explains’ or ‘adapts’ the SC discourse to make it accessible for the TT reader (2010: 32 ff.). In a similar vein Bielsa and Bassenett argue that media translation is strongly orientated toward the TT reader and that the concept of faithfulness does not apply in relation to the ST in media translation (2009: 65f.). They explain that faithfulness in media translation relates to the ‘original event’. Though there is certainly a certain amount of simplification and adaptation needed to inform the TT reader about complex and multi-layered events, the question remains whether these alterations are applied to facilitate the comprehension of the event or to represent the event in a way that fits the preconceptions present in the TC. There seem to be conflicting priorities between faithfulness to the original event and orientation to the target cultural context.

The findings of this chapter have limited validity because only six newspapers were analysed. The validity was further diminished by the fact that Goebbels was the sole issue investigated. It was also acknowledged that only a media-agenda analysis was conducted therefore the proposed hypotheses could not be tested. Nonetheless, the chapter has provided evidence for the existence of different media images and differing levels of awareness regarding the NS-Regime between the British and the French public. Moreover, the chapter has demonstrated that translation as a means to restrict access to information but also access to possible problem definitions plays a paramount role in the news production process. TS approaches are particularly useful for comparative studies because they focus on STs and TTs and can thus pinpoint what has been selected and de-selected but they also allow investigating inter- and intra-syntactical changes.

CHAPTER 5: REPORTING THE THIRD REICH — A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

The rationale for multiple causality is that I have found that a single source of explanation is limited in the phenomena that it can explain, and that there may be different potential causes for translational phenomena or co-acting causes (which do not necessarily act in the same direction).

(Brownlie 2003: 140)

Chapter One offered an outline of the socio-economic and political situation in Europe during the 1930s and described the political discourse of the NS-Regime. The second chapter examined the theoretical framework underpinning the present study. It was pointed out that contextual factors e.g. the social and economic conditions described in Chapter One but also ideological considerations, etc. impact on the output of the press. Chapter Three proposed to apply an adapted version of Calzada Pérez' (2001) three-level methodology for DETS to the present research and Chapter Four provided first results on how translation shaped the media texts.

The overall purpose of this chapter is to reconstruct the mosaic of factors influencing the translational and the journalistic tasks during the inter-war period. To this end general historical information is combined with evidence retrieved through the analysis of the correspondence of the *Manchester Guardian's* editor in chief, Crozier, and his foreign correspondents who reported directly from mainland Europe. Using the subjective accounts to investigate causal conditions certainly bears some limitations. We need to question how openly the participants of the interaction communicated and whether what they believed to be their motivations really were what had inspired their actions. Bearing this in mind, it will be important to mirror the statements of the *Manchester Guardian* members of staff against relevant findings of socio-historical research. Firstly, the *Manchester Guardian* as a newspaper company and its members of staff will be introduced. Secondly, the working conditions of foreign correspondents in Nazi Germany will be outlined. This section is enhanced with reports about the difficulties Lambert, the *Manchester Guardian* correspondent in Germany, encountered. Thirdly, instances will be shown where political considerations lead to alterations of news reports sent by the foreign correspondents. Moreover, factors relating to the news production process are traced. Finally, the important role the news agencies played in the information gathering and news distribution process will be investigated in more detail.

5.1 THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN BETWEEN 1935 AND 1939

5.1.1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN

After the Peterloo massacre in which several people who peacefully demonstrated for a reform of parliamentary representations were killed by governmental forces, Edward Taylor decided in 1821 it was time to found a newspaper to promote liberal interests - the *Manchester Guardian* (online archive MG 01/06/2002). The newspaper achieved international recognition under C.P. Scott's editorship from 1872 to 1929 (*ibid.*). Scott eventually bought the newspaper in 1907 and outlined his views on journalism in the famous essay 'Comment is free but facts are sacred' published on May 5 1921 (*ibid.*). He stated that a newspaper is not only a business but also a 'moral' institution in that "it plays on the minds and consciences of men. It may educate, stimulate, assist, or it may do the opposite" (*ibid.*). The character and influence of a newspaper, he argued, is defined by its orientation to either, profit and power, or to a higher and more exacting function (*ibid.*). "The primary office is the gathering of news. At the peril of its soul it must see that the supply is not tainted. Neither in what it gives, nor in what it does not give, nor in the mode of presentation must the unclouded face of truth suffer wrong" (*ibid.*). These principles might appear utopic but seem worth being strived for and also lay bare the liberal values that guided the journalistic practices of the paper. C.P. Scott entrusted his two sons with the control of the newspaper after retiring (*ibid.*). John Russell Scott became the manager of the company whilst Edward Taylor Scott served as the editor. Tragically, both C.P. Scott and his son Edward passed away in 1932, leaving John Russell Scott as the sole heir and with death duties that threatened to severely damage the business (*ibid.*). To guarantee the continuation of the editorial tradition, John Scott passed on his ownership to the Scott Trust in 1936 to save the independence of the paper. "The liberal pedigree of the Manchester Guardian was thus based upon the kind of people and intellectuals it attracted both as staff and as readers" but it was not the official party vessel of the Liberal Party (Gannon 1971: 75). In 1933 John Scott appointed William Percival Crozier as editor and gave him free reign in all editorial matters. Like C.P. Scott, Crozier was adamant to inform his readers about "the whole truth in so far as he could discover it" (Ayerst 1971: 507) but in line with the editorial tradition he insisted on providing balanced accounts. The unfolding events on the international political stage would proof that this appointment had been a fortunate choice since Crozier was "in charge of the Manchester Guardian's foreign news ever since there had been a regular, continuous service from the paper's own men" (Ayerst 1971: 499). The foreign correspondents who

served the paper knew each other well and Crozier was “anxious, to maintain a voluminous correspondence” with them, “even if it killed him” (*ibid.*: 499 ff.).

5.1.2 GENERAL ATTITUDES OF THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN

During the 1920s the *Manchester Guardian* proved to be a reliable friend to Germany and her newly established democratic government (Ayerst 1971: 507). The journalist-translators of the liberal intellectual paper took a strong interest in the “German intellectual exercise, the Weimar Republic” (Gannon 1971: 76). Like many others, the *Manchester Guardian* also considered the terms of the Versailles Treaty as too harsh. Though adamant to expose the German rearmament and the danger it posed, even the Berlin correspondent Voigt who disliked the Nazis was convinced of Germany’s right to sustain her own armed forces (Gannon 1971: 80). In a letter to Crozier he wrote: “It is impossible to stop Germany from becoming a Great Power – in fact ‘equality’, at bottom, means that she has a right to become one” (Voigt to Crozier 07/03/1935). The *Manchester Guardian* staff also firmly believed that the British government should not commit to too close of an alliance with France since her demands exceeded what was ‘just’ and because such a commitment could drag Britain unnecessarily into a war. After the remilitarisation of the Rhineland (see sections 1.1.3 and 6.1.2.1) and the international crisis that followed, Crozier wrote in a letter to Voigt: “[I]t will be of course extremely difficult to resist when the French call on us to go to war. We can make what stipulations we like about ‘unprovoked aggression’, and still they won’t count for much when the French tell us that we are in honour bound to assist them” (Crozier to Voigt, 25/03/1936). According to Crozier the Germans were not likely to attack Britain at this point but were in fact trying to gain her sympathy. Conversely, if Britain responded to the French demands of sanctioning Germany, the Nazis would take this as an opportunity to launch an attack (*ibid.*). Though Voigt insisted that the German peace offer following the remilitarisation was only camouflage, the article expressing this opinion was never published. “I am extremely sorry”, wrote Crozier, “but I am afraid I cannot use your article to-night. There is a great deal in it that could be used if it were put rather differently, but the general tone is so far away from the questioning line, which I think we have to use in the paper regarding the Anglo-French military pact,” (*ibid.*). This example illustrates how differences in opinion, i.e. expressions of differing ideological beliefs, lead to the non-publishing of an event originally selected for translation. It is worthwhile noting that Crozier’s viewpoint was widely shared among the British press (Gannon 1971: 93-102). The commonly held belief that Hitler’s peace declarations should be considered in combination with the British military forces being bound due to the Italo-Ethiopian conflict (see section 1.1.3) were two major causes for the reluctance of the British government to act upon the

violation of the *Treaty of Versailles* (*ibid.*). Many members of staff felt disappointed with the German people after they had elected Hitler, but saw it as their duty to inform Europe and the Germans about what was happening under Nazi rule (Ayerst 1971: 507). The *Manchester Guardian* published extensively on the persecution of the Jewish population and members of the Christian church as well as on the concentration camps, as we have seen in the previous chapter (Ganon 1971: 76). However, the afore-mentioned convictions of the *Manchester Guardian* affected its handling of the ‘German threat’. “Hitler, basing his case on grievances against Versailles, caused a kind of schizophrenia in the Manchester Guardian which opposed him ideologically but could not consistently oppose most of his political demands” (*ibid.*). Although the paper had a clear notion of what the German intentions were, “it was unable to draw the logical conclusions of this insight and was forced, each time it was confronted with the continual German heinousness it had always predicted, suddenly to urge tolerance and moderation (...)” (*ibid.*: 87). There are many instances where these overriding convictions affected the reporting of the *Manchester Guardian* – the articles on the Rhineland crisis (see section 6.1.2.2) in 1936 and the reports on the Danzig question in 1939 (discussed in Möckli 2012) are just two examples.

5.1.3 CROZIER AND THE GUARDIAN CORRESPONDENTS

Many of the foreign correspondents in the 1930s were permanently placed in Berlin, Paris, Vienna and Geneva to report on the events in central Europe. From 1935 to 1939 Berlin was covered by Charles Lambert, Paris by Alexander Werth, Geneva by Robert Dell, and Vienna by M.W. Fodor, though this last *Manchester Guardian* man relocated to Prague after the *Anschluss* of Austria in 1938. Frederick Voigt was the *Manchester Guardian*’s diplomatic correspondent and operated from his offices in London. Dell had lived in Paris for several years and was well acquainted with the French political and cultural scene (Ayerst 1971: 503). He was politically left of centre and a free thinker. Much like Voigt, he was also incapable of political self-restraint which led to his expulsion from France from 1918 to 1922. This characteristic is also visible in his journalistic work (*ibid.*). After a period of free-lancing in Berlin and Paris he became the official *Guardian* correspondent in Paris in 1929 and eventually moved to Geneva in 1933.

As we will see shortly, Werth had a brief spell in Berlin and then succeeded Dell as the *Manchester Guardian* correspondent in Paris in 1933. Based on his correspondence with Crozier he appears to have been quite easily offended and irritated. In many of his letters to Werth, Crozier explained in a very friendly and diplomatic tone why certain changes had

been made to Werth's articles. In his requests for information Werth did not always reciprocate this friendliness.

Fodor was based in Berlin and reported about the events in central Europe. He was the only non-native speaker among the foreign correspondents of the *Manchester Guardian*, desperately poorly paid and yet fully committed to his work (*ibid.*: 504). "Nothing was ever too much trouble for Fodor" and he sent articles as well as extensive and informative memoranda to Crozier (*ibid.*). However, shortly before the Nazis came to power quite a few transfers of correspondents had taken place among these cities as the following table illustrates:

BERLIN	1920 – January 1928	Voigt
	1929 (brief spell)	Lambert
	Unknown - 1933	Voigt
	January 1933 – beginning of March 1933	Werth
	March 1933 (brief spell)	Voigt
	March – September 1933	
	September 1933 (brief spell)	Dell
	September 1933 - 1939	Lambert
PARIS	1912 – 1918	Dell
	1918 – 1929	Hamilton
	1924 – 1929	Dell (freelance)
	1929 (brief spell)	Lambert
	1929 – 1931	Dell, ⇔ holiday replacement by Werth
	January – March 1933	Voigt (additional staff)
	1933 – 1939	Werth
	1939 (brief spell)	Lambert

GENEVA	1933 - 1939	Dell
VIENNA	1933 - 1938	Fodor

TABLE 2: Manchester Guardian - Foreign Correspondents

Especially interesting for the present thesis are the transfers between Paris and Berlin in 1933 since they profoundly affected the Germany-based information channels and flows of the *Manchester Guardian*.

5.1.3.1 CROZIER

Due to his long-standing involvement with the foreign news and his close relationships with the *Manchester Guardian* correspondents, Crozier, the editor of the *Manchester Guardian*, was extremely well informed about the European politics of the 1930s. He continued the paper's editorial tradition of informing the readers as comprehensively and impartially as possible about specific events. That he knew the foreign correspondents with their strengths and weaknesses so well helped him judging the 'objectivity' of their reports and to suggest and implement the necessary changes to their event representations (Ayerts 1971: 499). Crozier was diplomatic and compassionate but nonetheless assertive. His professional background as a schoolteacher may have been the cause for his preoccupation with stylistic matters (*ibid.*: 495). "The best and most effective English for newspaper purposes", so he argued, was "simple, direct, lucid, concise, short" (*ibid.*: 497). The tradition of providing a *Manchester Guardian* style guide started by Montague was continued under Crozier's editorship. In February 1937 he felt it necessary to ask Werth that he should write "a reasonable proportion of short and concise sentences" (Crozier to Werth 01/02/1937). He addressed a similar request to Lambert in 1938, criticising him for the overuse of Latinised words. "I think they make the style heavy. (...), in pairs and in groups they can, I think, always be avoided, and I think you will agree that if you read them aloud you will find them very ugly" (Crozier to Lambert 13/02/1938). In his defence Lambert replied (...) "may I say that these words were 'semi-translations' of such German words as Konzentrierung, Verjungung, Vereinfachung etc. with which the German press was full that afternoon" (Lambert to Crozier 15/02/1938). Though being aware of his offence, he did not have the time to revise the lead article, he explained (*ibid.*). Crozier was most sympathetic to this problem and answered "it is most difficult to translate some of these heavy German words without using just the long English abstract words which suit them. (...), "it is only when they are grouped or repeated that they offend" (Crozier to Lambert 17/02/1938). We have here clear evidence for the fact that interlingual translational, journalistic and even editorial

tasks are inextricably linked. Yet more factors seem to impact on the makeup of the media texts: stylistic considerations, intralingual translation difficulties and of course the editor as an actor that intervenes in the overall event reporting.

5.1.3.2 VOIGT

Frederick Voigt was very much at home in the culturally and intellectually stimulating city of Berlin during the Weimar Republic (Ayerst 1971: 501). He maintained a large network of friends and acquaintances and was well informed about all aspects of German life. His in-depth knowledge of Germany “gave his interpretation of what happened between 1931 and 1939 a perspective and insight which were unrivalled” (*ibid.*: 503). Politically, Voigt was certainly left of centre, despised the Nazi regime and was very outspoken about his dislike. Crozier had to urge him several times not to state his opinion too bluntly and the Nazis did not like his political views (Gannon 1971: 80). It is unclear whether he left Berlin for Paris in January 1933 because he was objectionable to the NS-Regime or whether other reasons caused his move. He was replaced by Alexander Werth. Werth was excited about the challenge of working in a country that was in an important and profound state of transformation. Unfortunately Werth, who was Jewish, did often not gain access to the information he needed. Voigt, annoyed about the lack of detail in Werth’s reporting about the terror in Germany and concerned about his colleague’s security offered Crozier to return to Germany. This offer was taken up and Voigt returned to Berlin in March 1933. Werth was not happy about his removal from the German capital but eventually accepted his new position as the *Guardian* correspondent in Paris (Ayerst 1971: 511). As suggested by Crozier, Voigt only stayed for a few days in Berlin and then returned to Paris from where he sent his reports to Britain. Voigt clearly stated in these articles that the terror accompanying the National Socialists’ seizure of power in Germany was not spontaneous but organised and approved by the NS-Regime (*ibid.*: 112). This was reason enough for the Nazis to ban the *Manchester Guardian* in Germany for the first time (*ibid.*). Voigt continued his reports but eventually had to leave Paris in 1934, after the French authorities informed him that the Gestapo had ordered his assassination (Gannon 1971: 81). He became the paper’s first diplomatic correspondent in London. This was, however, not the end to Voigt’s reports about the NS-Regime. He ran a special, underground service using the extensive network of people he knew there to gather information without the regime’s interference (Ayerst 1971: 514). Voigt’s most important and reliable informant was Max Wolf, who was forced to leave Germany in 1935 as the Gestapo started closing in on him. Voigt explained in his letters to Crozier that he had kept subsidiary channels open and that especially Wolf himself was in

contact with a number of influential people. The service, he stressed, could be maintained as before (Voigt to Crozier 28/01/1936). To highlight the importance of this costly undertaking he argued that many other newspapers relied on official German sources solely (Voigt to Crozier 03/02/1936). What we have learnt about Voigt's and Wolf's work in Germany clearly shows that the selection of speech events in the *Manchester Guardian* was restricted by the interference of the NS-Regime which did not allow the paper's foreign correspondents to take part or to access relevant information. Moreover, the reliance of other newspapers on exclusively German sources is likely to have impacted to a certain extent on their reports. What made it difficult for Crozier to work with Voigt was his lack of self-restraint. "No one on the Manchester Guardian ever doubted his knowledge or his insight, but there were often doubts about the prudence, wisdom or common sense of giving unfettered expression to his burning sincerity" (Gannon 1971: 84). Moreover, Voigt had made up his opinion about the Nazis and was keen to express this in his articles. In contrast, Crozier was inclined to provide the 'whole' picture with all its shades and insisted that the 'positive side' of Germany should be reported on too (Crozier to Lambert 20/12/1938). Due to his lack of 'neutrality', Crozier urged Voigt: "We really must consider what Germany does each time on its merits, examining her acts and her methods, approving them if they are good and condemning them if bad" (Crozier to Voigt 30/05/1937). This is yet another indicator for the fact that conflicting ideological beliefs within the newspaper companies could engender the non-publication of a report of an event or alterations of the newspaper articles. As pointed out in section 2.2.2, such discrepancies need to be expected and accounted for.

5.1.3.3 LAMBERT

Officially, it was only Lambert who covered the news from Germany. He was sent to Berlin in September 1933 with "minimum risks" instructions (Ayerst 1971: 514). In contrast to the keen and committed Voigt, Lambert appears to have been "naturally phlegmatic, and had to be prodded constantly by Crozier" (Gannon 1971: 78). Moreover, Lambert took long holidays and was suddenly struck by illnesses at the most inconvenient times (*ibid.*). He planned for instance a holiday in September 1937 and Crozier, who only became aware of the pending Nuremberg Rally at the beginning of the month, wrote: "If I had known the dates of the Congress sooner I would certainly have asked you to change because it is very much the week during which we need your personal services" (Crozier to Lambert 01/09/1937). Though Lambert made his way to Nuremberg, Crozier learned from a letter dated September 14 1937 that Lambert had not been able to participate in the event as he, like other journalists, was unexpectedly taken ill, unable to leave the hotel. This example

illustrates that an interception of the visible translation-import-flow in a particular newspaper might simply be related to the general 'laziness' of the journalist-translator or his/hers 'indisposition' and the subsequent inability to report the event. However, this only applies to 'minor' events since such an 'indisposition' does not necessarily exclude the reporting of the event as such. Other sources such as news agencies or reports from other journalist-translators could be used. It is likely that if the event was important enough or 'space' available within the newspaper, such sources would be drawn on. The passion that shines through in the writings of the other *Guardian* correspondents seems to be absent from Lambert's articles (*ibid.*). Nonetheless, his private correspondence with Crozier provides a clearer image of the difficulties a British correspondent working for an ideologically opposed newspaper encountered on a daily basis in NS Germany. The difficult living and working conditions might also explain Lambert's somewhat lacking enthusiasm (*ibid.*).

5.2 THE FOREIGN PRESS & THE NS-REGIME

Several examples presented in this section 5.1 illustrated how the NS-Regime interfered with the reporting of the paper. The aim of the present section is to explain in more detail how the German government influenced the press output not only in Germany but also in countries which reported about the Reich and how it attempted to project a positive image of Germany as a peaceful nation. The section is divided into three sub-sections each of which investigates one of the afore-mentioned influence spheres.

5.2.1 PRESSURE ON THE GERMAN PRESS

This section outlines how tightly the press was controlled under the Nazi Regime and briefly explains how the information flows between the government and the press were organised. As soon as the national socialists came into power they started to gradually streamline their propaganda including the German press. The NS propaganda system was divided into three departments: The Reich Ministry of People's Enlightenment and Propaganda, the Central Propaganda Office of the Party and the Reich Chamber of Culture (Bramsted 1965: 49). Goebbels was head of all three departments. However, there were intersections with competencies of other ministries and an intensive rivalry between Goebbels and the Foreign Ministry under Ribbentrop.

Prior to the take-over of the NS-Regime, a daily press conference was held providing all the newspapers with the most essential information. In 1933 the press department of Goebbels' Ministry took charge of this conference. Two different meetings, one at 10.30 am and one at 5 pm, were now run on a daily basis (Bramsted 1965: 116). With the implementation of the

editor law (*Schriftleitergesetz*) in October 1933, Jewish journalists were no longer allowed to join and admission became strictly controlled (Bramsted 1965: 89). At these conferences Goebbels' Ministry explained the viewpoints of the government regarding current issues and directives were issued about how the press should be reporting on these matters. It was essential for the newspapers to adhere to these directives since editors were held responsible for 'mistakes' (Bramsted 1965: 90). These directives were strictly confidential and had to be kept in safe places (*ibid.*). However, some of this information evidently leaked through to the *Manchester Guardian*: "I have obtained the whole set of confidential instructions issued to the German press by the 'Ministry of Enlightenment and Propaganda' in the month of August". (...). "I find them amusing. I think the point about anti-Semitism, which is marked in the original, is really important" (Voigt to Crozier 15/09/1935). Gaining access to this kind of information seems to have become more difficult over the years. "With regards to Goebbels' instructions to the German press, I've been trying to get them. But after we published the last lot, special precautions were taken and I have not been able to get any since" (Voigt to Crozier 31/03/1937). Some press releases were prepared and had to be published on the following day, others were to be printed without indicating the source (Bramsted 1965: 90). The journalists were under constant pressure since the regime kept a watchful eye over the output of the press and punished regime-critical releases with the confiscation of journals or even by excluding people from the profession. In May 1937 for instance, Wolf brought the case of the German journalist Ahrens to Crozier's attention. Ahrens had been working in London but, after confidential information from a meeting with Ribbentrop had leaked he had been recalled to Germany and questioned over the affair (Wolf to Crozier 14/05/1937). This journalist then vanished without a trace (*ibid.*). This example and the previously mentioned attempted assassination on Voigt, indicate that the NS-Regime was prepared to eliminate media representatives who did not adhere to the guidelines. It seems reasonable to assume that this exerted pressure on the foreign press.

5.2.2 PRESSURE ON THE FOREIGN PRESS

During the first year in power, the NS-Regime took little notice of the foreign press but this changed quickly. Before foreign journalists could enter the country, the German intelligence gathered information about them. Once arrived, they were kept under close watch – their telegrams were read, phone calls recorded, etc. (Longerich 1987: 238 ff.). Moreover, Goebbels had set up the *Auslands Club* (Foreign Club) where journalists could meet up, discuss, eat and work. The NS government, interested in portraying a positive image of Germany, tried more or less openly to influence members of the foreign press by granting special favours, organising exclusive interviews with Hitler, etc. However, "bribery,

cajolery, intimidation and blackmail” (Bramsted 1965: 119) were also common means of ‘guiding’ the foreign press output. “The treatment of foreign journalists quite naturally depended on the course of the foreign policy” (Bramsted 1965: 118). From 1938 onwards, foreign and home journalists did no longer attend the same conferences and, much to the dislike of Goebbels, the Foreign Ministry established its own press meetings. Goebbels’ rival also set up another meeting point for foreign journalists called the *Auslands Presse Club* (Foreign Press Club) (Bramsted 1965: 117). This accentuated the already tense relationship between the two institutions which was to the advantage of the journalists. “If they were on bad terms with one Ministry they could expect sympathy from the other. This somewhat grotesque situation frequently saved the journalists from penalties which would have been inescapable otherwise” (*ibid.*). Nonetheless, there had apparently been no need to establish general pre-censorship. Instead a number of penalty measures were used to punish the translator-journalists who ignored the directives of the Ministry. Actions ranged from passing a phone call to summoning up the relevant foreign correspondents (Bramsted 1965: 122). Further possibilities were sending a written warning, denial of telephone privileges, strong ‘suggestions’ to leave the country, expulsion within two to three days or, in the worst case, arrest for high treason and espionage (*ibid.*). It is estimated that before the outbreak of WW2 about fifty foreign journalists were forced to leave Germany (*ibid.*). Given the critical reporting of the *Manchester Guardian* with regards of the treatment of the Jewish population, the threat of expulsion was constantly looming over Lambert. In an undated letter probably written at the end of January or the beginning of February he wrote: „The Propaganda Ministry has informed the News Chronicle correspondent that in view of the attitude of the paper towards Germany and the reports it prints, it attached no importance to its Berlin staff which will be expelled unless the paper changes its attitude” (telegram from Lambert to Crozier January/February 1937). He argued that the same might happen to him and that he hoped the British government would counteract this practice by expelling German press representatives from Britain (*ibid.*). Later this year, on August 10, another telegram reached Crozier. Though not signed, it was presumably Voigt who sent it. “But there is. I gather. Going to be no reprisal for the expulsion of Ebbutt. But I also gather tt Ebbutt’s expulsion turns out to be the first of a series Lambert. Presumably. Wld come next and then reprisals will be taken here” (telegram from Voigt to Crozier 10/08/1937). Crozier took this threat seriously and two days later he wrote to Voigt, who had proposed a lead article about the church quarrel and the concentration camps in Germany: “At the moment I would prefer to avoid the Camps, because I don’t want to give the Germans any immediate occasion of throwing out Lambert” (Crozier to Voigt 12/08/1937).

The (de-) selection of topics to be translated and published in the *Manchester Guardian* was at times affected by the practices of the NS-Regime. The paper was also the subject of bans within Germany a number of times and for substantial periods. In 1935 the Goebbels' ministry disapproved of the *Manchester Guardian* reports about the Saar elections and banned the newspaper. In March Voigt, who was reporting from the Saarland, informed Crozier: "The German Embassy rang me up the other day and asked me to come and see them. I saw Fritz-Randolph, who is Goebbels' representative. He has just been to Berlin where he raised the question of lifting the ban on the *Manchester Guardian*. He was told that this has been considered but that the articles about the Saar made this impossible" (Voigt to Crozier 02/03/1935). Similarly, Crozier asked Lambert in July 1936 to visit the Propaganda Ministry and to ask why the paper had again been banned again (Crozier to Lambert 05/07/1936). As tension rose on the political stage of Europe, another fear started to haunt Lambert. On March 18 1938 he wrote: "I should like to remind you that I expect the London office to warn me in case of the danger of war. We were given a bad joit when we learnt on March 11 (and officially next day) that the German army had been partly mobilised and had invaded Austria, particularly my wife. We would have been caught had there been hostilities" (Lambert to Crozier 18/03/1938).

A problematic point for the correspondents working in this totalitarian state was certainly the access to reliable information. In a memorandum dating back to December 30 1936, Lambert extensively discusses how news was gathered by the translator-journalists. The most important source of information seems to have been the only existing German news agency *Deutsches Nachrichten Büro* (German News Office) to which German and foreign newspapers could subscribe (Memorandum Lambert 30/12/1936). The *Manchester Guardian* and the *Morning Post* were the only British newspapers which did not use the D.N.B.'s services (*ibid.*). Instead, Lambert explained, there were three additional types of sources that could be consulted. Firstly, German journalists working for German newspapers offered their services to foreign papers (*ibid.*). Their versions of events were longer and completer but they also had to inform the Ministry of Propaganda and the Secret Police who they were providing with information (*ibid.*). Secondly, a group of "mysterious and dubious" people provided only the foreign press with information and specialised in fragments of news from the secret police and/or information emanating from within the NSDAP (*ibid.*). Lambert suspected that these people were working as informants for the Secret Police and judged them dangerous and unreliable (*ibid.*). The third source, on which Lambert himself relied mostly, consisted of Germans who wrote articles and were willing to sell them to one or more foreign, non-competing newspapers (*ibid.*). Despite using these alternative sources it

was hard for Lambert to cover the late news without a D.N.B. subscription. He therefore had to rely on the news as it was printed in other papers (*ibid.*). Subsequently, important political events that happened late in the day reached the *Manchester Guardian* reader with delay.

5.2.3 PROJECTING A 'POSITIVE' IMAGE OF THE NS-REGIME

The aim of this section is to explain how the Nazi Regime intended to influence the French and British attitude towards Germany and relates the different tactics back to Goebbels' two main argumentative strategies discussed in section 4.3.2. Apart from exerting influence at home, the NS-Regime started setting up news agencies abroad, disguising their true origins and highly subsidising them. By doing so, these news agencies were enabled to sell information to newspapers for very little money or even to give it away for free (Sington and Weidenfeld 1943: 87). The information provided through such agencies was naturally favourable to the NS-Regime. However, it is not clear what impact this really had on the foreign press. Other attempts were made to place pro-German articles in newspapers and journals abroad by paying money (Ray 2000: 202). This seems to have happened especially in France.

As discussed in section 4.3.2, the NS-Regime was in the early years inclined to hide its true intentions with regards to foreign affairs at least from the UK - the increasingly threatening behaviour only escalated towards 1939. One part of Goebbels' strategy was therefore to stress the peaceful intentions of the Reich. The efforts of projecting a positive image of the authoritarian regime were increased and both, the foreign governments and the media, were the targets of these efforts (Urban 2007: 88). Yearly around 750 high-profile politicians and press representatives were invited to take part in cultural or political mass-events such as the Olympic Games in 1936 or the annual Nuremberg Rallies. This should, the Nazis hoped, if not convince them of the NS ideology at least demonstrate the Reich's grandeur and organisational talent. Indeed many foreigners were deeply impressed by the enthusiasm of the German people (Urban 2007: 164). The reports of the *Daily Mail*, as we will see in sections 6.1.4.3 and 6.2.6, testify to the profound and lasting impression the political speech events made on some foreign guests. In general, the Propaganda Ministry's efforts seem to have been met with mixed feelings. Whilst especially his ideologically-driven arguments were not well received, it might be argued that the double strategy of threatening with war and offering peace has produced the intended effect. In France and Britain both types of arguments seem to have played an important role throughout the period of 1935 to 1939 whenever military action would have been called for according to the *Treaty of Versailles*.

5.3 TEXTUAL INTERVENTIONS

Section 5.1 has provided an overview of the editorial tradition and political stance of the *Manchester Guardian* and the main actors within the newspaper company at the time. Section 5.2 drafted a picture of the information flows between Germany and Britain and the influence the NS-Regime exerted on the news production process. The purpose of the present section is to illustrate the variety of factors which could lead to the alteration and/or (de-) selection of media texts after the translator-journalists had ‘submitted’ them to the newspaper companies. This part is divided into four subsections. Firstly, spatial restrictions and the criterion of ‘newsworthiness’ will be explored. Secondly, the strong TT-reader orientation of media texts and issues of credibility are scrutinised. Thirdly, technical premises and their failure as well as human error are analysed as factors that shaped the media texts. Fourthly, we will look at the *Manchester Guardian* as a company in need to make a profit and also at how financial factors could have a direct bearing on the media texts. Finally, we will investigate political considerations of *Manchester Guardian* staff members which caused textual alterations.

5.3.1 SPATIAL RESTRICTIONS & NEWSWORTHINESS

This section investigates spatial restrictions in relation to newsworthiness. One key factor in the media production process is the question of space. Both the costs for paper and the costs for printing needed to be kept low to ensure that the price per copy stayed at a reasonable price whilst still making a profit. Ayerst observes in this regard that the better the *Guardian* was doing, the more unreadable it became since the font size had gradually been decreased to fit more content on the pages (1971: 82). Despite its economic layout, there was never enough room for all the interesting news from abroad. Crozier explained that the shortening of Fodor’s article had been a “question of space” and that in this regard “Sunday night is always the worst night of the week these days” (Crozier to Fodor 14/02/1938); presumably because the news accumulated over the weekend. On another occasion Crozier cautioned Werth: “Please keep an eye on the length of messages. Things are very crowded at present and we are endeavouring seriously to keep the size of paper down. On normal days, I would be entirely content with a message of from 500 to 600 words” (letter Crozier to Werth 27/10/1937). Similarly, he pointed out to Werth that there was no room for long messages about the French cabinet crisis because “we have to make room for pages of matter about the King” (Crozier to Werth 20/01/1936). These last two examples already indicate the close link between the spatial restrictions and the criterion of newsworthiness.

Newsworthiness is expressed in news values which Richardson defines as “the distillation of what an identified audience is interested in reading or watching, or the ‘ground rules’ for deciding what is merely an ‘event’ and what is ‘news’” (2007: 91). There is a multitude of criteria that determine newsworthiness (for a discussion see Richardson 2007: 91 ff.) amongst which we find geographic proximity, unexpectedness, threshold and many more (*ibid.*). Of course quality papers like the *Manchester Guardian* have different news values than broadsheet papers. Referring back to the example from 1936, we see that domestic affairs of their own country (the coronation of the new King) had been chosen over the domestic affairs of France. Given the crisis entrenched by the abdication of Edward VIII, this is hardly surprising. Another example is the letter Crozier sent to Voigt, in which he explained that he had “to hold the German Leader over”, because “the Mussolini speech and the general situation demanded to be written on” (Crozier to Voigt 08/12/1935). As we have seen in section 1.1.3, this was only two months after the Italo-Ethiopian war had started. Most of the *Manchester Guardian* staff agreed, that “the way in which Mussolini would be treated” in consequence of the war he had started would be decisive for the question of how the Hitler problem could and would be solved (Ayerst 1971: 519). In a quality and decidedly political paper like the *Manchester Guardian* news values were probably to a large extent informed by the relevance of political events for the United Kingdom and the paper’s readers.

5.3.2 CREDIBILITY

The objective of this section is to explore the notion of ‘credibility’ in the media. Media texts as commodities are strongly orientated towards their TT reader - not only in terms of the news values governing the (de-) selection of topics but also regarding credibility. The first and foremost task of a newspaper, and especially of a quality newspaper like the *Manchester Guardian*, is to inform its readers truthfully about events. “We need to believe in the veracity of the accounts provided by those men and women around the world who supply us with information about the events that shape our lives, and when such information is proven to be false, we are outraged” (Bassnett and Bielsa 2009: 117). We have seen in section 5.1.2 that truthfulness and balance were at the very core of the *Manchester Guardian*’s editorial tradition and maintaining its credibility was of utmost importance for this quality newspaper.

In November 1938, Crozier explained to Voigt that one of his articles needed revision because the reader would not believe what he read the way Voigt had written it. “I only omitted your last part because I think it might be advisable to break the shock to the public a little more. Perhaps you will return to it, but separate the crises or in some way slightly

modify the prophecy. I would like the public to believe these things because it is very necessary that they should, but they are frightfully disposed to ignore statements which are too disagreeable to them” (Crozier to Voigt 30/11/1938). In a similar vein he asked Voigt for another revision in December: “I have the feeling that it has exploded somewhat too harshly and that people will be startled and shocked and perhaps will not believe it” (Crozier to Voigt 21/12/1938). These two examples illustrate how the conceptualisation Crozier had of the *Manchester Guardian’s* reader and the imminent need of the newspaper to be credible lead to a precautionary alteration of Voigt’s articles.

Also related to the notion of credibility are instances of textual changes where inter-textual discrepancies between media texts within the same newspaper were evened out. On August 20 1936 Crozier explained to Voigt that he had omitted or softened the word “terror” on more than one occasion in his article. This was because a lead article published on the previous day contained a reference to “mendacities of the Red terror” (Crozier to Voigt 20/08/1936). “If to-night I had let your phrases go in as they were sent some of our enemies who are writing to attack us would have made a comparison between your article and the leader [lead article]” (*ibid.*). The result of such a comparison, one can assume, would have looked contradictory.

In other instances Crozier refused to print a piece of information because he could not trace back its origin and therefore not guarantee its truthfulness. “Thank you very much for your suggestion about the article on the Romanian Terror”, he wrote to Werth, “but I rather think we had better not have it. I shrink from having stuff about the terror in any country, unless it comes from our own people like Voigt, Fodor, or yourself, so that we can vouch for it if challenged” (Crozier to Werth 15/01/1936). A similar case occurred in November 1938 when he wrote to Voigt that he could not publish the information that seventy Jews had been executed in Buchenwald before the German diplomat Rath had been murdered by Grynspan (Crozier to Voigt 13/11/1938).

5.3.3 TECHNICAL INVENTIONS, FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND HUMAN ERROR

This section investigates how technical inventions and their changing accessibility but also their erroneous use affected the media production process. Firstly, the financial situation of the *Manchester Guardian* in the 1930s will be assessed in terms of gaining access to the telegraph and phone lines. Secondly, an example of ‘human error’ when using technologies will be used to illustrate the occurrence of unintentional changes in media texts. Thirdly, it

will be described how war time pressure impacted on the accessibility of modern information technologies.

The invention of the telegraph in the middle of the 19th century profoundly changed the way in which global news was produced (Bassnett and Bielsa 2009: 32 and Barth 2010: 66). The telegraph allowed its users to overcome spatial and temporal restrictions – news from far away countries was now immediately available (Barth 2010: 66). Using this and other technologies was partly a question of money. Additionally, the competing newspapers and their journalists fought over who could access the telegraphs and who first. This was because “only the most recent events were newsworthy” and subsequently “increasing competition to break news started to take place” (Bassnett and Bielsa 2009: 32). Though the monopoly position of the companies that privately owned the telegraphs in the UK had been abolished in the late 1860s financial considerations remained a decisive factor in terms of accessing technological devices. The invention of the telegraph also resulted in news becoming a commercial good that was sold in increasing quantities which paralleled its growing political influence (Barth 2010: 66). However, making profit had never been the main focus or strength of the *Manchester Guardian*. We have seen in section 5.1.2 that for this quality paper other values such as objectivity and truthfulness were prioritised. This lacking interest in financial matters was an enormous liability at the end of the 1920s, when Britain and the rest of the world was plunged into a deep crisis – the Great Depression (for more details see section 1.1.2 and 1.1.3). “The terms of the trade in the newspaper industry were turning against papers like the *Guardian*” (Ayerst 1971: 489). In order to overcome the financial difficulties, the popular newspapers tried to outcompete each other by boosting their circulation numbers. “In the nineteen-thirties, newspapers were sold, and readers bought” (*ibid.*). Those newspapers, among them the *Daily Herald* and the *Daily Mail*, hired canvassers who gave away free promotional gifts to people willing to become registered readers of the newspaper and additional income was generated by selling advertising space (Ayerst 1971: 489, Chalaby 1998: 39). A so-called circulation war started and the companies sold their newspapers at times below production price to squeeze their competitors out of the market (Chalaby 1998: 39). We have seen in Chapter Four that the economic developments in Britain profoundly affected the discursive practices of the daily press (*ibid.*: 76 ff.). The most far-reaching consequence was probably the increasing absence of political topics from the media and the resulting de-politicised media discourse (see section 4.1.1). In this regard the sociologist Chalaby argues that “subjecting political information to market judgements, journalists weakened the principle of publicity, and with that democracy as a whole” (1998: 89). The *Manchester Guardian* could not ignore these developments. It sought to find new

readers by introducing cheap rate subscriptions for students and teachers, etc. What saved it, however, was the *Evening News*, which was also in the possession of the *Manchester Guardian* owners but run as an independent company. Only through using the income the *Evening News* generated was it possible to steer the *Manchester Guardian* through these troubled years. Although compared to the popular press the paper's discursive practices were less affected by the market conditions, the technological premises and financial considerations still impacted on its news output.

We have already seen in section 5.3.1 that Crozier told his foreign correspondents time and again that they needed to restrict the number of words in their articles. Saving space meant keeping the printing and paper costs low and/or creating room for advertisements. Furthermore, the information gathering process was also affected. In July 1937, Phillips, the editor of the *Manchester Guardian Weekly* (first published in 1919), wrote to Werth: "Better stay in Paris. Things may develop there and in any event a Marseilles trip would be **very expensive** and I greatly doubt whether the Socialist Congress is worth a thousand words to any English newspaper" (Phillips to Werth 08/07/1937, my emphasis). In this instance newsworthiness and financial considerations influenced the decision to rely on secondary sources instead of sending a *Manchester Guardian* reporter to get the news first hand. Costs were also kept low in terms of the transmission of news as this historical research indicates: "Usually, however, long-distance telephone conversations were too expensive for the impoverished MG. Its men wrote letters" (Ayerst 1971: 519). Indeed there are few notes among the editorial correspondence of the *Manchester Guardian* that refer to phone messages and letters largely outnumber telegrams.

Changes in media texts were sometimes also caused by faulty use of technologies. It was because of her professional skills as a stenographer that the departure of Mrs Avis, who was working in London, was so much regretted among the *Manchester Guardian* staff. Her substitute, whose name remains unknown, was unable to execute the tasks as required. First to voice his concern was Werth, as we learn from Crozier's reply to him dating back to June 22 1937. Apparently, the incompetency of the substitute had led to mistakes in the published article. As we have seen in section 5.1.3, Werth was easily irritable and must have written an outraged letter of complaint since Crozier saw himself forced to reply that not only those who write but also those who revise and supervise are interested in avoiding mistakes (Crozier to Werth 22/06/1937). Moreover, so he pointed out, it was in no way helpful that an error that made it into the published version of the article was seen as a personal affront by the translator-journalist (*ibid.*). Unusually clear words from a usually diplomatic Crozier. In

Werth's defence one has to say that Dell, the London editor of the *Manchester Guardian* (for the paper also had a London edition besides the one published in and for Manchester), was equally dissatisfied with the. "If the young lady who succeeded Mrs Avis had stayed, the telephone bill would have tripled. *Not only was she slow, but it was necessary to repeat nearly everything twice over and to spell nearly every proper name or place name*" (Dell to Phillips 08/07/1937). He suggested he could look for a suitable substitute among the girls who were employed by the League secretariat in Geneva. These girls would at least have some knowledge of French, international affairs, names of persons and places, and have some general knowledge and intelligence too (*ibid.*). "It is not enough to have somebody who is just a competent stenographer and nothing more" (*ibid.*). This example illustrates that technological progress alone is not enough to assure secure and reliable transmission of information. If the person responsible for the data entry lacks the necessary skills, and Dell rightly points out that in the production of global news the required skill set is quite varied, the end user might be presented with information that lacks quality. In Voigt's case, however, the mistakes in the published version of his article were not due to the stenographer's incapability: "I am sorry about the mistakes in this morning's article about the south-west, etc. I find that the mistakes come over the wire, and, with submission, I rather think that your handwriting may be responsible" (Crozier to Voigt 21/05/1935). Another example illustrating that the machine is only as good as its user and a reminder that some alterations in articles might simply occur due to human error or technical failure.

As previously mentioned, the pressures of war time reduced the accessibility to the technologies to transmit news. Lambert found himself substituting for Werth in Paris when war was declared on Germany by France and the United Kingdom in September 1939. He stated in a letter that his silence of several days was due to technical causes (Lambert to Crozier 04/09/1939). He explained that he had tried to send messages but that it had been impossible to get them through (*ibid.*). "Some of the other people sent messages by radio to New York for relaying at tremendous costs to London (with no guarantee of their reception), but that sort of extravagance was not for us of course" (*ibid.*). Again we see that the *Manchester Guardian* did not have the financial means to transmit all the relevant news at all times. On September 10, 1939, Lambert outlines the main difficulties in another letter to Crozier. Phone lines were still not available and sending telegrams was unsatisfactory (Lambert to Crozier 10/09/1939). This was for two reasons: on the one hand, messages were only delivered on the same day if sent very early in the morning. The fault for this allegedly lay with the London office. On the other hand, telegrams were very expensive. One word would amount to one franc and twenty centimes, which brought the price for a message of

about 400 words up to three pounds (*ibid.*). In a further letter to Crozier Lambert stated on September 20 1939 that there was still no access to phone lines (Lambert to Crozier 20/09/1939). The outbreak of war had led to a considerable disruption of the transmission of news which seems to have affected financially less well-off papers more than their wealthy competitors.

5.3.4 SUBEDITORS

This section analyses how sub-editors introduced alterations - authorised and unauthorised - into media texts. We have previously seen that media texts are the result of a collective authorship (see section 2.1.3 and 3.1.2) because several actors are involved at various stages in the media production process. The intervention of the sub-editors was a continued source of complaint for the journalist-translators who compared the printed versions of their articles with the versions they had originally sent. On September 30 1935 Dell wrote to Crozier. "In the article in question some of the paragraphs were transposed and that is a practice to be avoided, in my opinion. There may be cases in which it is permissible, but it destroys the balance of a closely reasoned message" (Dell to Crozier 30/09/1935). He further complained that sub-editors in general took too many liberties with altering the wording of messages and even introduced sentences from agency texts (*ibid.*). "This is a dangerous practice", he argued, "for there is a risk that I may be made to say something inaccurate" (*ibid.*). The introduction of sentences from agency texts was a recurring issue though Crozier had already pointed out in a letter to Werth on September 8 1935 that he disapproved of this practice: "It is a standing instruction to the subeditors that they must not put into foreign correspondents' messages information or anything derived from other sources" (Crozier to Werth 08/09/1935). This instruction was probably issued in relation to credibility matters (see section 5.3.2). However, the sub-editors did not seem to be impressed by it for we read: "(...) as to the interpolation, I have continually warned the subeditors against inserting sentences into correspondent's work, and I have now warned them again. The sentence was of course highly misleading" (Crozier to Dell 30/05/1937). It was only a fortnight later that the work of the sub-editors gave rise to complaints again. "Yes, I agree that between London and Manchester they made rather a mess of your excellent message on Saturday and that we must do everything possible to stop it", Crozier wrote to Werth (Crozier to Werth 14/06/1937). The Manchester edition of the paper was published slightly later than the one in London thus there was time to introduce alterations. "Some of the worst errors, by the way, were corrected in our Manchester editions, but I do not think they need have ever gone in. It would be much better that any sentence that the subeditors cannot understand should be left out, and I have told them so; also that any important passages which seem dubious should be

referred back to you” (*ibid.*). However, the sub-editors were not always blamed for the changes they introduced. Crozier explained in a letter to Fodor that some parts of his article had been left out because of spatial restrictions (Crozier to Fodor 14/02/1938). “But the subeditor – incidentally he is about the best subeditor we have – tells me that to some extent he found your references to Czechoslovakia rather obscure, and to a slight extent in other passages he found them almost too plain spoken” (*ibid.*). It is likely that Fodor, as a non-native speaker, had to acquiesce to the subeditors’ alterations more often than his colleagues. The examples presented in this section testify to the considerable number of alterations that the articles sometimes underwent after the translator-journalists submitted them. Therefore they seem to support the argument that we should be careful when attributing sole responsibility to the translator-journalists, or any other actor involved, for the content and form of articles - especially in the realm of media translation.

5.3.5 POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Politics and political considerations are omnipresent in the production of news. The aim of the present section is not to give a general picture of the political factors involved but to present examples where political aspects are explicitly mentioned to be the cause for the particular makeup of media texts or for the inclusion or omission of certain topics. To this end we will look at regulations on news production issued by the British government and at explanations of the editor Crozier as to the reasons for certain (de-)selection choices.

In the course of the inter-war years France and the United Kingdom started more or less officially to prepare for the war that would sooner or later come. This entailed on the one hand, launching propaganda campaigns at home and censoring the national press partly in order to prevent Germany from getting strategically important information, and on the other hand, at a later stage in the course of war, using the available media to get information through to the German population so as to facilitate the task of the invasion of the allied troupes on the German territory. The French government already ensured in 1938 that it had control over the broadcasting sector and implemented restrictions regarding the circulation of the foreign press early in 1939. It finally installed governmental censorship on all media in August 1939, just days before WW2 began (Martin 1997: 233). The British government in turn had started to contemplate and plan the foundation of a Ministry of Information as early as 1935 (Balfour 1979: 53). This ministry should not only exercise censorship but “its main function would be to present the national case at home and abroad” (*ibid.*). However, the ministry struggled to fulfil its task since the media and the population were suspicious about its ‘true’ function and “except for dispatches going abroad, submission to censorship was

voluntary” (Balfour 1979: 59). The competences of the Ministry thus remained limited and the system was “based on bluff, goodwill (for no editor wanted to help the Germans) and the realisation that, if it broke down, a much more vexatious compulsory scheme would have to be substituted” (Balfour 1979: 61). However, the official Secrets Acts dating back to 1889 acted as a much more powerful censorship instrument in Britain than the Ministry of Information. The revisions introduced at several successive stages were not only aimed at preventing the leaking of sensitive information to other governments (Green and Karolides 2005: 106-408). Any act in preparation to commit a felony, as defined by the Act, as well as the reception of information obtained as a result of a violation of the Act were to be punished (*ibid.*). The defendants were not to be trialled under the premise of ‘in dubio pro reo’ but had to prove their innocence (*ibid.*). Offences against this act were severely punished and the British press output was clearly affected by this law. In September 1938 Crozier wrote a letter to Voigt and apologised because he had to alter his article to avoid giving away the origin of the story. “One of our people suggested to me that as the article obviously showed knowledge of the actual Note itself it might come under the Official Secrets Act (...). This is a very disturbing thought” (Crozier to Voigt 21/09/1938). The article must have been substantially changed since Crozier added: “In the meantime I express my regret for having made you waste so much of your labour. The Official Secrets Act is a **constant trial** to us, but I know that you *always* have it carefully in mind” (*ibid.*, my emphasis). This letter clearly illustrates that the British press had establish a kind of self-censorship to avoid punishment by the government. Furthermore, it also indicates that the Act continuously affected the work of the journalists. In a similar vein Crozier consulted Scott in November 1938, in the aftermaths of the Munich crisis, about the inclusion of information from an official document (see section 1.1.3 and 2.2.3 regarding the Munich crisis and appeasement). In this document Chamberlain urged the Czech government to surrender to the German demands (Crozier to Scott 07/11/1938). Given the enormous impact of the territorial losses of Czechoslovakia for European politics which just started to emerge, the publication of this information could have entailed far-reaching consequences for Chamberlain and his party. It is difficult to estimate the impact of the Official Secrets Act as a trigger for self-censorship among the British press during the inter-war years. A cursory search to support the above findings seems to indicate that there is still research to be done in this area.

However, not only governmental intervention but also Crozier’s personal political views led to the (de-) selection of certain topics. In October 1935, for instance, he informed Werth that his article, probably referring to the disagreement between France and the UK created through the Italo-Ethiopian War (see section 1.1.3 and 5.3.1), could not be published as “bad

blood would unnecessarily be created between the two governments”, between the UK and France (Crozier to Werth 31/10/1935). In contrast, he wrote to Voigt: “Do you agree with me that it will be a good thing to keep on writing about the Jews in Germany – not , I mean, so much about the whole question of this sort of prosecution, what it means and what can be done about it? It seems to me that it might help a sort of moral encirclement of the Nazis which must eventually have some corrosive influence even in Germany itself” (Crozier to Voigt 25/11/1938). Both examples demonstrate that Crozier was aware of the important and influential role the media played with regards to international politics and he carefully considered the consequences entailed with the publication of each article.

5.4 NEWS AGENCIES

The aim of this section is twofold. On the one hand, the history of the news agencies is briefly touched upon and their importance as a ‘causal condition’ for the news production process established. On the other hand, the implications of the high reliance of the analysed newspapers on news agencies are illustrated based on examples from the editorial correspondence of the *Manchester Guardian* staff. The technological progress that characterised the media landscape in the second half of the 19th century entailed the expansion and prospering of the news agencies whose existence dates back to the first half of the century. Charles-Louis Havas started off his business as a translation agency in Paris in 1832 (Barth 2010: 63 and Bassnett and Bielsa 2009: 39). He translated information published in the foreign press that he judged important and sold the translations to the French newspapers (Barth 2010: 63). His services soon attracted the interest of an international clientele and what had started off as a translation agency grew into the first French news agency, *Agence Havas*, in 1835 (*ibid.*). This illustrates how interrelated translational and journalistic tasks, interlingual and intersemiotic translation in a cross-cultural media context are. Julius Reuter and Bernhard Wolff had both worked for *Havas* for a short period of time but then founded their own businesses. Wolff established the *Telegrafisches Büro* in 1848 in Germany (in the United States *Associated Press* was founded in the same year) and *Reuter* was set up in 1851 (*ibid.*). In order to make their product, the international news, attractive for as many newspapers as possible, their discursive products needed to be objective, i.e. free of interpretation and factually true (*ibid.*). This business model achieved tremendous success and the agencies grew. To ensure global coverage but also to avoid interfering with each other’s businesses, the news agencies formed alliances (Barth 2010: 63 and Bassnett and Bielsa 2009: 42). Through these agreements they “effectively divided the world into main zones of influence for each other” (Bassnett and Bielsa 2009: 43). Although this cartel was

broken off in 1934 and alternative agencies started to emerge (Barth 2010: 64), the material analysed within this thesis clearly shows that the agencies kept their predominant position on the national markets. The French press mainly published news provided by *Havas*, while the British press continued to rely on *Reuter*. The news agencies, though private businesses, were not free of political and governmental influences. During the inter-war years *Havas* was highly subsidised by the French government and it is believed that the agency not only provided the French Foreign Ministry with information but also disseminated information as instructed by the French government (Georgakakis 2004: 74 ff.). The French *Ministère des Affaires Étrangères* (Foreign Ministry) in turn had already established a “section de traduction et d’analyse de la presse”, a department for the analysis and translation of the print media (*ibid.*: 75) in 1916. This reflects once more the high importance the governments attributed to the printed press and also testifies to the pivotal role translation played and plays in the production of global news. To support this argument I shall mention that Goebbels was equally obsessed with the foreign press output, and had originally employed his future wife Magda Quant - fluent in German, French, English and Italian - to translate what the foreign newspapers published about Goebbels and the Third Reich (Gathmann and Paul 2009: 152 f.). Unfortunately this private archive disappeared when Soviet troops confiscated it in 1945 and sent it to Moscow (*ibid.*). Coming back to the governmental influence in the news agencies, Wolff’s *Telegrafisches Büro* was dissolved and integrated into the government-run *Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro* in 1934. It is needless to say that the news provided by this agency can hardly be described as objective. We will see shortly that the reports from *Reuter* were not free from political influences either. Before investigating what the *Manchester Guardian* correspondents had to say about the work of the news agencies, we need to take notice of a few complicating factors. First of all news agencies have dual agency networks in that they work with local journalists on-site and global journalists placed in the agency offices located in the important cities (Bassnett and Bielsa 2009: 58 ff.). In the final agency texts that are sold to the newspapers one cannot discern what information stems from the journalists and what from the agency centrals (Barth 2010: 70). Furthermore, the increasing standardisation of the agency texts necessitated that explanatory commentaries were added – as this technique was more and more used, the borders between factual information and interpretation became blurred in the discursive practices of the news agencies. This raises questions about the faithfulness of the agency text and subsequently the media texts to the political event (*ibid.*). Given that a considerable part of the information about Goebbels was imported through agency texts and not through reports of the foreign correspondents (see section 6.1.2), governmental

interference and the practices of the news agencies must have impacted considerably on the analysed material. Finally, we have also seen in section 5.3.4 that the subeditors of the *Manchester Guardian* did not hesitate to complement the reports of the foreign correspondents with information derived from agency texts. For the reader of course it was not possible to know at all what piece of information had come from which source.

Reuter, it seems, had at one point been infiltrated by the Nazis for Fodor wrote to Crozier on April 27 1935:

“The South Tyrol thing is, however, a delicate question. You noticed that only Reuter has sent out this wild story. I wrote to you some months ago that Reuter was sending Nazi propaganda all the time. The result was that even Reuter noticed it and the correspondent was fired some weeks ago on a six months’ notice. Though Scholefield is not working any more for Reuter, his assistant continues to send out all these Nazi fakes. However, at the end of the month a new man, Mr. Holme, who is now second Reuter correspondent in Berlin, will come to Vienna. I expect that this wild rumour-mongering will cease then.”
(Fodor to Crozier 27/04/1935)

Fodor was not the only correspondent to have doubts about the truthfulness of the information *Reuter* was disseminating. On June 1 1935 Werth wrote to Crozier: “Don’t you think something should be done to stop the irresponsibly sensational stuff that one of *Reuter*’s men in Paris makes a point of sending” (Werth to Crozier 01/06/1935)? *Reuter* had reported some sort of riot which, according to the eyewitness Werth, had never taken place. “(...) to maintain that there were ‘hundreds of people’ shouting and demonstrating outside the Chamber is a pure undiluted fabrication” (*ibid.*). On June 8, Werth further clarifies: “(...) if I mentioned it, it was to draw your attention to the tendency of one of *Reuter*’s Paris men to be sensationalist at any price and to represent France as being in a state of latent civil war” (Werth to Crozier 08/06/1935). The sensationalism that Werth observed was maybe related to the fact that “newsworthiness ceased to be defined by principles, and events began to be reported because journalists had a competitive advantage to gain by publishing them” (Chalaby 1998: 84). The need to sell stories was sometimes satisfied by appealing to the reader’s emotions which led to a blurring of the borders between fiction and reality (*ibid.*: 153). This also affected the process of news selection (*ibid.*). However, especially quality newspapers like the *Manchester Guardian* were not impressed by such practices. Lambert explained to Crozier on May 13 1935: “Incidentally some of the agency stories are very irresponsible. Three big ones which we featured from Berlin were simply untrue. One was the Hitler ‘secret’ meeting in the Munich hotel, the second was the mobilisation of the first German conscripted contingents – and the third the Exchange story about the diplomatic

steps on the position of the Locarno treaty” (Lambert to Crozier 13/05/1935). It was not only the strong economic orientation of the news agencies that led to hoaxes. From a letter that Dell wrote to Crozier in autumn 1935 we learn that agency correspondents suffered under their working conditions. “(...) the correspondents of agencies, on account of the conditions in which they work, are more likely to make mistakes than the correspondents of papers who have much more time” (Dell to Crozier 09/10/1935). Dell argued that too much trust was placed in the news agencies and that *Reuter* had made several howlers over the past few weeks (*ibid.*). He described a case in which an agency journalist went straight on the phone without verifying the information he got and passed on the misleading news. “This sort of thing often happens with agency correspondents, who are always afraid that some competitor gets the news to London before them” (*ibid.*). Another issue with the reliability of *Reuter* arose in spring 1936. “(...) it is dangerous to depend on Reuter, Ferguson seems to be far from accurate” (Dell to Crozier 22/04/1936). Ferguson, so Dell explained, received supplementary and exclusive information from Michael Wright, a press agent of the Foreign Office. According to Dell, Wright was not so much concerned about telling the truth and Ferguson naive enough not to verify the information. “Of course government dope in all countries is dishonest, but it is the general opinion here both among journalists and diplomats that the Foreign Office is the worst of the lot” (*ibid.*). “The English press”, so Dell heard, “was the most servile in the world” (*ibid.*). Dells’ account indicates that the British government official in Geneva, Michael Wright, possibly had disseminated misleading information to falsify the British press output. Such an attempt – if it did take place – would have been all the more effective because it targeted the largest British news agency.

CHAPTER REVIEW

The objective of this chapter was to reconstruct the mosaic of factors that influenced the translational and journalistic tasks during the inter-war period. By providing specific examples the thesis aimed at contributing to the overall body of knowledge, but they do not necessarily identify general patterns of behaviour. The results showed that the history of the *Manchester Guardian* had brought about a particular editorial tradition which was continued by Crozier and his foreign correspondents throughout the inter-war years. As a quality newspaper, the *Manchester Guardian* emphasised the importance of objective, balanced and truthful accounts of events – even when the beliefs of the people they reported on were counter to their own liberal (and socialist) convictions. Furthermore, the editor strongly believed that the *Treaty of Versailles* had been unjust for Germany and that this nation should be treated equally. In contrast, France’s demands were seen as unjustified and most of

the *Manchester Guardian* staff thought it best to side-step strong continental commitments to avoid being dragged into a war. This led to a schizophrenic position with regards to Nazi Germany which was ideologically opposed but still brought forward demands that the *Manchester Guardian* staff considered just and could therefore not oppose. Crozier insisted on not publishing or adapting articles that were in contrast to this editorial tradition. Furthermore, stylistic matters also played a role. Equally important were spatial restrictions which were partly set by financial considerations (printing and paper costs) and partly influenced by the criteria of newsworthiness. It was briefly discussed that newsworthiness was differently defined in the quality and in the popular press. Furthermore, issues of credibility connected to stylistic considerations, discursive coherence and the reliability of sources also led to the (de-) selection of articles or alterations in the text. The *Manchester Guardian* was notoriously short of money which sometimes made it impossible for the correspondents to attend and report on an event. Thus, they either had to resort to agency texts or not report about the event at all. The use of phones and telegraphs was also limited thereby. The incompetency or particularities of certain individuals affected the transmission of the news too. Another important group that was responsible for the alterations of the texts were the sub-editors. This led to continuous complaints by the foreign correspondents and the issuing of new guidelines by Crozier – however, the disputes did not cease to occur. Furthermore, the working conditions produced by the NS-Regime impacted strongly on the news gathering, the news production and sometimes the news distribution process. This applied to the official service provided by Lambert and the unofficial service headed by Voigt. However, the *Manchester Guardian* editor also needed to consider the legal situation in Britain (Official Secrets Act) and possible political consequences that might occur as a result of certain articles. A further aspect to consider are the news agencies and in particular *Reuter*. Much of the information about NS-Germany was for financial reasons covered by agency news or the reports of the correspondents complemented with pieces of information emanating from the news agencies. These sources were not always reliable as was clearly shown. Financial and temporal pressure as well as political actors who influenced the work of the agencies impacted on their discursive output.

The mosaic of factors influencing the translational and the journalistic task is indeed very complex and varied. It was discussed in section 3.1.3 that we should think of them as causal conditions which influence the translation process to varying degrees at different times. It is essential when analysing translational products to weigh up which factors might have impacted to what extent on the particular makeup of the text. This chapter has provided a unique insight into the causal conditions that governed the work of the journalist-translators

reporting about the Third Reich and has thereby contributed to the general understanding of the complexity and versatility of media translation. We need to bear in mind, however, that these findings derive from a single case study and do neither necessarily apply to other newspapers nor to other time periods. The findings are also partly based on personal accounts - this poses its own limitations. However, the results clearly indicate that in the production of global news of which translation is an intrinsic part a wide array of contextual factors needs to be considered. Research which does not engage with a detailed contextual analysis will be prone to leap to hasty and therefore misleading conclusions. Future investigation will no doubt reveal how widely applicable the findings of this study are and further advance our understanding of the pivotal role translation plays in the production of global news.

6 THE ROLE OF TRANSLATION IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE MEDIA IMAGES OF THE THIRD REICH

“There are few people in England (and France) that understand German sufficiently well to appreciate the awful tone of such a speech, that it is no wonder that the public in general cannot realise how dangerous is the present situation in Europe.”

(Letter to the Editors, Manchester Guardian 14 September 1938)

The main purpose of this chapter is to untangle the interplay of intersemiotic and interlingual translation and journalistic writing in order to analyse how translation contributes to the construction of the media images. To this end, this chapter draws on the media studies concept of framing and the four framing strategies that have been presented in section 2.4.4: selective appropriation of text; temporal and spatial framing, labelling and repositioning of the participants. Framing strategies are often applied in combination and accumulation. It is this cluster characteristic which enables the realisation of their framing potential and they will therefore, whenever possible, be analysed jointly rather than artificially separated.

This chapter is divided into two subsections. The first section engages with text type related framing. To this end the (de-) selection decisions that need to be taken with regards to the text and the event context are investigated. These decisions can either be inspired by or partly determine the text type of the representing media text. In this regard Lüger's classification system for text classes and text types is introduced and the characteristics of the text types relevant to this study are briefly described. We then investigate three text-type related framing clusters on the textual and syntactical level: (a) the (de-) selection of paragraphs, sentences and clauses in agency texts, (b) the use of quotations as factual proofs in editorials and (c) the (de-) selection of contextual information in reporting media texts and the subsequent repositioning of the participants. The second, shorter section investigates the different ways in which the newspapers represented the event audiences. It will be shown that the audience's function in the SC event is altered in the intersemiotic translation process and in the representation of the event context both of which entail the repositioning of the participants. To this end, its function within the NS speech events is briefly revisited. This is followed by the description of six different types of event audience representations. The last subsection discusses the findings in relation to the framing potential of event audience representations. In both sections the examples have been selected because they appear to be particularly illustrative for the points discussed; others could have been used instead. They are also representative of patterns discovered in the corpus. Moreover, apart from section 6.1.3, the focus of the contrastive analysis lies on the TTs. The alleged STs will only occasionally be referred to.

6.1 TEXT-TYPE RELATED FRAMING STRATEGIES

6.1.1 FROM THE SC SPEECH EVENT TO THE TEXT TYPES IN THE TC

Unlike fictional texts, journalistic writing is to a large extent based on facts and events taking place in the real world. Speech events, as explained in the introduction, consist of the oral and non-verbal text and the event context. The agents involved in the reporting of the here analysed events (see table 1) made important decisions about what aspects of the text and the context were to be (de-) selected. As discussed in Chapter Five, a number of factors, which mutually influenced each other, such as access restrictions to the event and, time pressure, spatial restrictions, genre conventions but also more politically and ideologically motivated considerations impacted on these choices. This decision procedure was repeated at several stages and by several actors along the news production process. This affected the intersemiotic and interlingual translation of the textual aspects as well as the representation of the contextual aspects of the original speech events in a quantitative (how much was (de-) selected) and qualitative (alterations) manner, schematically represented in figure 6.




FIGURE 6: SELECTION PROCESSES IN THE PRODUCTION OF INTERNATIONAL NEWS

The selected information about a given speech event was presented in a particular text type. The choice of the text type is paramount because each of them is connected with a number of conventions. They not only impact on the quantity of the text and context information translated but also on the quantity of journalistic writing added and the range of framing strategies from which the translator-journalist can choose (Bassnett and Bielsa 2009: 68 ff.). In this regard decisions can sometimes be made prior to the actual speech event but may also be taken in relation to extra-textual factors. In the following section the notion of text type is briefly introduced. This is then succeeded by the presentation of Lüger's text class and type

classification system as described in Burger (2005). An outline of the text types relevant to this study follows.

There are various definitions of the concept of ‘text type’ within media and journalism studies (e.g. Reiss 1976, Brinker 2001, etc.). In the framework of this thesis the notion is relevant because the text type of the media text impacted on (a) the proportion of text and context information that could be imported and (b) the quantity and quality of the ‘added’ journalistic writing and (c) it also limited the choice of the framing strategies. Without engaging in a lengthy theoretical discussion about the differing concept definitions Lüger’s (1995) classification system - which Burger adapted to media texts (Burger 2005: 205ff.) - will be employed as a guideline to briefly describe the relevant text types. This will then be complemented with relevant insights from other scholars. Using this rather recent German-centred classification system entails some limitations since text forms are historical categories (Košir 1988: 356), i.e. they evolve over time and differ between lingua cultures (Siepmann 2006: 4). Thus, the French and British media text types of the 1930s will not fully correspond to Lügner’s classification system. However, the practice-orientated aspect of this study allows the bridging of such gaps and possibly elucidates our knowledge about the characteristics of the media text types of this period. In particular, the text type classification will not strictly follow Lüger’s model but will be adapted to this study.

Lüger distinguishes between *Textklasse* (text class) and *Textsorte* (text type). The criterion for the division into text classes is the text function (Burger 2005: 2008). He describes five classes of which only two are relevant in the print media: *informationsbetonte Texte* (informative texts) and *meinungsbetonte Texte* (evaluative texts). The second category incorporates an appellative component (*ibid.*: 210). Different text types are then assigned to these text classes and are distinguishable through (a) the thematic development (descriptive, argumentative, etc.); (b) in how much detail the event is described; (c) the intertextual text story (Is the story development typical?), the presence of the author; (d) the synchronic intertextuality (Does the text refer to other texts in the same newspaper issue?); (e) the formal structure (conventionalised structure); (f) the perspective (of the author or someone else); and (g) the explicit presence of the author in the text (in which case, what is his role, in which situations is he present?) (*ibid.*: 210 ff.). Four text types were predominantly used to present Goebbels’ speeches in the present corpus: commentaries and editorials, reportages, short news and reports (mostly agency texts). As figure 7 shows, commentaries/editorials and reportages have a predominantly evaluative text function whilst short news and reports are mostly informative.




FIGURE 7: MEDIA TEXT TYPES

6.1.1.1 COMMENTARY & EDITORIAL

Commentaries depend on information given in another media text for example a report (synchronic intertextuality) as their task is to comment on and evaluate an already known situation or event (Burger 2000: 215). The authors of the commentary sign the text with their names (*ibid.*). The article is written from a subjective perspective and the author can be present in the text (*ibid.*). The thematic development is argumentative and the speech acts are mostly evaluative (*ibid.*). The commentary possibly ends with an appellative message directed at readers but also at institutions or politicians (*ibid.*). The editorial differs from the commentary in that the author of the text is part of the editorial board and thus his/her statements presumably reflect the political stance of the newspaper. In this sense, “editorial opinion is generally institutional” (van Dijk 1996b: 19). Editorials are less personal than commentaries and express rather general opinions – mostly those of elites (*ibid.*). Furthermore, most editorials feature regularly in the same place in the newspaper. Within the present case study, only the French press used these text types to present Goebbels’ speeches. Especially the opinion press employed editorials to inform about the thoughts and impressions of the editors. In this text type little context information was used and quotations were restricted to one or two sentences. Conversely, there was a lot of journalistic writing involved. Given the text function and the selectivity with regards to the SC discourse, a wide variety of framing strategies could be employed. In turn, the interlingual translations were effective framing devices (see section 6.1.2).

6.1.1.2 REPORTAGE

The reportage allows the journalist-translator to report from a particular perspective. Reportages represent only certain selected aspects of an event, thereby foregrounding them. According to Burger “the journalist who writes from a specific perspective, does not do this as much as an individual but more ‘in the role of an individual’ who reports from, for the

recipients, a journalistically most advantageous position” (2005: 216). A typical role he/she assumes is the one of an eyewitness who was present at the event (*ibid.*). The journalist-translator has a number of devices to mark the perspective linguistically (*ibid.*). Reportages can feature (a) evaluative statements explicitly assigned to the author of the text, (b) verbalised sensory perceptions, (c) descriptions of the journalist-translator’s physical and psychological experiences, (d) the spatial localisation of the authors, as well as their (e) temporal positioning (*ibid.*). Three textual levels seem to be important in the reportage: the on-site level, the personal level and the documentation level (Müller 1989 quoted in Burger 2005: 216). Text passages relating to the on-site level provide detailed descriptions about spatial and temporal aspects as well as the particular atmosphere at the event (Burger 2005: 217). As regards the personal level, quotations and especially direct quotations constitute an important element. The central interest regarding the participants is how their statements are represented in the media text (Burger 2005: 220). Quotations are not only used to inform about what has been said but also to render the text more authentic (*ibid.*). The documentation level involves the interweaving of background knowledge into the text. Writing reportages not only requires that the journalist-translator is on-site but also demands extensive research on the topic (Burger 2005: 221). The reportage combines objective information and subjective perceptions. This is reflected in the complexity of the thematic development which combines narrative, descriptive and argumentative elements and resembles literary writing (*ibid.*). This text type is selected when an event does not need to be immediately reported (reportages might be preceded by short news) or has been scheduled. This allows the journalist-translator to travel to the event, to do the background research and to write the reportage. Subsequently, reportages often feature in relation to regular events such as Goebbels’ New Year speeches or the Nuremberg Rallies.

6.1.1.3 SHORT NEWS & REPORTS

Short news inform in very brief terms about what happened where, when, how and who was involved in the event. There is normally no particular perspective discernible and the author is not present in the text.

Reports contain the same information as short news but add information about the chronology of the event, its pre-history and consequences (Burger 2005: 214-215). Reports are more complex in their representation and subsequently longer than short news. In addition to the headline and the body of text they feature a lead. The author can be present in the text (*ibid.*). Short news and reports consisted in France and the UK often of agency texts. One difficulty in this regard is that the source (news agency) was often not indicated. The

fact that these texts were not written by someone directly employed by the newspaper is only discernible when they are compared. Though this text type is supposedly free of evaluation, this was rarely the case. Richardson suggests that the comparison of the use of news agency texts can provide interesting insights into contextual factors motivating the introduction of changes into the news text (2007: 106). Many of these agency texts only contained information about the speech itself. However, they sometimes featured a lead with evaluative aspects. The framing strategies employed in agency texts will be discussed in section 6.1.2 and we have seen in section 5.4 how the reliance on news agencies impeded the event reporting.

6.1.2 SELECTIVE QUOTING IN AGENCY TEXTS

Although many important newspapers had a foreign correspondent permanently placed in Nazi Germany, a considerable part of Goebbels' speeches found its way to France and Britain in the form of agency texts. Possible reasons for this might be a general trust in the translation services provided by these news agencies as well as the impossibility of the foreign correspondents being present at every speech event. Especially in periods of high political tension, foreign correspondents preferred or were asked to remain close to the centre of power, Berlin. The reliance of the British and French newspapers on news agencies was not without consequences. News agencies function as gate keeping agents who control what information is translated and penetrates the receiving cultures. They (partly) decide what events are covered and what aspects of a given reality are reported on. News agencies indeed have a very powerful (political) position and, as shown in section 5.4, sometimes abuse this power. Nonetheless, the comparing of agency texts can still be revealing in terms of uncovering the different perspectives taken by the newspapers. This is because newspapers have the right to edit the agency texts to their liking without even acknowledging the source (Bassnett and Bielsa 2009: 85). This section will exemplarily compare what information was 'imported' by the French and British press in relation to Goebbels' speech on the remilitarisation of the Rhineland in March 1936. This allows us to gauge what influence the news agencies had in terms of their gatekeeping role. Furthermore, by analysing the different representations of the events, by comparing reports clearly based on the same agency texts, we can also discern the differing viewpoints of the newspapers. To this end the framing strategies applied by the translator-journalist are identified and the role translation played within the frame building process is analysed.

6.1.2.1 BACKGROUND: REMILITARISATION OF THE RHINELAND

The remilitarisation of the Rhineland took place in the early hours of Saturday 7 March 1936 surprising the British and French politicians on their weekend break (Gannon 1971: 93). As discussed in section 1.1.3, the remilitarisation constituted a violation of the Versailles Treaty and presented due to the geographical proximity an imminent threat to French security. Conversely, British politicians had previously signalled that they were ready to discuss the matter. To legitimise this act of force, parliamentary elections including a form of a single question referendum were to be held on March 29 (Urban 2011: 52). In order to launch this election campaign, Goebbels gave a speech on March 10 in Berlin. The elections were only seemingly democratic since solely candidates from the NS party could be voted for and *Gemeinschaftsfremde* such as Jewish people were not eligible to participate. In addition, people could only vote for or against the new status quo – no alternatives were offered (Urban 2011: 46). There were further means to manipulate the elections, such as the exertion of pressure on the people, the rigging of the election results, as well as the influencing of the public opinion (Jung 1995: 42). Some of them were reported in the newspapers. The media texts analysed below were written in this context and refer to Goebbels' opening speech.

6.1.2.2 THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN & THE DAILY HERALD IN COMPARISON

The *Manchester Guardian* (*MG*) and the *Daily Herald* (*DH*), based their articles (published on March 11, 1936) reporting on the speech event entirely on an agency text from *Reuter*. However, they differ in terms of their headlines, the sequencing of the paragraphs, the temporal and spatial deixis and also the (de-) selection of the quotations. They consist mainly of interlingual and intersemiotic translations as well as speech context representations. Considering the speech was given only one day prior to the publishing of the articles, it seems likely that temporal restrictions and the need to report at the same times as the competitors have necessitated the use of an agency text. The line numbers below refer to the texts as represented in the appendix. When we compare *DH* line 7-19 to *MG* line 10-22, we see that spatial and temporal indicators have been altered. Whilst the *MG* writes that the election campaign has been opened “to-night” (12), the *DH* states that it happened “last night” (9). The spatial indicator “Deutschland Hall in the west of Berlin” (*MG*: 11-12) is shortened to “Deutschland Hall, Berlin” (*DH*: 15). This is probably because the exact location is of no relevance to the British reader. The same applies to the change from “200 other meeting halls in Berlin” (*MG*: 21-22) to “200 other halls” (*DH*: 18-19). The reporting of the *MG* seems to be temporally and spatially closer to the original speech event. Thus it is likely that the *MG* printed the ‘original’ text. This might be related to an additional temporal pressure the Manchester edition of the *MG* was exposed to—information reached the capital earlier.

Striking is the alteration of the sequencing of the context information. The *MG* divides the information into two parts: the first part precedes the interlingual translations and indicates that the audience was ushered to the speech event (15-20); the second part is post-positioned and conveys that the election campaign is undemocratic. Only NS party members can be elected and the participation in the propaganda marches is compulsory (72-122). In the *DH* the two parts follow each other directly and precede the interlingual translations (7-39). The second part is shortened in the *DH*, lines 72-93 (*MG*) do not appear here. However, the illegitimacy of the elections is still clearly stated. Though the shortening might have taken place for spatial reasons, the alteration of the sequencing has an influence on how soon the reader is made aware of the illegitimacy of the elections. This text passage is further foregrounded through bold print. Whilst the *DH* reader knows about the undemocratic practices in NS-Germany early in the text, the *MG* reader needs to go through the entire article to get to this point. Given that newspapers generally use the inverted pyramid structure to place the most relevant information at the beginning this seems to indicate that more relevance was attributed to the illegitimacy by the *DH* than by the *MG*.

It is useful to analyse the framing in headlines in connection with the (de-) selection of quotations. The focus of the *DH* appears to be twofold. On the one hand, the headline “Goebbels replies to Sarraut” (2) and the sub-headline “Not Leaving Cologne Under Menace of French Guns” (4-5) indicate that the *DH* assigned a certain importance to the stance taken by the French government towards the Rhineland remilitarisation, i.e. that Hitler must be driven out because the Nazis could not be trusted, and Germany’s reaction to it, i.e. their unwillingness to retreat. A lead article by Ewer published on the previous day explains the *DH*’s position with regards to the conflict: supporting the French government would mean war and war was to be avoided at all costs (Gannon 1971: 95). On the other hand, the focus seems to lie on the question of whether or not the NS-Regime is truly improving the situation of its people. In lines 42-59 Goebbels’ claims of the German government being especially close to its people and doing things rather than talking about them, are repeated. However, they are immediately contrasted with Goebbels’ statement that the £300,000,000 saved on food importation has been spent on rearmament. This statement is also graphically highlighted through bold print which indicates that it was seen as relevant. Thereby the readers’ interpretation of the text was guided. Considering only the graphically foregrounded text passages (headlines, sub-headlines, bold print) in the *DH*, the newspaper seems to be highlighting text passages that depict Germany as a strong nation which uses illegitimate means and does prioritise the strengthening of the military power over the satisfaction of the population’s needs. In light of the lead article printed on the previous day, it might be argued

that this media representation serves to make clear that Germany is a strong opponent with whom one should not lightly engage in war. Such an argument can only be put forward and should only be evaluated when considering the wider discourse of the newspaper (section 4.3.3.4).

The labelling strategies and the selective appropriation of text in the *MG* are very different. The main headline is factual and states what the speech occasion was: “Nazi election campaign” (2). The two sub-headlines are more revealing regarding the paper’s perspective: “Germany and League” (4) and Goebbels’ quote “We want no bad compromises” (6-7). The League of Nations’ primary function was to maintain and assure lasting peace. This seems to have been the main concern of the *MG*. According to Goebbels, the Nazis were willing to return to the League and to contribute to European peace if they were treated as an equal member (see section 4.3.2). The *MG* was willing to engage with this declaration of intent – in the lead article printed on March 10 we can read that it is important “not to lose the chance, if there should be the chance, **of cleaning up the horrible mess of suspicion and fear** which has poisoned these last few years, and to do it somehow with Germany, since it is obvious that it cannot be done without her: that is the aim that we need to keep in view” (*MG* 10/03/1936: 10 quoted in Gannon 1971: 95, my emphasis). Moreover, lines 32-34 equate the German wish for peace with that of GB, France and the League; lines 49-54 explain that the remilitarisation of the Rhineland ultimately contributes to European peace; lines 53-54 state that Germany does not want bad compromises but lasting treaties and in lines 56-71 we read that only the Führer’s proposals would lead to the national and economic recovery of Europe (both premises for lasting peace). It seems that the foregrounding of the peaceful intentions and thus the suggested rejection of imposing sanctions against Germany are indeed intentional. Crozier refused to publish an article of Voigt, which was too critical of Germany and its peace intention declarations, on March 25 1936. He explained this refusal with the belief that Germany could possibly attack if there were to be sanctions and that Germany was trying to win Britain’s sympathy. These sanctions, Crozier implies, would only be an advantage for France but not for the UK (see section 5.1.2).

As regards the selective appropriation of text, the *MG* made its selection in a way that supported the editors’ line of argumentation from the previous day. The other framing strategies applied by the newspaper function in a similar way. As discussed in Chapter Four, Goebbels incorporated statements conveying peaceful intentions into his speeches in order to gain trust abroad. In this particular instance the strategy seems to have been successful with the *MG*. In case of the *DH*, the link between the editorial and the selection of quotes is

slightly less straight forward. However, Goebbels -simultaneously to issuing peaceful intentions – pursued a ‘strategy of threatening’ (see section 4.3.2). By highlighting the strength of the German army he hoped to scare other nations enough to make them reluctant to engage in a conflict with the Nazis. This strategy seems to have worked in the case of the *DH*.

6.1.2.3 LE PETIT PARISIEN: THE GATEKEEPER FUNCTION OF THE NEWS AGENCY

A few points seem to be interesting when comparing the covering of the event by the *Petit Parisien* (PP) to the representations of the two British newspapers. The reporting article is also based on an agency text – provided by the French news agency *Havas* – and describes the context and the content of the speech. The headline indicates the perspective taken by the newspaper “Dr Goebbels vindicates Mr Hitler’s politics of force”^{xxi} (2-4). Goebbels’ speech is seen as a justification for Hitler’s “politics of force”, the undemocratic act of the invasion and remilitarisation of the Rhineland. Especially interesting is the (de-) selection of quotes. Like the *MG*, the *PP* incorporates the following statement: “Today, when the Führer speaks, the entire world listens because he has behind him one party, one army, one people”^{xxii} (29-32). However, the causal relationship as to why the world listens is not established in the *MG*: “But when Hitler speaks to-day the whole world listens” (41-43). The fact that the explanatory part of the sentence is ‘included’ in the *PP* highlights that Hitler’s politics are backed up by the people and even more so by the army. This interpretation is substantiated when we consider the inclusion of the sentence “We have rebuilt the army to reassert ourselves”,^{xxiii} followed by the quote “When the 16th of March came we told the world: we have rearmed. The world accepted this because it could not do otherwise”^{xxiv}. These quotations highlight the power of the re-established German army and the threat this poses for the rest of Europe. In contrast to this is the ‘omission’ of important contextual information. In fact none of the French newspapers report about the already occurring manipulation of the elections and the fact that people are more or less forced to participate in the Nazi propaganda events. Somewhere down the line of the news production process, this information must have been cut out. Its inclusion would have been advantageous for those French newspapers which were opposing the remilitarisation. It is likely that French news agency judged this piece of information as irrelevant or dangerous. This is a clear example of an interruption of the general translation-import-flow and is indicative of the news agencies role as gatekeepers.

6.1.2.4 SECTION REVIEW

The aim of section 6.1.2 was to investigate how the newspapers reshape and re-contextualise the intersemiotic and interlingual translations and additional journalistic writing provided by the news agencies and how this reflects the stances of the newspapers. Moreover, the section also aimed at investigating the role of news agencies as gatekeepers who enable and interrupted the VTIF.

A variety of framing strategies allow the journalist-translators involved in the publishing of reports based on agency texts to frame the articles. Given the text-type conventions, which do not allow for argumentative or evaluative practices and the temporal and spatial restrictions, it was essential that the frame construction did not rely on complementing the text with journalistic writing. Apart from the headlines and sub-headlines, through which the journalist-translator labels the event, there are no other textual additions. The dominant framing strategy applied to agency texts is the selective appropriation of text which allows the omission of 'undesired' information. This is one gate at which the VTIF can be interrupted and it applies to textual and contextual information alike. Another important framing strategy with regards to reports and possibly also short news seems to be the graphical highlighting of text passages. Graphical highlighting relies on the conventionalisation of the structuring of media texts where headlines, sub-headlines and lead are known to contain the most relevant information. Bold print is another means for the newspaper to signal that a text passage is more relevant than others and can be used independently from the position of the text passage and is therefore more versatile. Furthermore, we have seen that the *MG* has successfully back-grounded the illegitimacy of the election by altering the sequencing of the paragraphs which can change the perceived importance of the different information elements. The comparison between the French and British newspapers has once more highlighted differences in the media representations but also demonstrated that news agencies do have a gatekeeping role which might not always be in the best interest of the newspapers.

It appears then that the use of the agency texts, present in short news or reports, is affecting the media images in two ways. On the one hand, the text type conventions limit the variety of framing strategies that can be applied. It is therefore a further causal condition in the production of media texts that needs to be accounted for. On the other hand, news agencies are gatekeepers who control the VTIF. Whether information has been de-selected for publication by the newspapers or news agencies can only be evaluated through a contrastive analysis. This evaluation is further complicated by the frequent non-indication of the use of

agency texts. The differentiation, however, is important because it can lead to wrong attributions of de-selections to ideological stances.

6.1.3 ILLUSTRATIVE QUOTING IN EDITORIALS

Editorials form part of the evaluative text class and constitute a particular text type in which the opinion of (presumably) the entire editorial board of a newspaper on a particular topic is expressed (see section 6.1.1.1). Editorials, however, also aim at persuading the reader of the expressed viewpoint. This becomes visible in the argumentative structure of the text. In this regard van Dijk points out that “recipients expect or demand that opinions are made plausible, defended, supported or otherwise ‘backed up’” (1996b: 16). The way in which the writer construes his discourse by combining arguments and proofs not only allows us to discern the author’s perspective but also the assumed reader expectations. The less controversial an opinion is within a given social context, the less argumentative backup a statement of opinion requires (*ibid.*). Besides the writer and the reader who are explicitly and implicitly present in the text, there is a third group of people to be accounted for: “people whom the sender involves in the speech event because of their links with the object of this speech event” (Lee 2004: 688). One way in which such a third party can become visible in an editorial is through the use of quotations. Quotations (see section 2.1.1) have three main functions: adding vividness to the text, allowing the journalists to distance themselves from what has been said, and lending authority to the text (Obiedat 2006: 289 ff.). In light of the evaluative nature of the text type editorial, the last two functions are of particular interest for this section. The authoritative value of a quote is closely linked to the social position of the enunciator. However, this does not always mean that credibility increases along with the importance of the political role. It can simply indicate that the social position enables the enunciator to perform certain political acts. Additionally, the authoritative value of a direct quote derives from its claim to be a verbatim rendering of what has originally been said and subsequently a quote can be “valued as a particularly incontrovertible fact” (Bell 1991: 207). In that sense, quotes can function as evidence in the argumentative construction of discourse. The following section analyses how quotations might be used as evidence in editorials, how translation can serve as a tool to alter (and manipulate) this evidence and how this impacted on the positioning of the different actors present in the text in relation to each other. Firstly, the employment of quotes as factual proof for statements made by the journalist-translators is analysed. Secondly, the selection of a particular speech part as a means of providing an overall problem definition is investigated. It will be shown that the framing strategies of selective appropriation of text and positioning can be successfully applied especially in

cross-border contexts, which separate the TT reader from the ST speaker, to mediate the on-going political media discourse.

6.1.3.1 USING QUOTES AS FACTUAL PROOF

Following the remilitarisation of the Rhineland, the Locarno powers (see section 1.1.2) met in London to discuss how European peace could best be ensured. This involved assessing whether sanctions should be imposed on Germany. Probably to pacify the consulting member states, Hitler proposed that Germany would return to the League of Nations, sign non-aggression treaties and limit its air force - under the condition that the remilitarisation of the Rhineland was accepted. In doing so Hitler signalled a certain willingness to make concessions which was well received in Britain. It was against this backdrop that Gabriel Péri wrote the editorial “Law of the jungle or collective security?”^{xxv} published on March 12, 1936 in *L’Humanité* (H). The main point the article makes is that the international community should implement sanctions against Germany. Otherwise, we might deduce, the international community would allow the ‘law of jungle’ to reign. It seems plausible that this means that whatever nation is most powerful or most ready to use its military forces would be able to impose its demands. In this regard Péri states that the negotiations proposed by Hitler would not only reinforce Germany’s freedom of action - which according to him would equal war - but that the German government had made clear “that no other basis for negotiations will be accepted”^{xxvi} (12/03/1936: 1). This second part of the Péri’s statement which indicates that the Nazis were unwilling to accept any other conditions was then related to Goebbels’ speech dating back to April 10, 1936. Péri writes “That is what Mister Goebbels has announced to us in his electoral speech that was broadcasted from the Deutschlandhalle”^{xxvii} (*ibid.*). The following quotation taken from Goebbels’ speech appears to be used as a proof for the German unwillingness to truly negotiate: “The world must understand that there is no other solution to the great international problems than the one the Führer has indicated. Those are the only ones that can bring about the political and economic restoration of Europe”^{xxviii} (*ibid.*). Two aspects are striking: on the one hand, it is not explained why freedom of action for Germany would automatically lead to war. However, it seems that the second statement, the fact that Goebbels considers only Hitler’s solution as viable, is meant to shed light on this aspect. The fact that Goebbels insists that “the world **must** understand” illustrates the German unwillingness to accept other solutions. This, so it is implicitly suggested, goes hand in hand with being ready to launch a war if the solution is rejected. According to Péri, such a statement was not a proposition but an ultimatum. “One needs to accept or give in”^{xxix} (*ibid.*), he writes. On the other hand, Péri does not explain what the basis for negotiation Hitler proposed is. It seems that this “basis of negotiation”

only relates to the German insistence on re-establishing sovereignty over the Rhineland. Hitler's proposals are absent from the editorial which implies that they were considered irrelevant or insincere. This interpretation is backed up by another article concerned with the interview Hitler granted to the *Daily Mail* correspondent Price. The article was published in the same issue of *L'Humanité*. Within the article the interview consists mainly of a summary of Hitler's proposals. The unknown author comments: "One has the impression that this interview pursues a double aim: be agreeable to Britain and breach the unity of the Danube states through the proposals made to Austria and Czechoslovakia" (12/03/1936: 3)^{xxx}. If we consider Crozier's assessment of the situation (he believed it was very likely that Germany would attack Britain since it tried to win the UK as an ally), the French journalist's evaluation seems quite adequate (see section 5.1.2).

Goebbels' statement which formed part of an argumentative chain in the ST has been re-contextualised. If we take the article of the *Völkischer Beobachter* (VB) reporting Goebbels' speech as a point of comparison we see that an important part of Goebbels' argumentation has been omitted. Goebbels connects the above statement not to belligerent but to the peaceful intentions on the part of Germany. He explains that Germany is very interested in lasting treaties (12/03/1936: 2). Lasting treaties, so he states, presuppose the equality of the negotiating parties (*ibid.*). This equality had been re-established by the remilitarisation of the Rhineland (*ibid.*). Therefore the Rhineland could not be handed back, but Hitler was ready to agree to a number of concessions. These concessions constitute the scope of negotiation for which the NS-Regime allowed. *L'Humanité*, however, does not mention the German readiness to negotiate in the editorial. Besides this re-contextualisation and reconfiguration of Goebbels' statement into a different context through which it acquires different shades of meaning, there is another interesting observation to be made. The quote consists of two sentences which, according to the representation in *L'Humanité*, were directly uttered one after the other. However, the impersonal plural construction "ce sont" (those are) in the second sentence which is supposed to refer back to the first sentence does not grammatically match. This is because the first sentence contains an object noun in the singular and the impersonal expression in the second sentence should therefore be in the singular too. This could be a simple mistake but, since we are looking at a quote resulting from interlingual translation, it could also indicate that something is missing. If we consult the alleged ST again, we notice that an entire sentence and a clause have been omitted. The *Völkischer Beobachter* writes: "The world has to understand that there is no other solution to the great international problems than the one the Führer has proposed. **The world can no longer say that the Führer does not make precise proposals. He has made them and** they are the

only ones that can set in motion the political and economic re-emergence of Europe”^{xxxix} (12/03/1936: 2). Within the SC discourse, the omitted statement can be seen as a response of Goebbels to allegations against Germany. It was often accused of presenting the world with ‘faits accomplis’ and of using ‘coups de force’ rather than engaging in negotiations with the other powers (see section 4.3.2, argument b3a). In contrast, the omission within the editorial of *L’Humanité* seems to be compliant with the construction of the argument in that Germany’s alleged readiness to negotiate is made invisible.

The example illustrates how the statement Goebbels made in connection with Germany’s readiness to negotiate is used in the new context as a proof of Germany’s belligerent intentions. The alterations introduced within the quote support the aim of the re-contextualisation and enhance the strength of the proof. Thereby the relevant actors, in this case mainly France and Nazi Germany, are repositioned in relation to each other. In other words, the double selective appropriation of text encouraged by the text type editorial, in which the use of isolated, detached quotes is the norm, allows for a repositioning of the actors. Whereas the representative of Germany explicitly states the ‘friendly’ German stance towards France, the French media text depicts the two nations as enemies and Germany as the aggressor. The reader who does not read the entire newspaper might not be aware of the existence of the proposals made by Hitler – though this seems unlikely. The reader who is acquainted with both articles is in fact twice ‘informed’ that the proposals are insincere and therefore meaningless. Clearly, the French reinterpretation of Goebbels’ statement is not surprising and one might even say ‘justified’ but nonetheless revealing in terms of the extent to which the meaning of quotes can be altered and as regards the role translation plays in it.

6.1.3.2 USING QUOTES AS PROBLEM DEFINITIONS

In the aftermath of the Rhineland coup, the *Figaro* also published an editorial on 12 March 1936 written by Lucien Romier. The editorial evaluates the situation in light of Goebbels’ electoral speech and features the headline “German austerity”^{xxxii} (12/03/1936: 1). The factual statement that Goebbels opened the electoral campaign with a speech is immediately followed by the quotation: “Our food imports have been reduced from four billion in 1932 to one billion in 1934... It is more interesting to import raw material for the armaments than food. Let’s tighten our belts; that will do us good: it makes one light and ready for action”^{xxxiii} (12/03/1936: 1). Romier then goes on explaining that the text passage is not just one of Goebbels’ caprices (*ibid.*). On the contrary, by saying the above he tries to explain to the German population why they have to suffer from food deprivation: to enable German rearmament (*ibid.*). Romier insists that this is the bottom line of the story and that everyone

should understand it (*ibid.*). He argues that the German behaviour - which he classifies as “blackmailing with war” - is a permanent problem and needs thorough solving instead of fighting the symptoms (*ibid.*). He repeats the second part of the quote and, in order to explain its meaning, ‘translates’ it into “You will eat your fill when you are the strongest”^{xxxiv} (*ibid.*) and “You will organise the international economy to your liking on the day when you bargain with the sword on the table”^{xxxv} (*ibid.*). The two sentences quoted in the *Figaro* have been selected from a much longer speech originally delivered in German. This speech had a very different focus from the editorial in the *Figaro*. The three ellipses inserted after the first sentence already hint at the fact that the connection between the sentences might have been altered. If we consult the article published in the *Völkischer Beobachter* for further information, we see that the statement seems to have been embedded in a section talking about Nazi achievements in improving the population’s living circumstances. More specifically, the preceding paragraph talks about how the Nazis have helped the car industry. Goebbels then states “Of course we have had to import more raw materials in order to boost the economy and therefore we had to be economical with foreign currency”^{xxxvi} (12/03/1936: 2). For this reason, Goebbels explains, there has been an occasional shortage of certain goods for a limited number of days but until now they have managed with what they have (*ibid.*). Goebbels then declares: “In 1932 we have imported food for 4.5 billion, in 1935 we only needed to spend 0.9 billion. With the foreign currency we saved we imported things which were beneficial for the provision of employment,”^{xxxvii} (*ibid.*). Within the context of the SC speech, the expression “things which were beneficial to the provision of employment” was probably intended to be associated with the imports for the car industry and the construction of the highways. Nonetheless it is known that the falling unemployment rates in NS-Germany during the inter-war period were to a large extent due to the creation of employment in the armament industry. It appears that either the news agency or Romier has felt the need to explicitate this connection between the reduction of imports and the increase of employment with the rearmament of the German Reich. Given the emphasis on the highways and the car industry, I believe it rather unlikely that Goebbels made this explicit connection himself. We have also seen that Romier does not explicitate this once but provides two other ‘meanings’, i.e. translations of what Goebbels ‘meant’ to say.

This example illustrates how an explicitation introduced in the translated speech part can alter its original meaning and allow the TT producer to use it as an overall problem definition in the TT. The quote originally informed the speech audience that occasionally certain goods are not available in Germany due to the necessity to save foreign currency which was then spent on imports beneficial for the provision of employment. In contrast, the

TT reader is informed that the problem lies with the fact that Germany uses the saved money to build up its army. By placing the translated speech part at the beginning of the text (a 'severe' case of paragraph sequencing alteration) and by basing the development of the editorial's argument on it, the quote becomes an illustration of the entire problem. The importance of the quote is further highlighted by its repetition within the text and by its intralingual 're-translations'. The alteration of the quote seems to be a necessary precondition in the above example in order to make the statement a convincing proof. This combined with the fact that the editorial writer could have used other means to make his point testifies to the importance of the role translation plays as a means to selectively import information and also to mediate (manipulate) it. The pronounced selectivity is again encouraged by the text type conventions in editorials. Overall, the re-contextualisation and the alterations lead to a re-positioning of the participants: the NS-Regime, a peaceful and caring provider of employment for the German people in the alleged ST, becomes a powerful, rearmed potential aggressor for the French nation in the TT.

6.1.3.3 SECTION REVIEW

This section investigated the interplay of interlingual translation and journalistic writing in editorials. Editorials are evaluative and often refer to events presented in more detail elsewhere in the newspaper. They do not allow for the integration of much contextual or textual information. It appears to be a frequent practise in editorials to enhance the argumentative structure with quotations which pertain to the evaluated event. The quotes seem to function as 'proof' and support the argument(s) of the translator-journalist. The two examples analysed in this section have illustrated how relatively short passages from the SC speech were selected for translation and were re-contextualised in the media text. The embedding of the quotes in these new textual contexts and their argumentative structure profoundly changed the meaning of the translated speech passages. Moreover, it was also demonstrated that during the process of the interlingual translation the quotes were altered through the selective appropriation of text on the syntactical level and the explicating of the perceived meaning. In doing so, the strength of the proof was increased. Summing up, interlingual translation and journalistic writing co-operate visibly and invisibly in editorials and thereby reshape the meaning of the SC text passages. In doing so, a frame is established that suggests a particular interpretation of the discussed event.

6.1.4 FRAMING CONTEXT IN THE REPORTAGE

As outlined in sections 1.3.2 and 1.3.3, much of the effect potential of the NS speeches was based on their embedding in a carefully designed context. This context was composed of the

speech location, the requisites, the actors and the non-verbal actions of the actors and the interplay of the different components. Not all media text types allow for the inclusion of such contextual information. Within the present corpus the contextual information is often limited to event audience representations. This is a very interesting phenomenon and the entire section 6.2 is devoted to it. The aim of the present section is to analyse attempts to linguistically recreate the entities of the speech contexts including instances of non-verbal communication in reportages and to evaluate how this might have affected the reception of the speech in the TC. The task of conveying the contextual information appears to have been particularly difficult. Henry, who worked for the *Figaro*, stated in this regard: “If I had said that the parade of the Labour Service this morning has been fabulous, unheard of, how could these poor words produce even an approximate representation of the spectacle that has been presented to us?”^{xxxviii} (*Figaro* 11/09/1936: 1). As mentioned in section 6.1.1.2, reportages could only be provided if the reporters managed to be present at the speech event (predictable, regular, planned events). In the following part, four articles reporting about the Nuremberg Rally in 1936 and in 1937 respectively will be analysed. Each year a large number of foreign guests and press representatives were invited to this event since it presented an excellent opportunity to make a positive impression on foreign visitors (see section 1.4.4). In 1936, Raymond Henry, staff member of the *Figaro*, and G. Ward Price, a well-known reporter of the *Daily Mail*, seem to have been present at the occasion. In 1937, Henry attended the event again alongside an unnamed special correspondent working for the *Manchester Guardian*.

The analysis focuses on the following questions: (a) What is the importance assigned to the textual and contextual information? What contextual information is provided? (b) How is the context described and evaluated? (c) Whose perspective does the reportage take? Does the reader see the event through the reporter’s eyes? Is the reader directly involved in the text? How does the author position himself with regards to the other actors at the event? (d) What explicit statements of opinion do we find in the text and how do they relate context and the effectiveness of the speech? The first question (a) is concerned with the selective appropriation of contextual and textual information in relation to each other. The second question (b) investigates the evaluative effect of descriptions which belongs to the framing strategy of labelling. The third question (c) analyses how the framing strategy of positioning which includes temporal and spatial framing techniques was used. Finally, the last question (d) analyses the thematic development in terms of argumentation. Questions c and d will be merged in the analysis.

6.1.4.1 SELECTIVE APPROPRIATION OF CONTEXTUAL (AND TEXTUAL) INFORMATION

Reportages offered the journalist-translators an opportunity to translate the context into a linguistic form and to provide the reader with an impression of the dimensions and magnitude of the NS mass events. This information then (would have) enabled the reader to gauge the importance and significance of the actual speech, to see what effect the speech had on the immediately present audience and to form an opinion whether speech content and speech context were contradictory or compliant. (e.g. The displaying of military power is probably somewhat contradictory to the stating of peaceful intentions.) Both articles written by Henry contain ample contextual information including descriptions of the dimensions of the speech location, the non-verbal actions of the various actors, the Nazi practices relating to the further dissemination of the speech (through the omnipresent loudspeakers), as well as descriptions of the atmosphere and audio-visual effects. The *Daily Mail* assigns nearly half of its space to contextual information though the textual information is pre-positioned and its importance further signalled by the headlines consisting of quotes. The contextual description focuses on the military parade and the personal impression of the author. The *Manchester Guardian* provides a very limited amount of context information merely equalling the cloudy weather to a troubled political atmosphere. Also interesting is the selective appropriation of text in that all four articles mainly take up the text passages stressing the Bolshevik threat and the dissatisfaction of Goebbels with the other nations which remain unaware of the imminent danger. The *Daily Mail* additionally includes quotes stressing the military alliance of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.

6.1.4.2 LABELLING

Reportages contain text passages informing about the context of the speech event. Such passages can be descriptive but might also combine descriptive and argumentative text development. Both types feature implicit and explicit evaluations. Implicit evaluations in particular are often expressed through discursive practices identifying people, groups, places and events in a particular way. Such techniques fall under the umbrella term of labelling (see section 2.4.4).

Manchester Guardian (MG): The contextual information in the *MG* is scarce and represented in comparison to the speeches themselves and to the event in previous years: “Its **magnificence** as a spectacle remains undiminished but the speeches which have been made so far **lack the electricity and grip of former years**” (10/09/1937: 14, my emphasis), the Nuremberg Rallies, so the *MG* titles, have **lost importance** (*ibid.*, my emphasis). This loss of importance is mirrored in the weather “**brilliant** sunshine and **peerless** atmosphere **deserted** Nuremberg” “for the **first time**” we read (*ibid.*, my emphasis). This text passage combines

descriptive and evaluative elements and contrasts positive adjectives with negative noun constructions and verbs. This contrast along the temporal dimension (now vs. previous years vs. first time) and along the division between text and context (speech vs. spectacle) allows the translator-journalist to represent the loss of persuasive power and the subsequent decrease of importance but also of the danger of the Nuremberg Rallies. The contextual information seems to have been included in the reportage for this contrastive purpose rather than for information and in fact downplays the effect potential of the semiotic setting of the rally. With reference to section 5.1.3.3, it is likely that this text was a ‘pseudo-report’. Lambert was ill and could not attend the event. Though he knew the weather conditions, he did not take part in the rally. This probably explains the scarce contextual information.

Daily Mail (DM): Ward Price assigns more space to the contextual information. His focus lies on the parade and he writes about the “splendid spectacle magnificently staged”, the “military exactness” of the marching comrades whose “alignment and smartness were equal to the best troops in the world” (11/09/1936: 12). The “profound personal impression” the event made on Ward was that National Socialism was “the religion of Germany rather than its politics” (*ibid.*). The description of the parade, though pointing out its militaristic character, appears to express admiration not fright or disapproval and we find no further explicit expressions of opinion in the reportage which would contradict this interpretation. The display of discipline and order, according to Breil, was often transferred to how the new Nazi state was perceived (2006: 106). In the absence of any disapproving comment or negative evaluation this text passage seems to portray a rather positive image of the NS-Regime.

Figaro (F): Henry’s reportage from September 1936 sets out describing in detail the speech location, the Nuremberg Rally grounds, which is followed by a background information section regarding the *Arbeitsdienst* (Reich Labour Service). Interesting is the connection between the two paragraphs: “That is the **decor**, planted under a sky which gradually brightened up. As for the **actors**, those were the young men from the *Arbeitsdienst* (...)”^{xxxix} (11/09/1936: 1, my emphasis). Henry clearly indicates that the context and the actors played a specific role in this staged, orchestrated event. That these actors did not have a free will becomes evident when they “are manoeuvring according to the commands of the loudspeakers (has one already noticed that, without loudspeakers, National Socialism couldn’t exist?”^{xl} (*ibid.*). The image of the will-less man acting at the command of the machine (i.e. the loudspeaker) is certainly illustrative for the period of late modernity. However, it is also characteristic for the constant exposure of people to the Nazi propaganda

which was fuelled by the omnipresence of the loudspeakers (Klemperer 1947: 58 and Breil 2006: 106). He highlights the importance of this phenomenon again in 1937 when he writes: “Loudspeakers **all the time**, loudspeakers **everywhere**”^{xli} (Figaro 10/09/1937: 3). This clearly adds a spatio-temporal dimension to the representation of the context. The parade in 1936, according to Henry, was **grandiose** but had “an **exclusively militaristic** character” (11/09/1936: 3, my emphasis). The gigantesque proportions of the speech location attract the journalist-translator’s interest again in 1937. He raises the question of “what effects will this **enormous** mass of stone have?”^{xlii} (10/09/1937: 3, my emphasis). He then considers the costs the construction of this new congress hall entails and states “But **no consideration** counts when the Führer speaks”^{xliii} (*ibid.*, my emphasis). The images and adjectives which Henry uses to describe the speech context are all situated in the realm of superlative expressions, also a feature of the NS language use (see section 1.4.3.2). In my opinion, they represent rather convincingly the totalitarian aspect of the Third Reich. In doing so, the reader does not only learn what has been said but also gains an impression of the context and what effect it might have had on the audience.

6.1.4.3 AUTHORIAL PRESENCE & PERSPECTIVE

Section 6.1.1.2 pointed out that the journalist-translator writes reportages in the role of an individual whose position is - for the reader - most advantageous from a journalistic point of view (Burger 2005: 216). This section analyses what perspective is taken within the different reportages, how this positions the different actors of the speech event in relation to each other and what the effect of this could be for the TT reader.

Daily Mail (DM): The author is explicitly present in this reportage which becomes visible through the employment the first person singular pronoun ‘I’. The reader is informed about the event through the eyes of the eye-witness Ward, the journalist-translator. It was shown in the previous paragraphs that the Nazi representatives Goebbels and Hitler, as well as the members of the Labour Service participating in the parade, feature as actors in the *DM*. What is striking is the almost complete absence of the immediately present audience. Apart from one instance when Ward communicates his impression that National Socialism is the religion of **Germany**, thereby distancing himself to a certain degree from Germany and also the audience, the two actors - the immediately present audience and Ward - seem to be merged. Both are eye-witnesses of the same event, have (almost) the same perceptions of it, both seem to be over-powered by the semiotic setting designed by the Nazis. A further indicator of this lacking distinction is that the journalist-translator only reports about the momentary event and fails to provide any background information. This absence of a meta-level on

which the journalist-translator critically reflects on the event has consequences for the reception. The TT reader probably sees the journalist-translator as an outsider, an independent observer. Given that he does not fulfil this function in this reportage, the TT reader is to a certain degree ‘exposed’ to the NS propaganda - without necessarily being aware of this. This is also reflected in the thematic development which is rather descriptive than evaluative and not at all argumentative.

Manchester Guardian: The journalist-translator is only implicitly present in the reportage of the *MG*. Nonetheless, the indication that the source of the article is “our special correspondent” as well as the scenic introduction expressing knowledge about the local weather conditions in Nuremberg indicate that the journalist-translator has been an eyewitness. The author writes from the perspective of an observer – more precisely, of a British observer. The observant role of the journalist-translator is visible in meta-level reflections such as the comparison of last year’s and this year’s speech quality, statements that Goebbels omits important information, etc. The ‘Britishness’ of the perspective is displayed in the headline “Goebbels angry with Britain” (10/09/1937: 14), the statement that the main interest of the Nazis in Nuremberg is to know on whose side England is coming down in the Mediterranean conflict, etc. Interesting also is the exposing of Goebbels as a liar – his statements regarding the alleged “cultural barbarism of the Reds” are compared with the opposing opinion of “an eminent British expert” who had recently visited Spain (*ibid.*). Though not explicitly stated, the positive labelling of the British expert indicates that Goebbels’ opinion is seen as untrue. Consequently, the TT reader is likely to take a British outside perspective (as statements about France are absent). The reportage does not paint a very positive picture of the Nazis but also fails to represent them as dangerous (loss of importance, need to gain England as an ally) and does not provide information about how other, geographically closer nations perceive the speech event.

Figaro: Like the *DM* correspondent Ward, Henry is also clearly present in his reportages. However, apart from the actors actively participating in the event, Henry explicitly accounts for the audience and differentiates between the audience’s and his own role: “I observe the people tailgating on the tribune. They were silent and devout, like in the church. No whispering, not a word exchanged with a neighbour”^{xliv} (11/09/1936: 3). Conversely, the audience is not represented as a silent victim of National Socialism. Referring to the parade of the Labour Service in which the participants do not carry arms but spades, Henry points out: “They seem not to understand that one could be scared of a spade. They **pretend not to know** that it is very easy to replace a spade with a gun...”^{xlv} (*ibid.*). It seems to be clear for

Henry that the audience is well aware of Hitler's belligerent intentions but chooses not to understand. Similar to the *MG* correspondent's perspective, Henry's viewpoint is also nationally coloured. In both reportages published in the *Figaro* we learn relatively little about the speech content. What is conveyed, however, are statements regarding Goebbels' anti-communism and anti-Bolshevism. These are then related to the French situation - where the communists are well represented in the government - and interpreted as a threat against France. In contrast to the other newspapers, Henry directly addresses the TT readers in his reportages. This happens mainly through rhetorical questions and direct requests and orders. The reader is clearly invited to engage with the topic and to envision the situation and its consequences. Henry makes full use of the framing strategies for which the text type reportage allows. This is clearly visible in the thematic development of the text where evaluative, argumentative, descriptive and appellative functions are combined.

6.1.4.4 SECTION REVIEW

This section analysed how four reportages on the Nuremberg Rallies translated and re-contextualised the contextual information differently thereby creating particular frames restricting the possible interpretations of the events including the speeches. The purpose of this section was to investigate the framing strategies applied to the representations and intersemiotic translations of the context and to reflect on the effects of the applied frames on the TT reader. Within the present corpus contextual information was mainly conveyed through two text types: reports and reportages. As discussed in section 6.1.4.2, reports consisted to a large extent of restructured and rearranged agency texts in which the dominant framing strategies were the selective appropriation of text and labelling. In contrast, reportages which allow for descriptive, evaluative and argumentative thematic developments offer a wider range of possibilities in terms of framing strategies. In this corpus, however, the reportage was mainly used by the French opinion papers (*Figaro* and *L'Humanité*), slightly less often by the *Daily Mail*, and rarely by the *Manchester Guardian* and the *Daily Herald*. Possible reasons for this might be of organisational nature (i.e. predictability of the speech event) and certainly also entail economic (financial) and media-political considerations (newsworthiness, more important events happening at the same time). Whatever the reason might be we can say that the selective appropriation of context certainly played an important role within the reportage text type – on the discursive (i.e. is the context reported on at all) and textual level (which contextual aspects were (de-) selected).

With regards to labelling the analysed examples feature three different techniques. Firstly, the contrasting of the speech event with prior speech events allowed the *Manchester*

Guardian to foreground the temporal concept of loss, here in terms of importance and persuasiveness. Secondly, the employment of superlative expressions in the *Figaro* highlighted the totalitarian aspect (and its inherent danger) of the Third Reich. The labelling of the event as being staged and orchestrated feeds into this. Finally, the attribution of positive though military expressions to the event and its actors in the *Daily Mail* testify to the journalist-translator's admiration. Particularly interesting is the repositioning of the involved actors through the selection of a particular perspective which is a unique characteristic of this text type. In this regard it was shown that the merging of the immediately present audience and the journalist-translator in the reportage of the *Daily Mail* entailed the loss of the meta-level discourse through which the journalist-translator critically reflects on the event. In contrast, the *Manchester Guardian* retained this meta-level and refuted some of Goebbels' arguments by directly pointing out gaps in the chain of evidence and by contrasting his claims with the opinion of an expert. Finally, the differentiation between the immediately present audience and the journalist-translator in the *Figaro* allows us to reflect on the effect of the speech on the audience. I would suggest that given the characteristics of the NS speeches, this might be a key factor in understanding their dangerousness. It has to be acknowledged that the above findings are the result of an exemplary analysis and it is highly likely that other examples would reveal the use of different framing strategies. Nonetheless, they offer clear evidence that the representation and intersemiotic translation of contextual aspects are of paramount importance in the framing of political speeches in media texts. The text type of the reportage seems to be particularly useful in this regard. Its underrepresentation in the corpus suggests that especially the British public might have lacked the relevant information to fully appreciate the effect potential of the speeches. Summing up, journalists-translators do not only transpose texts from one language into another, they translate events which consist of verbal and non-verbal texts and contexts. The accessibility of the contextual and non-verbal information is of imminent importance for the TT reader because it is a key element in the meaning making process and its (non) representation affects the overall reception of the speech event (see section 2.3.5 & 3.1.4).

6.2 TRANSLATING CONTEXT: THE ROLE OF THE AUDIENCE REPRESENTATION IN CONTEXT FRAMING

The representation of a society by one or more people is, according to Grieswelle, a necessary precondition that enables this society to act conjointly (2000: 29). These people or groups of people obtain their representative and powerful positions in different ways. Depending on the form of state, they are democratically elected or inherit their political

position and yet others come in to power through a *Coup d'État* or other coercive means. In order to maintain the status quo these leading groups need to justify their claim to power. Admittedly, violence and terror might be useful in this regard. However, “sovereignty as a stable and lasting state presupposes a certain readiness to obey due to a belief in its legitimacy” (*ibid.*: 27). In other words, every government is highly interested in being respected as the legitimate representative of the state and needs to reaffirm this continuously. In this regard totalitarian regimes like the Third Reich are faced with a legitimacy vacuum because their power position can neither be justified through tradition nor through democratic processes (*ibid.*: 33). Two means to fill this vacuum are the use of persuasive discourse on the one hand, and the encouraging of pseudo-democratic participation on the other. Both strategies found ample application within the Third Reich. At the intersection of these two legitimisation strategies lies the role of the German audience targeted by the NS speech events. As discussed in section 1.3.2, the main role of the immediately present audience was to confirm through acclamations and verbal interjections the statements and claims made in the persuasive discourse by the orator. This (seemingly) spontaneous and voluntary participation of the people in the political process should create the impression that political action was taken in agreement with the people’s will. In this sense, the audience not only ‘legitimised’ what was said in the speech but also the subsequent political actions. The purpose of this section is to analyse across media text types how the immediately present audience and its non-verbal communication were represented and intersemiotically translated for or in the French and British daily press. As discussed in section 6.1.1 and briefly demonstrated in section 6.1.4.3, the (de-) selection of the audience representation as well as the (non-) alteration of its depiction influences the overall representation of the speech event. In consequence of the alteration of the role of the audience, the actors participating in the event are re-positioned. In this sense the differing techniques applied are very efficient framing tools. There are various types of audiences to be found within the corpus. In a few cases, however, these representations are not very elaborated in that they do not seem to fulfil a particular function in the media texts. Many of these cases belong to the informative text class where we read that the audience “applauded Goebbels”, “applauded enthusiastically”, “he was warmly welcomed”, etc. Though interesting and relevant in their accumulation they are not very yielding in terms of analysing the framing potential of event audience representations. Therefore, this section focuses on relatively elaborated audience depictions. Subsequently, the section is divided into seven subsections, six of which focus on the different audience types present in this corpus. Each section provides examples of the relevant audience types and explains how they serve to undermine or cast doubt over the

legitimacy claim to power of the NS-Regime. The last section sums up the findings and draws some more general conclusions with regards to audience representation in the media.

6.2.1 THE MISLED AUDIENCE

The Saar plebiscite, which decided over the incorporation of the previously German territory into the Reich, was held in January 1935. Unlike later territorial annexations the Saar question was posed legitimately as a plebiscite, had been foreseen in the *Treaty of Versailles*, and was in fact monitored by the League of Nations. The outcome was a foregone conclusion and clearly in favour of the return to the Reich. This approving behaviour of the Saar population did not fit in with the discourse of the *Daily Herald* and *L'Humanité*. As discussed in section 4.3.3, both papers depicted the NS-Regime as totalitarian and as a suppressor of the people throughout the 1930s, though the *Daily Herald* only infrequently. On January 8, after a pre-plebiscite speech of the propaganda minister, *L'Humanité* featured the headline “Goebbels and Hess call on the Saar inhabitants to subject themselves to Hitler”^{xlvi} (08/01/1935: 3). The title is followed by a sub-heading, which informs the reader by “paraphrasing” Goebbels’ and Hess’ statements that “if they vote for the return to the Reich, all freedom will disappear for them”^{xlvi} (*ibid.*). Though these headlines pretend to simply paraphrase what the Nazi orators had said it is clear that they are heavily informed by the interpretations of the situation by the newspaper. *L'Humanité* also writes that Hitler’s followers put all their efforts into the advocating of the Saar issue to “mislead”^{xlvi} the inhabitants of the Saar (*ibid.*). The population of the Saar that was addressed by Goebbels’ speech would potentially be misled by the Nazi discourses. Similarly, the *Daily Herald* reports about the celebration that followed the positive outcome of the plebiscite and allegedly entailed the insulting of the Catholic belief: “I saw men and women who had voted on Sunday for Germany, after sinking their bitter dislike for Hitler, look away with eyes full of tears and with clenched fists. They had not expected that their loyalty to Germany would be rewarded so soon with such insults to their religious faith” (16/01/1935: 1). Again we have an audience that had voted for the return to Germany because it had been misled as to what consequences this would entail.

6.2.2 THE ‘HYSTERICAL’ AUDIENCE

At the end of May 1937, Goebbels gave a speech which appears to have consisted to a large extent of attacks against the Catholic Church (see table 1, no ST available). He accused its members of moral decay, child molestation and homosexual acts. Speeches on these topics were bound to have a strong effect on the audience and *L'Humanité* reports that the audience at this particular speech event had been screaming: “Let us hang them! Let us massacre

them!”^{xlix} (30/05/1937: 3). In light of the doubts raised about the NS-Regime’s motifs for bringing the members of the clergy to court - they are believed to be a pretext by e.g. *L’Humanité*— these extreme reactions of the audience seem to display the effect potential of such an emotionally-loaded speech. The depiction of the audience by the *Daily Herald* at the occasion of the Danzig speech in June 1939 seems to pursue a similar effect. Whilst the rest of the press contested the spontaneity claim of the speech, the *Daily Herald* devoted most of its space to the description of the size and behaviour of the audience. “A **wildly** cheering, singing, **hysterical** crowd” gathered outside the opera house. This crowd “grew as the night went on” (19/06/1939: 7). Inside the theatre “the **roar** of the crowd could be heard” as they were screaming “Führer make us free. We will come back to the Reich!” (*ibid.*). The audience though clearly supporting the Nazis is depicted as wild and hysterical, almost as of unsound mind. Goebbels, according to the *Daily Herald*, knew how to guide this crowd: “As a master of crowd psychology, however, he converted what might have been disappointment into temporary exuberance (...)” (*ibid.*). This momentarily confused state of mind did not last. Once out of the grip of its master, many of the ‘Danzig Nazis’ were dissatisfied with the meaningless speech they were able to “coldly analyse” the next morning (*ibid.*). This article displays not only the effect potential of Goebbels’ speech on a crowd but simultaneously shows its limitedness. Furthermore, the momentary support for and legitimisation of the NS-Regime is quickly withdrawn once the crowd is freed from the influence of the masses and their master (see section 1.3.2).

6.2.3 THE FORCED AUDIENCE

As discussed in section 6.1.2, the remilitarisation of the Rhineland was to be legitimised a posteriori by a plebiscite. In this regard Goebbels delivered a speech on March 10, 1936. The *Daily Herald* and the *Manchester Guardian* reported about canvassers who “went round to private houses calling on the inhabitants (...) in the name of Germany” to listen to the speech (*Manchester Guardian* 11/03/1936: 6, line 15-20 & *Daily Herald* 11/03/1936: 6, line 3-9). Furthermore, signs were put up threatening that workers who did not participate would be reported to the Labour Front (*Manchester Guardian* 11/03/1936: 6, line 101-105 & *Daily Herald* 11/03/1936: 6, line 26-39). This active ‘inviting’ of the audience combined with diffuse threats was presumably intended to increase the size of the audience and thereby the apparent support the regime enjoyed in Germany. As previously stated the reporting of such methods represents the audience as an involuntary participant and subsequently questions how much backing the regime really enjoys. However, we have also seen in section 6.1.2 that the *Manchester Guardian* back-grounded this piece of information which seems to be in line with Crozier’s assessment of the Rhineland situation outlined in section 5.1.2.

6.2.4 THE ORCHESTRATED AUDIENCE

In June 1939 the conflict over the free city of Danzig between Poland and Nazi Germany had reached boiling point. Goebbels who visited the city on the occasion of the closure of the Gaukulturwoche made two speeches (see Möckli 2012). The first speech took place in the evening of June 17 when Goebbels visited the opera. Allegedly, a huge crowd had gathered and demanded that Goebbels should speak to them. According to the Nazis the speech was spontaneous, a response to the wish of the people and in that sense legitimated Germany's claim to Danzig. *L'Humanité* and the *Figaro* published an agency report on the next day providing information about the speech and its context. The *Figaro* writes: "Doctor Goebbels who was in the Danzig theatre tonight has been acclaimed by the crowd who had gathered in front of the building and, giving in to the insistence of the public, he took the floor"¹ (18/06/1939: 3). The sentence is complemented by information indicating that Goebbels had started his speech by emphasising the German character of Danzig and by contesting in violent terms Poland's right to the city (*ibid.*). In *L'Humanité* these two sentences are abbreviated and merged: "Goebbels, who was in the Danzig theatre tonight, has given a speech in which he contested in violent terms Poland's right to Danzig"^{li} (18/06/1939: 2). The reader does not learn about the alleged insistence of the Danzig population that Goebbels should speak. Taken on its own, the omission of the positive audience reaction could be explained by spatial restriction. This explanation would be supported by the fact that the text printed in *L'Humanité* is considerably shorter than the report the *Figaro* published. However, if we consider the more extensive report published on 19 June, we see that *L'Humanité* is generally not happy with the claim of the spontaneity the NS-Regime upholds. "But yesterday night he [Goebbels] has delivered himself from the height of the balcony in the opera to a dangerous and violent diatribe. 'Improvised speech', claims Hitler's press. Nobody has any illusions in this regard"^{liii} (19/06/1939: 3). Clearly, the repetition of the spontaneity claim would have substantiated the argument that the population of Danzig wanted to belong to Germany. Though the representation in *L'Humanité* does not depict the audience as a victim as such, it casts serious doubt on the question as to how spontaneous the event really was and thereby strongly questions the extent of the support of the German claim among the Danzig population. The fact that this claim was also vigorously contested in the Polish press (Heiber 1971/1972: 333) testifies to the importance of this seemingly minor aspect.

6.2.5 THE DOUBTFUL AUDIENCE

At the annual occasion of May 1 which, following other countries' example, had been declared the Day of National Labour in 1933, Goebbels and Hitler both gave a speech at the

mass meeting on the *Tempelhof* in 1935. However, the weather in that year appears to have been particularly bad and the speeches therefore cut short. According to some of the newspapers, the bad weather in combination with the poor quality of the speeches led to not very favourable audience reactions. In this regard *L'Humanité* reports that “one million people had been forced to listen to the chauvinist statements, full of threats of the fascist leaders”^{liii} (02/05/1935: 3). In a more general context we learn that the NS-Regime which had promised to improve the working class’ situation had failed to do so. Therefore, “in the working class neighbourhood, the flags and banners featuring the swastika are considerably less numerous than in previous years”^{liv} (*ibid.*). In accordance with this general dissatisfaction with the regime, is the fact that the workers who participated in the parade were forced to do so - only a medical certificate allowed them to stay at home the paper reports (*ibid.*). The speeches themselves were greeted with “reserved acclamations” (*ibid.*). *L'Humanité* depicts the audience as an involuntary participant at the speech event who was neither convinced by the regime’s achievements nor by the speeches and therefore showed little enthusiasm. Similarly bleak is its representation in the *Petit Parisien*. This newspaper also informs its readers that the workmen did not participate voluntarily in the event and that their presence in fact was monitored by calling the roll (02/05/1935: 3). As regards the audience reaction the *Petit Parisien* states: “The acclamations have been rather meagre and for the most part seem to have emanated from the elements gathered around and near the tribune”^{lv} (*ibid.*). Again we have an audience depiction which indicates that force had been used to ensure a large audience. However, this had led to the gathering of an audience that did not support the viewpoints of the speaker or the regime as such. The *Daily Herald*, though attributing the decrease of the audience in numbers to the horrific weather conditions, also stated that “the applause came almost entirely from the uniformed ranks rather than the main mass of listeners” (02/05/1935: 9). “The crowd’s enthusiasm”, according to the information the *Daily Herald* had obtained from the British United Press, “was as cool as the weather” (*ibid.*). In all three media representations the audience is displaying a lack of enthusiasm when applauding the speaker – two of them even indicated that what little applause they received emanated from Nazi party members. This clearly signals to the reader that the audience did not agree with what had been said and subsequently delegitimises the speakers and the speeches. This effect is reinforced by references to the audience members being forced to attend the event.

6.2.6 THE APPROVING AUDIENCE

We have already read in section 6.2.1.1, that the outcome of the Saar plebiscite, i.e. the return of the Saar to Germany, was positively received by many Germans and people living

in the Saar. It is useful to see the reception of Goebbels' speech which expressed the joy of the Nazis with regards to the result in this wider context. The *Figaro* stated in its headline "In **all of Germany** one has accommodated **with enthusiasm** the results of the plebiscite"^{lvi} (16/01/1935: 3). The lead of the article then explained that different mass events had been held everywhere to celebrate the occasion. More specifically, the *Figaro* indicates that "several hundred thousand people, delegations of the Reichswehr, of the S.A. and the S.S., of the Labour Service, and political organisations of the NSDAP had been called"^{lvii} to gather on the square in front of the Reichstag in Berlin where Goebbels was to give a speech (*ibid.*). Though the composition of the immediately present audience of Nazi followers solely could seem suspicious, the widespread positive reaction of the population seems to be taken as a proof of the legitimacy of the Nazi's power position in the Saar. It needs to be pointed out however, that this does not mean that the editorial board of the *Figaro* itself was happy with the result. In an article d'Ormesson discussed extensively the reasons for it and saw part of it in the lack of interest that France had displayed for the region over the previous years. Overall, he was not delighted but at least accepted the outcome. The *Daily Mail* took a much more positive stance. In its reportage covering the event we read: "The people of Berlin to-night **expressed their joy** at the return of the Saar to Germany in a demonstration in which, such was the **multitude**, it seemed that **everybody who could leave his home was taking part**. From **all quarters** of the city the people streamed to the great open space before the Reichstag from the portico of which the Minister of Propaganda, Dr. Goebbels, delivered a speech." (16/01/1935: 12). The positive description of the setting and the extent of the support Goebbels received continued throughout the reportage. Clearly, these text passages testify unambiguously to the *Daily Mail's* admiration of the NS-Regime and its legitimacy is backed-up in numerous instances through the positive representation of the audience reaction.

6.2.7 SECTION REVIEW

The present section explored the representations of the immediately present audience and the intersemiotic translations of its non-verbal behaviour at the NS speech events and explained their effect in terms of the repositioning of the two most important participating actors, i.e. the audience and the orator, in relation to each other. The analysis has shown that six types of elaborated event audience representations were dominant in the present corpus. The first two representation types (the misled and the hysterical audience) depicted the audiences as victims of the persuasive discourse in that it momentarily impeded their faculty to rationally judge the content of the speeches. In most of the examples the audience realises shortly thereafter its mistakes and regrets them. This shows at once the effect potential of the NS

speeches and simultaneously allows undermining and questioning the legitimacy of the NS-Regime and its discourse. The third representation type (the forced audience) depicts the audience as victims of force or of the threatening with using force. The audience members do not voluntarily participate in the event and subsequently their acclamation and confirmation of the NS-Regime is not only void but is a demonstration of the illegitimacy of its power claim. The fourth representation type dismantles the spontaneity of the audience acclamations as planned and orchestrated. In doing so, the legitimacy the NS-Regime has gained through the voluntary and spontaneous confirmation through the people becomes void. The fifth representation type indicates through the lacking enthusiasm of the audience when acclaiming the speaker that the participants are in fact dissatisfied and unconvinced with regards to the speech content and more generally with the NS-Regime. This of course does not substantiate but question the regime's claim to power. Finally, there are a few representations of genuinely pleased audiences. These representations in fact place the orator and subsequently the regime in a favourable light and legitimise the implicit power claim of the regime in the speeches. Representations of an audience that openly opposes what the representative of the NS-Regime says do not feature in the corpus. This is probably because a totalitarian regime does not allow such behaviour and media representations depicting such unlikely acts would not be convincing.

It has to be acknowledged that in many instances the division of the examples into the different audience types is somewhat artificial in that many are hybrid. They have been classified in accordance with their dominant traits. Nonetheless, the examples offer clear evidence for the important role of intersemiotic translation in terms of framing in media discourse. Whilst the function of the audience in the actual SC speech event is to acclaim the orator thereby confirming the regime's legitimacy, its role in many of the media texts seems to consist in challenging this legitimacy thereby confirming the viewpoint, the frame applied by the journalist-translator. The function of the audience is thereby completely reversed. The representations and intersemiotic translation of this component allow for and necessitate - like any other translational and journalistic activity - alterations, additions and omissions. Strategically used, 'event audience representation' is a very potent framing tool in the media translation of political speeches.

CHAPTER REVIEW

The objective of this chapter was to investigate how translation contributes to the mediation of intercultural political discourse on the text level. To this end, the relationship between interlingual and intersemiotic translation as well as journalistic writing was explored (a)

within specific text types and (b) in terms of representations of the event audience across the different media text types. Results revealed that the interplay of these three writing processes is considerably shaped by the factor 'text type'. This is because text type conventions determine the proportion of each of the three kinds of writing in the media text, the thematic development and the variety of the framing strategies that can be applied. However, it was also shown that these restrictions do by no means stop mediation happening.

Within the present corpus short news and reports consist almost exclusively of products of interlingual and intersemiotic translation as well as journalistic writing focusing on the immediate event context. They seem to be used for economic and temporal reasons, i.e. when the VTIF would have been interrupted otherwise, and are therefore pivotal in the communication between the public and the political sphere. It is important to bear in mind that these texts are pre-mediated by news agencies. That means that relevant information may already be de-selected and therefore does not arrive in the TC at all. Thus, news agencies function as gatekeepers. Similarly, contextual and textual information may already be altered when the newspapers receive them. Moreover, these media texts also contain implicit and explicit evaluations which can only be discerned from the paper's stance when a comparison with other media texts based on the same agency text is possible. Given for instance the 'infiltration' of the news agency *Reuter* by Nazi sympathisers (see section 5.4), far-reaching consequences are imaginable. When the newspapers prepare the agency texts for publication they are mediated for (at least) the second time. Textual additions are generally avoided since time is in most cases scarce. Thus the framing strategies focus on labelling in headlines and sub-headlines, graphical highlighting through bold print, alterations of paragraph sequencing to foreground and background information and the omission of unwanted or conflicting information through selective appropriation of text. Some of the alterations and adjustments are unrelated to ideological beliefs but engendered by various reasons such as different temporal and spatial circumstances of the 'STs' and TTs which necessitate the adaption of the relevant deixis.

Editorials are in many ways quite the opposite of short news and reports because the proportion of the contained intersemiotic and interlingual translation products is very low. The incorporation of quotations seems to be especially useful since they can serve as factual proof and as overall problem definitions. The separation of these text passages from their original textual and extra-textual context as well as their embedding into the argumentative structure of the TT can alter the 'original' meaning' or foreground specific shades of it. This not only highlights that meaning is established in relation to context and shows how

journalistic writing reframes translations but is also indicative for the importance of the distinction between text and text-internal co-text (see section 3.1.4). The alterations within the translated quotes can then strengthen and co-establish the frame applied through the journalistic writing. This raises questions about the ‘truthfulness’ of the interlingual translations. Subsequently, the general assumption that “the further away from direct quotation that reported speech moves, the greater the interpretative influence of the reporter is and hence the greater the potential for distortion or misrepresentation” (Richardson 2007: 106) might be challenged. Maybe the interpretative influence of the reporter increases in relation to the inaccessibility of the extra-textual and textual context of the SC. This could mean that in some cases direct quotes which are products of interlingual translation are more ‘influenced’ by the reporter than quotes rendered through reported speech in mono-cultural and mono-lingual contexts.

Reportages appear to be especially interesting with regards to the framing potential inherent in the intersemiotic translations and descriptions of the speech audiences. The (de-) selection of contextual and non-verbal information can deprive the reader of valuable knowledge necessary to evaluate the importance and significance of a speech event. Moreover, descriptions of the event context and the non-verbal communication of the participants often contain implicit and explicit evaluations which reflect the journalist-translator’s personal opinion. The contrasting of positive and negative attributes along the temporal and the text/context axis can for instance introduce an element of decay or the linguistic form of the representations can mirror the totalitarian language of the regime. Such modes of representation are likely to impact on the reception of the media texts. Furthermore, the different perspectives that the journalist-translators can apply to the reportage (e.g. collapsing or separation of the author and the event audience, national viewpoints, etc.) introduce or fail to introduce a meta-level through which the author can reflect on the event. This not only repositions the actors within the text and their attitude towards the interlingual translations present in the text but also alters the relationship between the TT reader and the media text.

Another very powerful framing strategy is the representation of the event audience in the TT. It was shown how different strategies are applied to the representations of this actor and the intersemiotic translation of its non-verbal communication which can profoundly reposition (a) the participants of the event to each other but also (b) the TT producer and TT reader and even (c) the agents involved in the SC event in relation to those involved in the TT production or reception. This subsequently impacts on the re-contextualisation of the

interlingual translations and how these quotations are evaluated by the TT reader. It is because of its function within the speech event as a body that legitimises the speaker and subsequently the regime that it can be used to obtain an opposite effect in the TT. It might be possible to apply the observations regarding the event audience, for instance, to the German population in Holocaust testimonials and to conceptualise it as a ‘bystander’.

It may be that the findings presented in this chapter were affected by the construction of the corpus and the limitations to it as pointed out under 3.2.5. It has to be acknowledged that only a limited number of examples could be presented and that, a verification of the results through e.g. a corpus-based investigation could have substantiated their viability. Moreover, the fact that only the editorial correspondence of the *Manchester Guardian* was analysed limited the possibility to affirm causality between textual observations and explicitly stated causes considerably. Nonetheless, this analysis testifies to the complexity of the news production process. The separation between translation and journalistic writing – which is arguably artificial at times - has made visible the essential role interlingual and intersemiotic translation and the translator/journalist play in the production of international news but has also highlighted how translation and journalistic writing mutually shape each other.

CONCLUSION

1 SUMMARY

The central aim of the thesis was to investigate the role translation plays, ‘hidden’ from the public eye, in the development of intercultural political media discourse. Based on the assumption that discourse is shaped by social realities and simultaneously constructs them, the study set out to not only uncover evidence of translational mediation in media political artefacts and their effects on the TCs, but also to explore the causal conditions which mould media texts. Situating the study within the context of WW2, the thesis also attempted to add a translational perspective to the reception of the Third Reich in France and the UK.

The thesis first outlined the broad historical backdrop necessary to appreciate the socio-economic and political situations of the countries relevant to this contrastive study. It then focused on the particularities of the political media discourse in Germany and found that political speeches were of imminent importance for the regime’s preservation of political power. A contributing factor to the continued success was the embedding of the speeches in to highly semiotic, carefully designed and emotionally (over-)stimulating mass events.

The focus then lay on the theoretical framework that was to underpin this study. A brief review of the existing literature revealed that the only established approach to deal with media texts where translational and journalistic writing are merged is Schäffner’s combination of CDA with ethnographic fieldwork. Aligning itself with this approach but replacing ethnography with archival research, it was argued that political ideologies are pivotal in the study of political discourse and it was proposed that argumentative structures provide indicative cues to uncover such influences in texts.

The next step consisted in adapting Calzada Pérez’s three-level methodology to undertake the contrastive analysis. Two initial problems lay with the impossibility of a coupled-pair alignment and with the vagueness of the distinction between context and text. The first issue shifted the focus away from issues of ‘translation proper’ to (de-) selection and re-contextualisation patterns. This new focus offered the possibility to integrate agenda-setting research to investigate the translation phenomenon diachronically on the discourse level. The discussion on the unavoidability of conflating text and context allowed for the investigation of the interplay of translation and journalistic writing in the textual analysis by drawing on Baker’s framing strategies.

By measuring the media-agenda, the different intensities of the French and British translation-import-flow were highlighted; this yielded subsequent hypotheses on differing awareness-levels within the French and British public. The analysis of recurring arguments in Goebbels' speeches and their (de-) selection for translation and re-contextualisation in the TC discourses not only pinpointed ideological influences but, in combination with the findings of the media-agenda analysis, also largely contributed to the description of the media images of the Third Reich. The case study of the *Manchester Guardian* further elucidated the question of what contextual factors besides political ideologies shaped these media representations. A complex network of often interrelated and sometimes conflicting causal conditions was reconstructed by studying the newspaper's editorial correspondence at the time.

Finally, the close textual analysis which combined CDA and framing emphasised yet a further important contextual factor, i.e. media text type norms. Moreover, it showed how interlingual and intersemiotic translation as well as journalistic writing, co-operate to establish particular images of speech events and thereby suggest interpretative frames. This at once confirmed the interrelatedness of the translational and journalistic tasks and underlined the importance of translation as an integral part of intercultural political media discourse.

2 ACHIEVEMENTS & IMPLICATIONS

2.1 METHODOLOGICAL ACHIEVEMENTS

The objective of this section is to discuss the methodological achievements of the present thesis. They were engendered by (a) the choice of an under-researched type of data, i.e. historical media texts in which translation and journalistic writing are merged; and (b) the decision to study 'shift patterns' diachronically in media texts which are neither (re-) translations of the same 'ST' nor do they refer to the same speech events. Moreover, the critical reflection on methodological approaches employed in similar studies has resulted in some amendments which have improved the viability of the results.

The first difficulty (a) was addressed by distinguishing between interlingual and intersemiotic translation as well as journalistic writing. This allowed us to compare those text passages which were clearly identifiable as products of translational activity. It was also acknowledged that in the context of media translation it is neither possible to pinpoint STs nor single authors. As suggested by Schäffner, this necessitated an adaption of the relevant terminology: 'translation shifts' became 'changes' and 'alterations'; 'STs' became the

‘alleged STs’. The second difficulty (b) was addressed by focussing on the one hand, on elements that typically featured in the representation of the NS speech events such as the different actors and their relation to each other. On the other hand, larger selection and de-selection patterns were investigated by combining agenda-setting and content analysis as well as by investigating the (de-) selection and re-contextualisation patterns of recurring arguments pertaining to Goebbels’ speeches in the media texts. **Thus, based on existing research, a methodological instrument has been designed that is able to synchronically (articles simultaneously published in different newspapers) and diachronically (development of Goebbels’ discourse between 1935 and 1939) analyse media texts which combine translation and journalistic writing and which are not (re-) translations of a shared ST.** Especially the integration of the diachronic dimension constitutes an advancement for existing methodological approaches in media translation. Until now, the diachronic dimension has only been looked at for either STs and their re-translations, or in terms of translation flows irrespective of contents. **The employment of agenda-setting research also provides a basis for developing hypothesis in terms of the reception and the political impact of the translations.** This could be a new research avenue to study translation effects whilst moving away from the hypothetical status of the results. Furthermore, the discussion of the criticism directed at CDA and how it has been dealt with has resulted in a detailed description of the selection and collection protocols and a clear triangulation of the context. In this regard, especially the distinction between text and context relevant to the first context level seems to be important. The conceptualisation of the ‘text-internal co-text’ as ‘context’ allowed us to mutually employ the three types of writing contained in the media texts as contexts. **In doing so, the interplay of intersemiotic and interlingual translation as well as journalistic writing, could be investigated from a new angle. This has highlighted the paramount role interlingual and intersemiotic translation play in the production of international news and has thus advanced our understanding of how translation mediates intercultural political media discourse.** Moreover, the application of Baker’s framing strategies was indeed beneficial to elucidating how translation mediates media discourse. Though higher-level features of narratives could have been considered too, this has not been done as many of these aspects have been covered in the discussion relating to the translation and re-contextualisation of Goebbels’ arguments in Chapter Four. Applying Baker’s framing strategies has also revealed that it seems at times difficult to distinguish between ‘selective appropriation of text’ and other framing strategies has been difficult which might imply that they operate on different levels (i.e. that repositioning, labelling and temporal and spatial framing might operate on a lower level than

selective appropriation of text). It has to be acknowledged that the methodology proposed in this thesis needs further testing to prove its general applicability. Nonetheless, applied within the present study, the methodological design has yielded tangible results ranging from historical insights into the working conditions of the journalist-translator(s) in inter-war Germany to elucidating the role translation plays in the construction of national media images.

2.2 THE FRENCH AND BRITISH MEDIA IMAGES OF THE THIRD REICH (R1)

The objective of this section is to explain how this thesis has explored and responded to the first research question (R1) which asked how the NS-Regime was represented in the French and British press between 1935 and 1939. Moreover, implications of these findings will be discussed. Common features are presented first, while national differences are outlined in a second step. The focus of the discussion lies on the comparison of the media images between France and Britain; findings relating to differences observed between the quality and opinion press or between newspapers of differing political orientation are only peripherally touched upon.

When Hitler and the NSDAP seized power in 1933 and consolidated the regime in the following years the French and British press followed this development anxiously. It soon became clear that Germany would not accept the present situation. First hesitantly but then increasingly insisting on its alleged rights, the NS-Regime began to violate the *Treaty of Versailles* which eventually culminated in the outbreak of WW2. Some historians claim that the catastrophe could have been avoided had France and Britain consistently implemented the terms of the treaty with a strong hand (e.g. Henig 1995: 49). It is widely acknowledged that a multitude of factors coincided and created the conditions which allowed the events to unfold as they did. Two elements likely to have played a role are the political discourse of the Third Reich and the political media discourse about the regime in France and the United Kingdom. This thesis has singled out one aspect of the NS discourse, i.e. Goebbels' speeches, and has attempted to reconstruct how the Third Reich was represented in the French and British press by analysing how Goebbels' speeches were transformed in the production of intercultural political news over a five year period.

The German Propaganda Minister was aware that his speeches were not only heard by the audiences directly present at the political events but would reach much larger audiences at home and abroad. Therefore he tailored his discourse to different addressees. Two strategies characterised his speeches in terms of their foreign policy function. On the one hand, Goebbels reassured Germany's neighbours that the Reich had no expansionist intentions but was strongly interested in European peace. On the other hand, he stressed the Reich's

military strength and was adamant that Germany's territorial demands must be fulfilled. The measuring of the media-agenda in combination with the analysis of the (de-) selection of recurring arguments and their re-contextualisation in the TTs have shown that it was speeches and arguments pertaining to this twofold strategy which were most frequently selected, translated and reported in the French and British press. **This indicates that Goebbels' discourses were in both countries mostly evaluated with regards to the question of whether there would be peace or war.** This frame seems to have been established by Goebbels himself and was adopted by large sections of the foreign press. Especially in the early years when Germany had not yet fully rearmed, alternative frames such as 'economic sanctions' could have been applied. In light of the devastations WW1 had caused just fifteen years before, however, it is not surprising that Goebbels' strategy fell on fertile ground. In a similar vein, most newspapers (exception: *L'Humanité*) were in favour of appeasement politics. This means that irrespective of how they represented the Third Reich in general, in many cases when the treaty would have needed to be enforced militarily, the newspapers argued against such actions. Apart from the war-or-peace-frame, other arguments of Goebbels seem to have surfaced in these critical moments. The *Figaro* for instance suddenly acknowledged the existence of a minority problem in the Sudetenland in 1938, whilst the *Manchester Guardian* argued in 1936 that Germany indeed had a right to equality and consequently the remilitarisation of the Rhineland should not be opposed. In this second example Crozier's belief that the regime, which was courting the British government, was unlikely to launch an attack against the UK seems to have been equally important. **These observations indicate that Goebbels' double strategy did not fail, as some historians argue (e.g. Michels 1992), but was indeed very successful because it tied in with the widespread and very acute war anxiety of the French and British public.** This finding demonstrates that TS which considers the SC and the TC discourse can offer new and important insights to other disciplines such as ML and History.

Despite this common ground, there were two aspects in which the French and British media images differed significantly. Firstly, the VTIV was considerably lower in Britain than in France. This means that British readers obtained less information about Goebbels' speeches than their French neighbours. This finding is consistent with Chalaby's research which argues that the strong de-politisation of the British press considerably reduced the amount of information on politics the British public received (1996: 149). Based on Chalaby's findings and the agenda-setting research it might then be argued that the British public was less alert to the increasing threat posed by the regime than the French public. This seems to indicate that the British government would have struggled to find sufficient support for a military

intervention on the continent. In France, where information was readily available and the threat in immediate proximity, awareness appears to have been higher and the consent to engage in an armed conflict thus more ‘easily’ attainable. This hypothesis is consistent with Hucker’s research which found that the French public opinion shifted earlier than the British in terms of ‘willingness’ to challenge the Third Reich militarily (2011). **This might suggest that there could be a ‘causal’ relationship between the intensity of the visible translation-import-flow relating to the political discourse of a given SC and the foreign policy adopted towards this SC by the ‘importing’ TC.** This remains a hypothetical statement which would necessitate further testing.

The second aspect which differentiated the media images was the ‘quality’ of the media images. Whilst all the French newspapers analysed within this study had taken a relatively hard line against Hitler from the beginning of the observed period, this was not the case in Britain. The *Daily Mail* sympathised with the regime and used a rather ‘calm’ reporting style – in comparison to its usual sensationalism – when publishing information on Goebbels’ speeches. The *Daily Herald*, though opposing the regime, failed to engage in a serious discussion of the issues at hand and reported only infrequently about the relevant events. Chalaby observed in this regard that the de-politisation of the British press affected its discursive practices when reporting about political events (1996: 149). The market forces which had engendered the de-politisation of the British press, he argues, “had made the British popular press ill-equipped to deal with the growing German threat” (1996: 154). Conversely, the *Manchester Guardian* was caught up between the two conflicting priorities of wanting to report objectively and being ideologically opposed to National Socialism. Though the paper conveyed its dislike for the regime (and was therefore banned on several occasions) its reports seem often relatively ‘factual’ and slightly ‘understated’ in comparison to what the French press published. In France, where market forces were alleviated, it was possible for newspapers to hold partisan opinions explicitly. Though to a lesser degree, this also applied to the mass-circulation paper *Petit Parisien*. However, it would be wrong to assume that Hitler did not have sympathisers in France or that there were no positive media representations of the Reich. This discrepancy is probably more related to the selection of the newspapers and the temporal limitations set to the study. **The qualitative difference between the French and British media images lies with the fact that the British market seems to have encouraged ‘toned-down’ media images while the French market invited partisan representations.**

Several factors might have limited the validity of the results. Only six newspapers were analysed within the present research project which reduces the overall representativeness of

the results. In a similar vein, the focus on Goebbels solely does not allow the project to account for other relevant issues such as for instance the British fear of air raids. Moreover, it might be possible that an extension of the time period into the 1920s could have allowed for insights into how the NSDAP was perceived before its ascent to power. A further aspect that has only incidentally been touched upon is how France and Britain perceived each other's stances and how representations in this regard influenced the discourse about the Third Reich. Nonetheless, the analysis has offered clear evidence that there were quantitative and qualitative differences in the media representations of the Third Reich in France and the UK. Moreover, in light of the evidence provided it also seems reasonable to assume that Goebbels' speeches were indeed more 'successful' in France and the UK than commonly believed.

2.3 THE ROLE OF TRANSLATION (R2)

The objective of this section is to discuss how the present thesis answered the second research question (R2) which investigated how translation contributed to the construction of the French and British media images of the Third Reich. To this end, findings relating to the involvement of translation on the discourse and the text (or event) level and implications thereof will be discussed.

The mere fact that 524 media texts containing at least partial interlingual translations of Goebbels' speeches were identified in a limited number of newspapers over a limited period of time testifies to the large amount of translation involved in the development of intercultural political discourse. Thus, the first contribution of translation to the construction of the media images is **the selection of political events for translation**. The comparative media-agenda analysis then revealed stark discrepancies between the visible translation-import-flow in France and Britain which suggests that an equally important contribution of translation on the discourse level is **the de-selection of political events for translation**. Both, what is translated and what is not translated shapes intercultural political discourse and entails political consequences. Moreover, the analysis of what recurring arguments in Goebbels' speeches were present in the media texts of the TC revealed that the continuing selection of arguments relating to either the Reich's peaceful intentions or its military strength for translation resulted in a strong peace-or-war frame and hindered the adoption of alternative perspectives. In other words, **through the selection and de-selection of topic aspects translation contributes to the establishing of strong and lasting media frames**.

In relation to editorials the thesis has clearly shown that **journalistic writing frames or re-contextualises the interlingual translations to such an extent that they acquire new or**

sometimes even completely different shades of meaning than they had in the SC event. Conversely, **various changes in the interlingual translations can strengthen and/or co-establish the frame applied by the journalistic writing.** Considering that interlingual translations in editorials are used as factual proof but seem to undergo considerable transformations in the translational transfer process **we might then need to rethink the assumption that the interpretative influence of the reporter increases “the further away from direct quotation reported speech moves”** (Richardson 2007: 106). This claim seems, if at all, to only hold true in monolingual contexts and is oblivious to the power of translation.

The analysis of the role of translation in reportages has highlighted that **(de-) selection of contextual information for representation and the (de-) selection of non-verbal communication for intersemiotic translation can deprive the reader from, or grant access to, the necessary information to evaluate a political event.** Moreover, translator-journalists then select among various modes of representation and intersemiotic translation. Thereby the interlingual translations are re-contextualised. One important aspect in this regard seems to be how the translator-journalist as an eye-witness represents himself/herself in the media text. **The collapsing or separation of author and event audience and their non-verbal communication in the event representation and the intersemiotic translation not only repositions the actors within the media texts and their attitude towards the interlingual translation but also potentially alters the relationship between the TT reader and the TT and subsequently between the TT reader and the SC event.**

The representation and intersemiotic translation of the event audience and its non-verbal communication works similarly. The function of the event audience in the SC context is to confirm in various ways of non-verbal communication (e.g. applauding, appearing in large numbers, spontaneously acclaiming, etc.) not only the legitimacy of the event but of the regime as such. **By introducing alterations, omitting or adding information, etc. to the representations and interwoven intersemiotic translations, this legitimising function of the event audience can be undermined or reversed.** Six different event audience representation types have been identified in the present corpus and they all re-position in various ways not only the actors within the text but also the text author and the TT readers in relation to each other.

The present analysis was based on a limited number of examples selected for illustrative purposes and retrieved from a limited variety of media texts. This affects to a certain extent on the viability of the results. It would be useful to include a broader range of media text types and more examples into future analyses. Moreover, there is probably also a need to

establish the representativeness of the examples more thoroughly. Nonetheless, based on the distinction between the three types of writing this thesis has provided clear evidence for the involvement of translation on the discourse and text (event) level and has advanced our understanding of how translation mediates intercultural political media discourse in texts where translation and journalistic writing are merged.

2.4 CONTEXTUAL FACTORS (R3)

The objective of this section is to discuss the results and implications thereof pertaining to the third research (R3) question which explored what contextual factors impacted on the news production and thus on the translation processes. The discussion will be structured along the four context levels outlined in section 3.3.2.

Level four consists of the broader socio-political and historical context in which the discursive practices analysed are embedded. In section 1.1, the thesis has carefully outlined the socio-economic and political situation of Europe, and more particularly of Germany, France and the UK, after WW1 and has sketched its development for the reader. This allowed us to appreciate not only the individual circumstances of each of the involved nations but also their complex and evolving relationships. The political ideologies populating the political realm of Europe at the time described in section 2.2.3 also considerably shaped the context in which this study is embedded.

Level three unites a large array of factors which relate to the specific extra-textual and situational contexts. They range from personal beliefs and values of the involved agents to issues arising from the news production process itself. Firstly, the media-agenda analysis and the study of Goebbels' recurring arguments in the TTs revealed that **ideologies indeed played a pivotal role in the news production process at the time**. This became evident when the curve progression of the visible translation-import-flow was mirrored against the selected speech topics. Goebbels' 'ideological' speeches caused at times unusual curve behaviours (e.g. *L'Humanité* & Bolshevism or *Manchester Guardian* & anti-Semitism). Ideological underpinnings also became visible in the political alignments of the papers with specific groups or nations and the argumentative lines they took regarding certain issues. It was also observed that the ideology of appeasement seemed to gain momentum in politically critical situations and pushed other ideological beliefs to the background. In a similar vein, the study of the editorial correspondence revealed that conflicting ideologies within one newspaper could have a direct bearing on the newspaper's presentation of events (e.g. *Manchester Guardian* March 1936). This highlights **the point made in section 2.2.2, i.e. that individuals and institutions can harbour differing ideological beliefs**. Apart from

these instances when ideological beliefs of the newspapers influenced the press output, governmental interferences of not only the NS state but also of France and Britain largely impacted on the news production process too. As discussed in section 5.2, the **Third Reich had a complicated system to control the foreign press output which included granting or denying access to events and information thereof; bribes and implicit and explicit threats which resulted in direct censorship or self-censorship of the newspapers to protect their correspondents.** Moreover, in accordance with the archival study it seems that the **British Secrets Act engendered substantial self-censorship in the British press.** According to historical research **in France subsidies and bribes appear to have played an important role in the shaping of the newspaper market but also had a direct bearing on the press output.** What this seems to indicate then is that on the one hand, **in both democratic and autocratic states governments interfere with the work of the journalist-translators** and, on the other hand, **that despite the strong TC orientation of the media, causal conditions lie with both the SC and the TC.** Another factor that is pivotal in the production of news is the newspaper market itself. By relating the results of the media-agent analysis to Chalaby's research it was possible to **identify the different market conditions as a key factor in the regulation of the visible translation-import-flow.** Additionally, evidence was also found in the archival material which indicates that events might not have been reported on or news not been transmitted for financial reasons.

A further institution which plays an important role in the news production process is the news agency. **Such agencies function, as discussed in section 5.4 and demonstrated in section 6.1.2.3, as gate-keepers which are involved in the regulation of the translation-import-flow.** Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that agency texts might contain evaluations which do not pertain to the newspapers and temporal constraints sometimes hinder their erasure through editing. Other factors that hinder or further the inclusion of a piece of information in the newspapers or lead to the (non-) introduction of alterations are **spatial and temporal restrictions, newsworthiness** and issues of **credibility.** Additionally, **other agents** involved in the news production process alter the media texts which, as the analysis of the editorial correspondence has shown, can improve the media texts but also introduce factual or other mistakes.

The second level relates to intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between utterances, texts, genres and discourses. In this regard it was pointed out in chapter four and in the conclusion under point 2.1 that Goebbels' speeches not only impacted on the TC discourse because they were reported on but because his carrot and stick strategy indeed seems to have

led (in combination with the war anxiety pertaining to level 4) to the adoption of a peace-or-war frame. Similarly, as the archival research has shown, it was for **reasons of interdiscursive coherence related to the issue of credibility that alterations were made** in some instances. A further major factor impacting on the realisation of the media texts was the choice of the text types. As demonstrated in section 6.1, the selection of **the text type not only regulated the proportion of translation and journalistic writing but also greatly affected the available framing strategies**. Finally, the first level which consists of the immediate language or text-internal co-text is of imminent importance as well. As discussed under section 2.1 in the conclusion, the distinction between the three types of writing (i.e. interlingual and intersemiotic translation and journalistic writing) involved in the construction of the analysed media texts allows us to analyse their interplay in terms of the construction of meaning. Though somewhat artificial, this distinction lends visibility to the involvement of translation in intercultural political media discourse in general and demonstrates the importance of the intersemiotic translation of non-verbal communication in political contexts.

It might be that the findings related to the third level bear certain limitations. This is because they originate from a single case study which is based on the subjective accounts of the involved agents. Moreover, the ‘mismatch’ between six analysed newspapers and one single case study has limited the possibility to relate the textual analysis consistently to the causal conditions pertaining to the third level. Nonetheless, this thesis has convincingly demonstrated how translational patterns can be linked to causal conditions. Moreover, by rigorously studying several layers of context a complex and varied mosaic of causal conditions underlying the news production process was unravelled. The analysis of the archival material in combination with information emanating from historical research provided an insight into how the different factors mutually impact on each other and thereby shape the media texts. Though there are certainly no definite answers as to what factor impacted when and to what degree on the production of the media texts, the analysis nonetheless allows us to appreciate the multi-causality in this field of translation and to at least propose convincing hypotheses.

3 ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION & FUTURE RESEARCH

The present thesis has made two main contributions to discipline of Translation Studies. One the one hand, this research project has conducted a thorough textual and contextual analysis of a historical set of data which had not yet been investigated from the point of Translation Studies. Thus, it has not only added a translational perspective to the reception of the Third

Reich in France and Britain but was also able to shed light on the work and working conditions of the journalist-translators during this époque and thereby contributed to translation history. Especially the in-depth analysis of the editorial correspondence of the *Manchester Guardian* has drawn attention to aspects that have been under-researched and even overlooked in media translation so far. Thus, this thesis provides signposts for future research in this area. On the other hand, the thesis has, based on previous research, developed a methodological instrument which allows Translation Studies scholars to synchronically and diachronically analyse translational patterns in media texts which combine translational and journalistic writing. Its application to the data at hand has produced telling results and thus furthered our understanding of how translation mediates intercultural political media discourse. The results of this study, however, are not only relevant to Translation Studies but have called into questions conceptions of media translation scholars who seem to overlook the powerful mediation potential that is inherent to translation. Moreover, the results seem also relevant to historical research since the comparison of the SC and TC discourses (as opposed to non-comparative or TC-orientated studies) offers new and compelling insights into this historical topic.

There seem to be at least three likely areas for future research. Firstly, the methodological design could be tested and possibly be improved by applying it to a different set of historical or contemporary data. In particular, the variety of the media texts could be increased and criteria could be determined to establish representativeness of examples. Secondly, it seems possible that certain analytical categories such as the ‘event audience’ could be transferred to other text genres. For instance, the alignment of representations of the German people (in literary eyewitness accounts of WW2) with the ‘event audience’ and of the text author with the translator-journalist could, if diachronically investigated, provide new insights into changing understandings of the Holocaust. And finally, the application of a full-fledged agenda-setting analysis promises to yield substantial evidence that testifies to the impact of translation on intercultural political media discourse and could therefore raise awareness on the important role translation plays in this type of discourse beyond the borders of the discipline.

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07/06/39	Goebbels und Alfieri sprachen auf gemeinsamer Arbeitstagung	p.8/12
12/06/38	Dr. Goebbels stiftet nationalen Kompositionspreis	p.3/6
16/06/39	Der geistige Arbeiter mitten in der Volksgemeinschaft	p.7/12
19/06/39	Danzig – Pflegestätte unserer Kultur	p.2/6
19/06/39	Deutschland steht an Danzigs Seite!	p.3/6
24/06/39	Die abgehackten Kinderhände	p.1&2/15
24/06/39	Betriebsappell in einer Omnibushalle	p.2/15

29/06/39	Erste Fernsehrundfunk-Schau eröffnet	p.3/10
14/07/39	Antwort an England	p.1&2/12
23/10/39	Jetzt hat der Angeklagte Winston Churchill das Wort!	p.1&2/6

2 RHINELAND APPENDIX

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GOEBBELS REPLIES TO SARRAUT

"Not Leaving Cologne Under Menace Of French Guns"

GERMANY'S election campaign was opened for the Government last night by the Minister of Propaganda, Dr. Goebbels, in a speech in the new Deutschland Hall, Berlin.

Before the meeting canvassers went round to private houses calling on the inhabitants "in the name of Germany" to listen to the speech which was relayed to 200 other halls.

The election campaign is being pursued with as much energy as if rival politicians were actually going to oppose the National-Socialist candidates (says Reuter).

In offices and factories, notices have been put up instructing the workers to take part in "propaganda marches."

Some of the notices contain the ominous sentence, "Workers who are absent from the parade will be reported to the Labour Front."

Large posters will be displayed in the polling stations on March 29 by order of Dr. Frick, Minister of Interior, drawing attention to the new law forbidding Jews to vote.

"FOLLOW OUR LEAD"

In his speech Dr. Goebbels said:—

"The Western democracies would do well to copy our example, for there is no Government so closely tied to the people as that in Germany."

"In Parliamentary countries the Governments tell the people what they are going to do, but we tell them what we have done."

Dr. Goebbels admitted that a large part of the £300,000,000 Germany had saved by reducing food imports had been spent on building up the army.

"I know that wages are low," he continued, "and are not always enough to clothe the people properly, but we fight this where we can."

"In former times, if a German Chancellor spoke, the world paid no attention. It was just a lesson in the German language. But when Hitler speaks to-day, the whole world listens."

Abroad, it is sometimes said that Hitler is the most powerful man in Europe. We might add that he is also the most simple and modest man in Europe.

"When the Leader left the League we began to build up our armaments. We knew that we were breaking the Treaty, but we did it because the others had not disarmed."

COLONIAL QUESTION

"M. Sarraut has said that it was not possible to sign treaties with Germany (because she had broken other treaties), but the German-Polish treaty was adhered to because it was sane and reasonable. We shall keep all treaties of that sort."

To M. Sarraut's declaration that France was not ready to leave Strasbourg under the menace of the German guns, Germany replied that she was not ready to leave Cologne under the menace of French guns.

"The reasons why we left the League," Dr. Goebbels concluded, "have been swept aside by what we have since done, but naturally we shall have to ask that, after our return to the League, the colonial question is solved, and the League divorced from the Versailles Treaty."

CIVIL PLANES: ARMY PILOTS

German commercial air pilots will henceforth be taken only from the ranks of army pilots, according to a new regulation (says Reuter).

Private schools for training pilots for commercial aviation no longer exist in Germany.

Daily Herald, 11 March 1936

**LE D^r GOEBBELS FAIT L'APOLOGIE
DE LA POLITIQUE DE FORCE
DE M. HITLER**

Berlin, 10 mars (dép. Havas).
Le D^r Joseph Goebbels, chef de la
propagande du parti national socialiste
et ministre de la Propagande du Reich,
a ouvert aujourd'hui la « campagne
électorale » par un grand discours pro-
noncé dans la Deutscherhalle à
Berlin. Le discours était transmis dans
deux cents autres grandes salles de la
capitale du Reich et radiodiffusé par
tous les postes allemands.

— Les Etats à l'ouest de l'Europe, a
déclaré en substance le D^r Goebbels, ne
se sont jamais lassés de reprocher à
l'Allemagne une autocratie et une dic-
tature. Nos grands succès n'ont été
possibles que par la suppression du
parlementarisme.

Autrefois les discours des chanceliers
allemands n'étaient que de mauvais
exercices de style. Aujourd'hui, quand
le Führer parle, le monde entier écoute,
car il a derrière lui un parti, une armée,
un peuple. Si, à l'intérieur, nous ne
sommes pas encore unis, nous sommes
unis comme un seul homme devant
l'étranger. (Formidables applaudisse-
ments.)

Nous avons quitté la R. D. N. en 1933
parce qu'on nous refusait l'égalité des
droits. Cette résolution nous fut pénible
mais le peuple l'a approuvée. Ensuite,
nous avons reconstruit secrètement
notre armée. Nous la reconnaissons.
Nous savions que nous violions le traité
de Versailles mais les autres l'avaient
violé en ne désarmant pas. Ils profi-
taient de notre faiblesse pour nous im-
poser des diktats. Nous avons recon-
struit l'armée pour pouvoir nous affir-
mer. Alors vint le 16 mars : nous dûmes
au monde : nous avons désarmé. Le
monde accepta car il ne pouvait faire
autrement.

Votre avenir en dépend
Instruisez-vous et votre situation s'améliore-
ra : apprenez tout le vocabulaire, la sta-
tistique et tout, broché, grat. n° 2 à Jean-
Baptiste, 33, r. Rivoli, Paris. Prix mens.

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Petit Parisien, 11 March 1936

NAZI ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Germany and League

"WE WANT NO BAD
COMPROMISES"

—Dr. Goebbels

BERLIN, MARCH 10.

The German election campaign was opened for the Government to-night by the Minister of Propaganda, Dr. Goebbels, in a speech in the new Deutschland Hall in the west of Berlin.

Before the meeting canvassers went round to private houses in Berlin calling on the inhabitants "in the name of Germany" to listen to Dr. Goebbels's speech. The speech was also transmitted to 200 other meeting-halls in Berlin.

In his speech Dr. Goebbels defended the increase in the German army.

The French may claim that it is enough if one nation has a strong army in Europe, but the wise man is prepared. We will not rely on the League. The League says it wants to preserve peace. So does France and Great Britain. So do we. But a thing doubly sewn is better sewn. That is why our sacrifices have been worth while.

In former times if a German Chancellor spoke the world paid no attention. It was just a lesson in the German language. But when Hitler speaks to-day the whole world listens.

GERMANY AND LEAGUE

Dr. Goebbels then described the steps leading to the occupation of the Rhineland, and said:

The reoccupation of the Rhineland was a deed for the repair of Germany's sovereignty and honour, and also for the building up of European peace.

The reasons why we left the League have been swept aside by what we have since done, but naturally we shall have to ask that after our return to the League the colonial question is solved and the League divorced from the Versailles Treaty. We want no bad compromises. We want definite lasting treaties.

The world must accept the Leader's proposals. There is no other solution. They are the only proposals which can restart the national and economic recovery of Europe.

The professed purpose of the elections, in which there will be only National

divorced from the Versailles Treaty. We want no bad compromises. We want definite lasting treaties.

The world must accept the Leader's proposals. There is no other solution. They are the only proposals which can restart the national and economic recovery of Europe.

The professed purpose of the elections, in which there will be only National Socialist candidates, is to give the German nation "an opportunity of showing its approval" of Herr Hitler's policy during the past three years. The present Reichstag will be dissolved on March 23 and the elections take place on the following day.

Herr Göring, Dr. Goebbels's political deputy for Berlin, in a "guiding speech" last night, said:

We in Berlin shall conduct this campaign with as much vigour and energy as we have fought against Jews and Communists. To-day our enemies are outside Germany and our election fight is directed against them.

The election campaign is being pursued with as much energy as if anyone were going to oppose the National Socialist candidates. In offices and factories notices have been put up instructing the workers to take part in "propaganda marches." Some of the notices contain the ominous sentence, "Workers who are absent from the parade will be reported to the Labour Front."

By order of Dr. Frick, Minister of the Interior, large posters will be displayed in the polling stations on March 23 drawing attention to the new law forbidding Jews to vote.—Reuter.

1	Daily Herald,	44	<u>"FOLLOW OUR LEAD"</u>	88	"M. Sarraut has said that it
2	GOEBBELS REPLIES TO	45	In his speech Dr. Goebbels said:	89	was not possible to sign
3	SARRAUT	46	-	90	treaties with Germany
4		47	"The Western democracies	91	(because she had broken
5	"Not Leaving Cologne Under	48	would do well to copy our	92	other treaties in the past) but
6	Menace Of French Guns"	49	example, for there is no	93	the German-Polish treaty was
7		50	government so closely tied to	94	adhered to because it was
8	Germany's election campaign	51	the people as that in Germany.	95	sane and reasonable. We shall
9	was opened for the	52		96	keep all treaties of that sort."
10	Government last night by the	53	"In Parliamentary countries	97	To M. Sarraut's declaration
11	Minister of Propaganda, Dr.	54	the Governments tell the	98	that France was not ready to
12	Goebbels, in a speech in the	55	people what they are going to	99	leave Strasbourg under the
13	new Deutschland Hall, Berlin.	56	do but we tell them what we	100	menace of the German guns,
14	Before the meeting canvassers	57	have done."	101	Germany replied that she was
15	went round to private houses	58	Dr Goebbels admitted that a	102	not ready to leave Cologne
16	in Berlin calling on the	59	large part of the £300,000,000	103	under the menace of French
17	inhabitants "in the name of	60	Germany had saved by	104	guns.
18	Germany" to listen to Dr.	61	reducing food imports had	105	"The reasons why we left the
19	Goebbels's speech which was	62	been spent on building up the	106	League", Dr. Goebbels
20	also transmitted to 200 other	63	army.	107	concluded, "have been swept
21	halls.	64	"I know that wages are low,"	108	aside by what we have since
22		65	he continued, "and are not	109	done, but naturally we shall
23	The election campaign is being	66	always enough to cloth people	110	have to ask that, after our
24	pursued with as much energy	67	properly but we fight this	111	return to the League, the
25	as if rival politicians were	68	where we can."	112	colonial question is solved,
26	actually going to oppose the	69	"In former times if a German	113	and the League divorced from
27	National-Socialist candidates	70	Chancellor spoke, the world	114	the Versailles Treaty."
28	(says Reuter).	71	would pay no attention. It was	115	
29	In offices and factories,	72	just a lesson in the German	116	CIVIL PLANES: ARMY PILOTS
30	notices have been put up	73	language. But when Hitler	117	German commercial air pilots
31	instructing the workers to take	74	speaks to-day, the whole	118	will henceforth be taken only
32	part in "propaganda marches".	75	world listens.	119	from the ranks of army pilots
33	Some of the notices contain	76	"Abroad, it is sometimes said	120	according to a new regulation
34	the ominous sentence,	77	that Hitler is the most	121	(says Reuter).
35	"Workers who are absent	78	powerful man in Europe. We	122	Private schools for training
36	from the parade will be	79	might add that he is also the	123	pilots for commercial aviation
37	reported to the Labour front".	80	most simple and modest man	124	no longer exist in Germany.
38	Large Posters will be displayed	81	in Europe.	125	
39	in the polling stations on	82	"When the Leader left the		
40	March 29 by order of Dr. Frick,	83	League we began to build up		
41	Minister of the Interior,	84	our armaments. We knew that		
42	drawing attention to the new	85	we were breaking the Treaty,		
43	law forbidding Jews to vote.	86	but we did it because others		
		87	<u>COLONIAL QUESTION</u>		

1	Manchester Guardian,	44	paid no attention. It was just	91	and the elections take place
2	NAZI ELECTION CAMPAIGN	45	a lesson in the German	92	on the following day.
3		46	language. But when Hitler	93	Herr Görllitzer, Dr. Goebbels's
4	Germany and League	47	speaks to-day the whole	94	political deputy for Berlin, in a
5		48	world listens.	95	"guiding speech" last night,
6	"WE WANT NO BAD	49		96	said:
7	COMPROMISES"	50	GERMANY AND LEAGUE	97	We in Berlin shall conduct this
8	- Dr. Goebbels	51	Dr. Goebbels then described	98	campaign with as much vigour
9	BERLIN, MARCH 10.	52	the steps leading to the	99	and energy as we have fought
10	The German election	53	occupation of the Rhineland,	100	against the Jews and
11	campaign was opened for the	54	and said:	101	Communists. To-day our
12	Government to-night by the	55	The reoccupation of the	102	enemies are outside
13	Minister of Propaganda, Dr.	56	Rhineland was a deed for	103	
14	Goebbels, in a speech in the	57	the repair of Germany's	104	Germany and our election
15	new Deutschland Hall in the	58	sovereignty and honour,	105	fight is directed against them.
16	west of Berlin. Before the	59	and also for the building	106	The election campaign is being
17	meeting canvassers went	60	up of European peace.	107	pursued with as much energy
18	round to private houses in	61	The reasons why we left	108	as if anyone were going to
19	Berlin calling on the	62	the League have been	109	oppose the National-Socialist
20	inhabitants "in the name of	63	swept aside by what we	110	candidates. In offices and
21	Germany" to listen to Dr.	64	have since done, but	111	factories, notices have been
22	Goebbels's speech. The	65	naturally we shall have to	112	put up instructing the workers
23	speech was also transmitted	66	ask that after our return to	113	to take part in "propaganda
24	to 200 other meeting-halls in	67	the League the colonial	114	marches". Some of the notices
25	Berlin.	68	question is solved and the	115	contain the ominous sentence,
26	In his speech Dr. Goebbels	69	League divorced from the	116	"Workers who are absent
27	defended the increase in the	70	Versailles Treaty. We want	117	from the parade will be
28	German army.	71	no bad compromises. We	118	reported to the Labour front".
29		72	want definite lasting	119	By order of Dr. Frick, Minister
30	The French may claim that it	73	treaties.	120	of the Interior, large posters
31	is enough if one nation has a	74	The world must accept the	121	will be displayed in the polling
32	strong army in Europe, but	75	Leader's proposals. There	122	stations on March 29 drawing
33	the wise man is prepared.	76	is no other solution. They	123	attention to the new law
34	We will not rely on the	77	are the only proposals	124	forbidding Jews to vote. -
35	League. The League says it	78	which can restart the	125	Reuter
36	wants to preserve peace. So	79	national and economic	126	
37	does France and Great	80	recovery of Europe.		
38	Britain. So do we. But a thing	81	The professed purpose of the		
39	doubly sewn is better sewn.	82	elections in which there will be		
40	That is why our sacrifices	83	only National Socialist		
41	have been worth while.	84	candidates, is to give the		
42	In former times if a German	85	German nation "an		
43	Chancellor spoke the world	86	opportunity of showing its		
		87	approval" of Herr Hitler's		
		88	policy during the past three		
		89	years. The present Reichstag		
		90	will be dissolved on March 28		

1 Petit Parisien

2 **LE DR GOEBBELS FAIT**

3 **L'APOLOGIE DE LA POLITIQUE**

4 **DE FORCE DE M. HITLER**

5 Berlin, 10 mars (dép. Havas)

6 Le Dr Joseph Goebbels, chef

7 de la propagande du parti

8 national socialiste et ministre

9 de la propagande du Reich, a

10 ouvert aujourd'hui la

11 « campagne électorale » par

12 un grand discours prononcé

13 dans la Deutschlandhalle à

14 Berlin. Le discours était

15 transmis dans deux cents

16 autres grandes salles de la

17 capitale du Reich et

18 radiodiffusé par tous les

19 postes allemandes.

20 - Les Etats à l'ouest de

21 l'Europe, a déclaré en

22 substance le Dr Goebbels, ne

23 se sont jamais lassés de

24 reprocher à l'Allemagne une

25 autocratie et une dictature.

26 Nos grands succès n'ont été

27 possibles que par la

28 suppression du

29 parlementarisme.

30 Autrefois les discours des

31 chanceliers allemand n'étaient

32 que de mauvais exercices de

33 style. Aujourd'hui, quand le

34 Führer parle, le monde entier

35 écoute, car il y a derrière lui

36 un parti, une armée, un

37 peuple. Si, à l'intérieur nous

38 ne sommes pas encore unis,

39 nous sommes unis comme un

40 seul homme devant l'étranger.

41 (Formidables

42 applaudissements)

43 Nous avons quitté la S.D.N. en

44 1933 parce qu'on nous

45 refusait l'égalité des droits.

46 Cette résolution nous fut

47 pénible mais le peuple l'a

48 approuvée. Ensuite, nous

49 avons reconstruit secrètement

50 notre armée. Nous le

51 reconnaissons. Nous savions

52 que nous violions le traité de

53 Versailles mais les autres

54 l'avaient violé en ne

55 désarmant pas. Ils profitaient

56 de notre faiblesse pour nos

57 imposer des diktats... Nous

58 avons reconstruit l'armée pour

59 pouvoir nous affirmer. Alors

60 vint le 16 mars : nous dimes au

61 monde : nous avons réarmé.

62 Le monde accepta car il ne

63 pouvait faire autrement.

64

3 ENDNOTES/‘SOURCE TEXTS’

ⁱ “Wer aber vor der Vergangenheit die Augen verschließt, wird blind für die Gegenwart”. (Richard von Weizsäcker, Rede zum 40. Jahrestag der Beendigung des Krieges in Europa und der Nationalsozialistischen Gewaltherrschaft, 08/05/1985).

ⁱⁱ (...) après avoir vitupéré contre les émigrés allemands chassés par la terreur nazie, Goebbels fit une risette à la France, déclarant que l’Allemagne « voulait enterrer le passé » (*L’Humanité* 08/01/1935 : 3).

ⁱⁱⁱ L’hitlérisme prépare la guerre (*L’Humanité* 06/08/1935)

^{iv} Goebbels lance un furieux appel à la guerre contre l’URSS et la France (*L’Humanité* 11/09/1936: 3)

^v La champagne du “plébiscite” bat son plein d’excitation guerrière, de menaces et de terreur” (*L’Humanité* 27/03/1938: 3).

^{vi} Goebbels déclara que l’Allemagne “a une volonté déterminée bien que les moyens dont elle use soient élastiques” (*L’Humanité* 06/08/1935 : 3).

^{vii} “Le Reich est à l’affût et attend le moment favorable” déclare Goebbels (*L’Humanité* 19/01/1936:3).

^{viii} « Je le proclame : Nous voulons les Allemands des Sudètes nous les aurons ... » (*L’Humanité* 29/09/1938: 3).

^{ix} Mais chaque jour, Hitler envoie des troupes nazies pour faire la guerre au peuple espagnol et préparer, au-delà des Pyrénées des bases d’attaque contre la France (*L’Humanité* 14/02/1937: 1).

^x Le nabot Goebbels (*L’Humanité* 20/11/1938: 4)

^{xi} “Il intervient insolemment dans le débat de la politique intérieure” (*L’Humanité* 12/03/1936: 1).

^{xii} « Nous ne voulons pas la guerre...Nous n’attaquerons personne. » a osé affirmer Goebbels (*L’Humanité* 14/02/1937 : 1).

^{xiii} Mais dès hier soir, il s’est livré, du haut du balcon de l’Opéra, devant plusieurs milliers de personnes, à une dangereuse et violente diatribe » (*L’Humanité* 19/06/1939 : 3).

^{xiv} Le Dr Goebbels, ministre de la Propagande, a prononcé ce soir un nouveau discours sur la Sarre dans lequel, après avoir violemment attaqué la presse des émigrés allemands, il a développé une nouvelle fois la thèse que rien ne s’opposera plus à une entente franco-allemande lorsque la question de la Sarre sera réglée (*Petit Parisien* 08/01/1935 : 2).

^{xv} L’Allemagne fera « mordre la poussière à tous les partis hostiles au régime » (*Petit Parisien* 05/08/1935 : 1).

^{xvi} Quant aux nations occidentales, notamment la France, les orateurs nazis n’ont pas à se mettre en peine : elles sont, dans la pratique séculaire d’institutions libres, une défense aussi bien contre le bolchevisme que contre le nazisme (*Petit Parisien* 11/09/1936 : 3).

^{xvii} “Pendant plus de deux heures le ministre de la propagande a déversé de son éloquence coléreuse et brutale mais habile et sure de ses effets : des ovations enthousiastes en témoignèrent (*Figaro* 11/03/1936 : 3).

xviii « Une espèce de folie s'est emparée de la population allemande et la haine de la race Israelite a atteint aujourd'hui son paroxysme » (*Figaro* 11/11/1938: 1).

xix « Nous admettons parfaitement qu'un problème de la minorité allemande existait en Tchécoslovaquie, que la situation de ce problème était devenu inévitable depuis l'Anschluss et que mieux valait le régler sans demi-mesure dans l'intérêt même de l'unité tchécoslovaque » (*Figaro* 29/11/1938: 1).

xx M. Chamberlain dont on ne peut pas prononcer le nom que avec émotion tant il inspire le respect et l'admiration, a posé le problème sur son vraie territoire quand il a dit avant-hier que c'était bien moins la Tchécoslovaquie qui était en cause que les principes qui font la dignité de l'homme – et sa civilisation (*Figaro* 29/09/1938: 1)

xxi « Le Dr Goebbels fait l'apologie de la politique de force de M. Hitler » (*Petit Parisien* 11/03/1936: 3)

xxii « Aujourd'hui, quand le Führer parle, le monde entier écoute, car il y a derrière lui un parti, une armée, un peuple » (*Petit Parisien* 11/03/1936: 3).

xxiii « Nous avons reconstruit l'armée pour pouvoir nous affirmer » (*Petit Parisien* 11/03/1936 : 3).

xxiv Alors vint le 16 mars : nous dimes au monde : nous avons réarmé. Le monde accepta car il ne pouvait faire autrement (*Petit Parisien* 11/03/1936 : 3).

xxv Loi de la jungle ou sécurité collective ? (*L'Humanité* 12/03/1936 : 1)

xxvi (...) qu'elle n'acceptera pas d'autre base d'accord (*L'Humanité* 12/03/1936 : 1).

xxvii C'est ce que vient de nous annoncer M. Goebbels dans son discours électoral radiodiffusé de la Deutschlandhalle (*L'Humanité* 12/03/1936 : 1).

xxviii Il faut, a-t-il dit, que le monde comprenne qu'il n'y a pas d'autre solution des grands problèmes internationaux que celles que le Führer a indiquée. Ce sont les seules qui puissent amener la restauration politique et économique de l'Europe (*L'Humanité* 12/03/1936 : 1).

xxix Il faut se soumettre out se démettre (*L'Humanité* 12/03/1936 : 1).

xxx On a l'impression que cette interview poursuit un double but: être agréable à l'Angleterre, et rompre par des offres visant l'Autriche et la Tchécoslovaquie, le front des états danubiens (*L'Humanité* 12/03/1936 : 3).

xxxi Die Welt muss einsehen, dass es keine andere Lösung gibt, als die, sie der Führer aufgezeigt hat. Die Welt kann jetzt nicht mehr sagen, dass der Führer keine präzisen Vorschläge mache. Er hat sie gemacht und es sind die einzigen Vorschläge, die den politischen und wirtschaftlichen Wiederaufstieg Europas in die Wege leiten können (*Völkischer Beobachter* 12/03/1936: 2).

^{xxxii} Privations Allemandes (*Figaro* 12/03/1936: 1)

^{xxxiii} Nos importations de produits alimentaires ont été réduites de quatre milliards en 1932 à un milliard en 1934... Il est plus intéressant d'importer des matières premières pour les armements que des produits alimentaires. Serrons-nous la ceinture : ça rend léger et dispose à l'action ! (*Figaro* 12/03/1936 : 1).

^{xxxiv} Vous mangerez à votre faim quand vous serez les plus forts. (*Figaro* 12/03/1936 :1)

^{xxxv} Vous organiserez l'économie internationale à votre guise le jour où vous marchanderez l'épée sur la table (*Figaro* 12/03/1936 : 1).

^{xxxvi} Wir mussten natürlich zur Ankurbelung der Wirtschaft mehr Rohstoffe einführen und darum mit den Devisen haushalten (*Völkischer Beobachter* 12/03/1936:2).

^{xxxvii} Im Jahr 1932 haben wir für 4 ½ Milliarden Nahrungsmittel eingeführt, im Jahre 1935 brauchten wir dafür nur noch 0,9 Milliarden auszugeben. Wir haben für die gesparten Devisen solche Dinge eingeführt, die der Arbeitsbeschaffung dienen (*Völkischer Beobachter* 12/03/1936:2).

^{xxxviii} Quand j'aurai dit que le défilé du service de travail, ce matin, a été fabuleux, inouï, en quoi ces pauvres mots usés pourront-ils faire naître la représentation même approximative du spectacle qui nous a été donné ? (*Figaro* 11/09/1936 : 1)

^{xxxix} Voilà le décor, planté sous un ciel qui s'éclaircissait par degrés. Quant aux acteurs, c'étaient les jeunes hommes de l'Arbeitsdienst, c'est-à-dire du service du travail » (*Figaro* 11/09/1936 : 1).

^{xl} (...) manœuvrant aux commandements des haut-parleurs (s'est-on déjà avisé que, sans haut-parleurs, le national-socialisme ne serait pas possible?), (...) (*Figaro* 11/09/1936 : 1)

^{xli} Les haut-parleurs toujours, les haut-parleurs partout (*Figaro* 11/09/1936 : 1).

^{xlii} Quel effet produira cette énorme masse de pierre? (*Figaro* 10/09/1937).

^{xliii} Mais aucune considération ne compte quand le Führer parle (*Figaro* 10/09/1937).

^{xliv} J'observais la foule massée sur les gradins. Elle était silencieuse et recueillie, comme à l'église (*Figaro* 11/09/1936 : 3).

^{xliv} Ils semblent ne pas comprendre qu'on puisse avoir peur d'une pelle. Ils feignent d'ignorer qu'il est très facile de remplacer une pelle par un fusil.... (*Figaro* 11/09/1936 : 3).

^{xlvi} Goebbels et Hess appellent les Sarrois à se soumettre à Hitler (*L'Humanité* 08/01/1935 : 3)

^{xlvi} Mais ils les avertissent que s'ils votent le retour au Reich, toute liberté disparaîtra pour eux (*L'Humanité* 08/01/1935 : 3)

^{xlvi} Les hitlériens se livrent à un véritable martèlement au sujet de la Sarre, pour tromper les Sarrois et pour cacher les graves dissensions au sein des cercles dirigeants (*L'Humanité* 08/01/1935 : 3).

^{xlix} « Pendons-les ! Massacrons-les ! » (*L'Humanité* 30/05/1937 : 3).

ⁱ Le docteur Goebbels, qui se trouvait ce soir au théâtre de Dantzig, a été acclamé par la foule qui s'est massée devant l'édifice et cédant aux insistances du public, il a pris la parole pour une allocution (*Figaro* 18/06/1939 : 3).

^{li} Goebbels, qui se trouvait ce soir au théâtre de Dantzig a prononcé une allocution dans laquelle il a contesté en termes violents les droits de la Pologne sur la ville libre (*L'Humanité* 18/06/1939 : 2).

^{lii} Mais dès hier soir il s'était livré, du haut du balcon de l'Opéra devant plusieurs milliers de personnes à une dangereuse et violente diatribe. « Discours improvisé », dit la presse hitlérienne. Personne ne se fait des illusions là-dessus (*L'Humanité* 19/06/1939 : 3).

^{liii} Leur "fête" fut sinistre: l'atmosphère de détresse, de guerre, de terreur planait sur le champ de Tempelhof, où un million de personnes furent forcées d'écouter des phrases chauvines, pleines de menaces des chefs fascistes (*L'Humanité* 02/05/1935 : 3).

^{liv} Dans les quartiers ouvriers, les drapeaux et les oriflammes à la croix gammée sont bien moins nombreux que les années précédentes (*L'Humanité* 02/05/1935 : 3).

^{lv} Les acclamations furent plutôt maigres et la plupart du temps ne paraissaient provenir des éléments massés autour et près de la tribune (*Petit Parisien* 02/05/1935).

^{lvi} Dans toute l'Allemagne on a accueilli avec enthousiasme les résultats du plébiscite (*Figaro* 16/01/1935 : 3).

^{lvii} À Berlin, plusieurs centaines de milliers de personnes, des délégations de la Reichswehr, des S.A., des S.S., du service du travail, des organisations du parti national-socialiste avaient été convoquées sur la place devant le Reichstag (*Figaro* 16/01/1935 : 3).